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This thesis sheds light on the causes and consequences of ethnic cleansing in the 20 '^’ 
century Balkans with particular reference to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It 
suggests that although the causes of the expulsion of targeted ethnic minorities may be 
thought to be multifarious in so far as they may be traced inductively in past history, 
fear, security dilemmas, and ethnic nationalism -  these correlations were not necessarily 
deterministic. This thesis argues that ethnic cleansing in the region was primarily a top 
down phenomenon and that it occurred when political leaders espoused it as a strategy 
of nation-state building.
The politics of ethnic cleansing at the national level were intrinsically linked with the 
delineation of borders, control of territory and other resources, national security and the 
political organisation of the state with the view to granting rights and protections 
exclusively to the members of the dominant nation. Wars of ethnic cleansing were not 
autonomous but instead an instrument of policy -  the state being central in their 
organisation and execution. Their central feature was coercion. Hence, military 
operations relied not on direct combat with opponents but on the demonstrative capacity 
of violence, which was intended to compel the targeted peoples to leave.
Although the Western powers’ reaction to the expulsion of ethno-national minorities in 
the course of the 20'*^  century has been inconsistent, the use of military means by the 
Western Alliance to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo suggests that the policy of 
ethnic cleansing may no longer be countenanced, at least, in the European state system.
In questioning the feasibility of creating states based on ethnic affinity as well as the 
validity of ‘population transfers’ and the partition of territory as viable tools of conflict 
resolution, the thesis establishes an agenda for policy making and future research.
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I. Introduction
I.l Why a thesis on ethnic cleansing ?
Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s has occasioned renewed interest 
in a phenomenon with deep roots in history: the expulsion of assorted minorities from 
their homelands which, although may have had ulterior reasons as a motivating force, 
ultimately has been undertaken on religious, ethnic, or national grounds. Traditionally, 
the related terminology has been blurred, using ‘mass expulsions’, ‘deportations’ and 
‘forced population transfers’ as descriptive terms. Mass expulsion has been legally 
defined as resulting ‘from the use of coercion, including a variety of political, economic 
and social measures which directly, or even indirectly, force people to leave or flee their 
homelands for fear of life, liberty and security . . . ’.’ Mass expulsion is a broad category, 
which may incorporate as a special case ethnic cleansing -  the expulsion of indigenous 
people who are usually in a minority and/or non-dominant position.^ Yet mass 
expulsion is distinct from ethnic cleansing, for there are several notorious cases of the 
former which do not fall in the category of the latter. The 1972 expulsion of about
50,000 Asians from Uganda, for example, although a clear instance of mass expulsion iiss expulsion p  ,
__
and, at least financially, they were hardly in a non-dominant position.^ Similarly, the
not necessarily a clear-cut case of ethnic cleansing since the Asians were not indigenous
' International Law Association, Declaration o f Principles o f  International Law on Mass Expulsion, 
adopted at the 62"** Conference, Seoul, 24-30 August, 1986, preamble. Reprinted in Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995, Appendix 6, pp. 223-227.
 ^ ‘Indigenous people’, in the context of this thesis, refers to those communities who have historically 
continued to live in ancestral territories o f their forebears for several generations. For a reasoned 
definition of ethnic cleansing and other supportive definitions see Chapter II. 
y&Z, \  ^ The Asians were brought iifClganda -  in the first two to three decades of the 20^ century -  under the
encouragement and protection of the British colonisers. They were placed in positions of control -  mainly 
in the economic sector -  acting as middlemen between the colonisers and the Africans. When the British 
left following decolonisation, however, the Asians came to take the blame for the former exploitative 
colonial system serving as a scapegoat to the regime of Idi Amin, set on the appropriation of their assets. 
The question of their citizenship was a complicated one. About two-thirds of Asians (circa 50,000) opted 
for British passports whereas one-third of them either continued to be citizens of India or Pakistan, or 
opted for Ugandan citizenship although in the latter case Amin’s regime refused to process thousands of
expulsion of more than 30,000 Albanian workers from Greece in 1993-1994, although a 
case of mass expulsion is not necessarily a case of ethnic cleansing because the expelled 
Albanians were not an indigenous group in Greece."  ^ On the other hand, while both 
deportation and forcible population transfers relate to the involuntary evacuation of 
individuals from the territory in which they reside, customary international law 
differentiates between the two: deportation presumes transfer beyond state borders, 
whereas forcible transfer relates to displacement within a state/ The new term, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ -  which gained currency in the 1990s -  incorporates both acts of deportation 
(the removal of the Albanians in Kosovo^ as well as that of the Serbs in the Krajina 
region of Croatia), and also acts of forced population transfer (such as those involving 
the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina^). Although the new term expresses 
more forcefully the grim reality of the expulsion of ethno-national minorities -  and 
despite its wide use -  ethnic cleansing is neither recognised as a separate legal category 
nor prohibited as such in international criminal law. Hence, ethnic cleansing stands in 
need of being defined precisely and outlawed explicitly in international law.
In an age of human rights awareness, the reason that ethnic cleansing so shocks the 
consciousness of mankind and warrants intervention by the international community is 
that acts* that constitute this inhumane phenomenon are not isolated, random acts based 
on examination of individual behaviour but result instead from a deliberate policy
applications on the ground o f missing the deadline. Officially, it was the ‘British’ Asians who were the 
target o f expulsion from Uganda but other Asians were forced out o f the country as well. See Thomas and 
Margaret Melady, ‘The Expulsion o f the Asians from Uganda’, Orbis, Vol. 19,1976, pp. 1600-1620.
For the case o f mass expulsion o f the Albanians from Greece see Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion, pp. 17-8, 
100 and ‘Greece v. Albania: Elsewhere in the Balkans...’, Economist, September 17,1994, pp. 37-8.
 ^ Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Judgement o f 2"‘' August 2001. Case No. IT-98-33-T. Part III, Legal 
Findings, paragraph 521. http://www.un.org/ictv/krstic/TrialCl/iudgement/krs-ti010802e-3.pdf.
 ^ The term ‘Kosovo’ is used throughout this thesis because it is the form used in the English language. 
The majority o f the province’s population uses the term ‘Kosova’.
 ^Throughout this thesis ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and ‘Bosnia’ are used interchangeably.
* See Chapter II, pp. 60-65.
which targets indiscriminately a civilian population so as to induce its flight. Ethnic 
cleansing, therefore, operates as a punitive measure against members of an ethnic 
community, violating among others the basic right of the individual to be judged on 
his/her own merit and not be condemned by association.
Being so central to the conduct of armed conflicts, ethnic cleansing has become a 
pressing political issue of burning contemporary significance. As the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict pointed out, most conflicts at the end of the 
20* century relied on strategies of ethnic expulsions. More civilians were killed than 
soldiers (by one estimate at the rate of about nine to one), and belligerents used 
strategies and tactics that deliberately targeted women, the poor and the weak.^ Given 
the widespread occurrence of this phenomenon, there is ground to fear that ethnic 
cleansing may replace genocide. Indeed, in our time it seems more likely for tyrannical 
leaders to engage in ethnic cleansing than genocide. As General Hector Gramajo, army 
commander and defence minister of Guatemala for much of the 1980s, put it: ‘Before, 
the strategy was to kill 100 percent... But you don’t need to kill everybody to complete 
the job ... There are more sophisticated means’. He went on to mention that his regime 
instituted what they called ‘civil affairs’ (in 1982) which, was to provide development 
for 70 per cent of the population while the army was busy in killing and maltreating the 
remaining 30 per cent.^ ® He was not boasting without cause: the Guatemalan conflict 
produced much bloodshed in addition to the displacement of thousemds of people. The
 ^ Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington D C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 
1997, p. xvii.
James Dunkerley, The Paciflcation o f Central America, London: Institute o f Latin American Studies, 
1993, p. 72.
'* Between 1951 and 1996 Guatemala was ravaged by a civil war. The conflict started in early 1950s 
when the Guatemalan government -  influenced by the Communist Party -  initiated an agrarian reform, 
which included confiscation o f American fruit companies, triggering in turn an U.S. intervention. The 
leftist government was replaced with a pro-American regime whose legitimacy was challenged by an 
insurgent movement, which launched sporadic attacks against the new government. In mid-1970s, the
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same can be said about the conflicts in Iraq/^ Kashmir,’  ^ Palestine/"* Sri Lanka/^ 
Sudan/^ as well as the former Yugoslavia.
There is therefore a desperate and urgent need to understand the nature of ethnic 
cleansing in order to comprehend conditions that might discourage its recurrence. 
Prevention requires addressing the root causes of the conflict. In the end, lack o f 
comprehension for the causes of crimes, and lack o f empathy for the context which 
fashions them, may be more dangerous than the crimes themselves. ^  ^ '
rebels moved into regions that were mainly populated with indigenous people (Mayan) where they 
reorganised and sustained attacks on a limited scale. The government, however, retaliated with ruthless 
military campaigns against civilians, mostly Mayan villagers. The conflict reached its peak between 1981 
and 1984 when three-quarters of a million people were internally displaced, a-quarter-of-a-million fled 
the country, 100,000 people were killed and 440 villages destroyed. Over 80 percent of the victims of 
human rights abuses were Mayan. The guerrillas were significantly weaken by mid-1980s but the 
excessive use of force against civilians by the Guatemalan government earned the rebels sympathy from 
various political groupings in North America and Western Europe. A peace process was initiated in mid- 
1980s that finally ended the conflict in 1996. See Norwegian Refügee Council Global IDP Project, 
‘Profile of Internal Displacement: Guatemala’,
http://www.db.idpproiect.org/Sites/ldpProiectDb/idpSurvev.nsf/wCountries/Guatemala/$file/Guatemala+ 
-March+2003.pdf.
The forced internal displacement and expulsion of the Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians from oil-rich 
regions in Iraq by the Saddam Hussein’s regime continued persistently from late 1970s till early 2003. By 
that time the number of displaced Kurds approached 700,000. See Roberta Cohen, ‘The Internally 
Displaced People of Iraq’, Iraq Memo # 6, November 20, 2002, The Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/cohenr/20021120.htm and Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Forcible 
Expulsion o f Ethnic Minorities, New York, 2003.
Since the late 1980s Indian officials in Kashmir have been fighting an ongoing Muslim insurgency 
aided by Pakistan. In the course of the struggle for control of the province more than 30,000 people have 
been killed, and virtually the whole Hindu population of the Valley of Kashmir (about a quarter of a 
million) have fled their homes. See Sumit Ganguli, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents o f  War, Hopes for  
Peace, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1997, pp. 107-108, 133, 152-156.
See below p. 18.
A power struggle between Tamils and Sinhalese has led to violent conflict in Sri Lanka, in which more 
than 50,000 people have been killed, whereas about half a million of the 3.2 million Tamils have left the 
country in the 1980s and 1990s. See Josephine C. Naidoo, The Tragedy o f  Sri Lanka: Ethnic Conflict and 
Forced Migration, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1998.
Official attempts to control an oil-rich region in south Sudan since the 1980s have subjected the Dinka 
minority to persistent repression and hardship with the view to forcing them to leave. See David Keen, 
‘Sudan: Conflict and Rationality’, in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates, War and 
Underdevelopment, Vol. 11, Country Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, especially pp. 
236-239. At present it is Western Sudan that has become the hottest site of ethnic cleansing. From 
February 2003 till May 2004 more than a million civilians of the African Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
ethnic groups have been expelled from some of the most fertile lands in the region by militias sponsored 
by the Sudanese government. See Darfur Destroyed -  Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia 
Forces in Western Sudan, Human Rights Watch Report, May 2004ror w d a nu ni w i n K n m ]/ ^— — — -  ,  '  ^.y -u - ) cu >
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Although widely discussed, ethnic cleansing remains an under-analysed and 
insufficiently problematised phenomenon. Marxism may indeed be the first social 
theory to raise key normative and sociological questions about social exclusion, but 
giving class exclusion the pride o f place, it neglects other modes of exclusion which are 
grounded on ethnicity, gender and race. In other words, Marxism does not consider 
social exclusion -  the closure of social relationships, and monopolisation of 
opportunities and resources -  evolving around ethnicity, in addition to class. 
Certainly, the fate o f ethno-national minorities was never the main preoccupation of 
Marxist inquiry. Q j-y '
If Marxism fails to provide a comprehensive theory, the most pervasive paradigm of 
International Relations -  Realism/Neorealism -  is scarcely any more satisfying. For 
though it does provide important clues about the behaviour o f states in the international 
arena, by drawing a sharp distinction between the domestic and international realms, by 
assuming that domestic politics does not necessarily condition a state’s international 
political behaviour, and by perceiving state policy to be a function of the need to 
maximise power in the international arena, it leaves crucial questions about ethnic 
cleansing and its by-product -  refugees -  unanswered. In the realist conception, ethnic 
cleansing may be seen as an inevitable consequence, but not necessarily as a cause, of 
conflict and insecurity. By contrast, it is the contention o f this thesis that ethnic 
cleansing in the Balkans -  more often than not -  has resulted from national (i.e. 
domestic) policies. International wars or the nature o f international interventions may
Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f Political Community -  Ethical Foundations o f the Post- 
Westphalian Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, pp. 116-8, 142.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, New York; Random House, 1979, pp. 93-7. See 
also Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War -  A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959, especially chapter IV.
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have facilitated ethnic cleansing but this is not to say that the latter factors were chiefly 
responsible for the expulsion of the targeted minorities. An analysis of ethnic cleansing, 
therefore, attests to the futility of attempting to separate domestic and international 
factors in the study of politics.
The objection of ethnic cleansing implies a critique of the nation-state model in which 
the state is conceived to belong to and serve solely the dominant nation to the detriment 
of ethno-national minorities. Ethnic cleansing as a means of building homogenous 
polities reflects the inability of the governments concerned to work out models of 
peaceful coexistence between different people in a given state. As Inis Claude has 
pointed out: ‘The quest for ethnic homogeneity implie[s] capitulation to a nationalist 
philosophy which denie[s] the essential unity of humanity, a philosophy in which the 
nation ... [is] ranked as a supreme and eternal value, and in which the individual [is] 
degraded to an appurtenance of the nation to which he [is] supposed to belong’.*^  There 
is therefore a need to consider the conception of the relevant unit of the state -  the 
nation -  grounded on civic criteria which provide for the inclusion of ethno-national 
minorities in the life of the state.
One more reason for writing a thesis on ethnic cleansing can be articulated in terms of 
the necessity to challenge the official raison d ’être for the expulsion of the assorted 
minorities. As will be shown, especially in chapters III and VI of this thesis, the 
ostensible justification for ethnic cleansing has been pronounced in terms of the 
preservation of peace and provision of security, the underlying assumption being that
Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities -  An International Problem, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1955, pp. 104-5.
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the peace and security of the state are best secured by striving for homogeneity. Hence 
the expulsion of unreliable, uncontrollable ethno-national minorities. This assumption, 
nevertheless, is profoundly problematic in terms of the costs incurred and precedents 
set. This thesis, therefore, suggests a revisitation of the conception of state security and 
its relation with the security of the people.^®
1.2 A note on the record of ethnic cleansing
Ethnic cleansing is an historical problem of long standing whose consistent 
documentation has been particularly challenging. Although this thesis focuses on the 
twentieth century Balkans^* it may be useful at this initial stage to provide a 
compendious historical account of this phenomenon. In this short section I purport to 
alert the reader about some of the recorded cases of ethnic cleansing, which although 
falling beyond the purview of this thesis, suffice to emphasise the pervasive nature of 
this phenomenon whilst setting my case studies in a context.
The Assyrians, who during the years 883-59 BC and 669-27 BC are reported to have 
resettled up to 4.5 million people in order to crush their resistance and disloyalty, have 
been accredited with initiating forceful expulsion of people as a state policy.^^ Before 
the Middle Ages expulsion was used as a tool to ensure control over alien or recently 
conquered territories. Its dynamics were mainly economic. In the Middle Ages, 
however, ethnic cleansing was perpetrated also on religious grounds and hostility was
Refer to Chapter VI.
The term ‘Balkans’ is normally used to include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, countries that 
constituted the former Federation o f Yugoslavia (i.e., Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
and its two autonomous regions Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Slovenia), and that part o f Turkey which 
borders directly Greece and Bulgaria. Romania and Slovenia may well be left out o f the region, however. 
A glance at the map suffices to convince one that, from a geographical point o f view, the peninsula 
sustains itself without these two countries bordering its north-east and north-west respectively.
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, Ethnic Cleansing, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 7.
14
directed against minorities who did not subscribe to the established religion. This 
feature persisted throughout to the eighteenth century: in 1290 the Jews were expelled 
from England;^^ in 1492 the Jews were expelled from Spain;^ "^  in the second half of the 
seventeenth century Irish Catholics were expelled from Ireland;^^ from 1609 to 1614 
Moriscos (Muslims who had previously converted to the Christian faith under duress) 
were expelled from Spain;^^ in 1685 Huguenots (Protestants) were expelled from 
France;^^ and in 1731-2 from Salzburg;^* in 1744 the Jews were expelled from 
Bohemia.^^ The common denominator of these expulsions was the perception that 
religious minorities were a threat to the unity of the polity and undermined the capacity 
of the rulers to control their subjects and build cohesive entities.
In the era of European colonialism many indigenous peoples became victims of ethnic 
cleansing as colonisers sought to secure strategic control of the occupied territories. In 
North America the forced removal of indigenous peoples from their traditional 
homelands went on gradually for almost three centuries as the British and French 
colonisers sought to secure complete control of the new territory and its resources.^®
See B. L. Abrahams, The Expulsion o f the Jews from England in 1290, Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1894.
Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation o f Peoples, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, pp. 65-74.
Sean O'Callaghan, To Hell or Barbados -  The Ethnic Cleansing o f  Ireland, Dublin: Brandon, 2000, 
especially chapters 3-6.
Rae, State Identities, pp. 74-81.
Ibid., pp. 83-123. It was this event that gave rise to the first use o f  the word ‘refugee’ although the term 
did not appear in international treaties until the second quarter o f the 19* century. See Michael Marrus, 
The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 
8-9.
Maria Grossmann, ‘The Expulsion o f the Salzburgers in 1731 and 1732’, Harvard Library Bulletin, 
Vol. 36, No. 3 ,1988, pp. 275-290.
Alfred M. de Zayas, ‘A Historical Survey o f Twentieth Century Expulsions’, in Anna C. Bramwell, ed.. 
Refugees in the Age o f  Total War, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 16.
N. F. Dreisziger, ‘Redrawing the Ethnic Map in North America: The Experience o f France, Britain and 
Canada, 1536-1946’, in Steven Béla Vârdy and T. Hunt Tooley eds.. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth- 
Century Europe, Boulder: Social Science Monographs Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2003, 
pp. 45-62. See also Bell-Fialkoff, Ethnic Cleansing, pp. 18-20.
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The same fate befell Aborigines in Australia and the Maori in New Z ealand/' 
Christopher Coker suggests that the confrontation between the indigenous people and 
the white settlers exemplified a clash between two people with different capabilities in 
that whites possessed both the technology to master the wild environment as well as the 
will to do so. Their ambitions were materialised at the expense o f the indigenous people 
who stood in their way.^^
From the nineteenth century onwards ethnic cleansing retained its strategic motivation 
but the emergence o f the nation-state model provided further incentives for the 
expulsion of ethno-national minorities. The practice o f ethnic cleansing in the modem 
era, nonetheless, was not necessarily different from that o f the pre-modem one. What 
differed, however, was the scale. If the consolidation o f monarchies in Europe produced 
refugees in thousands or tens o f thousands, the formation o f new states in the nineteenth 
and especially twentieth century produced flows o f refugees measured in hundred of 
thousands or even millions. In many places where the idea o f the nation-state was 
transposed, there existed not only one nation upon which the state was designed to be 
built but also many other ethno-national groups.^^ Not rarely in such cases ethnic 
cleansing was a means by which new govemments strove to establish control and
cohesion in their polities.^''
See, for instance, C. D. Rowley, The Destruction o f Aboriginal Society, Aboriginal Policy and 
Practice, Volume I, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970; and Robert Macdonald, The 
Maori o f  New Zealand, London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 70, 1985, especially pp. 4, 7-9.
Christopher Coker, War and the Illiberal Conscience, Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, pp. 75-82.
”  In Africa alone, there are about 800 ethnic groups and 1,000 distinct languages whereas a typical 
African state might contain dozens o f such groups. Alan Dowty, ‘Emigration and Expulsion in the Third 
World’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1986, p. 153.
See Philipp Ther, ‘A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of ‘Ethnic 
Cleansing” , in Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds.. Redrawing Nations -  Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central 
Europe, 1944-1948, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, pp. 44-47.
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In the twentieth century this practice was further facilitated by the occurrence of 
numerous wars.^^ What was peculiar to the practice of ethnic cleansing in the first half 
of the twentieth century was not merely its sheer scale but also its conception as a 
facilitator of peace and security, since it provided a better fit between the state 
boundaries and the people living within its territory. It was on this ground that ethnic 
cleansing was in fact condoned by the great powers. This was the case, for instance, of 
the expulsion of 14 million Germans from various central European countries following 
the end of World War 11.^  ^ Similarly, large-scale ethnic cleansing undertaken by Stalin 
in the former Soviet Union from 1937 through to 1949 was conveniently overlooked by 
the Western powers. More than three million people from thirteen ethno-national groups 
including Balkars, Chechens, Inguish, Kalmyks, Karachays, Khemshils, Kurds, 
Meskhetians Turks, Tatars, Soviet Koreans, Germans, Greeks and Finns were stripped 
off their property and sent to punitive exile in Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia on 
the ground of their alleged disloyalty to the Soviet state.^  ^ Moreover, the various 
agreements on population ‘transfers’ that were concluded in Europe in the wake of the 
second World War -  between Czechoslovakia and Hungary (February 1946), Poland 
and the Soviet Union (July 1945), Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (July 1946), 
Hungary and Yugoslavia (September 1946) -  amount in effect to ethnic cleansing since 
these exchanges were compulsory and were carried out chiefly under threat of force.^*
Refer to Chapter III in this thesis.
Alfred de Zayas, ‘Anglo-American Responsibility for the Expulsion o f the Germans 1944-48’, in 
Vârdy and Tooley eds.. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, pp. 239-253.
J. Otto Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1999. Norman M. Naimark, Fires o f Hatred -  Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001, chapter 3.
See Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the M o\e: War and Population Exchanges 1917-1947, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. 287-294; and Dariusz Stola, ‘Forced Migration in Central 
European History’, International Migration Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1992, pp. 329,336-337.
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The idea of population ‘transfers’ was embraced in practice as an alleged tool of conflict
resolution also in the case o f Palestine/Israel, India/Pakistan and Cyprus. An Arab-
Jewish population ‘exchange’, was first contemplated in a 1937 report o f the British
Royal Commission on Palestine and was based on the ‘instructive precedent’ of the
Greko-Turkish population ‘exchange’ of 1922-3.^^ Following the adoption of the
Partition Plan by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, the
Palestinian Arabs -  who opposed the Plan -  launched a series of attacks against the
Jews which were met with decisive force by the vastly superior Israeli military resulting
in the exodus of tens of thousands of Arabs. The war that commenced on 15 May 1948
between the new state o f Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and
Transjordan (who eventually occupied Palestine), on the other, provided fertile grounds
A
for the en masse expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs. By the time a truce was reached in 
1949, more than 600,000 o f them had become refugees whilst nearly 400 of their 
villages (or half o f the total) were razed to the ground by the Israeli troops.'^® The 
struggle for consolidation of the Israeli state and its expansion has been accompanied by 
gradual ethnic cleansing resulting on some four millions Palestinian refugees by 2004."^*
Alfred Maurice de Zayas, ‘A Historical Survey o f 20^ Century Expulsions’, in Bramwell, ed.. Refugees 
in the Age o f  Total War, p. 29. For the Greko-Turkish case and the practice o f population ‘exchange’ in 
the Balkans in the aftermath of World War I see Chapter III, pp. 81-90.
Benny Morris, The Birth o f the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. Morris maintains that the causes of the Arab exodus are multi-layered: some of 
the Arabs left out of fear, some -  who resided in areas of Arab military deployments -  were even 
encouraged by their leaders to leave, others left due to Jewish attacks. Although the author insists that no 
pre-war plan to expel the Arabs from Palestine has been found, he accedes that the Jewish army was 
involved in the expulsion of the Arabs in the course of war, that Jewish political and military leaders 
sought to construct a state with an overwhelming Jewish majority in a mostly Arab-populated area, and 
that the Israeli officials were determined to prevent Arab refugees from returning home at all costs. See 
especially Conclusion.
This figure is quoted from ibid, p. 1.
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Similarly, the division of the colonial India was premised on a ‘divide and quit’ British 
policy/^ Upon the retreat of the British colonisers and a decision to divide the 
subcontinent into a Muslim and a Hindu state in 1947, the ‘transfer’ of Hindu from 
Pakistan to India and of Muslims from India to Pakistan was accelerated. In total, some 
15 million people left or fled."^  ^ In the course of 1971, Pakistani government’s efforts to 
crush by force an insurgency movement in East Pakistan which opposed the military 
regime in Karachi and demanded independence for the majority Bengalis led an 
estimated 10 million people -  Muslims and Hindus alike -  to flee to India.'^ '^
Ethnic cleansing in Cyprus was of smaller scale but, nonetheless, a consequence of the 
division of territory. A former British colony, Cyprus became independent in 1960 but 
two out of its three political movements (the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters 
[EOKA] and the Turkish Defence Organisation [TMT]) sought unification of the island 
with Greece and Turkey respectively. In what can be described conflict by proxy, these 
movements’ clashes resulted in the establishment of a ‘Green Line’ between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities in Nikosia initially supervised by the British and then the 
United Nations. Eleven years of skirmishes and finally Greek-supported, pro- 
unificationist attacks on the Cypriot presidential palace prompted Turkey to occupy 
northern Cyprus in 1974. In the course of the war some 180,000 Greek Cypriots and
37,000 Turkish Cypriots fled their homes. In the aftermath of the war a further massive
Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths -  The Politics o f Partition, New York: Hill and Wang, 1990, especially 
chapter 7,
An estimated 8.5 million Hindus and Sikhs moved from Pakistan to India, while some 6.5 Muslims left 
India for Pakistan. Gunther Beijer, ‘The Political Refugee; 35 Years Later’, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 15, Nos. 1-2,1981, p. 29.
West Pakistani forces eventually failed in defeating opposition and irregulars in East Pakistan 
vindicating, in turn, the independence o f the new state: Bangladesh. See, Schaeffer, Warpaths, pp. 234- 
239.
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population ‘swap’ took place: 20,000 Turkish Cypriots went north whilst some 200,000 
Greek Cypriots headed south/^
So widespread have been cases of ethnic cleansing in the past century that the twentieth 
century may well be called an ethnic cleansing century. One of the sad peculiarities, 
nevertheless, was that large scale ethnic cleansing in that period began and ended in the 
Balkans, associating the region infamously with the expulsion of the targeted ethno- 
national communities. A thesis cannot of itself suffice to give a comprehensive analysis 
of the subject since many significant details and correlations would be omitted given 
that ethnic cleansing has become a problem of global proportions. The account of ethnic 
cleansing in the Balkans provided in this thesis, however, is premised on the assumption 
that a deeper understanding of the subject may serve to lessen its occurrence and 
mitigate its consequences.
1.3 What my argument is not about
Given the wide scope of the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing and arguments offered to 
account for it, it might be useful at the outset of this thesis to state what my argument is 
not about. My account of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans departs from the Zeitgeist of 
the 1990s which casts the conflict predominantly in religious / cultural / civilisational 
lines. The conflict analysis in the 1990s has been influenced -  to a great extent -  by the 
work of the Harvard Professor, Samuel Huntington, who claimed that the end of the 
Cold War had cleared the scene for more fundamental and possibly more violent 
conflicts grounded on the clash of values or cultures which he distinctively grouped
Ibid., pp. 240-244. Michael Stephen, The Cyprus Question, London: Northgate, 2001, especially pp. 
21-51.
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under the term ‘civilisations’. Indeed, Huntington saw the war in Bosnia as 
symptomatic of the conflict between ‘the West’ and ‘I s l a m N o  less a luminary than 
Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State (1973-77), embraced a ‘fault-line’ conception 
of the conflicts that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For Kissinger war in 
Kosovo -  as in Bosnia -  was a conflict waged at the ‘dividing line between the Ottoman 
and Austrian empires, between Islam and Christianity...
Conceptualisation of these conflicts on religious terms echoed the rhetoric of the Serb 
leadership, and to a lesser extent their Croat counterpart, as well as some elements of 
the international community.'** The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, for 
instance, argued that the struggle was along the fault lines of faith: ‘We realise’ -  he 
said -  ‘that we are completely alone and that only God is with us, although we are 
defending Christianity against militant fundamentalism’.'*^  Some have interpreted what 
they perceived as combat along religious cleavages to reflect the broader force of 
religious nationalism that threatened to attract the intervention of ‘kindred’ countries or 
adherents from therein.^® Others, like Robert Kaplan, have tended to ‘essentialise’ 
violence, that is, to treat it as inherent in Balkan cultural features; a corollary of which
Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash o f Civilisations?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, especially 
pp. 30, 37, 38. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilisations and the Remaking o f  World Order, New  
York; Simon and Schuster, 1996, especially pp. 28, 64,212.
Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Kosovo and the Vicissitudes o f American Foreign Policy’ in William Joseph 
Buckley, ed., Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2000, p. 293. Moreover, Kissinger viewed these conflicts as essentially ‘ethnic’ and 
irrational. See comments in Yahya Sadowski, The Myth o f  Global Chaos, Washington, D C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998, p. 24.
David Campbell, National Deconstruction -  Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis: 
University o f Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 111.
Cited in ibid., p. 45.
See, for instance, Huntington, The Clash o f  Civilisations, pp. 126-7, 178-9. Mark Juergensmeyer, The 
New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, Berkeley: University o f California 
Press, 1994, p. 134. Denis P. Hupchick, Conflict and Chaos in Eastern Europe, Houndmills: Macmillan, 
1995, pp. 225-7.
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was the thesis of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds'/^ The proponents of such interpretations saw 
violence as a result of anomie (i.e., cultural and social alienation) and moral poverty of 
the collectivities involved, ethnic cleansing reflecting the anomic collapse of rational 
values.^^ Violence, in this account, was perceived as essentially irrational and 
senseless.^^
This thesis does not adhere to the above lines of reasoning. Huntington’s argument may 
be seductive but, nevertheless, it tends to be simplistic, reductionist and therefore 
misleading. Being over-preoccupied with prescription -  outlining what he saw as a 
desirable response to the new wave of ‘cultural’ conflicts -  Huntington has overlooked 
aetiology, dealing with the root causes of the conflict and its dynamics. In any case, the 
evidence does not suggest that, in the Balkans, conflict has been caused by religious 
cleavages. Indeed, religious institutions in Croatia, or those of the Bosnian Croats and 
Muslims, or Kosovar Albanians do not appear to have supported either openly or tacitly 
the fighting. Although the Serbian Orthodox Church backed up Belgrade’s policies, at 
least in propaganda terms, the church’s role was to justify the war and ethnic cleansing 
rather than initiate them.^ "* Moreover, the massive number of refugees, the vast majority 
nominally if not particularly religious Muslims, eschewed their presumed civilisational
Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, London: Papermac, 1994, For a critique 
of the thesis o f ‘ancient ethnic hatred’ see below Chapter IV, pp. 141-147.
See discussion in Sadowski, The Myth o f  Global Chaos, ‘Introduction’.
See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama, ‘The War o f All Against AH’, New York Times Book Review, 10 
April, 1994, p. 7; and Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts.
Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War -  The War in the Balkans, London: Mandarin, 1994, p. 78. 
Geert van Dartel, ‘Nationalities and Religion in Yugoslavia’, in Martin van den Heuvel and Jan 0 .  
Siccama, eds.. The Disintegration o f  Yugoslavia, Yearbook o f European Studies 5, Amsterdam and 
Atlanta: Rodopi, 1992, pp. 23-46, especially p. 41. The Serb Orthodox Church’s close relation to the State 
has been attributed to the fact that the Church was financially dependent on the Serb State and therefore 
susceptible to its influence. For an illuminating analysis see Radmila Radic, ‘The Church and the 
‘Serbian Question” , in NebojSa Popov, ed,. The Road to War in Serbia -  Trauma and Catharsis, 
Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000, pp. 247-273.
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proclivities and sought refuge and protection in Western (Christian) countries rather 
than Islamic ones.
The portrayal of such violence as ‘irrational’ or ‘senseless’, on the other hand, appears 
to be confirmed when one focuses exclusively on the conflict’s consequences. Its cost in 
terms of loss of human lives and destruction of property has been so colossal that it is 
inviting to dismiss the hostilities as ‘sheer madness’, the implication being that its 
understanding and explanation belong to the realm of psychology and psychiatry rather 
than political science.^^ However, as is implied throughout this thesis, the expression 
‘senseless violence’ is misconceived -  in effect divorcing violence from its context.^^ 
Consequently, this thesis seeks to understand and explain ethnic cleansing in utilitarian 
terms by taking seriously the functionality of the violence. By so doing, it seeks to 
question an assumption that was widely held by policy makers during the first half of 
the 1990s conveniently justifying international inaction, and argues that ethnic cleansing 
is neither senseless nor irrational but an activity subject to the control and direction of 
the people who planed and performed it.
Accordingly, one underlying assumption of the unfolding analysis is that ethnic 
cleansing does not necessarily represent the values of the collectivities involved. The 
following chapters will show that the violence in effect, was primarily top-down, 
mobilised by political leaders for political and/or economic reasons. If some civilians 
embraced violence as a means of enforcing the expulsion of minorities, they were
See David Keen, ‘The Political Economy o f War’, in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald and 
Associates, War and Underdevelopment, Vol. I, The Economic and Social Consequences o f  Conflict, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 41.
For an enlightening anthropological discussion see Anton Block, Honour and Violence, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001, especially p. 9.
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generally responding opportunistically to events, which they neither instigated nor 
determined. This is not to justify their actions, but only to emphasise that ethnic 
cleansing was not primarily a grass root phenomenon. A corollary to this assumption is 
the preposition that responsibility for wartime atrocities and mass expulsion of targeted 
peoples rests with political leaders who devised the policy and the military who 
implemented it rather than with whole nations or communities.
Ultimately, this thesis conceives aggravated conflict -  such as war and ethnic cleansing 
-  to be related to conscious control. This, however, reveals a problem with the very 
terminology of conflict, which is often cast in ethnic terms. Hence, the assumption that 
violence was ‘ethnically inspired’ Such a phrase, not unlike ‘senseless violence’, 
nonetheless, is a misnomer without reasoned appeal. Conflict may display ethnic 
features by involving two or more ethnic groups, but this, in itself, is insufficient to 
suggest that ethnicity has caused it. What comes under the label of ‘ethnic conflicts’ are 
in fact conflicts that are largely about control -  for example, of state governance, 
territory, resources, and people -  in which ethnicity becomes an instrumental mean 
rather than an end. Given that ‘ethnic conflict’ has now become a widely used term, 
demanding its disuse may be unrealistic but it is important nevertheless to acknowledge 
that it does not revolve primarily around ethnicity.
1.4 Thesis’ questions, hypothesis and methodology
The theme of this thesis is that of causes and consequences of ethnic cleansing in the 
Balkans 'with particular reference to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The dynamics
Cathie Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans -  Nationalism and the Destruction o f  Tradition, 
London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 2-3.
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of ethnic cleansing in the region have so far been insufficiently explored, in that, 
although often discussed they remain unsystematically analysed. Hoping to fill such a 
gap, this thesis poses a question that is consequential to the political and social life of 
regional societies and beyond, namely: Why did ethnic cleansing occur in the Balkans? 
This main question raises a number of subsidiary questions: What precisely may ethnic 
cleansing be taken to mean and how it is to be differentiated fi"om genocide and 
ethnocide? To what extent, if any, was ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia of the 
1990s a legacy of history and conditioned by previous regional instances? How did 
collective fears and national security dilemmas feed into the practice of ethnic 
cleansing? Was ethnic nationalism the cause of, or a pretext for the expulsion of 
targeted minorities? How far was ethnic cleansing a national movement instigated ftom 
below or the product of the ambitions of the national, political leaders? If the latter, to 
what extent were such ambitions realised? Did international intervention undermine or 
paradoxically buttress the practice of ethnic cleansing? If national leaders conceived the 
expulsion of assorted minorities as a means to security, was security achieved as a result 
of ethnic cleansing?
My hypothesis is that ethnic cleansing in the region occurred because the national 
leaders espoused it as a strategy of nation-state building -  the nation-state model being 
considered by them as a supreme value. The expulsion of the targeted ethno-national 
minorities was designed to serve the control of the state, its territory and resources by 
the majority nation -  rights and protections sought exclusively for its members. The 
analysis shows that the correlation between ethnic cleansing, on the one hand, and past 
history, fear, security dilemmas, and ethnic nationalism, on the other, was not 
deterministic. The latter factors may have played a facilitating role but, in themselves.
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were insufficient to cause ethnic cleansing. Although a causal link between the 
expulsion of minorities and the consolidation of a nation-state has not escaped the 
attention of other scholars in the f ield,since I contend that no systematic study of 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, on these grounds, has been completed so far, this thesis 
is intended to make a significant contribution to the literature dealing with conflict 
analysis in general and Balkan area studies in particular.
Causation in International Relations, however, is elusive and downplayed, despite the 
fact that many scholars in the field -  even if not directly -  have worked vsdth various 
types of causes, such as material causes (Marxists), structural causes (neo-realists), or 
ideational causes (idealists, liberals and realists) although these boundaries are by no 
means clear cut. Despite the negligence of causation in International Relations,^^ this 
thesis is premised on the assumption that the study of a phenomenon cannot be 
separated from the study of its causes and consequences. Furthermore, it takes seriously 
the fact that a valid causal analysis impacts positively in the way in which problems are 
dealt with.
A cause can be considered as a thing that makes another thing happen. Michael Scriven, 
for instance, defines a cause simply as that which so tips the balance of events as to 
produce a result.^® Sometimes ‘cause’ and ‘condition’ are used interchangeably, though 
they are by no means synonymous and a mere condition is not necessarily a cause.^  ^A
Recall for instance Claude’s citation in Section I.l, pp. 13.
One notable exception is Michael Nicholson’s Causes and Consequences in International R ela tion s-A  
Conceptual Study, London: Pinter, 1996. Nicholson, nevertheless, is not neutral in the debate. His study is 
intended to defend what he calls ‘the social scientific school’ which takes economics and natural sciences 
as a conceptual model for addressing international relations’ problems.
^  Michael Scriven, ‘Causes, Connections and Conditions in History’, in William H. Dray ed.. 
Philosophical Analysis and History, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1966, p. 248.
H. L. Hart and A. M. Honoré, ‘Causal Judgement in History and in the Law’, in Dray ed.. 
Philosophical Analysis and History, pp. 216-217.
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mere condition can exist both when the phenomenon in question occurs and when it 
does not: oxygen exists in the air both when there is fire and when there is not. Security 
dilemmas among individuals and groups exist both in times of peace and in times of 
war. For a condition to qualify as a cause, nonetheless, it has to make the difference 
between what normally happens in the human environment (e.g., the absence of 
unwanted fire, peace) and what has happened therein on a particular occasion under 
consideration (e.g., fire, war). The dropping of a lighted cigarette on a pile of paper 
makes such a difference and therefore may be a cause of fire. An aggressive 
government intent on expansionism may be a cause of war. On the other hand, smoke 
and ash are consequences of fire; casualties and destruction are consequences of war.
To seek a cause of a phenomenon, generally speaking, is to ask ‘what ‘makes it 
happen’, what ‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it, or more weakly what 
‘enables’ or ‘leads’ to it’.^  ^In providing answers to causal questions, on the other hand, 
in saying that ‘X causes Y’, one assumes three things: 1) that X exists independent of Y; 
2) that X precedes Y in time; and 3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred.^^ In 
other words, in saying that governments which embraced aggressive policies of 
homogenising states caused large-scale ethnic cleansing, I am assuming that: I) such 
governments existed independent of ethnic cleansing i.e., ethnic cleansing was not a 
prerequisite for their existence; 2) such governments preceded ethnic cleansing in time; 
and 3) had it not been for such governments ethnic cleansing would not have happened.
“  Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach, 2"** edition, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992, p. 104.
See Alexander Wendt, ‘On constitution and causation in International Relations’, Review o f  
International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, 1998, p. 105.
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In natural science causation is a fundamental concept, which derives from the principle 
that something never comes from nothing. In the case of natural phenomena, however, 
logical regularities (when A then B) may render the task of revealing causation easier 
than in social science, where regularities, although indicative of the causes ‘out there’, 
do not suffice to determine them. The understanding of the underlying causes of a 
phenomenon in social science needs to be grounded not only on regularities but on 
qualitative, hermeneutic and historical evidence as well, conditions that by increasing 
the number of factors involved increase accordingly the complexity of the task at hand. 
Moreover, there is the problem of a degree of relativity to context, i.e., when different 
observers identify various causes for a particular case and rank these differently, they 
may only increase uncertainty about causal relations. Yet despite the uncertainty that 
stems from competing conceptions of causality, and the fact that the margin of error in 
social science may be higher than that in natural science, there is no need to avoid 
attempts at causal inference, no matter how imprecise.^"^
As a causal inquiry, the subject of this thesis is addressed by means of explanatory 
inference grounded on historical evidence of the many and wide ranging cases of ethnic 
cleansing in the Balkan region in the 20* century. Explanatory inference here is taken to 
mean a critical analysis of the empirical facts with the view of inferring causal relations 
from the available data. Its central objective is to explain changes in the state-system 
that account for the inception of ethnic cleansing as a state policy and its eventual 
execution. In the process, the way in which actors defined related issues and
^  Causal inference here refers to learning about causal effects from the available data. See Gary King, 
Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry -  Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 8, 76.
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alternatives, their perceptions of each other, and what they aimed to achieve have been 
taken into account as far as possible.
Asking why an act happened requires an explanation i.e., making intelligible the goals 
and purposes for which the action was taken.^^ ‘Explanation’, however, is sometimes 
contrasted with ‘understanding’. Hollis and Smith, for instance, draw a distinct line 
between the two. For them there are always two stories to tell in International Relations: 
one explains international politics by inquiring into the causes; the other, leaning 
towards hermeneutics, understands international politics by inquiring into the meanings 
that motivate actors in their actions.^^ Not only does their approach leave unanswered 
the question of ‘how can a meaning be a m o t i v e ? b u t  it also blurs the fact that the 
distinction between ‘explanation’ (finding causes) and ‘understanding’ (putting order as 
to motivating forces) is neither necessarily profound nor very appealing. A good 
International Relations’ story requires simultaneously ‘explanation’ and
‘understanding’, and this thesis assumes that ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing.
A reminder on the relationship between explanation and description may be useful at 
this juncture. As King, Keohane and Verba have pointed out, social science research 
involves the dual goal of describing and explaining. Convincing causal explanation 
requires good description whilst the relationship between the two is an interactive one: 
sometimes explanation leads one to look for more description; at other times.
Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Errors Have their Advantage’, International Organisation, Vol. 38, No. 2 ,1984, 
p. 317. Hidemi Suganami, On the Causes o f  War, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 135,139.
^  Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 1.
I owe this point to Geoffrey Stem. Conversation with the author, 17 May 2004.
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description leads one to new causal explanations. In other words, description has a 
central role in explanation its virtue being inference: i.e., learning about unobserved 
facts on the basis of the facts observed or available data; and distinguishing between the 
systematic and nonsystematic features of the observed facts.^*
My research in preparation for writing this thesis aimed to cover the major available 
English literature dealing with conflict analysis in the Balkans, especially the break-up 
of the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990s and the ensuing wars. My findings suggest 
that ethnic cleansing was primarily a policy sanctioned by the state. Though the national 
level of analysis takes a prominent part in my contemplations, the analysis also dwells 
on the international level given the preoccupation of this thesis with the consequences 
of ethnic cleansing including the international community’s reaction to it. The argument 
is accumulative and is build incrementally from one chapter to another. The following is 
the chapters’ synopsis:
Chapter II deals with definitions and conceptual distinctions. It defines ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and sheds light on its practice, and it compares the term with ‘genocide’ and 
‘ethnocide’. The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the argument to be 
developed in the following chapters.
Chapter III identifies major cases of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans namely those 
associated with the Balkan Wars of 1912-13; those of the First World War; the 
‘Population Transfers’ between Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, and 
especially Greece and Turkey in the 1920s; those of the Second World War and post
King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 34.
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World War II cases, primarily those of the Turks in Bulgaria in the late 1980s and my 
core case study -  the former Yugoslavia (mainly Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo) in the 
1990s. By exploring the contexts in which ethnic cleansing occurred, this chapter 
provides a basis for a comparative analysis.
Chapter IV evaluates some of the standard explanations of ethnic cleansing in the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which attribute the expulsion of ethno-national 
minorities to past history, ‘ancient ethnic hatred’, fears and security dilemmas, 
nationalism and diverging ethno-national identities. Finding these arguments deficient 
as primary explanations for ethnic cleansing, the analysis identifies state leadership as 
the agent with prime responsibility for choosing and implementing ethnic cleansing as a 
policy of dealing with ‘undesired’ ethno-national minorities.
Chapter V argues that the policy of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s was bound primarily 
with efforts of the Serb leadership to re-organise the Serb polity on the basis of ethnic 
criteria. This inevitably implied redrawing borders so as to include in the new state Serb 
inhabited territories situated in Bosnia and Croatia. Ethnic cleansing became a means to 
such an end. Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo is contrasted with the case of Bosnia by 
emphasising commonalities and differences in relation to their causes but also with 
regard to the external actors’ reaction to them.
Chapter VI questions the official raison d ’être often proffered for the expulsion of 
assorted minorities. It suggests that the pursuit o f security cannot be self-referential. 
Ethnic cleansing as a policy intended to provide national security is profoundly 
problematic because by undermining the security of particular peoples it put in jeopardy
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the security of others too. Whilst state security is an important value, its acquisition may 
no longer be justified independent of the means.
Chapter VII concludes by pointing out the need for criminalising ethnic cleansing in its 
own right. Considering implications for international intervention and conflict 
resolution it argues that humanitarian intervention should not be based on a negative 
conception of peace, whereas conflict resolution should not rest on the misplaced 
assumption of the superiority of the homogenous nation-state but rather recognise the 
need for human diversity and cultural pluralism.
32
II. Anatomy of Ethnic Cleaning
‘[TJhe elucidation o f the language o f political science is by no means an idle exercise in 
semantics, but in many instances a most effective way to solve substantive problems o f  
research"}
Before entering into a detailed analysis of the dynamics of ethnic cleansing in the 
Balkans, a reasoned definition of the term is needed so that it becomes clear what is one 
talking about. This chapter deals with the terminology of ethnic cleansing. It examines 
whether ethnic cleansing is a mild expression used to cover the horrors of genocide or 
whether it is instead a notion in its own right used to express situations different from 
those of genocide. This chapter questions the adequacy of the interchangeable use of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ with ‘genocide’ and argues for the recognition of ethnic cleansing as 
a separate criminal offence. In addition, it elucidates related concepts such as ‘nation’, 
‘state’, ‘nation-state’, ‘ethnic community’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnocide’. Subsequently, 
some of the most notorious acts employed in the course of conduct of ethnic cleansing 
will be pointed out.
Il l Defining ethnic cleansing
The term ‘ethnic cleansing’, unlike the practice it represents, is of relatively recent 
origin. Nevertheless, as yet, no coherent interpretation on the derivation of the term 
exists. Mary Kaldor, for instance, has asserted that the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was first 
used to describe the expulsion of Greeks and Armenians from Turkey in the early 
1920s:? But John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary argue that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a
' Felix E. Oppenheim, ‘The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification’, in Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby eds., Handbook o f Political Science, Vol. I: Political Science: Scope 
and Theory, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, p. 284.
 ^Mary Kaldor, Wew and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, 
p. 33.
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chilling expression coined by the Serbs to describe forced mass-population transfers, 
that is the physical transplantation of one (or more) ethnic community which is (are) 
consequently compelled to live somewhere else/ Veljko Vujacic for his part, traces the 
first use of the term in the late 1980s when the Serbs complained of the alleged 
Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo/ Whereas Drazen Petrovic has 
suggested that the expression ‘ethnic cleansing’ has its origin in the Yugoslav military 
vocabulary of the 1990s -  ‘ethnic cleansing’ being a literal translation of the expression 
^etnicko ciSCenje'^ in Serbo-Croatian/
The word ‘cleansing’, however, has been in use in the Balkan region for much longer. 
Philip Cohen states that during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 the term cleansing was 
used explicitly to describe Serbia’s method of acquiring territories,^ whilst Norman 
Cigar indicates that the term was used during the Second World War to connote the 
homogenous nature of the people inhabiting a given territory, particularly so in the 
framework of the fighting between Serbian nationalists of the Chetnik movement and 
Croatian nationalists of the Ustasha movement of the time and their efforts to forge their 
respective homogenous nation-states.^ The addition of the age-old adjective ‘ethnic’ 
indicates that people targeted for cleansing belong to ethnic communities other than 
those of the perpetrators.*
 ^John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation o f Ethnic Conflict’, 
in John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, eds.. The Politics o f  Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies o f  
Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London and New York: Routledge, 1993 p. 9.
Quoted in Norman M. Naimark, ‘Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe’, The Donald W. 
Treadgold Papers, No. 19, The Henry M. Jackson School o f International Studies, University o f  
Washington, 1998, p. 8.
 ^DraÈen Petrovic, ‘Ethnic Cleansing -  An Attempt at Methodology’, European Journal o f  International 
Law Vol. 5, No. 4 ,1994, p. 343.
 ^ Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit o f  History, College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1996, p. 7. Italics in original.
 ^ Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy o f  Ethnic Cleansing’, College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1995, pp. 18-19.
® Petrovic, ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, p. 343.
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Ethnie cleansing is not what lawyers call ‘a term of art’, i.e., it lacks both legal 
definition and a body of case law. It is instead a term used by soldiers, journalists, 
sociologists, social scientists, etc., to describe a phenomenon which is not defined by 
law.^ That said, a general agreement on a precise meaning of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is so far 
lacking. However, the Commission of Experts charged by the United Nations’ Security 
Council with investigating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia defined ethnic 
cleansing as ‘rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation 
to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group’. T h i s  
definition, nonetheless, evades the question of the perpetrators, their intent, and the 
systematic character of ethnic cleansing.
UN Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki -  Prime Minister of Poland between 24 
August 1989 and 14 December 1990 -  defined ethnic cleansing as ‘the elimination by 
the ethnic group exerting control over a given territory of members of other ethnic 
g r o u p s I n  his later considerations, the UN Special Rapporteur added that “ ethnic 
cleansing’ may be equated with a systematic purge of the civilian population based on 
ethnic criteria, vdth a view to forcing it to abandon the territories where it lives’. 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki has provided important qualifications of ethnic cleansing. 
Nevertheless, when using terms such as ‘elimination’ and ‘purge’ it is not clear whether
 ^ I am grateful to Professor Christopher Greenwood o f the Law Department o f the London School of  
Economics and Political Science for revealing this point to me during our conversation o f 20* June 2000.
Final Report o f  the United Nations Commission o f  Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780, 1990: Annex Summaries and Conclusions, UN Doc, S/1994/674/Add.2 Vol. 1, 28 
December 1994, p. 17,
" Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports o f  the Special Rapporteurs and 
Representatives: Situation o f  Human Rights in the Territory o f  the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. 
A/47/666-S/24809, o f 17 November 1992.
Situation o f  Human Rights in the Territory o f  the Former Yugoslavia, Sixth Periodic Report on the 
Situation o f  Human Rights in the Territory o f  the Former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 o f  
Commission resolution 1993/7 o f  23 February 1993. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110, February 1994, 
paragraph 283.
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he implied killing or the removal of the targeted group(s). In addition, he does not 
specify ethnic cleansing as a policy of the perpetrators.
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff has argued that: ‘...ethnic cleansing can be understood as the 
expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic 
discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of 
these’. T h i s  definition, however, does not stress the fact that ethnic cleansing is a 
deliberate action committed by using force and/or intimidation, does not qualify the 
perpetrators and extends the range of the targeted group(s) beyond the ethnic, religious 
and national criteria. . K
V ^' S"Finally, Drazen Petrovic describes ethnic cleansing as ‘a well defined policy of a 
particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given 
territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin’.'"* Although avoiding some 
of the flaws of the previous definitions, Petrovic’s definition appears somehow 
ambiguous given that the characterisation of the perpetrators as ‘a particular group of 
persons’ is rather vague and consequently not adequate.
It can be deduced, however, that the consistency among these definitions lies in the 
recognition that in ethnic cleansing campaigns the bone of contention is territory, which 
is defined by the perpetrators in ethnic terms: the quest for territory inhabited by the 
perpetrators’ own people being the modus operandi of ethnic cleansing operations.'^
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ‘A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, p. 
1 1 0 .
Petrovic, ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, p. 351.
See Jennifer Jackson-Preece, ‘Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing 
State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1998, p. 821.
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Consequently, ethnic minorities that inhabit contested territories are deemed by the 
perpetrators to impair the homogeneity of the dominant nation/ethnic community, and 
are, hence, compelled to flee their homelands.
Although these definitions do a useful service in pointing out some important 
characteristics of ethnic cleansing, none of them on its own is sufficient in defining the 
phenomenon in all its complexity. Based on the above considerations, I propose that the 
following be kept as the working definition of ethnic cleansing for the purposes of this 
thesis:
Ethnic cleansing is a deliberate policy designed by and pursued under the 
leadership of a nation/ethnic community or with its consent, with the view to 
removing an ‘undesirable’ indigenous population of a given territory on the 
basis of its ethnic, national, or religious origin, or a combination of these, by 
using systematically force and/or intimidation.
It should be pointed out that, although the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing constitute a 
collectivity, this is not to imply that each and every member of the perpetrators’ 
community participates directly in the acts or even agrees with the policy. Instead, what 
makes ethnic cleansing a collective endeavour is that it is perpetrated under the 
directives of the leaders of their nation/ethnic community or at least with the 
leadership’s consent, and that the perpetrators have also the backing of a significant 
section of their nation or ethnic community, though many might be coerced into bowing 
to the official policy.'*
Although statistics for all areas that underwent ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia are missing, a 
few researchers have provided some data about the size of the collectivity of perpetrators and their 
supporters. Peter Maass, for example, suggests that in Banja Luka, about 30 per cent o f the Serb 
community opposed ethnic cleansing, while 60 per cent of them were confused and supported it overtly or 
tacitly. The latter went along with the 10 per cent who actually had the guns and controlled the television 
tower. Peter Maass, Love thy Neighbour: A Story o f War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, p. 107. 
These statistics are supported also by Anthony Oberschall’s research. See his article ‘The Manipulation of 
Ethnicity: from Ethnic Co-operation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 
23, No. 6, 2000, p. 986. In Serbia, during the last months o f 1991, 50,000 people had signed a petition for 
peace and an estimated 50,000 reservists were in the hiding from the call-up. The latter number had risen
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In addition to qualifying ethnic cleansing as a deliberate course of action, i.e., a policy 
supported by the authorities of the perpetrators’ community, the proposed definition 
emphasises that the character of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the traits that -  
apparently -  make the targeted population ‘undesirable’ and therefore subject to 
removal are one or a combination of the ethnic, national or religious background(s) of 
the victims. Last but not least, the removal of people from the territory in which they 
traditionally lived is obviously not based on the voluntary principle. Hence, the 
perpetrators use force and/or intimidation to compel the targeted people to leave.
II.2 Supportive definitions and conceptual distinctions
The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ -  as defined above -  is intrinsically bound up with other 
related terms such as ‘ethnic community, ‘nation’, ‘state’, ‘nation-state’, and 
‘leadership’. For this reason, elaborating on the latter concepts may serve to throw in 
sharper relief the proposed definition of ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, defining 
such terms as ‘ethnic community’ and ‘nation’, entails certain difficulties, which have 
to do with the intangible nature of the entities in question. Moreover, inherent in the 
task of definition are difficulties that have to do with delineation, i.e., drawing the line 
between entities that to some extent overlap.
Let me start by considering the meaning of ‘ethnic c o m m u n i ty T h e  compounding 
adjective ‘ethnic’ derives from the ancient Greek noun ethnos^^, originally meaning
to 200,000 by 1994. Tom Gallagher, The Balkans after the Cold War -  From tyranny to tragedy, London: 
Routledge, 2003, p. 65, For opposition in Serbia see Ivan Torov, ‘The Resistance in Serbia’, in Jasminka 
Udovicki and James Ridgeway eds.. Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking o f  Yugoslavia, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2000 and Fabian Schmidt, ‘The Former Yugoslavia: Refugees and War 
Resisters’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 25,24 June 1994.
It is only recently that a shift in terminology occurred fi’om the term ‘tribes’ to that o f ‘ethnic 
communities’. ‘Tribes’ have a profound colonial connotation; the concept itself being derived from the 
Latin term tribus meaning barbarians at the borders o f the empire. Although less in use than it used to be, 
in the Western world ‘tribe’, more often than not, implies uncivilised, non-Western, primitive-atavistic
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heathen or pagan. In French, the Greek noun ethnos survives as ethnie, and it is from 
here that this word is borrowed and used in English to connote an ‘ethnic community’.^  ^
Max Weber -  among the first classical theorist to grant attention to ethnic groups -  
defined them ‘those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common 
descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of 
memories of colonisation and migration...
Weber did emphasise some crucial elements of an ethnic group such as common^ 
traditions or ways of life, shared memories of a common past, and attachment to a 
homeland. In addition, he acknowledged the important role that history, myths and 
symbols play in shaping the ethnic group and sustaining the life of the community. 
Weber, however, maintained that shared physical or cultural characteristics are 
insufficient to qualify a group as an ethnic one. Instead, it is the belief in these shared 
characteristics, regardless of whether such belief has any objective foundation (and not 
only by those who share them but also by those who react to them), which has 
community-forming powers. By extension, he did not think that common descent alone 
could lead to group formation. In his view, the most effective means of bringing the 
community into being was political action.^^
people. See, Ronald Cohen, ‘Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology’, in Annual Review o f  
Anthropology, Vol. 7, 1978, pp. 379-403.
For a detailed analysis of the etymology of this term and how it came to give way to its derivatives 
ethnic/community and ethnicity see ‘Introduction’ in Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and Malcolm 
Chapman eds.. History and Ethnicity, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 11-14.
Raymond Williams, Keywords, London: Flamingo, 1976, p. 119.
‘Introduction’ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds.. Ethnicity, Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 4.
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology, Edited by Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, p. 389.
Ibid., pp. 389-393.
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Recently, Anthony Smith has offered a more comprehensive definition of an ethnic 
group or an ethnie. In his opinion, an ethnie is ‘a named human population with myths 
of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common 
culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its 
m e m b e r s I t  follows, therefore, that both the perception and the shared belief of 
common descent between the members of the community, shared memories of a 
common past, attachment to a motherland, common cultural elements (such as 
language, religion, laws, customs, dress, music, crafts, architecture, food, etc.,) and a 
degree of solidarity and consciousness of the collectivity are important qualifying 
criteria of an ethnic group.
Ethnic groups/communities are usually smaller in size than the nation with which they 
cohabit. In the context of the Balkans, the term ethno-national groups/minorities is used 
to indicate the presence of not only ethnic communities without a state such as the 
Roma, for instance, but also national groups who have, or have had, a mother country 
outside a given republic (for example, the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, the Albanians in 
Kosovo, etc). Nevertheless, international law, thus far, provides no universally accepted 
definition of a minority. However, a minority may be defined by certain objective and 
subjective attributes such as its distinctiveness fi*om other groups within the state in 
terms of ethnicity, culture and history; being numerically inferior and in a non-dominant 
position to the rest of the population of the state; as well as having a sense of 
community and a wish to preserve and develop their distinctive culture and traditions.^"^
‘Introduction’ in Hutchinson and Smith, eds,, Ethnicity, p. 6. For a detailed discussion on the 
characteristic elements o f an ethnic community see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, 
Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986, chapter 2.
See Malcolm N. Shaw, ‘The Definition o f  Minorities in International Law’, in Yoram Dinstein and 
Mala Tabory eds.. Protection o f  Minorities and Human Rights, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
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‘Ethnicity’ is a term that is often used in conjunction with ‘ethnic community’. 
‘Ethnicity’ is a very recent term, its first usage being attributed to the American 
sociologist David Reisman in 1953.^  ^Paul Spoonley maintains that the term emerged in 
order to discard the concept of ‘race’ and its sense of biological determinism. Ethnicity 
came to be used by ‘sociologists and others to acknowledge ‘the positive feelings of 
belonging to a cultural g r o u p C h a p m a n  et al., on the other hand, suggest that 
‘ethnicity’ implies the quality of belonging to an ethnic community and it can mean the 
essence of an ethnic group or ‘what it is you have if you are an ‘ethnic group’...’; this 
usually being so, in ‘a context of relativities’.^  ^ It is in this latter connotation that the 
meaning of ethnicity will be referred to in this thesis.
An important factor, which must be taken into account in any discussion of ethnicity is 
the difference between the ethnicity claimed by the people themselves and that 
attributed to them by others. Guibemau and Rex maintain that in either case the 
perception of ethnicity will not rest upon some scientific sociological truth but on a 
subjective interpretation which might vary greatly in attitude between what group 
members think about themselves and how others regard them. In other words, the 
criteria applied for classification and therefore interpretation might be different between 
members of the group and those who classify them from outside. In the Balkan region
1992, pp. 1-31. For a survey o f some o f the suggested definitions o f  a minority see Jennifer Jackson 
Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-State System, Oxford: Clarendon, 1998, chapter 2.
Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto 
Press, 1993, p. 3.
Paul Spoonley, Racism and Ethnicity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 36.
They argue that “ ethnicity’ is a term that only makes sense in a context of relativities, o f processes o f  
identification, and that nevertheless aspires to concrete and positive status both as an attribute and as an 
analytical ‘concept’’. Furthermore, they point out that although a term used to describe phenomena that 
involve everybody, ‘ethnicity’ has come to signify a marker o f  strangeness and unfamiliarity. See, 
Chapman et a l ,  ‘Introduction’, in Tonkin, McDonald, and Chapman, eds.. History and Ethnicity, pp. 15- 
17.
Montserrat Guibemau and John Rex, ‘Introduction’, in Guibemau and Rex, eds.. The Ethnicity Reader: 
Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, pp. 3-4. See also Ted
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this is a point of great relevance as the outside perceptions of what Balkan people are 
and their own perceptions of themselves have varied widely. Suffice to remember that 
often and till this very day many outsiders speak of Balkan tribes and Balkan tribal 
rifles.
A nation^  ^has all the attributes of an ethnic community, but in addition it is definitely 
attached to a clearly demarcated territory, has not only a common past but also a 
common vision for the future and, most importantly, it has acquired statehood. The term 
‘nation’ is often used interchangeably and misleadingly with ‘state’ which refers to a 
political formative unit and which has a much longer life than that of ‘nation’. In legal 
terms, a state is considered to be a political formation which normally consists of a 
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and capacity to enter into 
relations with other s t a tes .A nation-state is a specific case of a state in which the 
permanent population consists of a single nation which in turn controls the government 
of the state, including its apparatus of law, the economy and military power.
Lastly, in the framework of this thesis ‘leadership’ means high-ranking governmental 
officials and military echelons, high-ranking members of political parties, and 
prominent members of scientific, artistic and religious institutions. In the course of
Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View o f Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 3.
^  The term ‘nation’ comes from the Latin word nasci which means ‘to be born’. The concept of ‘nation’, 
however, is older than that of ‘ethnic group’, the former originating in the days of the French revolution.”^  
See, Giorgio Ausenda, ‘Postscript: Current Issues in the Study o f Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and 
Humanitarian Intervention, and Questions for Future Research’, in David Turton, ed.. War and Ethnicity: 
Global Connections and Local Violence, Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997, p. 221.
See discussion in Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Fourth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, pp. 139-148.
42
analysis, ‘leaders’ and ‘elites’ are used interchangeably but refer to the meaning of 
‘leadership’ stated above.
II.3 Ethnic Cleansing: A Euphemism for Genocide?
In the context of the 1990s conflict in the Balkans, ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
have often been used interchangeably in order to describe events in the former 
Yugoslavia, and not only by lay people but by political practitioners, scholars of politics 
and international relations, and journalists as well. Let me cite a few examples. 
Genocide was recognised in Article 4 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 
(hereinafter referred to as the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia -  ICTY), 
established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in 
May 1993.^  ^UN General Assembly Resolution 47/121 of 18* December 1992 states in 
paragraph 9 of the Preamble that: ‘... the abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a 
form of genocide In April 1995, a hearing before the Commission on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe of the US Congress was entitled ‘Genocide in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina’.^  ^ From the very first week of the NATO bombing campaign against 
Serbia in March 1999, the U.S. State Department explicitly raised the possibility of 
genocide being under way in Kosovo,^ "^  as did the German Defence Minister Rudolf
The ICTY was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 827, adopted on 25 May 1993, 
under Chapter VII o f the United Nations Charter. This Tribunal is empowered to prosecute persons 
committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches o f the Geneva Conventions o f  12 August 1949, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and violations o f the laws or customs o f  war. The Statute o f the ICTY 
is printed in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds.. Documents on the Laws o f  War, edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 569-570. 
http://www.un.org/gopher-data/ga/recs/47/121.
U.S. Congress, Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Hearing before the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 104* Congress, 4* April 1995, http://www.csce.gov/pdf/040495.pdf 
Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly -  NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Washington 
D C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 111.
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Scharping.^^ Helsinki Watch was the first non-governmental organisation to pronounce 
that its findings, at the very least prima facie, provided evidence that genocide was 
taking place in the region.^^ Amongst academics, Professor Rudolph J. Rummel of the 
University of Hawaii had no doubt that the Bosnian Serb massacre of Bosnian Muslims 
was genocide.^^ The same view was disseminated by Professor Helen Fein in her public 
lecture ‘Denying Genocide: From Armenia to Bosnia’ at the London School of 
Economics on 22"  ^January 2001. Amongst journalists, Roy Gutman was awarded the 
1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Dispatches for his book A Witness to Genocide and 
Norman Cigar published in 1995 a book entitled Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy o f 
‘Ethnic Cleansing'. Christopher Bennett surveying the latest events in the region has 
argued that ethnic cleansing, in fact, is a euphemism for genocide.^* But is it? Is ethnic 
cleansing indeed a mild expression used to cover the horrors of genocide or is it a 
notion in its own right used to express situations different from those of genocide? And, 
is it legitimate to use the two terms interchangeably?
II.3.1 Genocide Defined
As a way of considering the above questions let me first comment on the meaning of 
‘genocide’. Originally, the term -  a synthesis of the Greek word genos, which means 
‘race’, and the Latin word cide, which means ‘to kill’ -  was coined by Raphael Lemkin 
in his 1944 book. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, to describe the Holocaust. Four years
Ibid.
War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Helsinki Watch Report, Human Rights Watch, August 1992 
(referred to as Helsinki Watch P ‘ Report). In addition, Helsinki Watch 2"‘^  Report (War Crimes in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina), Helsinki Watch, A Division o f Human Rights Watch, April 1993, maintains that ‘what 
is taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina is attempted genocide -  the extermination o f  a people in whole or 
in part because o f their race, religion or ethnicity’,
R, J. Rummel, Death by Government, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1994, pp. 
31-32.
Christopher Bennett, ‘Ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia’ in Guibemau and Rex eds.. The Ethnicity 
Reader, p. 122.
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later the legal definition of genocide was codified in Article 2 of the 1948 United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (which entered into
force in 1951), as follows;
...genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) 
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.^^
According to the UN definition, genocide is characterised by two legal ingredients, 
namely, the material element constituted by one or several acts enumerated above, 
known in legal parlance as actus reus, and the mental factor known in legal terminology 
as mens rea, which consists of the special intent (or dolus specialis) to destroy in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, or religious group, as such. The dolus specialis applies to 
all genocidal acts mentioned in Article 2(a) to (e) above, that is, all the enumerated acts 
must be part of a wider plan to destroy the group as such."^ ° It is this special intent {dolus 
specialis) of the perpetrators/gewoc/Wa/re to destroy a group in whole or in part that sets
Roberts and Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws o f  War, p. 181. Some scholars, however, have 
attempted to define genocide in different terms than those o f the United Nations Genocide Convention. 
For example, Horowitz defines genocide as ‘a special form o f  murder: state-sanctioned liquidation against 
a collective group, without regard to whether an individual has committed any specific and punishable 
transgression’. See, Irving Louis Horowitz, Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power, New Brunswick, 
New York Transaction Books, 1980, pp. 1-2. Helen Fein, for her part, has offered the following definition 
o f genocide: ‘Genocide is a series o f purposeful actions by (a) perpetrator(s) to destroy a collectivity 
through mass or selective murders o f  group members and suppressing the biological and social 
reproduction o f the collectivity’. Helen Fein, Genocide Watch, New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1992, p. 3. Chalk and Jonassohn, on the other hand, have proposed the following definition: 
‘Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a 
group, as that group and membership to it are defined by the perpetrator’. Frank Chalk and Kurt 
Jonassohn, The History and Sociology o f  Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990, p. 23. Despite these contributions, which have the merit o f pinpointing at least 
two important features o f  genocide, namely that genocide is ‘state-sanctioned’ and ‘a form o f one-sided 
mass killing’ the most widely accepted definition o f genocide, nonetheless, remains that o f the UN 
Genocide Convention.
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. 1T-95-10-T decision o f 14 December 1999, paragraph 62. 
Printed in André Klip and Gôran Sluiter eds., Annotated Leading Cases o f  International Criminal 
Tribunals, Volume IV, The International Criminal Tribunal fo r the Former Yugoslavia 1999-2000, 
Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002. The cited paragraph at p. 682.
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genocide aside from any other crime. As observed by the representative of Brazil during
the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention
‘genocide [is] characterised by the factor of particular intent to destroy a group. 
In the absence of that factor, whatever the degree of atrocity of an act and 
however similar it might be to the acts described in the convention, that act 
could still not be called genocide’."*^
While addressing the theoretical interpretation of genocide both the United Nations’ 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter referred to as ‘ICTR’) and the 
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have 
held that the crime of genocide does not necessarily imply the actual extermination of 
the targeted group in its entirety."^  ^ Nor, according to the International Law 
Commission,"^  ^does it require the complete annihilation of a group fi’om every comer of 
the globe.'^ '^  Both Tribunals maintained that the geographical zone in which an attempt 
to eliminate a group is made may be limited in size (i.e., it can be a region or even a 
municipality). This, however, raises the question beyond what threshold could the crime 
be qualified as genocide?
The phrase ‘in whole or in part’ was understood by both Tribunals to mean the 
destmction of a significant portion of the group from either a quantitative or a
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, decided on 2 September 1998, paragraph 
519. Printed in André Klip and GOran Sluiter eds., Annotated Leading Cases o f  International Criminal 
Tribunals, Volume II, The International Criminal Tribunal fo r Rwanda 1994-1999, Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2000. The cited paragraph at p. 500.
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T decision o f 21 May 
1999, paragraph 95. Printed in André Klip and Gôran Sluiter eds.. Annotated Leading Cases o f  
International Criminal Tribunals, Volume II, at note 41 above. The cited paragraph at p. 578. Prosecutor 
V. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, decided on 2 September 1998, paragraph 497. Printed in 
ibid. The cited paragraph at p. 498. Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T decision o f 14 
December 1999, paragraphs 79-83. Printed in André Klip and GOran Sluiter eds.. Annotated Leading 
Cases o f  International Criminal Tribunals, Volume IV, at note 40 above. The cited paragraphs at pp. 685- 
687.
Quoted with approval by the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, ibid.
^  International Law Commission Draft Code o f Crimes, paragraph 8. Cf. 
http://www.un.org./law/ilc/reports/1996/chap02.htm.
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qualitative standpoint. Subsequently, genocidal intent may be manifested in two ways: it 
may consist of desiring the extermination of a large majority of the targeted group, in 
which case it would constitute an intention to destroy the group en masse; or it may 
consist of the destruction of a more limited number of persons, such as the leadership of 
the group, chosen by the perpetrators for the impact that their disappearance would have 
upon the survival of the group as such."^ ^
The definition of genocide, nevertheless, remains ambiguous for two reasons. The first 
has to do with the difficulty of determining the intent of the perpetrators and secondly, 
the targeted ‘group’ is not quantified. Indeed, the genocide definition does not indicate 
what constitutes a ‘group’; in other words, what size should the targeted ‘group’ have 
for the crime to classify as genocide? Can it be the population of a district, a city, a 
town or even a village? In many ways, the confusion on the meaning of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ is a corollary of the vagueness of the meaning of ‘genocide’. Of course, it is 
only large scale ethnic cleansing that strikes a chord with genocide. To some extent, 
whether one decides to qualify ethnic cleansing as genocide depends on whether one 
chooses to atomise the ‘group’ to the level of the town or the village, in which case it 
may be easier to prove the intent of the perpetrators.
Indeed, while it might be difficult to prove that the Serbs had the intent to commit 
genocide against the whole community of Bosnian Muslims or Kosovar Albanians, it 
might be less difficult to do so should one focus discretely at particular villages or 
towns like Prijedor in Bosnia, for instance, where by June 1993 over 43,000 of nearly
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, paragraph 82, at note 40 above. The cited paragraph at pp. 686-687.
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50,000 Muslims had been expelled or been killed."^  ^ In terms of speed, of course, the
most relevant example is that of Srebrenica where between 13 and 19 July 1995 as
many as 7,000-8,000 men of military age were systematically massacred while the
remainder of the Bosnian Muslim population present in the town, some 25,000 people,
were expelled."*  ^ The Trial Chamber in the Krstic case stated that it was ‘convinced
beyond any reasonable doubt that a crime of genocide was committed in Srebrenica’/*
However, the Trial Chamber also acknowledged that the central objective of the 1992-
95 conflict between the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats was ethnic cleansing, by
which it understood the use of military means to terrorise the civilian population with
the aim of forcing their flight/^ In addition, the Trial Chamber suggested that apart
from the high numbers of people that were executed, methodologically speaking,
Srebrenica was no different from some other parts of Bosnia Herzegovina/® The Krstic
judgement indicates also that the strategic location of the enclave, situated between two
Serb territories, may explain why the Bosnian Serb forces did not limit themselves to
expelling the Bosnian Muslim population/^ The judgement states that:
The Bosnian Serbs’ war objective was clearly spelt out, notably in a decision 
issued on 12 May 1992 by Momcilo KrajiSnik, the President of the National 
Assembly of the Bosnian Serb People. The decision indicates that one of the 
strategic objectives of the Serbian people of Bosnia Hercegovina was to reunite 
all Serbian people in a single State, in particular by erasing the border along the 
Drina which separated Serbia from Eastern Bosnia, whose population was 
mostly Serbian.^
See Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 104**’ Congress, Testimony o f Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, April 4, 1995.
httD://www.csce.gov/pdf040495.pdf. Prosecutor v. DuSko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement o f 7 May 
1997, paragraph 128. Printed in André Klip and GOran Sluiter eds.. Annotated Leading Cases o f  
International Criminal Tribunals, Volume I, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 1993-1998, Antwerp: Intersentia, 1999. The cited paragraph at p. 318.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. Judgement o f 2"** August 2001. Case No. IT-98-33-T. Part III, Legal 
Findings, paragraphs 487, 519, 594, http://www.un.org/ictv/krstic/TrialCl/iudgement/krs-ti010802e- 
3.pdf.
48 ICTY Press Release, The Hague, 2 August 2001, OF/P.I.S./609e.
http://www.un.org/ictv/pressreal/p609-e.htm.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Part III, paragraph 562, at note 47.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Part II, Findings o f Fact, paragraph 94, at note 47 above.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Part HI, paragraph 597, at note 47.
Ibid., paragraph 562.
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This was confirmed also in Prosecutor v. Radislav Appeals Judgement wherein
it was inferred that:
... Srebrenica (and the surrounding central Podrinje region) were of immense 
strategic importance to the Bosnian Serb leadership. Without Srebrenica, the 
ethnically Serb state of Republica Srpska they sought to create would remain 
divided into two disconnected parts, and its access to Serbia proper would be 
disrupted. ... Control over the Srebrenica region was consequently essential to 
the goal of some Bosnian Serb leaders of forming a viable political entity in 
Bosnia ...^^
Both Krstic judgements indicate that the Trial Chamber has opted for the atomisation of 
the ‘group’ showing once more that the UN definition qualifies a situation as genocide 
or not depending upon one’s interpretation of the word ‘group’. Nevertheless, should 
one decide to atomise the ‘group’ to the level of the town or village, one might run the 
risk of opting for countless genocides, which would look too pale when compared to the 
Holocaust, and the Armenian and the Tutsi genocides. In addition, should one atomise 
the ‘group’ in this way, one will be faced with a number of violent conflicts which in 
their totality do not qualify as genocide and yet contain in themselves one or more cases 
of genocide, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s being a recent case in point. In my 
opinion this is not useful in analytical and conceptual terms and it might be better, 
therefore, when considering whether a situation qualifies as genocide or not, to look at 
the whole picture of the conflict and avoid atomising the (targeted) ‘group’ to the level
Prosecutor v. Radislav KrstiC. Appeals Judgement o f 19 April 2004. Case No. IT-98-33-A. Paragraph 
15. http://www.un.org.ictv/krstic/ADDeal/iudgement/index.htm. The first Krstic judgement concluded that 
genocide had taken place in Srebrenica and sentenced general Krstic to 46 years in prison. Both the 
defence and prosecution appealed. The defence argued that the interpretation o f  the UN genocide 
definition had been misleading and that what happened in Srebrenica did not amount to genocide. In the 
defence’s view Krstic sentence was far too harsh and it ought to have been reduced to 20 years 
imprisonment. The prosecution, on the other hand, suggested that general Krstic, being responsible for 
genocide in Srebrenica, should have been sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber 
reiterated that genocide had taken place in Srebrenica but curiously reduced Krstic sentence to 35 years 
imprisonment. This, however, may be seen as a contradiction in terms since having gone at lengths to 
medce the case for the most heinous crime in Srebrenica the Appeals Chamber gave the defendant a 
reduction in the term o f imprisonment. On the other hand, irrespective o f whether one considers this case 
as genocide or not the severity o f Srebrenica massacre is so high as to warrant life imprisonment for the 
general who oversaw its execution.
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of a town or a village. This will allow for a conceptual consistency and also for an 
acknowledgement of a hierarchy of crimes in which genocide stands at the top.
II.3.2 Comparing ethnic cleansing with genocide
At a first glance, the genocide definition may suggest that ethnic cleansing and genocide 
are coterminous. This can be attributed to the similarities of the actus reus ingredient of 
both phenomena. Indeed, the genocidal acts enumerated in the genocide definition can 
be present in ethnic cleansing campaigns although not in the same measure. By the 
same token, the discriminatory character of both genocide and ethnic cleansing is 
conspicuous. In point of fact, both genocide and ethnic cleansing reject the egalitarian 
proposition that all humans are equal and therefore should be so treated. As opposed to 
this, their mission is to eliminate part of the population based on discriminatory grounds 
defined by the membership of individuals in a particular ethno/national group. 
Consequently, both genocide and ethnic cleansing have served as political strategies 
which seek to eliminate ethnic differences within a given state and reinforce the 
hegemony of the perpetrators and their community. In this sense, both genocide and 
ethnic cleansing are forms of ‘politicide’, in so far as they involve politically motivated 
killing.^ "*
Although by no means modem occurrences, both genocide and ethnic cleansing have 
assumed modernist traits: they are almost always sanctioned by the perpetrators’ state. 
In turn, both genocide and ethnic cleansing have served as instruments of nation-state
The term ‘politicide’ is introduced by Barbara Harff to differentiate between socially and racially 
motivated killing, on the one hand, and politically motivated killing, on the other. Barbara Harff, 
‘Recognising Genocides and Politicides’, in Helen Fein ed.. Genocide Watch, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1992, pp. 27-8. This distinction is rarely clear cut, however. As this thesis shows, ethnic 
cleansing is very much a political enterprise, accompanying on occasions the process o f nation-state 
building. Similarly, no case of genocide can be detached form a given political context.
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creation or nation-state consolidation.^^ Hitler -  as he himself affirmed in his work Mein 
Kampf -  had aspired for a ‘pure’ German state that was to ‘embrace all Germans’.
Similarly, Milosevic aspired for a state of the »wbian nation and'Tudjman aspired for a .
state of the Croatian nation.^  ^ (By pointing out this similarity, however, I am in no way 
drawing a sign of equality between these three figures). In employing ethnic cleansing 
and genocide to pursue the ideal of the homogenous ‘nation-state’, these governments 
followed a path beset with both danger and immorality. At the same time, they sought 
an ideal that could not be fully achieved. Hence, the success of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing has rarely been absolute. Indeed, despite the drastic efforts made to get rid of 
the targeted ethnic minorities, such minorities continue to exist in Serbia and Croatia, 
just like racial purification of Germany in the aftermath of the Holocaust had failed to 
be reached.
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff has pointed out that both ethnic cleansing and genocide are forms 
of what he calls ‘population cleansing’, where ‘cleansing’ is a euphemism that 
camouflages the ugly truth i.e., the human suffering of the targeted groups.Genocide 
may include ethnic cleansing when extermination of a people requires their physical
It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that although, by design, the beneficiary of the Holocaust, for 
instance, was meant to be the German nation. Hitler did not undertake his grand endeavour in the name of 
the German nation but instead in the name of the Aryan race. He had come to realise that the concept of 
nation ‘could have only transient validity’. In his own words, his aim was ‘to get rid of this false 
conception and set in its place the conception of race...’ Indeed, his new order was to be conceived in 
terms o f race and nations were to be fused into this higher order. See, Alain Finkielkraut, In the Name o f  
Humanity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century, translated by Judith Friedlander, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000, p. 51. Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, on the other hand, has not been motivated 
by grand fantasies of racial purification. Indeed, with so much intermingling and so many mixed 
marriages in the region the notion of ‘racial purification’ sounds but a contradiction in terms. Instead, the 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing were carried out in the name of this or that nation, and for the benefit of 
this or that nation-state.
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf Translated by Ralph Manheim, With an introduction by D. Cameron Watt, 
London: Pimlico, 1992, p. 362.
This was explicitly expressed in the Serbian and Croatian constitutions. See extracts from respective 
constitutions in Robert M. Hayden, ‘Imagined communities and real victims: self-determination and 
ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia’, American Ethnologists, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1996, p. 791.
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, Ethnic Cleansing, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 1-4.
51
displacement (e.g., Holocaust) but ethnic cleansing does not necessarily equate with 
genocide. While both these phenomena are concerned with getting rid of a targeted 
population, genocide constitutes an extreme case while ethnic cleansing a milder one, in 
so far as ethnic cleansing is more concerned with the removal of people i.e., 
dispossession, while genocide is concerned with their physical extermination. That said, 
ethnic cleansing does not necessarily require the killing of people, although this does 
not imply that killing is not bound to happen especially in case where the targeted 
people strongly resist such removal. Ethnic cleansing that followed in the aftermath of 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, for instance, did not encounter large scale killing. This 
was particularly the case of the so-called population transfers that were conducted 
between Bulgaria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, and Greece and Turkey.^^ 
Similarly, the case of ethnic cleansing of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in 1989 is 
another case in point. More than 300,000 ethnic Turks were expelled from the country 
that consequently fled to Turkey, but large-scale killing was not involved.^®
Nevertheless, in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s one might argue that ethnic 
cleansing acquired a genocidal element given that the killing, torture, rape, etc., spread 
such fear and insecurity as to compel the community of victims to take flight. Yet, 
despite this, the death tolls that resulted from this case do not compare with those that 
have resulted from the three genuine cases of genocide of the twentieth century, namely 
that of the Armenians by the Young Turks in 1915, that of Jews by the Nazis in 1939- 
1945, and that of the Tutsis by the Hutu in Rwanda in 1994.^* Killing can be viewed as
See discussion in Chapter III, pp. 81-90. 
^  Refer to Chapter III, pp. 104-109.
Using the UN definition of genocide and placing it within the context o f the larger category o f  crimes 
against humanity, Alain Destexhe has suggested that in the course o f  the twentieth century only the three 
above mentioned cases qualify as genuine examples o f genocide. Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide 
in the Twentieth Century, Translated by Alison Marschner with Foreward by William Shawcross, New
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a differentiating factor of the two phenomena: in genocide killing is an end in itself, 
while in ethnic cleansing killing is rather a means to an end. Subsequently, from a moral 
standpoint, the scale of extermination can be viewed as a measure of difference between 
ethnic cleansing and genocide.^^
By extension, the targeted groups of ethnic cleansing, particularly in the case of the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, have not proven to be completely defenceless. While it 
is impossible to argue for equivalency of action between the perpetrators and the 
victims, it is nevertheless the case that, in self-defence but not exclusively so, the 
targeted groups have also retaliated in kind. Indeed, a number of multiple conflicts took 
place following the disintegration of the federation of the former Yugoslavia. Serbs 
fought against Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians and the latter three 
groups were able to engage in both defensive and offensive war against Serb forces. 
Moreover, in Bosnia armed confrontations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
emerged in 1993. In all these cases war crimes and other human rights violations were 
not confined to one side, in stark contrast to the Holocaust, the Turkish genocide of
York: New York University Press, 1995, pp. 1-20, For the case o f  the Armenians see, Vahakn N. 
Dadrian, The History o f  the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolian to the 
Caucasus, Providence: Berghahn, 1997. For the Jewish Holocaust see Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed.. Thinking 
about the Holocaust: After H alf a Century, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1997. For the genocide o f Tutsis see Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be 
killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998. O f these three 
cases, however, that o f the Armenians is -  arguably -  less clear cut with no universal agreement either on 
its evidence or on it interpretation. See Norman M. Naimark, Fires o f  Hatred -  Ethnic Cleansing in 
Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 35-38.
“  In the three cases o f genocide referred to above, a large majority o f the targeted groups were physically 
exterminated. It has been estimated that around six million Jews were killed by the Nazis, around one 
million Armenians were killed by the Young Turks and at least eight hundred thousands Tutsis were 
killed in Rwanda, the latter at a rate three times faster than that o f the Jews during the Holocaust. In the 
former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the scale o f human destruction has been o f  smaller proportions 
with around 200,000 victims in Bosnia (of all nationalities) and 10,000 Albanians in Kosovo. As pointed 
out in the ICTR hearings in the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgement, the scale o f extermination 
measured with the number o f dead victims from the targeted group can be an important factor to prove 
the intent o f  the perpetrators o f the crime. The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, 
paragraph 93, at note 42. That said, the scale o f  killing may serve as an indicator o f the intent o f the 
perpetrators to remove a targeted group from a given territory as opposed to the intent to destroy such 
group, or vice-versa.
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Armenians and also the Rwandan genocide, which were one-sided mass killings 
sanctioned by their respective states with the aim of physically destroying the targeted 
group(s).
Although genocide acquires a territorial component in the sense that in its aftermath the 
perpetrators are likely to have greater control over the territory and its resources, the 
bone of contention in genocide is the (targeted) people who usually do not exercise 
sovereign claims over the territory. By contrast, in the case of ethnic cleansing, what is 
perceived to be primarily at stake is territory, particularly when attempts are being made 
to redefine frontiers, when contending parties dispute their respective rights over given 
territories. In the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s any one of the conflicting 
groups was a party in the territorial dispute(s). The threat of territory changing 
sovereigns tied in to the population that inhabited the contested territory. So long as a 
substantive number of people fi"om an ethno/national community lived in the disputed 
areas, such group would have, perceptively, some legitimate basis for its territorial 
claims. Hence, from the point of view of the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing an efficient 
way to undermine the legitimacy of competing territorial claims was the removal of as 
many members of the rivalling group(s) as possible. Indeed, given that in the case under 
consideration the aggressors were Serbs and that Serbs in contested territories were not 
a majority, strategic dictate had it that they resort to ethnic cleansing rather than 
genocide. Hence, their tactics were to engage in the type of violence that would cause 
the targeted people to leave.^^
For an endorsement o f this view see Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Hearing before the Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 104“’ Congress, Testimony o f  Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
April 4 ,1995, at note 46 above.
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Some analysts, nonetheless, have claimed that naming events in the former Yugoslavia 
as ethnic cleansing rather than genocide has to do with the reluctance to comply with 
the obligations put forward in the Genocide Convention. '^* Despite the fact that the 
initial unwillingness of the West to address the situation cannot be denied, one need not 
relate this only to whether the situation qualified as genocide. Although the Western 
reaction to the conflict was gradual, given the long term commitment of international 
troops in Bosnia and the extent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members’ 
involvement in Kosovo in 1999, it is imprudent to say that the West was not prepared to 
back up its responsibilities in the region. On the other hand, the nature of genocide in 
Rwanda was not contested and yet the intervention there was so slow to come.
In sum, although prima facie, ethnic cleansing and genocide might appear synonymous, 
mainly due to the actus reus ingredient of both phenomena, similarities between them 
should not blind one to their differences. In particular, three differences between ethnic 
cleansing and genocide demand attention: whereas genocide is primarily concerned with 
the extermination of the targeted people, ethnic cleansing is concerned with the removal 
i.e., dispossession of the targeted groups from contested territories; although more often 
than not killing accompanies ethnic cleansing, the scale of victimisation during its 
campaigns tends to be much smaller than in the case of genocide; and, while 20* 
century genocides have involved one-sided mass killings, in ethnic cleansing of the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s the targeted groups have retaliated in kind, although not 
in the same measure.
^ See, for instance, Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia, pp. 115-116, 118.
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Most importantly, what sets genocide apart from ethnic cleansing and indeed from any 
other crime, is the special intent specialis) to destroy targeted people in whole or
in part. Although ethnic cleansing is a deliberate activity, the intent of its architects and 
perpetrators is bound up with the removal of the targeted people rather than their 
extermination. Consequently, to use genocide and ethnic cleansing interchangeably does 
not render justice to either term: genocide would be devalued and cheapened while the 
nature of ethnic cleansing would be obscured rather than explained. Hence the need to 
bring the language in line with facts and develop an accurate concept that captures the 
essence of ethnic cleansing adequately.
II.4 Ethnic cleansing and ethnocide
Apart from ‘genocide’, another term that connotes certain similarities with ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ is that of ‘ethnocide’, a relatively new notion used to describe an old 
phenomenon associated with acculturation of a peopleAlthough social science 
literature has been using ‘ethnocide’ fairly extensively for more than thirty years, the 
term does not as yet have a legal definition. The word apparently emerged first in 1970 
in the work of the French anthropologist Robert Jaulin.^  ^Generally speaking, the term 
refers to the intentional destruction of the culture (or crucial cultural elements) of a 
community of people without necessarily destroying the people that belong or adhere to 
that particular culture.The following seeks to show that ethnic cleansing in general.
For some examples of ethnocide that beset peoples of the ancient world see Anthony D. Smith, 
National Identity, London: Penguin, 1991, pp. 31-32.
^  Robert Jaulin, La Paix Blanche: Introduction a L 'Ethnocide, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970.
‘Ethnocide’ or ‘cultural genocide’ as it is sometimes referred to is an ambiguous notion not least 
because ‘culture’ itself has proved a difficult term to define. Indeed, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn 
found close to 300 different definitions of the term ‘culture’ in the early 1950s. A. L. Kroeber and Clyde 
Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review o f  Concepts and Definitions, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Museum, 1952. While the idea of ethnocide is widely shared, its description continues to vary with 
scholars disagreeing on whether ethnocide requires the entire disappearance of a particular culture or only 
its partial destruction. The majority of those engaged in the study o f ethnocide evade the qualification of 
the perpetrator/s as well. Although, it is generally agreed that the intent o f the perpetrator/s is essential in
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and in the region o f the former Yugoslavia in particular, has a strong ethnocidal 
dimension. What is there in ethnic cleansing that links it to ethnocide?
As pointed out, the bone o f contention in ethnic cleansing campaigns has been territory, 
and in particular rural territory. Consequently, the primary targets of ethnic cleansing 
have been rural communities, which are generally land-based given their inclination to 
identify themselves primarily with their particular homeland. Generally speaking, for 
any nation or ethnic community, the territory to which the collectivity is attached does 
not constitute merely a geographical feature: it is also a component of the ethno-national 
identity. Indeed, for any land-based community, territory has a unique value as the 
community’s culture and way of life is linked closely to it. Land is not only an 
economic factor of reproduction, a principle source of livelihood but it is also the basis 
o f cultural and social identity o f the community. As Stavenhagen puts it, for indigenous 
people ia n d  is habitat, territory, the basis for social organisation, cultural identification, 
and political viability; frequently associated with myth, symbols, and religion. Land is 
the essential element in the cultural reproduction o f the group’. T h e  attachment people 
have to their homeland as a source of material, spiritual and cultural life, and the 
protective attitudes humans exhibit towards their places find expression in the term 
‘territoriality’. In addition to the attachment and protection, territoriality implies also 
control o f the landscape including its resources and the people who inhabit it.^^
classifying a situation as ethnocide, the question of how to identify and qualify that intent has raised 
considerable controversy. For ethnocide see, Marc A. Sills, Ethnocide and Interaction Between States and 
Indigenous Nations: A Conceptual Investigation o f Three Cases in Mexico, Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
Denver, 1992.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights, Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 1990, p. 89.
Robert Sack conceived territoriality as ‘the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or 
control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic
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In particular, land-based people have a fundamental relationship with their territory: the 
main qualitative factors of such relationship lying both in the cultural, spiritual, and 
traditional value that a particular land has for the community. As Al-Khasawneh and 
Hatano point out:
For the majority o f indigenous peoples, survival o f their cultural and national 
identity, preservation of their unique way o f life and spiritual heritage, political 
autonomy and economic self-sufficiency depend on the possibility o f living on 
their traditional lands and controlling the use and exploration of their natural 
resources. Loss of land threatens their very [cultural] existence ...^°
From its very inception, the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been about re­
allocation of territory and its resources while forcefully expelling the targeted 
indigenous groups from their homeland. For the targeted communities, therefore, it is 
precisely the possibility o f living on their traditional land and subsequently the use and 
exploration of its natural resources that is ruled out by the perpetrators o f ethnic 
cleansing. The traditional bond between the indigenous people and their homeland as a 
source o f not only material life, but also a source o f cultural and spiritual one is broken 
up, threatening the cultural existence o f the community.^' Therefore, it is the land factor 
that, primarily, ties together ethnic cleansing and ethnocide. \ \ ^
Other elements in common between ethnic cleansing and ethnocide include the attacks 
on monuments of major cultural importance or sites o f cultural heritage such as.
territory’. For the meaning and definition of territoriality see Robert Sack, Human Territoriality: Its 
Theory and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 19.
The Relation o f  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The human rights dimensions o f  population 
transfer, including the implantation o f settlers. Preliminary report prepared by Mr. A S. Al-Khasawneh 
and Mr. R. Hatano on 6 July 1993. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17, paragraph 207.
Although, as pointed out, culture is not an easy term to define, most anthropology in our days starts 
with the assumption that ‘culture’ is an integral notion which includes not only explicit elements such as 
language, religion, art, etc., but also implicit elements such as territory, natural resources, political, 
economic and administrative organisation, etc. Sills, Ethnocide, p. 44.
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mosques, churches, libraries, schools, etc7^ Such destruction represented not only an 
attack on the culture o f the targeted communities but also an intimidation campaign to 
compel a permanent flight of the targeted ethnic groups. By extension, the attacks on 
the native languages of the targeted ethnic groups, sometimes reaching the extent of 
denying their use in public services constitutes another charasteristic element of 
ethnocide.^^ In addition, mass rape, this sinister component of ethnic cleansing 
campaigns, had also an ethnocidal dimension, given the reproductive capacity o f 
women and their role in cultural transmission due to their key position in the family 
structure.
This is not, however, to say that ethnic cleansing and ethnocide are synonymous. 
Although ethnocide can serve as a means of ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing goes 
further than ethnocide as the latter does not necessarily require that targeted people be
Bosnia’s national library, for instance, was shelled and burned in August 1992 by ^erb forces. 9q per 
cent of the Library’s 1.5 million volumes, including over 150,000 rare books and manuscripts, 100 yekrs 
of Bosnian newspapers and periodicals and the collection of the University of Sarajevo went up in smoke. 
This constituted the largest single act of book burning in recorded history. See the testimony of Andras 
Riedlmayer before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 104*’’ U.S. Congress, 4*’’ 
April 1995, http://www.csce.gov/pdf/040495.pdf. Similarly, two-thirds of Kosovo’s 180 libraries have 
been destroyed between 1990-1999 including over 900,000 books. Jolyon Naegele, ‘Kosovo’s Libraries 
Cleansed of Albanian Books’, wysiwyg://main.l/http://www.bosni...at.cfm?articleid=702&reportid=146. 
In addition, almost all mosques in Banja Luka were reportedly blown up in 1993. UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/47, Fifth periodic report on the situation o f human rights in the territory o f the former 
Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur o f the Commission on Human 
Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 o f  Commission resolution 1993/7 o f  23 February 1993, November 
1993, paragraph 98. At the same time 21 per cent of Roman Catholic constructions have been partially 
destroyed and a further 25 per cent damaged in Banja Luka again. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110, paragraph 
13, at footnote 12 above. By January 1993 all mosques (about 50) in Prijedor had been destroyed. UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, Report on the situation o f human rights in the territory o f  the former Yugoslavia 
submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on Human Rights, 
pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/S-l/l o f  14 August 1992, February 1993, paragraph 26. While 
on November 9, 1993, the historical Ottoman bridge in Mostar (listed with UNESCO as a monument of 
major cultural importance) was destroyed by military action. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, paragraph 69. In 
addition, a State Department report of December 1999 estimated that more than 40 churches and 
monasteries have been destroyed or damaged in Kosovo since NATO forces arrived in the province in 
June of the same year, http://www.nvtimes.eom/librarv/world/europe/l 21099kosovo-deaths.html.
This was the case in Kosovo from 1989 when the autonomous status o f the province was abolished till 
1999 when Serb forces retreated from the province following the NATO bombing.
For mass rape as a weapon o f ethnic cleansing see below pp. 63-4.
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removed from their homeland. In other words, ethnocide may not necessarily be 
accompanied by ethnic cleansing. Indeed, when in the era o f colonisation, the 
Europeans set out to convert indigenous Latin Americans and Africans to Christianity, 
the removal of the natives from their homelands was not contemplated. In our days, 
many underdeveloped countries, while struggling for development, are said to be 
threatened by ethnocide as new technologies and practices generally filtered from 
abroad gradually set root in their territories. Yet, their peoples, ethnic minorities 
included, are not necessarily either removed from their homelands, or threatened with 
such removal.
II.5 The practice of ethnic cleansing^^
The coercive uprooting of a people from their homeland cannot be conducted in a 
humane manner since it is bound to involve a high degree o f intimidation and/or 
violence. But its tempo can differ from one instance to another. It can involve a 
dramatic expulsion carried out en masse during a short period o f time as is the case off  ^
the Kosovar Albanians during the w in^r o f 1998-9, but it ifrày be also a gradual, low-; |
. I
intensity process, carried out incrementally and stretched over a longer period of time. 
The expulsion of Greeks from Turkey, for instance, that started early in the 1910s ended 
only in the 1950s.
As a practice, ethnic cleansing can consist of a range o f different measures with a view 
to creating an atmosphere of growing fear and insecurity that leads to the flight o f the 
targeted ethnic population. As well as forcing a people into exile there may be a more
Although the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has not changed substantially in the course of 
the twentieth century, it is only ethnic cleansing in the 1990s that has been systematically documented. 
For this reason, it is the acts of this case of ethnic cleansing that will be primarily referred to below. 
Norman M. Naimark, ‘Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe’, p. 29.
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gradual process involving measures such as harassment, intimidation and 
discrimination; the denial of the means of employment, education, health care, public 
services, and public administration; the prohibition of ethnic association combined with 
discriminatory and repressive legislation, etc/^
However, in the Balkan region, ethnic cleansing has been connected, more often than 
not, Avith times of war. Indeed, in the course of the 20* century, all the major cases of 
ethnic cleansing have been associated with armed conflicts such as the Balkan Wars of 
1912-13, the two World Wars as they affected the region and the regional wars of the 
1990s.^* While in principle ethnic cleansing can be a consequence of war, in the case of 
the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s most analysts agree that war was initiated and 
carried out as a means of ethnic cleansing, with the primary objective of the fighting 
being the establishment of ethnically homogenous regions. In this case, rather than 
being a by-product of war, ethnic cleansing constituted war’s most significant 
purpose.^^
In the course of war severe and violent measures have been employed during the 
conduct of ethnic cleansing including: outright expulsion of targeted ethnic 
communities from their places of residence (sometimes at gun point); shooting at their
’’’ Jackson Preece, ‘Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument o f Nation-State Creation’, p. 822. Such indirect and 
milder measures have been employed deliberately in Kosovo, for instance, from 1989 when the 
autonomous status o f the province was stripped off by M ilosevic till 1999 when Serb forces were forced 
out o f the province in the aftermath o f NATO’s intervention. Similar measures were adopted by 
Tudjman’s regime towards the Serb community in Krajina following the independence o f Croatia in 
1992.Ct|
For an historical overview o f  ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region during the 20* century see Chapter 
III.
For an endorsement o f this view see, for instance, Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 8. Report on the 
situation o f  human rights in the territory o f the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
Special Rapporteur o f the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 15 o f  Commission 
resolution 1992/S-I/l o f  14 August 1992, 27 October 1992. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10, paragraph 6. See also.
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homes and properties or blowing them up with explosives; looting and burning of the 
schools, medical facilities, churches, mosques etc., to ensure that the targeted people do 
not return;*® arbitrary mass arrests and detention of civilians to provide a pool of 
prisoners for exchange, forced labour purposes, and/or use of detainees as human 
shields;*  ^taking of hostages; forceful transfers of ethnic groups; deliberate torturing and 
other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; summary execution; etc.*^
The siege, including the shelling of and sniper attacks on population centres and the 
cutting off supplies of food and other essential goods, as well as the blocking of 
humanitarian aid was another tactic frequently used to force the targeted ethnic groups 
to flee. In particular, major cities, such as Sarajevo, Mostar and Vukovar, were shelled 
on a regular basis in a deliberate attempt to spread terror among the civilian 
population.*^ Another method of attacking civilians with a view to compelling their
E/CN.4/1993/50, paragraph 16, at footnote 72 above. Bennett, ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, p. 122. Noel Malcolm, 
‘Bosnia and the West; A Study in Failure’, in The National Interest, Spring 1995, p. 8.
In Kosovo, for example, from March till May 1999, some 500 residential areas, amongst which more 
than 300 villages have been burned in whole or in part by Serb forces. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt 9905 ethnic ksvo exec.html.
From July until the end o f December 1992 alone the ICRC registered approximately 10,800 detainees 
in more than 50 places o f detention in Bosnia. See E/CN.4/1993/50, paragraph 44, at footnote 72 above.
A valuable contribution on the documentation o f the practice and means o f ethnic cleansing in the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s has been made by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, (and his team) who has 
written a number o f reports on this matter. In addition to reports quoted above (see footnote 12 and 72) 
useful in this regard are the following reports: Situation o f  Human Rights in the Territory o f  the Former 
Yugoslavia, Periodic Report on the Situation o f  Human Rights in the Territory o f  the Former Yugoslavia 
submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on Human Rights, 
pursuant to paragraph 32 o f  Commission resolution 1993/7 o f  23 February 1993, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/3, May 1993; and respectively Second (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/4, May 1993), and Third 
(UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/6, August 1993), Periodic Report(s) on the situation o f human rights in the 
territory o f  the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur o f  the 
Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 o f  Commission resolution 1993/7 o f  23 
February 1993.
By early January 1994, for instance, there were on average 1,000 shell or rocket impacts per day in the 
city o f Sarajevo launched by the Serb army. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110, at footnote 12 above, paragraph 
59. Similarly, Mostar has been subjected to constant shelling and sniping from Bosnian Croat forces. 
From May till September 1993, for instance, there were up to 400 shells impacting on the city every day. 
Consequently, 50 percent o f the buildings and 90 per cent o f the private houses had been destroyed. See, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/8, Situation o f Human Rights in the Territory o f the Former Yugoslavia, Fourth 
periodic report on the situation o f  human rights in the territory o f  the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur o f  the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 
o f Commission resolution 1993/7 o f  23 February 1993, (September 1993), paragraph 26.
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flight were threats or actual implementation of environmental disaster. Examples 
include the mining of the hydroelectric power station at Bijelo Polje in Mostar and the 
systematic shelling by Serb forces of the chemical plants in Tuzla in winter 1993/4.*"^
More prominently, landmines (mostly anti-personnel ones) were widely used affecting 
particularly locations of strategic significance such as border areas, roads, mountain 
trails, cities, towns, villages, water-ways, industrial plants, etc., situated in the contested 
territories. In some areas remining was practised and mines were also used as booby 
traps as a means of strengthening control over territory or hampering supply efforts. In 
the course of ethnic cleansing all sides employed landmines both for defensive and 
offensive purposes. Subsequently, landmines have continued to pose a serious risk to 
human life, impeding farming, transport and commerce, etc.*^
Amongst the most heinous features of ethnic cleansing campaigns, particularly in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, were offences against women. Sexual abuse and in particular mass 
rape of women, including minors, were widely used as a weapon in the systematic 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing.W hile rape has often been associated with armed 
conflicts, in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s the systematic character and the scale
E/CN.4/1993/50, paragraph 107 and E/CN.4/1994/110, paragraph 62, at footnotes 12 and 72 above.
Following the rupture with the Soviet Union in 1948 and, preoccupied with thoughts o f a Soviet 
invasion, Tito encouraged the growth o f military industries, including the production o f  landmines with 
its main production centres located in Bosnia and Croatia which are believed to have continued mine 
production during the 1990s conflict. Many o f the landmines produced and deployed in the region are 
amongst the world’s most difficult to detect, non-metal types, making demining a very complicated and 
costly process. According to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), whose mandate 
includes collection o f information on minefields and coordination o f  mine clearance, an estimated four to 
six million landmines may have been deployed by Serb, Croat and Muslim forces throughout Bosnia and 
the contested areas o f Croatia. For the use o f landmines in Croatia and Bosnia see Shawn Roberts and 
Jody Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy o f  Landmines^ Washington, D C.: 
Vietnam Veterans o f America Foundation, 1995, pp. 181-205.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, paragraphs 82-85, at footnote 72 above. Human Rights Watch Report: 
‘Rape as a Weapon of ‘Ethnic Cleansing” , http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/fiv. See also, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/5, Rape and abuse o f  women in the territory o f  the former Yugoslavia: Report o f  the 
Secretary-General, June 1993, paragraph 17.
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of mass rape indicates that soldiers were licensed to rape, in order to humiliate, shame, 
degrade and terrorise the whole ethnic group spreading thus a climate of fear, panic and 
insecurity that would force the entire group to flee/^ Because crimes o f gender violence 
frequently remain under-reported due to the cultural stigma and shame attached to the 
victims, it is impossible to detail the precise number of such offences. Some tentative 
estimates have been made, however, which indicate the large scale o f this problem in 
the region.**
In general, two aspects of violence employed against civilians has attracted attention, 
namely the instrumental and expressive dimension -  ethnic cleansing being seen by 
some as the most grisly form o f symbolic violence.*^ Whereas the instrumental aspect 
o f violence is technical and involves expediency and the relation between means and 
goals, the expressive aspect of violence is symbolic and communicative; it involves 
meaning, what do these practices ‘say’, what do they express?^^ The practice o f ethnic 
cleansing was clearly expressive, communicative. Acts o f violence employed in its 
course: killing of men, rape of women, burning of houses, and destruction o f cultural
See Human Rights Watch Report: ‘Rape as a Weapon of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, and E/CN.4/1993/50, 
paragraph 260, at footnote 72 above. The threat of rape and actual rape were a crucial factor in motivating 
Kosovar. Albanians to leave their homes in winter/spring 1999. Although there were fewer rapes in ^  ^
Kosovo than in Bosnia (Human Rights Watch documented 96 rapes o f  Kosovar-.women between March |  v ^
and June 1999 though it believed the actual number was much higher), the accounts of rape in Bosnia had, 
already established the credibility of the threat. Human Rights Watch Report: ‘Rape as a Weapon of 
‘Ethnic Cleansing” .
During 1992, for example, 119 pregnancies resulting from rape were registered in six medical centres = ‘ }
^  in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Zenica and Belgrade. Medical studies suggest that of every 100 incidents of rape, 
f one will result in pregnancy hinting that the 119 documented cases of rape were likely to have been the 
result o f approximately 12,000 incidents of rape. E/CN.4/1993/50, at footnote 72 above, pp. 64-67. The 
Commission of Experts established by the Security Council in 1992 to investigate the violations of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia recorded 200 cases o f children that had been 
born out of forced impregnation, which would raise the number o f incidents of rape to about 20,000. See 
testimony of Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, 104^ U.S. Congress, 4^ April 1995, at note 46 above.
See for instance Anton Block, Honour and Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, pp. 107, 112.
^  Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture o f Military Conflict,
Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 153.
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monuments presented a warning to the rest of the ethnic community; by inspiring fear 
and setting an example they delivered the message to the targeted groups ‘leave’. 
Identifying the expressive aspect of ethnic cleansing and arguing that violence can be 
understood in terms of symbolic action does not imply, however, that ethnic cleansing is 
‘symbolic’ violence. Rather the emphasis here is that the effective use of physical force 
in the course of ethnic cleansing campaigns depended on its symbolic form; it was a 
function of the way in which it was carried out; it relied on the message.^^ Pointing out 
the expressive dimension of such violence should not translate, nevertheless, as 
negligence towards its instrumental component. As Christopher Coker asserts these two 
aspects of violence ‘are closely related; they form a continuum’. I n  other words, while 
discerning the expressive aspect of violence employed in the course of ethnic cleansing 
one should not lose sight of its instrumental dimension, i.e., violence as a means to an 
end, as part of a strategy in service of a political project that sought to acquire and
control ethnically homogenous territories. The expressive aspect of violence should not 
be seen as an independent, autonomous element but rather as a complementary one that 
reinforced its instrumental dimension.
II.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has shed light on the analysis of ethnic cleansing with reference to its 
definition, terminology, and practice. Despite the fact that ethnic cleansing has often 
been used interchangeably with genocide, a comparative analysis of the two terms 
suggests that ethnic cleansing is not necessarily a euphemism for genocide. From a 
conceptual point of view, it is useful to acknowledge a hierarchy of crimes, where
Refer to Block, Honour and Violence, p. 108. 
Coker, Waging War Without Warriors?, p. 153.
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genocide would constitute the most heinous of all crimes, while ethnic cleansing would 
consist of milder ones. This suggestion is premised on the assumption that while 
genocide is concerned with the extermination of a targeted people, ethnic cleansing is 
concerned with their removal. Ethnic cleansing, however, is accompanied by ethnocide 
given that the removal of people from their homeland threatens directly their cultural 
identity, although the reverse is not always the case.
The coercive uprooting of people from their homeland cannot be a humane experience. 
Indeed, a wide range of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and even 
war, have been employed as a means of ethnic cleansing. The two aspects of violence -  
instrumental and expressive -  employed in the course of ethnic cleansing were 
interdependent and complementary serving both the aim of the expulsion of the targeted 
communities as a means of acquiring and consolidating ethnically homogenous 
territories.
Having defined the phenomenon which is the subject of investigation of this thesis, I 
now turn to explaining it. The next chapter considers under what circumstances did 
large-scale ethnic cleansing take place in the twentieth century Balkan region.
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III. T he legacy  of e th n ic  c le a n s in g  in th e  B alkan reg ion  during  
th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry
^The very existence o f  a range o f  common problems within a distinct (if sometimes disputed) 
geographical region binds the Balkan states together and allows fo r  the acceptance o f  ‘the 
Balkans’ in conceptual terms'}
^Stable security can only be achieved by people and groups if  they do not deprive others o f  it . ..
Ill.l Introduction
The range of common problems that have befallen the Balkan states simultaneously at 
various stages in the past century include economic deprivation, internal strife, war, 
foreign interference and domination, (humanitarian) intervention, post-conflict 
reconstruction and reconciliation. One of the saddest problems, however, has been that 
of ethnic cleansing, which though not associated exclusively vvith the Balkans,^ has 
scarcely in any other region -  especially in the twentieth century -  occurred with such a 
sickening frequency.
This chapter considers ethnic cleansing as a shared regional problem in the Balkan 
peninsula in the course of the past century. It shows that ethnic cleansing in this region 
has been primarily a top-down phenomenon associated with official policies designed to 
construct homogenous polities over contested territories inhabited by multi ethno- 
national communities. As such, ethnic cleansing was an organic part of the process of 
nation-state building.
* Spyros Economides, The Balkan Agenda: Security and Regionalism in the New Europe, London 
Defence Studies 10, London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, University o f London, 1992,
p. 2,
K, Booth and N. J. Wheeler, ‘The Security Dilemma’ in J. Baylis and N. J, Rengger, eds,. Dilemmas o f  
World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
 ^Refer to Chapter 1, pp. 14-20.
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The term ‘state building’ is used here to refer to those governmental policies aimed at 
the accumulation, consolidation and centralisation of state power/ In principle, state 
building encompasses the objectives of reaching societal cohesion and political stability 
within the territory of a given state. Historical experience shows that when a state 
comprises a multi-ethnic population, societal cohesion has been sought in one of the 
following three ways: by balancing ethnic demands with state interests; by assimilating 
ethnic minorities into the dominant nation; or by excluding ethnic minorities from the 
state.  ^ Of these three policies, the first is the most feasible, although the most 
challenging. The second, albeit inclusive, becomes problematic especially when 
assimilation is unwanted by the targeted group(s) and may consequently lead to various 
degrees of conflict, whereas the third has produced a catalogue of tragedy. Indeed, 
ethnic cleansing -  like genocide -  is a profoundly problematic way of seeking societal 
cohesion since it involves coercion and the negation of rights of the targeted people. 
This is not to deny the importance of societal cohesion as a contributing condition to a 
state’s political stability but it is to question the feasibility of ethnic cleansing as a 
means towards such an end.
Historically, war has been ‘a great state-building activity’,^  providing ‘the chief 
occasions on which states expanded, consolidated, and created new forms of political 
organisation’.^  Not only does war indirectly create conditions for the mass movement of 
people but it can be employed by a government directly as a means of ethnic cleansing
 ^The meaning o f power is elaborated in Chapter V, pp. 175-177.
 ^ See Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and 
the International System, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, especially pp. 21,196,
 ^ Charles Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History o f European State-Making’, in Charles Tilly, ed.. The 
Formation o f  National States in Western Europe, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 74.
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 
1990, p. 70.
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as in the 1990s former Yugoslavia. Moreover, state building has been intrinsically 
linked to state security, especially during the early stages of state formation when 
boundaries are drawn and state makers seek to impose order and secure exclusive 
control of people. The legitimating ideology for the exclusion of the assorted minorities 
has been primarily that of ethnic nationalism, i.e., the idea that the state should be 
exclusively of and for a particular nation -  a raison d ’être working to the detriment of 
ethno-national minorities.*
Each section of this chapter considers a major case of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan 
region by analysing the motives of the actors who espoused such a policy, their 
legitimating reasons and also the international responses, while taking into account the 
commonalities and differences between them. Although ethnic cleansing can be a 
gradual, low-intensity process, carried out incrementally over a long period of time, the 
following analysis concentrates mainly on large-scale cases of ethnic cleansing, that is, 
cases in which the number of uprooted people is measured upwards by tens of 
thousands. Such cases, in the region, have been most of the time associated with the 
phenomenon of war; ethnic cleansing taking place either during war or in its aftermath. 
Such was the case with ethnic cleansing that accompanied the Balkan Wars of 1912-3, 
forced population ‘transfers’ in the aftermath of the First World War, and ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the course of the Second World War and in the 
course of the regional wars of the 1990s. An exception to this rule was the case of the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria in 1989 when, in peacetime, nearly three hundred 
thousands ethnic Turks were expelled to Turkey. The following proceeds to consider 
these cases in turn.
For the facilitating role o f nationalism see Chapter IV, pp. 162-172.
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III.2 The Balkan Wars and the Great War
The ethnic cleansing that accompanied the Balkan Wars and the Great War was part o f 
the process of nation-state establishment in the region. The emergence o f the Balkan 
states was a gradual process that stretched from early 19^ *^  century till early 1910s/ 
facilitated by the decline of the Ottoman Empire which had ruled the region for nearly 
500 years claiming its ‘legitimacy on the basis o f dynastic loyalty, not ethnicity’. B y  
rejecting the Ottoman rule, nationalist leaders o f the nascent states rejected also any 
form of state organisation enshrined in the Ottoman model and embarked on searching 
for a new concept upon which to base their state’s political organisation. Balkan leaders 
departed from the concept o f a state in which many nationalities with differing 
languages, cultures, and religions occupied the same geographic space and embraced 
the idea that one people with one language and religion should have virtually exclusive 
possession of a given territory. This logic implied that the state ought to be congruent 
with the nation; a state’s territory encompassing all one’s nationals.
The sympathy for national homogenisation, however, neglected the intertwined 
multicultural Balkan setting, which was, obviously, menacing to the new enterprise. In 
view of the mixed demography of the region, obtaining an exact fit between the
 ^ Greece was the first Balkan state to gain independence from Turkey in 1830, the Greek war of 
independence being supported directly by Britain, France and Russia. The Congress of Berlin (1878) 
granted full independence to Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, and affirmed the sovereignty o f Bulgaria 
although reducing the size of her territory previously decided by the San-Stefano Treaty (1877). Under 
the terms of the Congress of Berlin Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Macedonia remained officially 
under Ottoman suzerainty.
Mark Mazower, Dark Continent -  Europe’s twentieth century. New York; Vintage Books, 2000, p. 41.
"  See Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment o f  the Balkan National States, 1804- 
1920, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977, especially p. 320.
The criteria for identifying a nation were not clear-cut, however. Language and religion were the main 
determinants but, often, boundaries were blurred since it was common for people of the same religion to 
speak various languages, or for people who spoke the same language to have different religions. This 
suggests that one’s belief on one’s identification and the role of political action had an important impact 
on national consolidation.
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physical borders of a state and the cultural identity of its inhabitants was a formidable 
task. Given the aspirations of the national elites to achieve their own nation-state which 
was to encompass all the nation, it comes as no surprise that most o f the newly bom 
Balkan states were essentially irredentist in character.*^ They were committed to the 
recovery o f their ‘unredeemed’ national territories, that is, lands inhabited (in part) by 
their own people but not actually incorporated within the national boundaries of the 
state. Given the mixture o f the peoples in the region many territories became the subject 
of redemption by more than one state, setting thus the stage for multiple 
confrontations.^"^ Ethnic cleansing which followed was a consequence o f such irredentist 
thinking which assumed that if  peoples of other ethnic origins were to be removed their 
claims on territory would be forfeited and the risk o f future confrontation(s) would be 
diminished. In addition, this assumption was an underlying theme o f much of the 
warfare that affected the region during the past century.
The first Balkan war was fought by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia (in 
coalition) against the Ottoman Empire, in the name o f national liberation from Ottoman 
rule and was supported tacitly by the Great Powers, which loathed the Ottoman
The term ‘irredentism’ derives from the Italian word ‘irridenta’, meaning those territories, Trente, 
Dalmatia, Trieste, Fiume, which although culturally Italian remained under Austrian or Swiss rule and 
thus unredeemed after the Italian unification (1861). In modern political usage the term refers to territorial 
claims, usually supported by historical arguments -  made by one state to lands within another. Unlike 
secession, whose success depends to a large extent upon group sentiment and loyalty, irredentist claims 
are fostered from above and are usually utilised by governments as a mobilisation instrument, especially 
at times when support is particularly desired. See James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 57, 59, 61, 63.
A classic example is Macedonia whose territory was contested between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. 
From the 1870s onwards Bulgarian, Serb and Greek Orthodox churches vied with each other to persuade 
the Slav Macedonians that they were Bulgarians, Serbs or Greeks respectively. In 1906 due to Greko- 
Bulgarian antagonism in Macedonia an anti-Greek movement in the Bulgarian Black Sea and the Maritza 
valley area sprung up, as a result of which some 35,000 Greeks were forced to seek refuge in Greece. 
Stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York: Macmillan, 
1932, p. 121. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History o f the Balkans 1804-1945, London and New York: 
Longman, 1999, p. 183.
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presence in Europe.T he Balkan armies won a quick victory. Outnumbered by two to 
one, still at war with Italy and Libya, denied the use of sea lanes by the Greek fleet, and 
hampered by Sultan Abdulhamid IPs lack of military preparedness, the Ottoman 
Empire was easily defeated by its former vassals.Excesses in this war, nevertheless, 
were multifarious and no distinct efforts were made to differentiate between Ottoman 
military forces and the Muslim population who lived in the region. Not only were the 
Ottoman forces defeated but roughly 100,000 Turks were forced to flee from the region 
before the armies of the Balkan countries during less than four weeks of the war.^  ^The 
unity of the Balkan allies, nonetheless, laid in the choice of a common opponent. Once 
that opponent was defeated the irredentist agendas and territorial pretensions of the 
Balkan states were bound to clash. Although most peoples in the Balkans perceived 
themselves better off without the Ottoman domination, the ensuing territorial rivalries 
did not render the region a more stable and peaceful place.
The affirmation by the Great Powers, in 1912-3, of the Albanian state fhistrated the 
hopes of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria that all Albanian inhabited territories could be 
divided between them.^* Although the support of Austro-Hungary and Italy ensured the 
recognition of the new state, the Great Powers were not in accord regarding Albania’s 
frontiers. Austro-Hungary and Italy -  supporting the Albanian request -  argued that
Hostilities were opened on 8 October 1912 by Montenegro but by 18 October all other Balkan countries 
had declared war against the Ottoman Empire. An armistice was signed on 3 December 1912 and peace 
negotiations commenced in London on 13 December. The state o f war continued to exist between Turkey 
and Greece, however, because the former would not cede the fortress o f  Janina (Joannina). Montenegro, 
whilst officially at peace after 3 December, continued bombardments at Scutary (Shkodra) in the north o f  
Albania. See Ernst Christian Helmreich, The Diplomacy o f  the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1969, chapters VII and X.
Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile -  The Ethnic Cleansing o f  Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922, Princeton: 
The Darwin Press, 1995, pp. 136-138.
Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities, p. 15.
Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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borders of the new state should include all Albanian inhabited territories while Russia 
and France -  who supported Serb and Greek claims -  resisted the stance o f Austro- 
Hungary and Ita lyT  The end result was a compromise: while establishing an Albanian 
state, the Great Powers at the same time amputated Albanian inhabited territories: 
Kosovo was assigned to Serbia to compensate her fo r^W j^^cc^  into the Adriatic sea 
whilst Chameria (Epirus) was assigned to Greece in compensation for her territorial 
claims to southern Albania. Consequently, more than half o f the Albanian people 
remained outside the Albanian state against their wishes.^^ While in the long-term such 
a settlement subjugated a substantial part o f the Albanian population to foreign rule and 
strained relations between Albania and her neighbours, in the short run it enticed 
Bulgaria to seek compensations in Macedonia, in the hope that she could achieve a swift 
military victory.^*
The contest over the Macedonian territory was the rationale behind the second Balkan 
War (29 June -  30 July 1913), initiated by Bulgaria on Serbia.^^ The aspirations of 
Bulgaria were thwarted swiftly, however, as Serbia and Greece fought in coalition and 
emerged as victors, dividing Macedonia between them.^^ So brutal were the Balkan
Ibid., Chapter X. Helmreich, The Diplomacy o f the Balkan Wars, Chapters XIII and XV.
The drawing of Albanian frontiers was based on the presumption that preserving peace in Europe 
should take precedence over considerations of ethnic composition o f territories. As the British Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey stated to the House of Commons on 12 August 1913, the basic objective of 
the agreement on Albanian borders was to satisfy the Great Powers, but many criticisms could be raised 
by anyone who really knew Albania and viewed the issue from the country's viewpoint. In his words, ‘... 
in the course of the efforts to find a solution, the main goal has been to preserve intact the agreement 
among the Great Powers and if the decision on Albania has attained this, then it has performed the most 
important duty to the benefit of peace in Europe’. Cited in Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: 
A History o f Kosovo, London: Hurst, 1998, p. 84.
Ibid., p. 82. Jelavich and Jelavich, The Establishment o f the Balkan National States, p. 219.
Klimet Dzambazovski, ‘Macedonia on the Eve of the Balkan Wars’ in Béla K. Kirâly and Dimitrije 
DJordjevic, eds.. War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. XVIII, East Central European Society and 
Balkan Wars, Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs Distributed by Columbia University Press, 
1986, pp. 213-220.
The territory of Macedonia was divided as follows: Greece annexed Aegean Macedonia (51 percent of 
the Macedonian territory), Serbia got Vardar Macedonia (39 percent) while Pirin Macedonia (10 percent) 
went to Bulgaria. The national composition of Macedonia was complex. In principle nationality was
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Wars that the members of the International Commission of Enquiry set up by the 
Carnegie Endowment asserted in their report that ‘there is no clause in international law 
applicable to land war and to the treatment of the wounded, which was not violated, to a 
greater or a less extent, by all the belligerents'?'^ Bulgarian action in Macedonia is 
recorded to have been particularly harsh towards the Greeks, Muslims and Serbs?^ 
Reportedly, the Serb and Greek troops committed even greater excesses in turn. 
Although the Serbian army entered northern Macedonia and the Greek army southern 
Macedonia amid cries of jubilation from the population, this initial enthusiasm for the 
liberators soon gave way to doubts, then to disenchantment and finally to despair.^^ The 
Carnegie Endowment Commission noted that the majority of the population in 
Macedonia was Bulgarian at the time and was so called by the Greeks. Serb authorities, 
on the other hand, introduced the category of ‘Slav Macedonians’ in order to conceal 
the existence of Bulgarians in Macedonia.^^ Initially the leaders of the community and 
clerics of the Bulgarian church were expelled to Bulgaria, and then the population was 
directly approached and urged to proclaim themselves as Serbs or G reeks.T he Serb 
authorities treated the population of Vardar Macedonia as ‘rebels in a perpetual state of
determined by religion. A Macedonian listed in Turkish registers as a member o f the Greek Church was 
considered a Greek, a Macedonian listed on the Exarchate’s (Bulgarian national church) roll was 
considered a Bulgarian while a Macedonian registered as a member o f the Serbian Church was considered 
a Serb. But this delineation was neither firm nor final. Frequently, Macedonians peasants would declare 
themselves first as followers o f the Greek Patriarchate, and then o f the Exarchate or o f the Serb Church 
depending on the circumstances and the promises made to them if  they changed affiliation. As 
Dzambazovski points out, political pressure was exerted on Macedonians to declare themselves as 
Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgarians. Besides the church, were the schools in which the Greek, Serbian and 
Bulgarian languages were used not only to educate, but also to indoctrinate people. See ibid., p. 216.
The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction 
and Reflections on the Present Conflict. Introduction by George F. Kennan. Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1993, p. 208.
In Poutnik, for instance, the Serb forces during one night attack o f June 29/30 are said to have suffered 
3,200 casualties, most o f them being killed after surrender. Ibid., p. 140. See also, Z. Duckett Ferriman, 
Greeks, Bulgars and English Opinion, London: Bonner and Co., 1913, pp. 33-4.
The Other Balkan Wars, p. 50.
Ibid., p. 158. The term ‘Slav Macedonians’ is used in this thesis to refer to the people o f Macedonia 
who are o f Slav descent as opposed to Albanian descent, Greek descent, Turkish descent, etc.
Ibid., pp. 53, 165.
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revolt’. ‘The ordinance did not have in view isolated criminals. To punish the culprit? 
That was not enough while his family remained; his family must be deported and the 
friends who were unwilling to ‘denounce’ the culprit, his ‘associates’ who seized the 
opportunity of ‘setting him at liberty’ when he was ‘ under surveillance, guard or escort’ 
by officials or public employees -  they must be deported too’.^  ^ In Aegean Macedonia 
this scenario was repeated down to the smallest detail. The only difference, the Carnegie 
Commission observed, was that the techniques of ethnic cleansing -  including looting, 
rape of women and burning of villages -  were here pursued even more systematically 
and with less human sentiment.^®
A Serb policy of oppression was put in place towards Kosovar Albanians as well. In 
Prizren, Gjakova, Dibra and Ohri, Albanians organised insurrections, all of which were 
eventually defeated by the Serbs. Consequently, some 25,000 Albanians took flight 
whereas many of those who remained suffered at the hands of the Serb soldiers. The 
Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery are known to have used excessive force ‘with a view to the 
entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by 
Albanians’.L e o n  Trotsky, who reported the Balkan Wars in the Western press, was 
shocked by the gamut of atrocities perpetrated in the course of these wars against people 
of Muslim faith, clashing with Balkan national censorships but also with the Russian 
press for their conspiracy of silence about the atrocities committed by the Slavs in the 
Balkans.^^
Ibid., p. 162. 
Ibid., p. 186.
Ibid., pp. 151, 181.
Leon Trotsky, The Balkan Wars 1912-13, New York: Monad Press, 1980. For eyewitness accounts see 
Part II, chapter 3.
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By January 1914, the Bulgarian government estimated that about 132,000 refugees had 
fled to Bulgaria whereas about 100,000 Greeks had left Bulgaria for Greece. Only about 
2,400 refugees from Vardar and Aegean Macedonia were repatriated.^^ The Serb and 
Greek governments, on the other hand, disputed the number o f the Slav minority in 
Greece -  the Serbian sources putting their number at 260,000, while the Greek 
authorities reducing it to 120,000.^"^ This ‘battle of numbers’ in the region was to 
continue until recently as is evidenced in the case of Albanians in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.^^ Traditionally, ethnic communities perceived their numbers to 
be proportionate to their power and often exaggerated them to back their territorial 
claims or group rights. Governments, on the other hand, saw the threat posed by 
minorities as proportionate to their size: the larger their numbers, the greater the threat. 
Hence, the official attempts to undermine the cohesion of particularly large minorities in 
one way or another.
In the wake o f the Balkan wars, Greece and Serbia, in particular, emerged with 
significant gains in terms both o f territory and population. In the case of Greece, the 
new territories were a 70 per cent addition to the kingdom, whose population increased 
from 2.8 million to 4.8 million. According to Greek sources, Greeks made up 43 per 
cent of the acquired population (with 39 per cent Muslim, mostly Turks, 10 per cent 
Slavs and 8 per cent Jewish).^^ By the same token, Serbia roughly doubled its territory
”  The Other Balkan Wars, p. 154.
Ibid., p. 195.
Throughout the 1990s the government in Skopje insisted that Albanian minority made up less than 20  ^
percent of the country’s population whereas representatives of the Albanian community claimed that their , 
share in total population run up to 30 percent. The last census result -  publicised on 1st December 2003, a 
year after the eventual conduct of the census -  cut an average figure of 25 percent. http://www.balkan- , 
info.com/html2/english/031202-WMI-002.htm. ^  ^ >'
Pavlowitch, A /fistory o f the Balkans, pp. 188-9. f \
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and increased her population from 2.9 million to 4.4 million.^^ Likewise, the smaller 
Montenegrin state roughly doubled its territory although not all her irredentist 
aspirations were fulfilled.^* But this aggrandisement in people and territory brought 
about more ethnic heterogeneity, an unwelcomed feature that state administrations took 
measures to reduce. In Serbia, for instance, Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia were 
renamed as ‘Old Serbia’ and ‘Southern Serbia’ respectively.^^ Moreover, Kosovo 
Albanians were placed under a regime of military occupation: about 20 thousand of 
them being killed by the end of 1913, while Muslim families were forced to convert in 
large numbers, those who refused being tortured or shot."*® On the other hand, in 
Macedonia a consistent policy of assimilation was put in place and military authorities 
sanctioned the dismissal of school teachers, priests, and local officials who were not 
willing to declare themselves Serbs."^ * The Muslim minority that Montenegro acquired 
due to its inland expansion, mainly in the Sandzak region, was also subjected to harsh 
repression; about 13,000 Muslims were forced to leave for Bosnia while a comparable 
number of them were converted to Orthodoxy under duress."*^
The idea of the nation-state as an ideal form of political organisation was embraced not 
only by the new Balkan states but also by the Young Turks following the Ottoman
John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History -  Twice there was a country, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, p. 94.
In fact, over one-quarter o f the Montenegrin army died during the unsuccessful attempt to seize Scutary 
(Shkodra) in northern Albania. In the process, Serb and Montenegro fighters burned whole Albanian 
villages including their inhabitants. Their brutality has been vividly portrayed in the eyewitness accounts 
of M. Edith Durham, a British war correspondent and nurse, who administered care to Montenegrin 
soldiers. M. Edith Durham, The Struggle fo r  Scutary, London: Edward Arnold, 1914.
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 114. Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the 
Deceit o f  History. Foreword by David Rieasman. Number Two: Eastern European Studies, College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996, p. 11.
Two thousand Muslim families were estimated to have been forcefully converted in May 1913 in the 
Kosovo region o f Peja (Pec) alone. This policy was pursued in order to strengthen the diplomatic case o f  
the Serb government for the right to incorporate Albanian inhabited lands in Serbia. Noel Malcolm, 
Kosovo: A Short History, New Updated Edition, London: Papermac, 1998, pp. 254-5.
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 94.
Ibid., p. 95.
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defeat in the first Balkan war. In 1914 they sought to rid themselves of national 
minorities and construct a homogeneous Turkish state shifting control of the economy 
to Turkish hands and establishing a Turkish clientele that would provide support for 
their policies."*  ^ In the framework of this plan, attempts were made to persuade the 
Turkish minorities in the Balkan countries to emigrate to Turkey. It is estimated that in 
1914 about 115,000 Muslims left Greece, and 135,000 the other Balkan states, for 
Turkey. On the other hand, in the same year some 265,000 Greeks were driven out of 
Turkey while 85,000 of them were deported to the interior of Asia Minor."*"*
For the remaining Turkish population in the region, the Young Turks sought a 
population ‘exchange’, the first provision of which was made in a Protocol annexed to 
the peace treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey signed at Constantinople in September 
1913. It provided for the ‘authorised reciprocal exchange’ of the Bulgarian and Turkish 
populations within fifteen kilometres of the entire common border between the two 
countries. Nonetheless, given the scale of the uprooted people, the legal provision of the 
‘exchange’ appeared to confirm the reality and compel the remaining inhabitants of 
Bulgarian and Muslim villages in Turkey and Bulgaria respectively to transfer their 
residence to the other side of the ftrontier."*^  Until October 1914, when Turkey entered 
the First World War, some 48,570 Turks from Bulgaria were ‘exchanged’ with 46,764 
Bulgarians from Turkish Thrace."*^
Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy -  The Social Origins o f  Ethnic 
Conflict in the Balkans, London: Greenwood Press, 2001, pp. 183-5. O f course, a crucial part o f the plan 
had to do with the genocide o f the Armenians. Refer to Chapter II, p. 53, footnote 61.
These figures are quoted from C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1934, p. 434. See also Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, 
pp. 183-5.
 ^ See Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities, p. 19.
^  Ibid, p. 20. But the Turkish exodus continued thereafter. It has been estimated that between 1923 and 
1939 around 200,000 Turks left Bulgaria and sought refuge in Turkey coerced by legislation enacting 
property taxation. Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, London: Hurst, 1997, 
p. 79. With the Turks leaving the country in large portions and the influx o f the Bulgarian refugees
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The Turkish officials intended to extend the practice of population ‘exchange’ with 
Greece and in May 1914, the Turkish Minister at Athens had suggested to the Greek 
Prime Minister Eleflherios Venizelos the exchange of the Greek rural population of the 
region of Smyrna (Izmir) against the Turks of Greek Macedonia. Subsequently, the 
Greek Prime Minister had given his consent and a preliminary agreement was reached 
in the same month,"^  ^ but the First World War interrupted these plans -  if only 
temporarily.
In Balkan terms, the Great War was a continuation of the Second Balkan War."** Taking 
advantage of the World War, Bulgaria who supported the Axis powers, sought to revise 
the situation with the view of gaining the Macedonian territories she had lost in the 
Second Balkan War. Indeed, she succeeded in occupying most of Vardar Macedonia 
and eastern Aegean Macedonia, an act which, as Hugh Poulton points out, appeared to 
have been popular with the majority of Slav Macedonians since most of them identified 
themselves as Bulgarians at that time. The Bulgarian army, however, subjected the local 
population to harsh repression: pillage, massacre of civilians and rape of women were 
wide spread. The population of eastern Macedonia was reduced by 30,000 people who 
died due to famine produced deliberately by the Bulgarians, while about 42,000 
inhabitants of the area were deported to Bulgaria."^^
moving in from neighbouring countries, the degree o f national homogeneity in Bulgaria was increased; 
the population rose from 4.3 million in 1910 to 6.3 million in 1934, 86.7 per cent o f the latter being 
Bulgarian speakers. Pavlowitch, A History o f  the Balkans, p. 286. Roudometof, Nationalism, 
Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 190.
Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange o f  Minorities and its Impact upon Greece, Paris: Mouton, 
1962, pp. 55-6.
Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War -  The War in the Balkans, London: Mandarin, 1994, pp. 81-82. 
L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, pp. 545-570.
Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, London: Hurst, 1995, p. 76. See also Report o f  the 
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Cases of ethnie cleansing in the context of the First World War have been recorded also 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following the outbreak of the Great War, Croatia and Bosnia, on 
the one hand, and Serbia, on the other, found themselves on opposing sides of the war; 
Bosnia and Croatia fighting on the side of Austro-Hungary while Serbia fighting on the 
sides of Allies. But this schism was not necessarily as clear cut amongst their people. 
Indeed, enrolled in the Austro-Hungarian army were not only Croats and Muslims but j 
also Serbs. Similarly, although the majority of volunteers from Bosnia in Serbian and/ 
Montenegrin armies were Bosnian Serbs, some Muslims did serve as volunteers in the 
Serbian army as well and there were also Croats who owed their sympathies to 
Belgrade. This notwithstanding, the majority of people of Bosnia remained loyal to the 
Austro-Hungarian state as they did not wish to see their country dominated by Serbia in 
some form of post-war arrangement.^® Following the outbreak of the Great War, a Croat 
Serb division in the Austrian army (headed by the military governor of Bosnia) was 
deployed to fight in Serbia where they encountered the resistance of many Serbs from 
Bosnia. This latter fact seems to have prompted authorities in Bosnia to take harsh 
action against Bosnian Serbs, although the intention of some Croat officials in Sarajevo 
to incorporate Bosnia into Croatia -  an idea opposed by the Bosnian Serbs -  may have 
played a role as well. Serbs from eastern Bosnia were resettled in the west of the 
country ‘for fear of fifth-column activities’, while thousands of others were held in 
internment camps in Bosnia or Hungary or otherwise forced to flee into Serbia or 
Montenegro.^ ^
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia -  A Short History^ New Updated Edition, London: Papermac, 1996, p. 159, 
Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 157-163. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, pp. 106-7. Figures however differ. 
Malcolm mentions that up to 5,500 Serbs were kept in internment camps while roughly 5,000 Serb 
families were driven into Serbia or Montenegro, while Lampe claims that by mid-1917 the number of 
Serbs deported or confined in concentration camps approached one hundred thousand.
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Kosovo, on the other hand, was occupied in the north by Austro-Hungary and in the 
south by Bulgaria. While life for Albanians in the north improved as Austrians were 
generally sympathetic to them, the conditions o f life under Bulgarian rule in the south 
were significantly worse. The Bulgarian policy o f assimilation towards the Serbs and 
Slav Macedonians -  mirroring the policy o f Serbianisation in Kosovo and Macedonia 
carried out by the Serbs between 1913 and 1915 -  was particularly brutal.^^ 
Nonetheless, when in fall o f 1918 the occupying forces in Kosovo suffered defeat and 
Serbian troops returned to the province, they took their revenge against the Albanians 
causing heavy casualties particularly in the Western part o f Kosovo, where many towns 
and villages were razed to the ground. \
III.3 Post World War I population ‘transfers’
The aftermath of the First World War saw the resumption of the idea of population 
‘transfers’ initiated in the wake of the Balkan Wars. Its underlying premise was the 
official believe that minorities were ipso facto  alien elements, ‘anomalies within the 
nation-state’, a factor ‘which weakened and divided it’.^ "^  At the Paris Peace Conference 
the representatives of the Great Powers thought that one o f the ways of achieving a 
more durable peace in areas where the population was ethnically intermingled would be 
to disentangle them by reciprocal migration. Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of 
Peace between Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine 
on 27 November 1919, provided that ‘Bulgaria undertakes to recognise such provisions 
as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may consider opportune with respect to
Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 260-263.
”  Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 12-3.
Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 
10 .
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the reciprocal and voluntary emigration o f persons belonging to racial minorities’.^  ^ A 
special Convention concerning Reciprocal Emigration was signed on the same day by 
the Greek and Bulgarian plenipotentiaries and subsequently ratified on 9 August, 
1920.^^ The Greek government o f the Prime Minister Eleflherios Venizelos viewed the 
Bulgarian minority in Greece -  numbering about 139,000 persons in 1919 -  as a threat 
to permanent peace between Greece and Bulgaria so long as this minority remained in 
that part o f Greece which Bulgaria considered as an ‘unredeemed’ portion of her 
territory. The above mentioned convention was signed with a view to removing such a 
threat. Even though the agreement was intended to make it easier for ethnic minorities 
to join their national state, initially this agreement did not have a significant impact; 
until June o f 1923 only 197 families from Greece and 166 from Bulgaria had applied for 
emigration.^^
In the aftermath o f World War I, Greece did not consider her territorial aspirations to be 
satiated. Inspired by the Megali Idea -  the Great Idea o f a Greece on two continents and 
five seas (Europe and Asia; Ionian, Aegean, Mediterranean, Marmara and Black Sea) -  
and apparently encouraged by Great Britain, France and United States of America -  the 
government of Venizelos declared war on Turkey on 15 May 1919.^* As Arnold
Cited in Alfred Maurice de Zayas, ‘A Historical Survey of 20* Century Expulsions’, in Anna C. 
Bramwell, ed., Refugees in the Age o f Total War, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 18.
Ibid. Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities, pp. 13, 38, 43. De Zayas suggests that the Greko-Bulgaro 
‘exchange’ o f population between 1923-1928 was ‘relatively humane’ and based on a ‘voluntary basis’, 
but he has not considered the internal developments in Greece and the impact o f the Greko-Turkish war. 
See below, pp. 85-88.
Macartney, National States, pp. 439-440.
The Greek offensive aimed at grabbing territory from Turkey and was intended to thwart Italian 
attempts to annex the fertile coast of Anatolia since Italian colonial aspirations in Africa were by and 
large frustrated. For the political and economic rationale behind Greek expansionism in Anatolia and the 
reaction of Western powers on this issue see Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and 
Turkey : A Study in the Contact o f  Civilisations, London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1922, chapter 111; 
and Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, London: Granta 
Books, 1999, pp. 378-382.
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Toynbee has pointed out, in any war with Turkey, Greece could not feel herself the 
aggressor. In invading Ottoman territory she was simply recovering what she regarded 
as her own; she claimed to be waging a war of liberation, a morally defensive war, 
although she took the o f f e n s i v e . H o w e v e r ,  despite its initial success, the Greek 
offensive did not endure. In August 1922, the Turks launched a counter-offensive, 
which drove out the Greek army and with it thousands o f Greek civilians.^® Upon their 
retreat, the Greek army -  and many o f the local Greeks who had been armed by it at the 
beginning of the war -  applied a ‘scorched earth’ policy burning Turkish villages and 
destroying all that was in their way.^* An armistice was brokered at Lausanne in 
November 1922 and a peace treaty was signed on 30 January 1923, under whose terms 
the Greek and the Turkish governments agreed on the compulsory exchange o f Turkish 
and Greek minorities.^^ Only the Greeks o f Istanbul were exempted from the provisions 
o f the Lausanne Treaty, apparently under some pressure from Western countries that 
sought to protect their commercial interests in the city. The same exemption applied to 
the Turks o f Greek Thrace. As a result, about 100,000 Turks were left in Greece and the 
same number of Greeks were left in Turkey.
\
Toynbee, The Western Question, p. 137.
^  Not unlike the case of the Serbs in Krajina (Croatia) and Kosovo in the 1990s, the Greek minority in 
Turkey was compromised by the presence of the Greek army. Greeks in Turkey had welcomed and 
supported the Greek army wholeheartedly and their protectors were not convinced that if their kinsmen 
remained in Turkey they would be spared from reprisals. The departure of the Greek minority therefore 
had both a voluntary and coercive nature. See ibid., pp. 241-2.
McCarthy, Death and Exile, pp. 279-283.
“  At the meeting of T* December 1922 of the Territorial and Military Commission of the Conference of 
Lausanne, it was declared that the four Great Powers (France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan) endorsed the 
proposal of exchange of populations, believing ‘that to unmix the populations of the Near EâsLwjfrJend 
to secure the true pacification o f the Near East aiH because they believe an exchange of populations is the 
...guickesTand most efficacious way of dealing with the grave economic results which must result from the 
greaTmOvement of populations which has already occurred’. Cited In Ladas, The Exchange o f Minorities, 
p. 338.
Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 186. Pavlowitch, A History o f the Balkans, 
p. 238.
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The ‘exchange’ of Greek and Turkish populations affected more than two million 
people. Some 1.3 million adherents of the Orthodox faith were expelled from Turkey to 
Greece, while nearly 800,000 Muslims travelled in the opposite direction. "^  ^ The 
criterion of the exchange was agreed to be religion: Turkish-speaking Orthodox 
Christians, who had more things in common with the Turkish than the Greek way of 
life, had to abandon Asia Minor whereas Greek-speaking Muslims had to leave Greece 
and move to Turkey where most of them felt strangers. These refugees were attached to 
their country of birth by many ties and resented the idea of being forbidden to return 
there. Moreover, the exchange did not have any orderly character; on the contrary, it 
was brutal and occasioned a great deal of human misery.
Reflecting upon the rationale of the Lausarme Convention one analyst has opined that 
this convention was a result of Turkey’s declaration that it would refuse to repatriate 
over a million Greeks exiled from Turkey between 1912 and 1922, so as to prevent the 
Greek community in Turkey from becoming a weapon in the hands of foreign 
governments and from being utilised for subversive purposes. Thus the convention 
simply acknowledged an accomplished fact, although its terms also allowed Greece to 
rid herself of her Turkish minority.However, as Arnold Toynbee suggests, Greece 
proved as incapable as Turkey in governing well a mixed population containing an alien 
majority and a minority of her own, and like the Turkish government, it was influenced
^  Glenny, The Balkans, p. 392. Out o f  this huge number about 150,000 Greeks in Turkey and 400,000 
Turks in Greece left their country o f origin after the Convention o f Lausanne was signed in 1923. Ladas, 
The Exchange o f  Minorities, p. 17. Figures differ. Pentzopoulos maintains that in the aftermath o f  the 
Greeko-Turkish war, 354,647 Muslims left Greece and 339,094 Greeks arrived in Greek Macedonia from 
Anatolia. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange o f  Minorities, pp. 69, 107. The fact that the vast majority 
o f people were uprooted before the signing o f the Convention suggests that the Treaty acknowledged a 
fa it accompli.
Ladas, The Exchange o f  Minorities, pp. 340, 720. Macartney, National States, pp. 444,446.
^  Ladas, The Exchange o f  Minorities, pp. 3, 336, 728.
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by the idea of the nation-state and pursued national homogeneity with vigour and 
wanton rapidity without considering how to modify it according to their specific 
circumstances.^^ The historical record shows that the logic of increasing state security 
by means of national homogenisation does not rest exclusively with Turkey. Greece 
adopted the same logic when it sought to ‘exchange’ its minority with Bulgaria, when it 
expelled Turks and Albanians to Turkey in the aftermath of the Greko-Turkish war, 
when it expelled Albanian Chams to Albania at the end of the Second World War and 
when it expelled Slav Macedonians in the course of the Greek civil war (1946-9) and its 
aftermath.^* The idea of attaining homogeneity by expelling minorities is in fact 
reflexive, a mirror image of an exclusivist logic adopted both by Turkey and Greece, a 
testimony of their incapability of finding ways of accommodating their minorities.
The Greek debacle in Asia Minor and the subsequent Lausanne Convention impacted 
directly on the Greek attitude towards the Bulgarian minority in Greece and Greek 
compliance with the Neuilly Convention of 1919. As already noted, although the terms 
of the latter convention provided for the voluntary exchange of population between 
Greece and Bulgaria in the first three years of its enforcement only about 250 families 
had applied to leave from both Bulgaria and Greece. Faced with the enormous task of 
sheltering a large influx of refugees following the defeat of the Greek army in Asia 
Minor, it became a matter of expediency for the Greek government that population 
transfers with Bulgaria (and Turkey) be accelerated using coercion if necessary.^^
Toynbee, The Western Question, pp. 136, 320.
For the case o f Albanian Chams and Slav Macedonians refer to pp. 86-7 and p. 104 respectively.
As the Greek Prime Minister admitted to Henry Morgenthau in November 1923, the Greek government 
considered o f imperative importance, in particular, hastening the ‘exchange’ o f  population with Turkey 
given that Turkish landlords occupied many thousands o f  acres o f the most fertile lands in Aegean 
Macedonia and Thrace and if these lands could be promptly vacated they would immediately provide 
farms and homes for Greek refugees. Henry Morgenthau, An International Drama, London: Jarrolds, 
1930, p. 86.
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Several thousand Bulgarians were expelled to Bulgaria or fled in order to avoid 
expulsion whilst their homes were taken over by Greek refugees. An exchange that had 
been designed as voluntary in theory became compulsory and coercive in practice. It 
was evident from the beginning that if  carried out on a voluntary basis, the exchange 
would have been a failure given that comparatively few were prepared to avail 
themselves of the Convention voluntarily. Under duress, however, about 50,000 
Bulgarians left Greece for Bulgaria whereas around 25,000 Greeks left Bulgaria and 
settled in Greece.^^
By extension, the influx o f Greek refugees from Turkey impacted hard on the Albanian 
community living in Greece.^* The Greek authorities, nonetheless, distinguished 
between Orthodox Albanians and Muslim Albanians residing in G r e e c e . T h e  former 
were officially considered as Greeks; they were allowed to stay but were subjected to 
assimilation policies. It is the latter who were subjected to ethnic cleansing; they were 
either included in the forced population ‘transfers’ with Turkey or expelled to Albania. 
This was particularly the case o f  the Albanians o f Chameria, many of whom were
Macartney, National States, p. 440. Figures differ. Pentzopoulos suggest that 30,000 Greeks left 
Bulgaria and 53,000 Bulgarian left Greece. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange o f  Minorities, p. 60. 
While Ladas mentions that 46,000 Greeks and 64,000 Bulgarians were ‘exchanged’. Ladas, The 
Exchange o f  Minorities, p. 721. The remaining Slavs in Greece (about 82,000 in 1928) opposed the 
implementation of the Neuilly Convention under the influence o f the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation (VMRO) which struggled to maintain the Slav minority in Greece in order to sustain its 
claims over Greek Macedonia. Macartney, National States, pp. 439, 441. Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: 
Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, p. 30.
On the eve of the Balkan Wars the Albanian minority in Greece was about half a million, concentrated 
mainly in the regions of Joannina, Monastir, and Athens. Vladimir Ortakovski, Minorities in the Balkans, 
Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000, p. 328. Hugh Poulton with MLIHRC, 
‘Minorities in the Balkans’, The Minority Rights Group, Report No. 82, London: Expedite Graphic Ltd., 
1989, p. 34.
A large body of the Albanian community -  about 200,000 -  were Christian Orthodox who spoke both 
Greek and Albanian, many of them being educated in superior Christian schools provided dignitaries for 
the Greek society. Pavlowitch, A History o f the Balkans, p. 171.
Macartney, National States, p. 445. Official statement by Mithat Frasheri, Plentipotentiary Minister of 
Albania in Athens at that time, dated September 8, 1925 in Kaliopi Naska ed., Dokumente per Çamërinë 
(Documents on Chameria).- 1912-1939, Tirana: Dituaria, 1999, pp. 449-450.
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landlords and resented the land appropriation plans undertaken by the Greek 
govemment/"^ Initially, they were included in the Greek-Turkish exchange of 
population, and terror and violence was purportedly used against them in order to 
compel them to leave either for Turkey or for Albania so as to make space for the Greek 
refugees. In May 1924 alone, 38 Albanian villages (about 30,000 people) were emptied, 
their inhabitants expelled to Turkey. The expulsion of the Albanians was carried out 
openly until December 1924 when the Turkish government refused to accept them 
under pressure from its Albanian counterpart.^^ As a result, the ethnic composition of 
Greek Macedonia was completely changed. By 1928 Greeks accounted for 88.8 percent ' 
of the population in Aegean Macedonia, as compared to about 24 percent of their share 
just before the first Balkan war.^^
In sum, the Lausanne Treaty simply acknowledged an accomplished fact: it legalised a 
situation in which thousands of refugees were denied permission to return to their 
homeland against their wishes. The exchange of respective minorities between Greece 
and Turkey had a knock-on effect on the treatment of Bulgarian and Albanian 
communities in Greece. Faced with the arduous task of accommodating hundred of 
thousands of Greek refugees from Turkey, Athens responded with a policy of ethnic 
cleansing of her own, targeting her Albanian and Slav minorities. The most disturbing 
fact of this period is that ethnic cleansing was not only permitted as a practice but also 
considered legitimate as a policy given that international treaties were sanctioned to
Roudomentof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 189. The Other Balkan Wars, p. 195.
Naska, Dokumente per Çamërinë, pp. 97, 101, 241, 397, 406-8, 434-6. The last wave o f ethnic 
cleansing o f the Albanians from Greece occurred in the immediate aftermath o f World War II, when 
about 20,000 Albanian Chams were expelled to Albania allegedly for siding with the Axis forces during 
the war. Hugh Poulton, Minorities in Southeast Europe: Inclusion and Exclusion, London: Minority 
Rights Group, 1998, p. 9; Roudomentof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 190.
Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange o f Minorities, p. 134. The Other Balkan Wars, p. 195.
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legalise it. Not only did the European powers fail to condemn ethnic cleansing but they 
even considered it a success.^^ Although ethnic cleansing produced a greater degree o f 
national homogeneity and arguably more security for Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, it 
also set a dangerous precedent for the future offering a vicious model for those seeking 
territorial divisions along ethnic lines in the region and beyond.
Curiously, at that time, only a handful of politicians realised the dangerous precedent 
that was being set. As Alfred de Zayas points out, the compulsory ‘exchange’ o f 
minorities between Greece and Turkey ‘...was not seen by the international community 
as the brutal uprooting of hundred of thousands o f persons from their homelands; 
instead it was hailed by many as legal measure intended to bring peace on the basis of
78 / /an international treaty and under the auspices of the League of Nations’.
Hitler himself embraced with zeal the idea o f population transfer and became one o f its 
leading advocates and practitioners seeking to populate the occupied territories with 
German kin.^^ Unfortunately, although denouncing Hitler’s policies, the Western 
powers embraced the same idea when they advocated expulsion of as many as 14
The British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill himself was sympathetic to the Greko-Turkish 
experiment and advocated it as an example for ‘solving’ the German minority problem in Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II. On 15 December 1944, in his speech before the House of Commons he stated 
that: ‘... expulsion is the method, which so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory 
and lastiïTgl^ï é ^  will be no mixture o f populations to cause endless trouble. ... A clean sweep will be 
made. ... The disentanglement of populations which took place between Greece and Turkey ... was in 
many ways a success, and has produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since . . . ’. 
Combined quote from Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities -  An International Problem, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1955, p. 97 and Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam -  The Expulsion o f  
the Germans from the East, 3'^ '* edition, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1988, p. 11.
De Zayas, ‘A Historical Survey of 20^ Century Expulsions’, p. 20.
In October 1939 Hitler announced to the Reichstag his plan for ‘a new order’ consisting on a 
resettlement of Germans so that better dividing lines could be obtained. The process commenced with the 
signature of the German-Estonian Protocol (15 October 1939) but was extended later -  by means of 
agreement or occupation -  to Latvia, Russia, Italy, Romania and Poland. German citizenship was offered 
to those who claimed German descent and who had no (known) hereditary disease. Half a million 
Germans from Eastern Europe had moved to Germany by March 1941. See Hedwig Wachenheim,
Mmillion Germans from central and eastern Europe at the end of World War 11.*^  But the 
idea o f population transfer has been extended further afield. As noted in Introduction, a 
scheme for an Arab-Je wish ‘exchange’ of population was put forward in 1937 by the 
British Royal Commission on Palestine based on the ‘instructive precedent’ of the 
Greco-Turkish exchange.** This idea has also set a precedent for displacement in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh amongst others.*^ In the Balkans the model o f forced 
population ‘transfer’ was advocated by Cetnik and Ustasa movements during the 
Second World War, by Radovan Karadzic, Franjo Tudjman and their followers in the 
1990s and even by some members of the Macedonian Academy o f Science as well as 
the former prime minister of FRY of Macedonia Ljubco Georgievski who advocated in 
May 2001 and April 2003 respectively the exchange of minorities between Macedonia 
and Albania.*^
The practice of population ‘transfer’ is vast and painful but it becomes so much more 
disturbing given the influence it has exercised on some journalists and academics who 
advocate such practice as a technique o f conflict resolution.*"* Whatever benefits might 
result from forced population ‘transfers’, however, such practice must be weighed 
against both the tangible and intangible losses involved. Intangible effects may be 
significant given that the displacement o f people involves psychological distress and has
‘Hitler’s Transfers of Population in Eastern Europe’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1942, pp. 705-718. 
For Hitler’s policies during the Second World War see Mazower, Dark Continent, chapter 5.
See De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam.
See Chapter I, p. 18.
Refer to Chapter I, p. 19.
For Cetniks and UstaSa see discussion below p. 92-98. For Karadzic’s and Tudjman’s rhetoric of 
population ‘transfers’ see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death o f  a Nation, Revised and 
Updated Edition, London: Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 220, 246, 306-7. For the case of Macedonia see ‘In 
Pursuit of Ethnic Purity’, Transitions Online, 4 June 2001, http://balkanreport.tol.cz and Ljubco 
Georgievski, ‘Thesis for Survival of the Macedonian Nation and State’, Dnevnik, April 18, 2003, Posted 
on Balkan Human Rights List on April 22, 2003, at
http://groups.vahoocom/group/balkanhr/message/5382.
See Chapter VII, pp. 274-276.
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serious human and social consequences, reducing the cultural inventory of the victims, 
weakening their community networks, undermining their traditions, social mores, ethics 
and value systems/^ As the Bishop of Chichester argued before the House of Lords in 
1946, forced population ‘transfers’, ‘entail an appalling amount of misery and 
hardship’, and ‘represent neither a model of humanity nor a model of wisdom’.*^  They 
involve a tragic human rights trade-off and significant, tangible and intangible, losses, 
which render the endorsement of such a practice profoundly problematic.
III.4 The First Yugoslavia and its aftermath
The creation of a South Slav (Yugoslav) state in 1918 was a matter of expediency. 
While the Serbs saw in such a state an opportunity to unite all their peoples in an 
expanded Serbia, Croats and Slovenes -  unable to secure their independence -  
perceived a Yugoslav state as a source of diplomatic and military leverage against 
Austro-Hungary and Italy both of which laid claims to Croatian and Slovenian 
territories. Moreover, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had an economic incentive to favour 
the idea of a unified state because it promised a large, integrated economy.*^
However, the ideal of creating a nation-state out of the South Slav mosaic, to be brought 
about along the lines of the Italian Conte Massimo d’Azeglio -  ‘We have made Italy,
Human Rights Dimensions o f  Population Transfer, Including the Implantation o f  Settlers, Preliminary 
report prepared by Mr, A, S. Al-Khasawneh and Mr. R. Hatano, United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention o f  Discrimination and 
Protection o f Minorities, E/CN,4/Sub,2/1993/17, 6 July 1993, paragraphs, paragraphs 82, 86-89, 99.
Cited in De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. 12.
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, pp. 89, 99, 112, 127. James Gow, ‘Deconstructing Yugoslavia’, 
Survival, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, July/August 1991, p. 292. The new state initially named the Kingdom o f  
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (renamed as Kingdom of Yugoslavia in January 1929) had a complex 
demographic structure: o f the total population 43 percent were Serbs, 23 percent Croats, 8.5 percent 
Slovens, while the other ethnic groups made up almost one-third o f the population (12 million) o f the 
Kingdom. Barbara Jelavich, History o f  the Balkans -  Twentieth Century, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, p. 151.
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now we have to make the Italians’** proved to be a Herculean task, given the abundant 
mutual fear and misperceptions by various national groups in the country. The Serbian 
domination in state structures became a source of resentment for the other national 
constituencies, particularly for the Croats, who were the most finstrated nation in the 
Kingdom.*^ Whereas the Serb elite viewed the existence of Yugoslavia as an expansion 
of Serbia into Habsburg lands, the Habsburg Slavs, especially the Croats, viewed the 
new state as a federation of independent units. As a result, throughout the inter-war 
period political conciliation was not forthcoming: Croat politicians sought 
decentralisation while the Serb government opted for centralisation, a contradiction that 
in turn became the primary reason for the gradual delegitimisation of the state.^° As 
ethnic relations worsened the state was gradually undermined by sabotage and violence. 
Not only was assimilation a recurrent theme of Serbian policy towards the rest of ethnic 
groups in the Kingdom, but it gradually degenerated to ethnic cleansing. Initially this 
was the case of Albanians in Kosovo but once the Second World War expanded to the 
region, hardline nationalist leaders pressed their irredentist claims and the struggle for 
territory produced more ethnic cleansing in the (puppet) Independent State of Croatia 
(Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, NDH). This section considers these two cases separately.
D ’Azeglio’s famous remarks were pronounced at the first sitting o f the Italian parliament in 1861. 
Cited in E. J. Hobsbaum, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 44.
In the first twenty-four Yugoslav governments (1918-1929), Serbs held the post o f prime minister 97 
per cent o f the time; defence minister, 100 per cent o f the time; interior minister, 92 per cent; foreign 
minister, 83 per cent; and justice minister, 87 per cent. By the eve o f  World War II, out o f 165 generals in 
the Royal Yugoslav Army 161 were Serbs or Montenegrins. Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 8- 
9.
^  Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 195.
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III.4.1 Ethnie cleansing in Kosovo
The Kosovo Albanians were the only ethnic group who were virtually unanimously 
against their inclusion in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and rejected 
the legitimacy of Serbian or Yugoslav rule over Kosovo.^^ Indeed, they challenged Serb 
rule as early as 1918 through the activities of ‘the Committee for the National Defence 
of Kosovo’ (led by Hasan Prishtina) and the Kaçak Movement (led by Azem Bejta 
(Galica) and his wife Shota).^  ^ Although recognised as a language group, Albanians 
were not initially recognised as a national minority by Serb authorities. A 1929 
statement drawn up by the Yugoslav delegation at the League of Nations in response to 
Albanian criticism stated: ‘Our response has always been that in our southern regions ... 
there are no national minorities. That position is still our last word on the question of 
recognition of minorities in Southern Serbia’.D e n y in g  Albanian national identity, 
Serb authorities regarded the Albanians of Kosovo as Albanian speaking Serbs, a thesis 
that was entrenched in the official ideology to justify first the Serbian conquest of the 
province and then its submission. '^^
Responding to the Albanian resistance to Serb domination, Belgrade sanctioned the 
expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo across the border into 
Albania proper. The Albanian-speaking population of the province fell from upwards
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 99. Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 273,
Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 273-278. Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, 
Politics, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 302-5.
Cited in Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 268. The ‘southern regions’ in addition to Kosovo included Macedonia, 
whose people’s identity was also suppressed. The Macedonians were not recognised as a distinct people 
either; instead they were regarded as an ‘unformed’ ethnic group that could be easily assimilated as Serbs. 
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 101. As was the case in Kosovo, Serb language was forcibly imposed 
on the population o f Macedonia and names o f people were changed to Serbian forms. Henri Pozzi, Black 
Hand over Europe, London: Francis Mott Company, 1935, pp. 180-81. But, unlike the case o f Albanians 
in Kosovo, Serb policy towards Macedonians focused on assimilation rather than ethnic cleansing.
Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 268-9. Banac, The National Question, pp. 293-5.
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800,000 to 439,657 in time for the first pan-Yugoslav census (1921).^^ In addition, 
given that 90 percent o f the Albanian population in the first Yugoslavia lived in villages 
and that their main source of living was the land, the Serbian government embarked on 
a programme of colonisation that sought to expropriate the land from Albanian villagers 
with the view to forcing them to leave Kosovo. In turn Serb officials planned to settle 
Slav-speakers in Albanian areas and therefore change the ethnic composition of the 
province in favour of the Serbs.^^ By 1928 about 12,000 families o f Serb colonists 
totalling up to 70,000 people were settled in almost half o f the arable land o f Kosovo.^^
From 1935 onwards, the intensification o f land confiscation from the Albanians was ./cf
based on the pretext that they had no documents proving their title to ownership. The 
whole population of 23 villages in upper Drenica were dispossessed in 1938 alone. The 
government allowed these villagers only 0.4 hectares per family member which, as 
acknowledged by a Serbian policy document, was ‘below the minimum needed for 
survival’. The document went on to elaborate: ‘But that is and has been our aim: to 
make their life impossible, and in that way to force them to emigrate
Although initially Serbia had refrained from compulsory population transfers like those 
practised earlier by Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey she did embrace this idea in earnest by 
1926 when the Belgrade government asked Turkey to take 300,000-400,000
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, pp. 193-4. Banac, The National Question, p. 298.
^  Serb authorities had other goals in pursuing the policy of colonisation, namely: they aimed to stop the 
outflow of people from Serbia and Montenegro that were emigrating to North America by offering them 
grants of free land closer to home; they sought to punish Kaçaks by confiscating their property (and then 
allocate it to settlers); and they sought to attend to security concerns by concentrating new settlers in 
strategically important locations. Hajredin Hoxha, ‘Elemente të presionit ekonomik ndaj Shqiptarëve në 
Yugoslavinë e vjetër’, (Elements of the economic pressure towards the Albanians in the old Yugoslavia’), 
Përparimi, Prishtina, Vol. XVI, No. 4, Prill 1970, pp. 324-326. Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 278-284.
Hivzi Islami, ‘Kosova’s demographic ethnic reality and the targets o f the Serbian hegemony’, Kosova 
Historical/Political Review, Tirana: Eurorilindja, No. 1, 1993, p. 31.
^ Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 283; Banac, The National Question, p. 301.
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A l b a n i a n s . F r o m 1933 onwards there were serious talks between the Yugoslav and 
Turkish governments regarding the deportation to Turkey o f large numbers of Kosovo 
Albanians, whom Yugoslav officials described a s ‘Turks ^ O n  11 July 1938 an inter­
governmental agreement was signed according to which 40,000 families -  defined as 
‘blood relations living under one ro o f -  were to leave Kosovo for Turkey, while their 
land would become state p r o p e r t y . T h e  expectation was that the agreement would be 
implemented over a six-year period: 1939-1944. However, the death of Ataturk and the 
fall o f the Stojadinovic government that had concluded the agreement, the lack o f 
financial means and particularly the outbreak of World War II hindered the completion 
of the planned expulsion o f the Albanians.
In addition, the idea of removing the majority Albanian population from Kosovo was 
discussed frequently by the ‘Serbian Cultural Club’, an influential intellectual group in 
the political life o f Belgrade, especially between 1937-9. One o f the most influential 
members o f the group and a former plotter of the assassination o f Franz Ferdinand in 
Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 -  Vasa Cubrilovic -  argued that Albanians could not be
^  Serbian Colonisation and Ethnic Cleansing o f Kosova: Documents and Evidence, Prishtina: Kosova 
Information Centre Press, 1993, pp. 10-11.
The Yugoslav-Turkish Convention on Deportation of Albanians (1938) is published in ibid, pp. 43-56 
in the French language.
Islami, ‘Kosova’s demographic ethnic reality’, p. 31. The idea of altering the ethnic composition of 
Kosovo by inducing Albanians to emigrate to Turkey was embraced again, however, in the aftermath of 
World War II by the Communist regime. Tito’s break with Stalin and Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the 
Cominform (June 1948) bode ill for the Kosovo Albanians since Albania’s communist alliance with the 
Soviets made them suspect due to their kinship ties with Albania. In order to weaken their national 
consciousness the Yugoslav authorities promoted a policy o f ‘Turkification’, which not only encouraged 
Albanians to be educated in the Turkish language but also to emigrate to Turkey. Consequently, a new 
Yugoslav-Turkish agreement intended to effect Albanian emigration to Turkey was signed in 1953. 
Under the pretext of fighting Albanian nationalism, the secret police headed by Aleksander RankoviC 
(Vice President of Yugoslavia from 1963-66) pursued a campaign of intimidation against the Albanians 
and as a result of the pressure to emigrate between 1953 and 1957 some 195,000 Albanians are reported 
to have left for Turkey. By 1966, the number of Albanians who left Yugoslavia exceeded 230,000, whilst 
simultaneously a new wave of Serb and Montenegrin colonisers were settled in the province. Anton 
Logoreci, ‘A Clash Between Two Nationalisms in Kosova’ in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, eds.. Studies 
on Kosova, Boulder: East European Monographs distributed by Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 188. 
Biberaj in Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, The Albanian Problem in Yugoslavia: Two Views,
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repulsed by means of gradual colonisation alone and that the only efficient way to cope 
with the Albanians was their eviction en masse. His policy paper entitled ‘Iseljavanje 
Am auta’ (The Expulsion o f the Albanians) -  dated March 7, 1937 -  argued that Hitler’s 
discriminatory policies against the Jews and Stalin’s re-location policies affecting 
millions o f people in Russia implied that a plan sanctioned by the Belgrade government 
to render lives of Albanians so miserable that they would leave for Albania or Turkey 
would be tolerated by the international community and its success assured/
Prompted by scarcity of arable land in Montenegro which could not sustain a population
that was increasing steadily (16 percent from 1912 to 1931), Cubrilovic argued for the
settlement o f Montenegrins in Kosovo:
The increase in the Montenegrin population has brought poverty, which has 
recently led to incessant social-political movements detrimental to the authority 
o f our state and somewhat dangerous for future law and order. It is not in our 
interests to offer these people maize and pensions. The only solution is to move 
them to the fertile regions o f Kosovo and Metohija because they are close to the 
Albanians in mentality and t e m p e r a m e n t . ^  ^  ~
Introduction by Hugh Seton-Watson, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982, p. 29. William W. 
Hagen, ‘The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, 1999, p. 58.
Vasa Cubrilovic, ‘The Expulsion of Albanians’, Kosova Historical/Political Review, No. 3, Tirana: 
Eurorilindja, 1994, p. 41. Cubrilovic’s thesis resurfaced again in 1950s when he authored a report entitled 
‘The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia’, which was addressed to the senior Yugoslav leadership 
including Tito, Milovan Djilas and Aleksander RankoviC, where he re-activated his pre-war views on the 
necessity o f expelling Albanians from post-war Yugoslavia because of the strategic importance of holding 
on to Kosovo. See Vasa Cubrilovic, ‘The Minority Problem in the New Yugoslavia’, Kosova 
Historical/Political Review, no. 1, Tirana: Eurorilindja, 1993. As Mark Almond asserts, for all his 
devotion to the Serbian cause, Cubrilovic was an extraordinary political chameleon. He survived the First 
and Second World War and entered Tito’s government, still advocating the expulsion of the Kosovar 
Albanians. Living to a ripe old age (dying in 1990) Cubrilovic was one of the spiritual fathers of the 
revival of Serbian nationalism after Tito’s death. A prominent member o f the Serbian Academy, 
Cubrilovic’s influence was an essential prerequisite for the Academy’s Memorandum of 1986. Almond, 
Europe’s Backyard War, pp. 89, 194-5. See also below p. 110.
Vasa Cubrilovic, ‘The Expulsion o f Albanians’, Kosova Historical/Political Review, No. 4, Tirana: 
Eurorilindja, 1994, p. 37.
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Cubrilovic lamented the fact that Albanian inhabited territories impaired Serb
expansion in the south and prevented the direct connection between Serbia and
Montenegro, and Macedonia. In his geo-strategic thinking:
Until the connection of Serbia and Montenegro with Macedonia along the whole 
of its extent from the Drin River to Southern Morava is re-established, we will 
not be secure in our possession of this territory. From the ethnic standpoint the 
Macedonians will fully unite with us only when they enjoy true ethnic support 
from the Serbian motherland, which they have lacked to this day. This they will 
achieve only through the destruction of the Albanian block.
Cubrilovic argued that the eviction of Albanians could be secured by a range of 
multiple means: generation of fear among Albanian masses; implementation of a policy 
of divide and rule by winning over men of influence; applying legal pressure in order to 
render the existence of Albanians in Kosovo as bitter as possible through the imposition 
of fines, arrests, ruthless collection of taxes, harassment of the clergy, ploughing 
graveyards, burning down Albanian villages and town quarters, etc. He suggested also 
that Cetnik operations should be licensed in Kosovo and that Serb colonists should be 
given arms; massive clashes should be provoked with the Albanians and if necessary 
should be put down by blood engaging colonisers and C e tn i k s . I n  the event, as a 
result of the repressive policies embodied in the colonisation programme or through 
direct pressure put on the Kosovo Albanians, more than 100,000 of them left the 
province between 1918 and 1941.^ ®^
Vasa Cubrilovic, ‘The Expulsion o f Albanians’, Kosova Historical/Political Review, No. 3, Tirana: 
Eurorilindja, 1994, p. 39. Serbian Colonisation and Ethnic Cleansing o f  Kosova, p. 19.
Vasa Cubrilovic, ‘The Expulsion o f  Albanians’, pp. 41-2. Serbian Colonisation and Ethnic Cleansing 
o f  Kosova, pp. 24-7. Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 5-6. Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 284.
The figure estimated by Malcolm is between 90,000 and 150,000. Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 286. Vickers 
puts the figure between 200,000 and 300,000. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 119. Biberaj 
mentions more than half a million. Biberaj in Pavlowitch and Biberaj, The Albanian Problem in 
Yugoslavia, p. 25.
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This pattern of ethnic cleansing was reversed from April 1941 until the latter months of 
World War II when most of Kosovo had fallen under Italian rule and was eventually 
joined to Italian-occupied Albania. On April 1941, the northern tip of the province had 
been occupied by Germany while the eastern part of Kosovo together with Macedonia 
were annexed by Bulgaria which repeated the repressive policy for the region adopted 
during World War I. The Albanian leaders in the north of the province were 
preoccupied with the idea of removing Serb and Montenegrin colonists from the 
province and recovering the confiscated land that had been given to them, an idea which 
the Germans endorsed. During the first two or three months of occupation, up to 20,000 
Serbs and Montenegrins were driven out of Kosovo while as many as 10,000 houses 
were burned. By April 1944, the chief German political officer in Belgrade, Hermann 
Neubacher, calculated that since 1941 around 40,000 Serbs and Montenegrins had been 
expelled from Kosovo. Many of these expelled Serb and Montenegrin colonists did 
not return to Kosovo at the end of the Second World War; about 4,000 colonist families 
moved in other parts of Yugoslavia; more than half of these were settled in Vojvodina 
in the homes of the Germans and Hungarians expelled by the post-war Communist 
regime.
It can be surmised from the above that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was conditioned by 
concerns of a political (consolidating control in the province), economic (redistributing 
provincial resources to fellow Slavs), geo-strategic (securing direct links between Serbia 
and Montenegro, and Macedonia), security (furnishing the belief that only that ‘country
Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 290-4.
Ibid., p. 305. Serb sources put this figure up to 100,000. See for instance, Alex N. Dragnich and 
Slavko Todorovich, The Saga o f  Kosovo: Focus on Serbian-Albanian Relations, Boulder: East European 
Monographs distributed by Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 138.
Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 318.
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which is inhabited by its own people can be sure of its security’ and demographic 
(tilting the ratio of the population in favour of the Serbs) nature. The changing sides of 
the perpetrators and victims during World War II, should be understood not merely in 
terms of revenge on the side of the Albanians but more importantly in terms of the 
Albanians’ lifetime repression and exclusion in the Yugoslav state. In addition, the 
latter suggests that ethnic cleansing can have an opportunist dimension provided by its 
nexus with the occurrence of war.
III.4.2 Ethnic cleansing in the Independent State o f Croatia (NDH)
As noted, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was plagued by an early crisis 
that stemmed from the diverging expectations and attitudes of its constitutive peoples 
towards the new state. While the new administration dominated by Serbs opted for a 
centralised state that sought a ‘fusion’ of the South Slav ‘tribes’ it became increasingly 
difficult for non-Serbs to distinguish between Yugoslavism and greater Serbian 
nationalism.^Political co-operation especially on the part of the Croats was not 
forthcoming and political murder was employed by the Serbs to settle scores with 
political opponents, one of the most notorious being the assassination of the Croat 
Peasant Party’s leader, Stjepan Radic, during a session of the parliamentary assembly in 
the capital -  Belgrade -  on 20 June 1928 following which political co-operation 
between Croats and Serbs virtually ceased.
This quote comes from Cubrilovic, ‘The Expulsion of Albanians’, Kosova Historical/Political Review, 
No. 3, Tirana: Eurorilindja, 1994, p. 39. Also in Serbian Colonisation and Ethnic Cleansing o f  Kosova, p. 
19.
Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 192.
For an account o f this event see Glenny, The Balkans, pp. 409-412.
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Radie’s death was a ‘disaster for Yugoslavia’ since it came to justify complete rejection 
of the state in minds of many Croats. The political quarrels between the Serbs and 
Croats paved the way for and justified the following Royal Dictatorship. On January 
1929 King Aleksandar Karadordevic seized power, suspended the constitution and 
changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yet, as Mark Almond has pointed out, however much the King 
might posture as sovereign of the newly named ‘Yugoslavia’, his rule remained 
essentially Serbian and his police took brutal measures against any threat to the integrity 
of his kingdom which might be posed by non-Serb political or intellectual forces. In 
the meantime. Ante Pavelic, the Vice-President of the Croatian Bar Association and a 
former delegate to the Parliament in Belgrade, established Ustase-Hrvatska 
Revolucionarna Organizacija (UstaSa-Croatian Revolutionary Organisation), the name 
Ustasa derived from ustati, meaning to stand up. The ultimate goal of the Ustasa 
movement was the establishment of an independent Croatian state and by 1930 several 
hundred Ustasa émigrés had set up paramilitary training camps in Italy under the 
patronage and control of M ussolini.^In a belated attempt to reorganise the Yugoslav 
Kingdom, in August 1939 an agreement was reached between the Prime Minister 
Cvetkovic and the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party Vladko MaCek, known as the 
Cvetkovic- MaCek Sporazum (Agreement) which set up a self-governing province of 
Croatia that encompassed roughly 30 percent of Yugoslav territory and population (4.4 
million, including 866,000 Orthodox Serbs and about 164,000 Muslims). But this 
endeavour failed to appease the Ustasa who objected to the borders of the new entity in 
that they failed to include all Bosnia, which the Ustasa claimed to be historical Croatian
Almond, Europe's Backyard War, p. 123. 
"'‘ ibid., p. 124.
115 Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, p. 87. Jelavich, History o f  the Balkans, Vol. 2, p. 201.
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land/^^ The membership of the Ustasa movement, however, remained low, popular 
support for it did not exceed 10 percent of the population/
The support o f Italy, however, enabled the Ustasa to proclaim the Independent State o f 
Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, NDH) on April 10, 1941 (barely four days after 
Italy’s annexation of the country). The new state included present-day Croatia and 
Bosnia. The NDH’s official propaganda adopted the line that Serbs and Croats could 
not live together and consequently set out to create an ethnically pure Croatian state 
from which Serbs, hut also Jews and Roma, would be permanently excluded. The latter 
groups were denied citizenship in the NDH, a measure designed to speed up the 
sequestration of their assets. Upon attaining power the Ustasa began executing 
suspected opponents and encouraging the local militias to evict Serb families to Serbia. 
The Serbs were purged from government service, the military, mass media, business, 
and other professions, and the use of the Cyrillic alphabet was banned.*** Bosnian 
Muslims also suffered discrimination and some persecution despite the fact that Pavelic 
regarded them as the purest Croats, the ‘flower o f the nation’. Whereas a minority o f 
Bosnian Muslims supported the Ustasa movement, the majority o f them appear to have 
remained either opposed to or neutral toward it and tried to stay clear o f the fighting.**^
The main concern of the NDH’s authorities, however, lay with the large Serb minority 
whose presence in the view of Ustasa leaders ‘endangered Croatian existence’. In order
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, pp. 191-3. Glenny, The Balkans, pp. 475-6.
Figures vary and a study put this figure as low as 1 percent of the Croat population. For the upper limit 
see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 204, for the lower one see Philip J. Cohen, Serbia's Secret War, pp. 
195-6 (footnote).
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 204. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, p. 89. Glenny, The Balkans, p. 
499.
Philip J. Cohen p. 101. For an analysis o f the position of the Bosnian Muslisms in NDH see Malcolm, 
Bosnia, pp. 185-92.
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to solve the Serb question in the NDH, the Ustasa claimed that a third of about two 
million Serbs living there would be expelled; a third would be assimilated through 
conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism; and a third would be killed. Widespread 
acts of terror against the Serbs began in May 1941 while expulsion commenced the 
following month. Ustasa militias deployed throughout Bosnia and the Krajina region of 
Croatia first tried to conglomerate as many Serbs as possible into camps for expulsion 
to Serbia. Although individual resisters were killed, John Lampe suggests that it was 
only when expulsion became increasingly difficult, that the Ustasa resorted to mass 
killing in villages and dispatchment of the prisoners to the death camps. Lampe asserts 
that ‘by July 1941, German authorities in Serbia had recorded nearly 140,000 people 
pushed across the border, with perhaps another 40,000 unrecorded. The German 
military command in Belgrade responded by cutting the number of authorised border 
crossings to two, then to one, and by autumn to none’.^ ^^  This point unleashed mass 
killing and forced conversion of the Serbs. Buttressed by pseudo-historical propaganda 
that claimed that the Serbs of Bosnia and of the old Military Border in Croatia were 
actually Croats or Vlachs that were forcefully proselytised into Orthodoxy in Ottoman 
times or the interwar period, the UstaSa regime launched a campaign of coerced 
conversion under which, during 1941-2, about one-quarter million Serbs were 
catholicised.*^^ The number of Serbs killed on the territory of the NDH during this 
period remains controversial. In the 1990s Serb sources alleged that more than 700,000 
Serbs were murdered whilst their Croatian counterparts put the figure down to tens of 
thousands.
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p, 205. Glenny, The Balkans, p. 498. 
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, pp. 206-7.
Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-45: The Chetniks, Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1975, p. 106.
For accounts o f  this controversy and its political manipulations see Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard 
War, pp. 3-7. Phillip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 106-112. Robert M. Hayden, ‘Recounting the
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The NDH’s excesses not only jeopardised Ustasa relations with Italy given that they 
undermined Italian control in the country, but also gave way to open action in the NDH 
of Cetniks who took revenge against the civilian population, most of whom happened to 
be Muslim rather than Croat. The Cetnik movement took shape during the initial 
months of World War II. The name Cetnik, chosen by the leader of the Movement 
Draza Mihailovic, originated from the word Ceta used initially by upland guerrilla 
bands that opposed the Ottoman rule in Montenegro, Herzegovina and northern Albania 
and eventually in all central Balkans at the beginning of the 20^ century.Though the 
Cetnik bands did not have many fighters, (in the initial months of the war only about 
10,000), they had enough to persuade many Serbs that active resistance was under 
way.^ ^^
Cetnik ideology was expounded in a memorandum entitled ‘Homogenous Serbia’ (dated
30 June, 1941) written by a leading Cetnik ideologue Stevan Moljevic,^^^ who reckoned
that the primary and essential duty of Serbs was:
to create and organise a homogenous Serbia which must encompass the entire 
ethnic territory where Serbs live, and to secure for Serbia all necessary strategic 
and communication lines and centres as well as economic regions that would 
forever enable its free economic, political and cultural development. These 
strategic and communication lines and centres are necessary for the security, 
life, and survival of Serbia, and if in some regions today we do not have a 
Serbian majority, those regions must serve Serbia and the Serbian people... 
Transfers and exchanges of population, especially of Croats from Serbia and of 
Serbs from the Croatian areas, is the only way to arrive at their separation and to
Dead: The Rediscovery and Redefinition o f  Wartime Massacres in Late- and Post-Communist 
Yugoslavia’, in Rubie S. Watson, ed.. Memory, History and Opposition under State Socialism, Santa Fe, 
New Mexico: School o f American Research Press, 1994, pp. 167-184.
The worst killings took place in the Foca-Cajnice region where at least 2,000 Mulsims were killed by 
Cetniks and local Serbs in August 1942 and in February 1943 more than 9,000 were massacred. Malcolm, 
Bosnia, p. 188. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, pp. 206,209,210. Glenny, The Balkans, pp. 494-5.
Pavlowitch, A History o f  the Balkans, p. 315.
Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, p. 202.
M oljevic’s memorandum was an extension o f  a recurrent theme o f  the Serbian political discourse. In 
fact it echoed an earlier memorandum o f  Ilija GaraSanin o f 1844, titled ‘Nacertanije’ (The Outline), that 
had propagated the assimilation o f the various non-Serbian peoples living within the envisioned Greater 
Serbia. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 68. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 3-4. For an analysis o f  
the main objective o f the Cetnik movement see Tomasevich, War and Revolution, pp. 166-69.
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create better relations between them, and thereby remove the possibility of a 
repetition of the terrible crimes ... in the entire area in which Serbs and Croats 
live intermixed ...
In the summer of 1941, the Belgrade Cetnik Committee proposed that, in order to make 
Greater Serbia purely Serbian in composition, large-scale population ‘shifts’ would be 
necessary -  specifically: some 2,675,000 people would have to be expelled (including 
one million Croats and half a million Germans), and that 1,310,000 Serbs would be 
brought into the newly annexed areas. No figures were given for ‘shifts’ of Muslims, 
although it was acknowledged that ‘in the Serbian unit the Muslims present a grave 
problem and if possible it should be solved in this p h a s e A  Cetnik directive of 
December 20, 1941, specified their goals to create an ‘ethnically pure’ Greater Serbia, 
consisting of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Hezegovina, and Vojvodina, 
‘cleansed ... of all national minorities and non-national elements’. This directive 
provided also for ‘cleansing the Muslim population from the Sandzak and the Muslim 
and Croatian populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina’.
Cetnik plans for the homogenisation of Serbia may have been a reaction to the 
massacres of the Ustasa against the Serbs in the but at the same time they also
represented an extension of a theme with deep roots in the Serbian political culture. 
Nonetheless, both Cetnik and Ustasa failed in their objectives not least because both 
movements lacked a sound political and military organisation, a compelling ideology.
Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 3-4,44. Tomasevich, War and Revolution, p. 167.
See Tomasevich, War and Revolution, p. 170.
Ibid. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, pp. 44-5.
Tomasevich, War and Revolution, p. 173.
Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, p. 3. See also Paul N. Hehn, ‘The Origins o f Modem Pan-Serbism -  The 
1844 Nacertanije o f Ilija Garasanin: An Analysis and Translation’, East European Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 
2, 1975, pp. 153-71. Michael Boro Petrovic, History o f  Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, Vol. I, New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976, pp. 230-235. Banac, The National Question, pp. 82-84.
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and a sufficiently popular base/^^ Yet even though neither Cetnik nor Ustasa succeeded 
in implementing their plans in full scope and scale, ethnic cleansing became a 
significant feature of this multiple war, which was to be utilised later in order to 
manipulate events in the 1990s.
III.5 The case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria -1989
The post World War II era, from 1945 till the late 1980s, saw far less ethnic cleansing in 
the Balkans than beforealthough  large scale cases of ethnic cleansing in the context 
of warfare or its aftermath can still be identified. Such was the case of the Germans, 
around half a million of whom were expelled from Yugoslavia alone in the second half 
of the 1940s,*^  ^ and the Slav Macedonians during the Civil War in Greece (1946-49) 
about 50,000 of the latter being ethnically cleansed allegedly for supporting the Greek 
commun i s t s .At  first sight, however, ethnic cleansing of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria in the late 1980s appears to be a sort of oddity, not only because it lacked 
association with war but also because the region had seemingly departed from such an 
experience for good.
The ultimate beneficiaries o f the struggle between UstaSa and Cetniks were the communists who 
emerged as winners at the end o f the war and established for a second time a Yugoslav state. As Serbs 
fled from UstaSa they joined either the Cetniks or the partisans, but their allegiance often switched back 
and forth between the two depending on whose strength prevailed locally. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, p. 
95.
This may be attributed to the fact that most o f the region fell into the Communist block whose official 
policy did not emphasise the ethno-national difference. Moreover, the Cold War tended to hinder internal 
conflict.
The expulsion o f the Germans from Yugoslavia was an episode o f ethnic cleansing o f as many as 14 
million Germans from Central and Eastern Europe sanctioned by the Great Powers following Nazi defeat. 
For the rationale o f the latter expulsion see Chapter VI pp. 241-242. Refer also to footnote 77 above.
The oppression o f the Slav Macedonians continued during the 1950s; the use o f  Slavonik names was 
forbidden, the use o f the Macedonian language was banned and in the border regions with Yugoslavia, 
Macedonian peasants were not allowed to move from their villages. Due to such repressive measures 
many o f  them emigrated to Australia or Canada. Since the end o f  the Greek Civil War, the official denial 
o f the existence o f a Slav Macedonian minority continues to be a constant o f  the Greek government. 
Hugh Poulton with MLIHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, pp. 30-31.
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In order to understand how ethnic cleansing of the Turks of Bulgaria came about it is 
useful to consider some relevant features in the relations between the Communist 
Bulgarian authorities and the Turkish minority in the years preceding 1989 when the 
Bulgarian Turks fled en masse to Turkey. The nation-state building efforts in Bulgaria 
indicate that ethno-national minorities were often viewed by officials with distrust and 
considered a factor that undermined Bulgarian national cohesion; this being particularly 
the case of the Turkish minority, the biggest in the country (in the 1990s comprising 
some 900,000 individuals, or about 10 percent of the total population).
One of the central aims of the Bulgarian Communist regime was the construction of a 
one-nation Bulgarian state, the official view among many Bulgarian administrations 
being that the population of the state had to be or to be made into ‘Bulgarian’ that is. 
Eastern Orthodox in religion and Bulgarian-speaking in language. The hardest 
stumbling block in the accomplishment of this policy was the existence of a large 
Turkish minority. At various times, Sofia had reached agreement with Ankara in order 
to facilitate the emigration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, the largest emigration being 
recorded between 1949-51.*^* In August 1950 the Bulgarian government claimed that a 
quarter of a million Turks had applied to leave the country. The Turkish government for 
its part was reluctant to accept such mass immigration and in November 1950 closed the 
country’s border with Bulgaria due to illegal crossing. In January 1951 the two 
governments agreed that only Turks in possession of a Turkish entry visa could enter 
Turkey. But in November 1951 Turkey closed its border again on the ground that
Roudometof, Nationalism, Glohalisation, and Orthodoxy, p. 190.
This emigration wave grew out o f the Turkish minority’s anxieties over the 1946 nationalisation of  
Turkish schools and the confiscation o f the minority’s private property. For a detailed account o f  1949-51 
emigration see Bilan N. Çimçir, The Turks o f Bulgaria (1878-1985), London: K. Rustem & Brothers, 
1988, pp. 167-81.
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Bulgarian officials had forged Turkish entry visas in order to rid itself of as many Turks 
as possible. It has been estimated that about 155,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey in 
this period. In 1968 another agreement was reached which provided for the departure in 
the following ten years (1968-78) of close relatives of those who had left in the period 
1944-1951. Some 60,000 Turks left Bulgaria under the terms of the latter agreement.
It has been suggested that the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus provoked worries in 
Bulgaria due to its sizeable Turkish minority. Fearful of repetition of the Cypriot 
scenario on its own soil, the Bulgarian state closed down most Turkish schools, 
newspapers, and journals. Moreover, the government adopted a policy of negating the 
identity of the Turkish minority: according to the Bulgarian officials there were no 
Turks in Bulgaria, but only ‘Turkified Bulgarians’. During the 1970s there were 
repeated cases of ethnic Turks being pressured to exchange their names for Bulgarian 
ones and renounce their own religion. Adherence to Islamic faith was seen by the 
authorities as inhibiting the loyalty of the Communist government. This was set out in a 
1977 article published in an official publication {Filosofska Misul) in Sofia, which 
stated:
It was clear to the Bulgarian Communist Party that the Bulgarian Mohammedan 
problem was, above all, of social origin. That is why ... (the Party) set as its 
objective the elimination, above all, of the social roots of Islam in the Rhodope 
... (to) heal the wounds and traumas in (the) spirituality of Islamicised 
Bulgarians ... (to) emancipate the Bulgarian awareness in them, dulled and 
concealed in the course of centuries, and to accelerate their joining of the 
Bulgarian socialist nation.
Nonetheless, according to Amnesty International, until late 1984, forced assimilation of 
ethnic Turks was not pursued by the Bulgarian authorities on a consistent basis. But in
Bulgaria: Imprisonment o f  Ethnic Turks -  Human Rights Abuses during forced assimilation o f the 
Ethnic Turkish Minority, London: Amnesty International, April 1986, pp. 3-4.
Mary Neuburger, ‘Bulgaro-Turkish Encounters and the Re-Imagining o f  the Bulgarian Nation (1878- 
1995)’, East European Quarterly, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-6.
Cited in Bulgaria: Imprisonment o f  Ethnic Turks, p. 5.
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the latter months of that year there was a shift in the official policy; in December 1984, 
the Bulgarian authorities initiated a countryside campaign to change forcibly the names 
of all Turks of Bulgaria. Among the reasons cited for such a shift in policy have been 
the following:
- A demographic imbalance in terms of population growth of the Bulgarian 
majority and Turkish minority -  the growth rate of the former declining while 
that of the latter rapidly increasing. It appears that the demographic imbalance 
between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo and the attendant problems for 
the Yugoslav authorities presented a warning sign for the Bulgarian government.
- Economic insecurity in view of the fact that important agricultural areas vital for 
Bulgaria’s valuable tabacco exports and major wheat production areas were 
becoming increasingly populated by minorities, especially the Turks.
- Adherence to Islamic faith was perceived by the authorities as impairing 
communist cohesion in the country.
- Fear of the influence of Muslim ftmdamentalism from neighbouring Turkey.
- A national census scheduled for December 1985 seemed to have increased the 
authorities’ anxieties to claim, at least on paper, transformation of Bulgaria into 
a one-nation state.
- Officially, assimilation policies were premised on modernisation of the country. 
The Bulgarian Communist Party claimed that, led by the ideology of Marxism- 
Leninism, Bulgaria was to become a modem industrial state in which all citizens 
spoke the same language and shared the same customs. The presence of a large 
minority, living in concentrated areas, speaking a different language and having
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different customs and way of life was seen by the Government as an obstacle to 
the modernisation process/'^^
In early 1985 the Bulgarian officials stated that ethnic Turks were in fact descendants of 
Slav Bulgarians who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule and 
that these ‘Slav Bulgarians’ were ‘voluntarily’ and ‘spontaneously’ requesting new 
Bulgarian names as an indication of their ‘rebirth in the Bulgarian nation’ By the end 
of March 1985 the name-changing campaign had apparently been completed and Stanko 
Todorov, Chairman of the National Assembly, reported on 28 March that the 
‘resumption’ of Bulgarian names by citizens with ‘Turkish-Arabic’ names had been 
completed safely. Bulgaria was a ‘one-nation state’ and that in the ‘Bulgarian nation 
there are no parts of any other peoples and nations
Nevertheless, the Bulgarian official claim that the entire Turkish population of Bulgaria 
voluntarily chose to exchange their Turkish/Muslim names for Bulgarian/Slavic ones, to 
give up their Turkish language and renounce their Turkish customs and rituals is hardly 
credible. Despite the Bulgarian official stance there is abundant evidence that 
intimidation and even violence were used to a large extent to compel the Turkish 
minority to comply with this state sponsored assimilation policy.
Ibid., pp. 7, 24-5. Destroying Ethnic Identity -  The Turks o f  Bulgaria, New York: Helsinki Watch, 
June 1986, pp. 28. Hugh Poulton with MLIHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, pp. 9-11. Eminov, Turkish 
and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria, pp. 91-99.
Bulgaria: Imprisonment o f Ethnic Turks, pp. 9, 20,24-5.
Ibid., p. 9.
For such evidence see Bulgaria: Imprisonment o f  Ethnic Turks, pp. 9-14. Hugh Poulton with 
MLIHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, pp. 9-22. Hugh Poulton, The B aiuns: Minorities and States in 
Conflict, London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991, Chapters 10 and 11.
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Whereas initially the name-changing campaign was met with sporadic small scale 
protests by the Turkish minority, by 1989 a Turkish civil rights group was formed and 
mass protests started, including hunger strikes and demonstrations. As a result the 
authorities increased their pressure and begun expelling initially mainly Turkish 
activists to Turkey. Soon thereafter this took the form of an exodus, with at least 60,000 
refugees crossing the border during the first half of the year. By late August the number 
climbed to 300,000. "^^  ^ The exodus of the Turks provoked condemnation by 
international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) -  then known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) -  and the United Nations, as well as individual countries such as 
Turkey, United States of America and other Western and Islamic countries, under which 
pressure following the demise of Todor Zhivkov’s regime at the end of December 1989, 
the Bulgarian government revoked the assimilation campaign and allowed the Turkish 
minority to return to their homes. This was the first instance in the Balkan region 
when ethnic cleansing was reversed.
III.6 Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s^ ^^
Ethnic cleansing in the 1990s accompanied a process of state disintegration and 
reformation, as the federation of Yugoslavia became inoperative and new states 
emerged in the wake of its disintegration. A policy of decentralisation unleashed by the 
1974 Constitution that loosened the federal structure and expanded the autonomy of the
Poulton, The Balkans, p. 153.
Ibid., pp 160-1. Hugh Poulton with MLIHRC, ‘Minorities in the Balkans’, p. 22. Darina Vasileva 
points out, however, that while over 150,000 Turks returned to Bulgaria, more than 200,000 chose to 
remain permanently in Turkey. Darina Vasileva, ‘Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return’, 
International Migration Review, Vol. 26, No. 1,1992, p. 348.
This section presents a sketch o f the key events in the chain o f  causes and consequences o f  ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. For a detailed analysis see Chapter V.
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provinces o f Kosovo and Vojvodina had alienated Serb nationalists who perceived the 
latter arrangement as the carving up of Serb territory into three parts (Serbia proper and 
the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and V o j v o d i n a ) . N o t  only did they protest 
against what they perceived as the partition o f Serbia but also against the alleged federal 
government’s discriminatory policy vis-à-vis the Serb Republic in the economic field 
and against alleged anti-Serb policies pursued by Kosovo Albanian ‘separatists’.^ ®^ 
Their complaints were spelled out in a manifesto issued in 1986 by Belgrade’s leading 
Serbian intellectuals known as the ‘Memorandum o f the Serbian Academy o f Science 
and Arts’, a document that portrayed Serbs as the most victimised people in Yugoslavia, 
suggesting that the Serbs’ suffering demanded compensation: the borders of the Serb 
Republic should be redrawn so that all Serbs throughout Yugoslavia could live in an 
expanded Serbia.
This platform was adopted by the new Serb leader Slobodan M ilosevic who pressed for 
further centralisation of the federation and in March 1989 abolished the autonomous 
status o f Kosovo and Vojvodina, in addition to deposing the leadership in Montenegro 
with a view to securing its c o n t ro l .C e n t r a l i s i n g  tendencies coupled with the
Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalisation, and Orthodoxy, pp. 214-5.
In Kosovo Serb nationalists commonly complained that they were being compelled to leave the 
province by Albanian pressure. But facts do not support this allegation. While about a quarter of a million 
of Kosovo Albanians were forced to leave the province from 1945 till 1966, the exit of Serbs from 
Kosovo began only after the mid-1960s. In October 1988 statistics showed that in the previous 15 years 
25,661 Serbs left Kosovo against 250,000 Albanians. James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The 
Yugoslav Crisis, London: Pinter, 1992, p. 69. Unemployment statistics illustrate the severe disadvantage 
of Kosovar Albanians -  they were over three times more likely to be unemployed than the average 
Yugoslav. Although they made up four-fifths of the working age population in the province, Albanians 
held only about 60 percent of the jobs. By contrast, Serbs and Montenegrins held a third of all jobs -  
more than twice their proportion in the population. See Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 205.
Philip J. Cohen, Serbia’s Secret War, p. 116. Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, London: 
Pinter for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, pp. 61-2.
While these moves were relatively swift and easy in Vojvodina and Montenegro given that a large 
section of the population there were Serbs, the coup in Kosovo was secured as a result o f a huge military 
clampdown against Kosovo Albanians opposition and the removal o f all political and cultural rights from 
them, a move that initiated two decades of conflict and a rapid decline in the values of life. Alex J.
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economic crisis and the unequal burden such crisis imposed on different republics led to 
debates about Yugoslavia’s future. Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia and 
Macedonia, aimed to loosen the federal arrangements while Serb officials favoured 
strengthening a centralised federation. As Slovene and Croat politicians sought a shift of 
authority from federation to national republics, Milosevic’s response was that if there 
were any attempts to replace the federal structure of Yugoslavia with some looser 
arrangement, he would seek to annex whole areas of Croatia and Bosnia inhabited by 
Serbs. Milosevic championed the idea of a centralised state in which all the Serbs 
l ived.Claiming that at issue were state borders and the unity of the Serbs, and the 
rights of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, he used such claims as a propaganda 
theme for launching aggression. The brief encounter of hostilities between Slovene and 
Federal armies (26 June -  3 July 1991) following the declaration of independence of 
Slovenia (25 June 1991) can be attributed not only to the well planned resistance on the 
part of Slovenes but also to the absence of a Serb minority in Slovenia and lack of 
common borders between the two republ ics .This  short war was, nevertheless, a 
prelude to war in Croatia just like the latter became a prelude to war in Bosnia.
The government of Franjo Tudjman that came to power in Croatia in May 1990 
emphasised the Croat identity by adopting a range of ethnic symbols such as the
Bellamy, ‘Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99’, The International Journal o f  Human Rights, Special 
Issue, The Kosovo Tragedy -  The Human Rights Dimensions, Vol. 4, Nos. 3/4, 2000, pp. 112-3.
Branka Maga§, Destruction o f  Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, London: Verso, 1993, p. 
276. Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 215, 223.
Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration o f  Yugoslavia from the Death o f  Tito to the 
War fo r  Kosovo, 3'^ '^  edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 34.
See Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 
2"^  edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 228-9. Similarly, the existence o f too few self-identifying 
Serbs in the former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia (FYROM) may have been one o f the reasons why 
there were no military confrontations between Belgrade and Skopje. Moreover, since FYROM could not 
form an alliance with either Athens or Sofia, it co-operated with Belgrade apparently providing the chief 
conduit for breaking the economic sanctions imposed on Belgrade. See Almond, Europe's Backyard War,
p. 208.
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traditional coat of arms, flag and national anthem as the official insignia of the republic; 
making the Latin script the official alphabet; and transforming the character of civil 
services into an exclusively Croatian one by dismissing Serbs and replacing them with 
Croats/^^ Although the local Serbs made up only 12 percent of Croatia’s population, 
their contribution to the police, up till this time, was estimated at over 60 percent, most 
of the Serbs being recruited from rural areas such as Krajina. Given Belgrade’s 
opposition to Croatia’s intention of independence and the decision of the federal army’s 
General Staff in Belgrade (April 1990) to transfer all weapons of the Croatian 
Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalna Odbrana -  TOs) from republican hands into 
the custody of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija -  JNA), it 
is hardly surprising that Croatia’s Serbs were considered politically suspect by the new 
government in Zagreb .Tudjman’s policies raised fears among the Croatian Serbs 
regarding their future status in the new state and stimulated their mobilisation around a 
Serb nationalist programme. Having formed paramilitary units and staged an armed 
rebellion, in summer 1990 Croatian Serbs in the Knin area conducted their own 
referendum on the issue of autonomy, and proclaimed themselves an autonomous 
region (the so-called Krajina Republic), doing in fact exactly what Serbian authorities 
were denying the far more numerous Albanians in Kosovo. Supported by the Belgrade 
regime, the Croatian Serbs proclaimed themselves to be ‘the Serbian region of Krajina 
in Croatia’ on 4 January 1991 and a part of Serbia in March 1991, eventually preceding 
the declaration of independence by Croatia (25 June 1991).^^*
Cohen, Broken Bonds , p. 131. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 15.
Milan Vego, ‘The Croatian Army', Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1993, p. 203. The Territorial 
Defence Forces (TOs) were established in the Yugoslav republics in the 1970s as a result o f  the 
‘Generalised Popular Defence System’ following the Soviet invasion o f Czechoslovakia in 1968. They 
were intended to provide a citizens’ army in waiting premised on the assumption that all citizens would 
act in case o f  a foreign invasion.
Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, pp. 73-4. Gow, ‘Deconstructing Yugoslavia’, p. 298. Misha Glenny, The 
Fall o f  Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, Penguin Books, 1992, chapter 1.
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Following their retreat from Slovenia the next target of the federal army troops became 
Croatia, which they attacked on 22 July 199l/^^ Milan Vego, a military analyst, 
suggests that the federal army intended to seize two-thirds of Croatian territory and 
topple the government in Zagreb, but failed in its objective. Croatian resistance proved 
to be much more robust than expected and the four month long siege of Vukovar 
provided time for Croats to enhance their defences and strengthen their fragile Croatian 
Army (Hrvatska Vojska -  HV) established only in late September 1991
Ostensibly intervening to separate the local Serb militias and the Croat troops, the
JNA’s aim then shifted to delineate borders of the new Serb state so as to include the
Serb inhabited territories of Croatia. By late August the situation had escalated into full
scale-war. It is at this early stage of the conflict in Croatia that it became apparent that
the war was in fact an instrument of ethnic cleansing. As Mark Almond points out:
Only when television pictures were shown, not only of columns of the surviving 
defenders of Vukovar being marched off to an obscure fate, but also of Croatian 
civilians, women and old men predominantly, equally disappearing under Serb 
guard, did many Westerners realise that the war was not just about conquering 
territory but also about removing its unwelcome peoples.
The Serb army and paramilitary troops in Croatia aimed to intimidate Croats as a whole 
and at the same time to consolidate the various pockets of Serb populated territory by 
linking them up by means of driving out the Croats through terror and intimidation.*^^ 
The war in Croatia formally ended on 3 January 1992 resulting in some 30 percent of
By now the federal army had in fact become predominantly Serb given that most o f its personnel from 
the other republics had left to join their own national armed forces.
The HV grew from a rather poorly organised and equipped force o f 10,000 National Guardsmen and 
about 40,000 policemen but amounted to about 200,000 troops toward the end o f the Croatian war. Vego, 
‘The Croatian Army’, pp. 203, 206. See also James Gow, ‘One Year o f War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
Radio Free E urope/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 2 3 ,4  June 1993, p. 6.
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 226.
Patrick Moore, ‘The ‘Questions o f all Questions’: Internal Borders’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL) Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, No. 38,20 September 1991, p. 38.
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Croatian territory being occupied by the JNA and Serbian irregulars. Some 20,000 
people were killed -  more than half of whom civilians -  and, some 200,000 became 
refugees. More than 200,000 buildings, one-third of all Croatian highways, 500 historic 
cultural monuments, 50 bridges, thousands of vehicles, and 250 post offices were 
destroyed. Direct and indirect war damage to Croatia’s economy was estimated at $20 
billion. The peace settlement that was negotiated by the UN representative Cyrus 
Vance declared the occupied territory a ‘UN-protected zone’, the long-term status of 
which remained for the moment undecided, freezing albeit temporarily, the outcome of 
ethnic cleansing of the Croats from Krajina.
Whilst the federal army was engaged in ethnic cleansing and war in Croatia, 
preparations were made, on the side of the Serbs, to secure strategic control of territory 
in Bosnia. The federal army established itself in the Bosnian countryside and major 
communication points; its very presence greatly encouraging local Serbs to challenge 
the government in Sar aj evo .UN sources suggest that while the war was still going on 
in Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs were receiving arms secretly delivered from Serbia and 
that their actions were co-ordinated from Belgrade. As war receded in Croatia, the 
Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitary troops which had been functioning since 1990 in 
the Serb held regions of Croatia transferred their operations to Bosnia, aiming to secure 
control over a great arc of contiguous territory connecting the majority Serb rural areas.
These figures are quoted from Milan Vego, ‘The Croatian Army’, p. 206,
Gow, ‘One Year o f War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 7.
Annex IV ‘The Policy o f Ethnic Cleansing’ o f  the Final report o f  the United Nations Commission o f  
Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) prepared by M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Peter M. Manikas and Ludwig Boltzman, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/ANX/IV.htm. See also 
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 11. Malcolm, Bosnia, p. 225. Magas, Destruction o f  Yugoslavia, p.
XV.
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The strategy again was to link up various pockets of Serbian settlement by driving out 
non-Serb residents, Muslims and Croats, through terror and intimidation.
Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs, led by the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka -  SDS, the same name as that of the Serb party in Krajina) 
embarked upon what can be described as a policy of creating yh/Yj accomplis. Between 
September and November 1991, they established six autonomous regions (Srpske 
Autonomme Oblasti; SAOs) -  comprising some sixty municipalities, many of which 
had only a relatively small Serbian population -  which, for all practical purposes, were 
independent from the government in Sarajevo. In a referendum held on 9 and 10 
November 1991, Bosnian Serbs voted to establish an independent Serb Republic within 
the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having announced that the republic of Bosnia 
no longer existed, in January 1992 the Bosnian Serb leaders declared the ‘Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ to be a part of the rump Yugoslavia. The 
Bosnian Croats led by the Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska Demokratska 
Zajednica -  HDZ) responded, in turn, by establishing their own communities: on 12 
November 1991 they set up the so-called ‘Croatian Community of Bosnian Sava 
Valley’ in Bosanski Brod; six days later ‘the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia’; 
whilst on 27 January 1992 ‘the Croatian Community of Central Bosnia’. T h e  
establishment of these Croatian communities, although somehow different from SAOs 
in so far as they lacked executive and legislative bodies, reflected, nevertheless, the tacit
Ostensibly a response to the National Assembly’s decision to hold a referendum on Bosnia’s 
sovereignty and independence, the latter Serb action ignored the fact that they were not prevented from 
holding their own referendum in November 1991. The referendum on Bosnia’s independence, which was 
boycotted by the Serbs, was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992 and produced a unanimous response 
in favour o f independence. For the above mentioned events see Milan Andrejevich, ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: A Precarious Peace’, Radio Free Europe /  Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report^ Vol. 
1, No. 9, 28 February 1992, pp. 9-13. Milan Vego, ‘The Army o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, February 1993, p. 63.
Vego, ‘The Army o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 63.
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agreement between the Serb and Croat leadership of that time to partition the Bosnian 
republic/^*
It was at this stage (early 1992) that, for all intents and purposes, the practice of ethnic 
cleansing that began earlier in Croatia was extended to Bosnia, whilst preparations for 
war in the republic were well under way/^^ The Serb strategy of driving out the non- 
Serb population in order to ensure the strategic control of territory became clearly 
evident with the continued expulsion of Croats from the occupied territories in Croatia 
(even though under UN protection), and especially so in the course of the Bosnian war.
The Bosnian war was bound to be an asymmetrical one. Not only had the Serb military 
been concentrating in the republic for months but the Serbian dominated General Staff 
had ordered in June 1991 that the Bosnian Territorial Defence Forces (TOs) be placed 
under the control of the former federal army in Belgrade. These measures left the 
Bosnian government stripped of the means to defend the country and its population. The 
political leadership in Sarajevo, however, underestimated the growing threat posed by 
the Serbs to the republic’s territorial integrity, and was too slow in organising popular 
resistance against attacks by the local Serb paramilitaries and the federal army.^^* 
Indeed, the Bosnian presidency declared a state of war only on 26 June 1992 by which 
time two-thirds of Bosnian territory had already fallen to Serbian control. The lack of 
governmental action is said to have induced some local Muslim leaders to take the
See Chapter V p. 193.
Gow, ‘One Year o f  War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 1. Patrick Moore, ‘Ethnic Cleansing in 
Bosnia: Outrage but Little Action’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 1 
No. 34 ,28  August 1992, p. 1.
Some o f the Croatian TOs in the western Herzegovina, however, defied the General Staffs orders and 
kept hold to their weapons. Milan Vego, ‘The Army o f  Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 63.
The reason for this can be attributed to a disbelief that Serb nationalists and the JNA would eventually 
go to war, and a wish to avoid provocative action.
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initiative and organise paramilitary groups in some parts of the republic where the 
Muslims comprised a majority of the population.
The Bosnian Croats, aided by Zagreb, were faster in organising their defences. The 
Croatian Defence Council (Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane -  HVO) was set up by local 
representatives of the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic 
Community (HDZ) in summer 1991, whilst arms distribution began in early 1992. The 
HVO also incorporated troops from the Croatian Defence Union (Hrvatski Odbranbeni 
Snage -  HOS), a paramilitary organisation set up by the ultra-right Croatian Party of 
Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava -  HSP), a militia which was formally disbanded in 
August 1992. Within the ranks of the HVO were also many Bosnian Muslims (20-30 
percent of total troops), whose preference for joining this formation rather than local 
Muslim militias was informed by the HVO’s ability to provide w eapo n s .A l l  HVO 
operations, nevertheless, were controlled (and financed) by the staff of the Croatian 
Army (HV) in Zagreb and as many as 15,000 HV soldiers are reported to have fought in 
the Bosnian war.^ "^^
The first clashes between the Serbs, and Muslims and Croats in Bosnia took place in 
late February 1992, whereas full scale hostilities had broken out by 6 April. The
Milan Vego, ‘The Army o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp. 63-4.
James Gow, ‘One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp. 3, 8 ,9 ,  11. Christopher Bennett, 
Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, London; Hurst, 1995, p. 201.
Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: a Guide to Nationality Politics, Organisation, and 
Parties, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharp, 1994, p. 20. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the 
Destruction o f  Yugoslavia, Second Edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 207. Milan 
Vego, ‘The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 3 March 1993, p. 
100.
The beginning o f war, however, has no clear-cut date. Many sensed the looming war through summer 
to winter 1991 whilst Slovenia and Croatia eagerly sought their independence. See Almond, Europe’s 
Backyard War, pp. 8-9. Glenny mentions 22 March 1992 as the start o f  the war. Glenny, The Fall o f  
Yugoslavia, p. 167. Gallagher suggests that war in Bosnia erupted on 2 April 1992. Tom Gallagher, The 
Balkans after the Cold War -  From tyranny to tragedy, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 88. Kaldor, and
117
military offensive against Bosnia and Herzegovina occurred amid calls from Serbian 
leaders of SAOs to protect Serbian communities in Bosnia. As in Croatia, the federal 
Yugoslav army claimed that it was ‘defending Yugoslavia’ and was engaged in 
‘peacekeeping’.H o w ev e r, by 18 April 1992, that is, in just two weeks of fighting, the 
number of refugees, mainly Muslims and Croat, had topped the 150,000.^^  ^ In the first 
six weeks of the war the federal army and its paramilitary adjuncts had carved out more 
than 60 percent of the entire territory of Bosnia. The speed with which Serb 
operations were carried out and the high level of their co-ordination leaves little doubt 
that they were carefully pre-planned.
From the commencement of the war in Bosnia until February 1993, Bosnian Muslim 
and Croat forces co-operated against the Serbs. But the conflict took a new turn in early 
February 1993 when the Muslim-Croat alliance broke down and for a year or so 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats engaged in fighting each other for creation of their own 
homogenous ter r i tor ies .On 5 July 1992, the hardline Bosnian Croat leadership of 
Mate Boban supported by Tudjman’s regime had proclaimed a Croatian state within 
Bosnia -  the Croat Union of Herzeg-Bosna with its centre in Mostar. Like the Serb 
Krajina (in Croatia) Herzeg-Bosna claimed authority over its police, army, currency (the 
Croat Kuna) and education (which adopted the Croat curriculum and language). The 
Croat-Muslim hostilities were a bonanza for the Serb army which under the military 
leadership of Ratko Mladic (the former Yugoslav army commander in Kosovo, Knin
Silber and Little argue for April 6. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global 
Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p. 31. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 292.
James Gow, ‘One Year o f War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp. 7-8.
Patrick Moore, ‘The International Relations o f the Yugoslav Area’, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, 
No. 18,1 May 1992, p. 35.
Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration o f  Yugoslavia from the Death o f Tito to the 
War fo r  Kosovo, 3*^*^ edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 206.
For the rationale o f the Croat-Muslim fighting see Chapter V, p. 216-217.
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and Sarajevo) sought to secure an open road between Belgrade, Banja Luka and Knin, a 
highway known as ‘Operation Koridor’. As large numbers of Muslim refugees expelled 
by Serbs in Eastern Bosnia moved in southern regions, previously with a substantial 
Croat population, the relations between Muslims and Croats deteriorated further 
prompting the Croats to accuse the Muslims and their leaders of trying to change the 
ethnic composition of those regions
Following the massacre on 22 April 1993 by the Croatian troops of Muslim inhabitants 
of the village of Ahmici fierce fighting between the Croats and Muslims broke out with 
the Croats losing heavily. The most intense battle was that for the capture of Mostar, 
cleansed of its Serb minority in June 1992 when the town was seized under the banner 
of the Croat Defence Council (HVO). The struggle for Mostar ended indecisively, the 
city being divided along ethnic lines into two homogenous parts: Croat and Muslim. It 
is estimated that more than 20,000 Croats and Bosnian Muslims were killed during the 
Croat-Muslim war of 1993-4. By the beginning of 1994 almost half of the pre-war Croat 
population of Bosnia (about 750,000) had left their homes.
The Washington Agreement (signed under the auspices of American diplomacy in 
February 1994) that ended the Croat-Muslim war led to a decisive reversal in the 
fortunes of the Serbs, the military balance shifting slowly in favour of the Muslim and 
Croat forces.**  ^The corrosion from within of the Krajina Republic of Serbs in Croatia, 
transformed as it was into a garrison society with little or no sustainable economic life.
For the Croat-Muslim war see Marcus Tanner, Croatia -  A Nation Forged in War, New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 285-292 and Ivo Goldstein, Croatia -  A History, Translated 
from the Croatian by Nikolina Jovanovic, London: Hurst, 1999, pp. 243-248.
For the division o f  Mostar see Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and 
International Intervention, London: Hurst, 2002, pp. 100-106.
For the Washington Agreement see Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, Chapter 25.
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coupled with manifested weaknesses of the Serb troops in Bosnia provided an 
advantage to the Croatian army which the latter did not miss/^^ The ease with which the 
Croatian army succeeded in May 1995 to recover a targeted part of the Croatian 
territory occupied by the Serbs -  an offensive known as Operation Flash -  stimulated a 
second, more decisive attack in August 1995 -  Operation Storm -  which recovered the 
rest of the Croatian territory formerly under Serbian control/Operations Flash and 
Storm produced yet more ethnic cleansing, the Krajina region being virtually 
depopulated of its Serb inhabitants who retreated with the Serb army. Moreover, the 
Serb exodus had knock-on effects across borders. Many of the Croatian Serb refugees 
moved into Bosnia, particularly in the Banja Luka region, as a consequence of which 
some 20,000 Muslims and Croats were expelled; their homes being appropriated by 
Serb refugees. Many Bosnian Croats, in turn, moved to Croatia and took over deserted 
Serb houses.
The most infamous episode of ethnic cleansing was that of Srebrenica -  a United 
Nations ‘safe area’ -  which occurred in the summer of 1995. Following the overrunning 
of the enclave by the Serbs on 11 July some 7,000-8,000 Muslim men and boys were 
slaughtered while tens of thousand of refugees (mainly women and children) were 
expelled from the enc lave .The  fact that this tragedy happened in the presence of UN
Glenny points out that 90 percent o f the Serb army in Krajina were local people. Glenny, The Fall o f  
Yugoslavia, p. 29.
For Operations Flash and Storm see Goldstein, Croatia, pp. 253-4; and Ozren Éunec, ‘Operations 
Flash and Storm’ in Branka Maga§ and Ivo Zanic eds.. The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
1991-5, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 67-83.
There are parallels to be drawn between the Serb exodus in Krajina (1995), and in Kosovo (1999), and 
the Greek exodus in Asia Minor (1923) following the end o f the Greko-Turkish war. While the coercive 
element is present in all three instances, the case can also be made that many locals chose to leave fearing 
revenge o f their former neighbours whom they had driven away and whose houses they had looted.
For the fall o f  Srebrenica see Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record o f  a War 
Crime, London: Penguin, 1996 and Srebrenica Report, Report o f  the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1999), http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf.
120
peace-keeping troops meant a serious loss of prestige for the world organisation and 
was one significant factor that stirred the international community into a more robust 
and decisive action to end the violence resulting in the Dayton Agreement (signed in 
November 1995) which eventually ended the war in Bosnia. The merits of Dayton, 
however, remain disputed and some criticise the Accord for de facto partitioning Bosnia 
and legitimising ethnic cleansing given that it provided for two distinct entities (the 
Muslim-Croat federation holding 51 percent of the territory and Republika Srpska 
holding the remaining 49 percent) and for three separate armies Muslim, Croat and 
Serb, while the provisions of the agreement for the return of the refugees have been 
slow to materialise.**^
In addition, Dayton failed to address the question of the Serb repression in Kosovo and 
this led many Kosovo Albanians to question the efficacy of their policy of peaceful 
resistance and seek instead alternative forms of action. Indeed, the emergence of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA -  Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) affirmed that peaceful 
resistance had failed to dent Milosevic’s oppressive policies, although the very presence 
of KLA enabled the Serb leader to accelerate and justify his regime’s ethnic cleansing 
of Albanians in the province, at least before his constituencies. Despite the fact that Serb 
forces employed counterinsurgency techniques to confi-ont the KLA, Milosevic might 
have questioned the possibility of defeating it through such techniques given the 
growing strength and popularity of the KLA with the Kosovo Albanians. The 
appointment of Vojislav Seselj -  the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, whose 
paramilitary groups were responsible for some of the most terrible atrocities in Bosnia
See, for instance, Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals o f  Partition, London, New  
York: Verso: 1997, pp. 35-37,104-5. Refer also to Chapter V below, p. 217,
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and whose political programme since 1991 included the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians
-  as Vice-Prime Minister in the Serb Government in February 1998, benefited
Milosevic’s own position following the start of the campaign against the KLA.^**
Towards the end of 1998 Milosevic is reported to have put into effect a plan -  dubbed
Operation Horseshoe -  by means of which he sought simultaneously to eradicate the
KLA and permanently change the ethnic composition of Kosovo by expelling her
Albanian inhabitants. As Daalder and O’Hanlon explain:
The central idea of the plan ... involved employing Mao’s favourite guerrilla 
tactic of draining the sea in which the fish swam; in the case of Kosovo, this 
meant emptying the villages of their Albanian population in order to isolate 
KLA fighters and supporters. The coordinated attack would involve a broad 
swath of territory in the shape of a horseshoe, moving from the northeast down 
to the west and back to southeast of Kosovo along the Albanian and Macedonian 
border.
By October 1998, more than 300,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their 
homes, 50,000 or so being vulnerable while hiding in the hills -  one of the world’s five 
largest crises of the time involving refugees and internally displaced people.
Diplomacy was given a chance to resolve the crisis. Peace talks were convened by the 
Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, U.K. and U.S.) at Rambouillet and in Paris in 
February and March 1999 with a view to preventing the escalation of the conflict and 
reaching an agreement for an interim self-administration in Kosovo that could
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, 
Lessons Learned, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 54, Leurdijk and Zandee, Kosovo, p. 62.
Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly -  NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Washington 
D C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2000, p. 58. For Operation Horseshoe see also U.K. Select Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report, ‘Did NATO misjudge M ilosevic's likely response in Kosovo to the 
bombing campaign?’, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationerv-
office.co.uk/pa/cm 199900/cmselect/cmfaffy28/2811 .htm. ‘Did NATO miscalculate?’, BBC news online, 
April 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid 326000/326864.stm. Peter Beaumont 
and Patrick Wintour, ‘Milosevic and Operation Horseshoe’, Observer, July 18, 1999,
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/Kosovo/Storv/0.2763.207919.00.html.
World Refugee Survey, 1999, Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees 1999, p. 1.
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accommodate both the insistence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on its territorial 
integrity and the expectation of the oppressed majority of the province. In the end, the 
Albanian delegation accepted the terms whilst their Serbian counterparts rejected them. 
Among the terms of the draft-agreement, controversy has centred on Annex B (the 
Status of Forces Agreement -  SOFA) to Chapter 7 regarding the military 
implementation provisions of the Accords, which provided for the movement of 
Western troops throughout the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -  making 
no distinction between the province of Kosovo and the rest of the state. Paradoxically -  
as the UK Deffence Committee pointed out -  by virtue of the Western governments’ 
efforts to use language which underlined the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, an element of imprecision was engendered which could have allowed the 
SOFA to be read as a charter for NATO’s ‘occupation’ of Serbia although the Alliance 
denied any such intention and the co-ordinators of the peace talks (U.K. and France) 
conceded that SOFA could have been amended.Curiously, although SOFA has been 
used extensively as part of the Serb propaganda campaign in the course of Operation 
Allied Force, during the peace talks the Serb delegation did not raise it as an obstacle to 
the agreement to the Accords, and Belgrade rejected the political part of the draft 
Accords (which provided for interim self-administration in Kosovo) before the SOFA 
ever became the subject of detailed discussion. This may suggest that Milosevic had 
decided to put NATO’s credibility to the test before the peace talks began and that he 
approached the peace negotiations entirely in bad faith disbelieving that NATO would
UK Defence Committee, Fourteenth Report, ‘The Background to Military Intervention -  
Rambouillet’. Available at http://www.parliament.the-stationarv-
office.co.uk/pa/cml99900/cmselect/cmdefence/347/23709htm.
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carry out its threats and consequently seeing no reason for attempting to find a 
diplomatic solution to crisis
The failure of peace talks prompted the Western Alliance to resort to military action. 
Nonetheless, NATO’s bombing campaign of Spring 1999 had the unintended 
consequence of accelerating the very action it had sought to end. Rather than capitulate 
when faced with NATO’s action, Milosevic escalated the situation as foreseen in 
Operation Horseshoe.He saw NATO bombing not only as a problem but also as an 
opportunity to ethnically re-engineer Kosovo especially since the Alliance was not 
considering the option of deploying ground troops. By 5 May 1999, the UNHCR had 
estimated that one million and a half Kosovo Albanians had been forcibly displaced; 
over 600 settlement had been partially destroyed, including 300 villages completely 
razed; furthermore, summary executions were reported in over 70 towns, and as many 
as 50,000 Kosovo Albanians were still unaccounted fbr.^ "^*
Although NATO initially failed to stop ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians or 
limit Serbia’s ability to carry it out, to attribute this case of ethnic cleansing to NATO’s 
bombing campaign is disingenuous. Some analysts, nonetheless, have suggested that 
NATO is responsible for ethnic cleansing of the Albanians in Kosovo because only after 
the bombing started the expulsion of the Albanians was speeded up. In their view, 
NATO’s intervention was unnecessary and the presence of the OSCE’s Kosovo
Ibid, See also Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, Vol. 75, 
No. 2, April 1999.
Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 92,115. See also comments o f Dame Pauline Neville-Jones 
in Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report, at note 188.
United States Department o f  State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, Washington D.C.: 
US Department o f State, 5 May 1999.
http://www.state.gov.www/regions/eur/rpt 9905 ethnic ksvo toc.html.
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Verification Mission monitors on the ground would have been enough to restrain 
Belgrade from the policy of ethnic cleansing. Their view, however, is not 
unproblematic. As Ivo Daalder has persuasively argued, to blame NATO for ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo is to ignore basic historical facts, not least the increase of Serbian 
military forces in the province, long-term suppression of the Albanians under 
Milosevic’s regime, the incremental depopulation of Kosovo of her Albanian 
inhabitants, the continuation of Serb attacks while the European civilian monitors were 
present in the province, the repetitive pattern of the conflict in Kosovo with those in 
Croatia and Bosnia, and the concern of Belgrade to deprive the KLA of its base of 
support and cover. Daalder is also right to point out that blaming NATO for ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo implies confusion of pace with intent. The pace with which 
Serbian forces acted against the Albanians increased in the course of NATO’s bombing 
campaign, but their purpose remained the same. If prior to the commencement of the air 
campaign Serbian forces had paced themselves in the believe that -  as a Serb diplomat 
reportedly put it -  ‘a village a day keeps NATO away’, once the bombing started and 
the prospect of using NATO ground troops had been publicly ruled out there were no 
incentives to restrain the Serbian action.
Albanians did not leave their homes because of NATO bombs but because of a 
systematic Serb policy of terror and intimidation. NATO bombs might have accelerated 
the pace of the expulsion of Albanians but Milosevic’s government was committed to
See, for instance, Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, ‘For the Record’, The National Interest, 
No. 57, Fall 1999, pp. 9-15; and Jonathan I. Chamey, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in 
Kosovo’, American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999 available also at 
httD://www.asil.org/aiil/kosovo.htm. For NATO’s air campaign refer to Chapter V, pp. 222-229.
Ivo H. Daalder, ‘Nato and Kosovo’, The National Interest, No. 58, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 113-116. 
Ibid.
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ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its Albanian population, on one scale or another. The 
policy of ethnic cleansing was conceived not only to serve a military purpose -  the 
destruction of the KLA -  but also a political objective in restoring Kosovo to complete 
Serb control, altering its ethnic composition, making available land for Serb refugees 
from other parts of the former Yugoslavia and destabilising neighbouring countries. 
Although the fact that some tens of thousands of Serb refugees were settled in the 
province in the 1990s does not seem extraordinary, its significance becomes apparent 
when viewed in the context of the scale of Albanian emigration mentioned above and 
the context of the poverty of the province, the poorest in the former Yugoslavia with a 
stable unemployment rate of about 80 percent.
NATO’s intervention made possible the reversal of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo 
Albanians; in the wake of the withdrawal of the Serbian army and paramilitary troops 
from the province virtually all Albanians returned home. Although it is regrettable that 
following the withdrawal of the Serb military, Kosovo Serbs became the victims of their 
own former victims, the Serb exodus was not so much the result of a policy as was the 
brutal and systematic expulsion of the Albanians. Although not all Kosovo Serbs may 
be responsible for the maltreatment of their Albanian countrymen, those who offered 
logistical support to Belgrade’s policies and took part in the expulsion of the Albanians 
and the looting of their homes had tied their fate to that of Milosevic’s security forces.
It is illuminating to remember that a milder form of ethnic cleansing has been going on in Kosovo 
since 1989 when the autonomous status o f the province was removed and Albanians were fired en masse 
from Jobs and deprived o f health services and education. By 1993 some 400,000 Kosovo Albanian men o f  
military age were forced to leave Kosovo (mainly for Western countries) in order to avoid recruitment 
into the Yugoslav army and being sent to fight in Bosnia. Whereas by fall o f 1998 some 300,000 Kosovo 
Albanians were displaced from their homes as a result o f sustained Yugoslav attacks, which included 
shelling o f cities and villages. Figures quoted from Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 
pp. 47, 74.
Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 13, 108. International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 61, 
‘War in the Balkans’, pp. 13-21, http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.efm.
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III.7 Conclusions: What can be learned ?
The historical experience of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the conclusions that can 
be drawn from it are far from comforting. Balkan leaders were so attached to the nation­
state model of the political organisation that they considered it as a supreme value, as 
the only model to be followed in building up and consolidating their own state. As 
Arnold Toynbee observed in the 1920s, they applied the idea of the nation-state hastily 
and without due consideration in an environment that lacked a past history or present 
local institutions which might have modified it in accordance with their specific 
multinational setting.^ ®® The goal of creating homogeneous nation-states backed by an 
ethnic conception of nationalism conflicted with the reality of complex demographic 
compositions and set the stage for ethnic cleansing.
Not only has ethnic cleansing in the Balkans been bound with the process of nation­
state building but, more often than not, it has been associated with the phenomenon of 
war. Indeed, war provided propitious conditions for the implementation of irredentist 
agendas and the mass expulsion of peoples, ethnic cleansing being at times a war aim 
(e.g., the Second Balkan War and regional wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia) 
whereas at other times its consequence (e.g., the Second World War as it affected the 
region). Whenever the case, territorial aggrandisement achieved through warfare 
brought with it more heterogeneity which national leaders sought to minimise either by 
assimilation or, if that failed, through outright expulsion. One cannot help but notice the 
selective ethics of ethnic cleansing; different criteria being adopted to justify official 
action as opposed to that of minorities, with the government favouring its nation while 
depriving ethnic minorities the kind of rights or privileges it claimed for its own kin.
Toynbee, The Western Question, pp. 16, 136.
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The exclusivist membership in the majority nation has strengthened the political 
relevance of ethno-national identities making it easier for leaders to present justification 
for their exclusivist policies in terms of a discourse of conflicting identities. However, 
as it will be argued in the next chapter,although ethnic cleansing has been validated 
on the ground of defining and protecting the national ‘self against the infidel ‘other’, 
this simplified discourse defies the fact that the salience of ethno-national identities was 
enhanced in the course of and in the aftermath of violence and ethnic cleansing. 
National identity does not necessarily capture the nature of ethnic cleansing in its full 
complexity.
This chapter has suggested that ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has been primarily a 
top-down phenomenon; its main causes being political. In virtually all cases, what was 
at issue was either territory i.e., the delineation of borders or sovereign rights over 
territory, or perceived incompatible political/economic rights between the majority 
nation and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the fact that ethnic cleansing was time and 
place specific renders its occurrence a function of the quality of political leadership.
On the national plane, a political culture which has allowed for marginalisation of 
minorities and their exclusion from the political life of the country has been conducive 
to ethnic cleansing. Moreover, internal opposition by resistance movements towards the 
purge of ethnic minorities has been insufficient to influence policy. On the other hand, 
the Western powers’ reaction towards ethnic cleansing in the region has been 
inconsistent: they overlooked it during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and during the 
Second World War in the former Yugoslavia; they condoned it in the aftermath of the
See Chapter IV pp. 168-172.
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First World War in the form of forced population ‘transfers’ between Greece, Bulgaria 
and Turkey; they initially overlooked it in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s and 
then faced with faits accomplis they institutionalised it at Dayton in 1995; they pressed 
for its reversal in Bulgaria in 1989 and intervened militarily to reverse it in Kosovo, ten 
years later, in 1999. Although the responsibility for expulsion of million of peoples in 
the region does not lie with Western powers, the latter might have, even if 
unintentionally, become accomplices in this inhumane phenomenon either by dint of 
their indifference or through their lack of resolve and limited involvement to prevent 
ethnic cleansing or reverse it.
In sum, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans reflects the incompatibilities of territorial 
expansionism and the official perception of minorities as a threat that undermines the 
cohesion of the dominant nation. As part of the process of nation-state building, it is a 
testimony of the failure of governments to accommodate inclusively ethnic minorities. 
Although the rationale for ethnic cleansing has been often interpreted in terms of 
promoting state security by increasing its homogenisation the proportionality of such an 
act is questionable.^®  ^Homogenisation might contribute to mitigate the danger of ethnic 
strife but this relation is not necessarily deterministic. The costs of increasing the degree 
of national homogeneity by means of ethnic cleansing in terms of human suffering, 
infliction of unrest in the neighbouring countries and the precedent set have been 
tremendously high, rendering the feasibility of this enterprise deeply problematic.
See Chapter VI.
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IV. D ebating  s o m e  c a u sa l  ex p la n a t io n s  for e th n ic  c le a n s in g  in 
th e  fo rm er  Y ugoslav ia  in th e  1990s
'History is a highly usable commodity, since it [helps] a political elite to formulate its ideas and 
regulate its political discourse’.^
'...the relevance o f  the security dilemma in explanation is greatly reduced because it no longer 
looks unavoidable...
'I can only regret that awareness o f my nationality came to me in such a painful way, through 
death, destruction and the suffering o f  people, and through reduction, accusations, suspicions 
and extreme homogenisation ’?
IV. 1 Introduction
Having elaborated on the occurrence of ethnic cleansing as a shared problem in the 
Balkan peninsula in the twentieth century, I consider in the present chapter some 
possible causal explanations for ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
Like no other case in recent times, this one has attracted the attention of scholars -  
giving rise to a growing body of literature as a result.
Yet the kinds of explanations proffered have been varied each focusing on specific 
features of ethnic cleansing or on the propensities of actors to behave in certain ways 
under certain conditions. The ‘certain conditions’ are usually subsumed under various 
concepts, such as ‘history’, ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, ‘fear’, ‘security dilemmas’, 
‘(ethnic) nationalism’, and may be categorised as ‘explanations by concept’."^ Such a list 
of the explanations by concept is not necessarily all-inclusive. It could be extended, of
' J H Plumb cited in Christopher Coker, War and the 2(f^ Century: The Impact o f War on the Modern 
Consciousness, London and Washington: Brassey’s, 1994, p. 35.
 ^ Patrick M. Morgan, ‘Liberalist and Realist Security Studies at 2000: Two Decades o f Progress?’, in 
Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff eds.. Critical Reflections on Security and Change, London: Frank Cass, 
2000, p. 52.
 ^ Slavenka Drakulovic, a Croatian, quoted by Koen Koch, ‘Conflicting Visions o f State and Society in 
Present-Day Yugoslavia’, in Martin van den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama, eds.. The Disintegration o f  
Yugoslavia, Yearbook o f European Studies 5, Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 1992, p. 196.
 ^ For explanations by concept see Alexander Wendt, ‘On Constitution and Causation in International 
Relations’, Review o f  International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, 1998, pp. 110-111.
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course, to include politics, which because of the prominence of this factor, will form the 
basis of next chapter. It could be extended also to include the collapse of the Yugoslav 
federation.^ However, it is assumed here that while this latter factor may have acted as a 
catalyst for the conflict it does not necessarily explain ethnic cleansing. Susan 
Woodward is right when she points out that ‘there would have not been war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, if Yugoslavia had not first collapsed’.^  In principle, the beginning of a 
course of events might be spoken of as in some sense essential; but as Oakeshott asserts 
‘a mere beginning explains nothing, is logically neutral and cannot take the place of a 
cause’.^  Indeed, although the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation might have been 
a necessary condition for both war and ethnic cleansing, it is not a sufficient one for 
either. Other states such as Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union have 
disintegrated in the aftermath of the Cold War but none have experienced ethnic 
cleansing and large scale war. Another approach regards conflict in general as stemming 
from the failure to fulfill basic human needs. Here a fundamental weakness is that 
different people may have different needs and a hierarchy of needs has so far not been 
established. In any case, although inadequate provision of necessities might act as a 
catalyst for conflict, it does not necessarily lead to violent conflict -  ethnic cleansing 
included. Yet, although this theory is not that powerful in explaining violent conflict, it 
is worth consideration in a study of conflict resolution.*
This chapter considers some of the most pertinent explanations for ethnic cleansing in 
the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Given the recurrent expulsion of ethnic minorities
 ^For considerations on the crises that crippled the Yugoslav federation see Chapter V, pp. 178-184.
 ^Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War’ in Barbara F. Walter and Jack 
Snyder, eds.. Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 75. 
’ Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 131.
* For Human Needs Theory see John Burton, ed.. Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1999.
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in the region one is inclined to inquire whether history played a role in the incidence of 
ethnic cleansing in the 1990s. Some accounts of the latest conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia contend that violence was conditioned by bitter historical memories that 
have produced a culture of ethnic hatred. Real or perceived conflicting historical 
representations and memories coupled with, at times, hostile attitudes between different 
nations or ethnic communities, it is argued, have produced a climate of mutual fears. 
But, how far does the existence of fear and security dilemmas contribute to ethnic 
cleansing? The following analysis examines these propositions and evaluates the extent 
to which they are valid. A further approach for consideration depicts (ethnic) 
nationalism as the evil of our time and places the blame for several wars and ethnic 
conflicts on it. The last section of this chapter considers the extent to which nationalism 
has explanatory purchase in the context of ethnic cleansing.
IV.2 The Role of History
History for a historian can be what nature is for a scientist i.e., the realm of his/her 
inquiry. Many analysts scrutinise history in hope of revealing some trends which would 
help make more sense of events and build a mental scheme or charter for them. A 
successful outcome would have meant first of all less exercise for the mind. Events 
would be chained historically and any present or future event would be understood in 
terms of past ones. Present and future would repeat the past. History would repeat itself. 
The fallacy of such an endeavour, nevertheless, stems from lack of appreciation of the 
different nature of ‘nature’ and ‘history’. Alas, this is not the predominant view of 
history. Indeed, some scholars have realised the ‘stubbornly enigmatic’ nature of history
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and have suggested that ‘history reveals flashes of coherence and moral meaning, but no 
clear patterns’.^
But, when it comes to Balkan history, very little of it seems enigmatic, as many 
observers tend to read the present in terms of the past. William W. Hagen, for instance, 
writing at the close of the millennium, has argued that ‘today’s tensions are the result of 
the region’s absorption into the Ottoman Empire, which led to the extraordinary 
dispersion and intermixture of ethnic groups’ in the Balkans. While George F. 
Kennan, for his part, traces the origin of the conflict even further back in history. He 
contends that the recent Balkan conflict ‘is a problem with very deep historical roots. 
Those roots reach back, clearly, not only into the centuries of Turkish domination but 
also into the Byzantine penetration of the Balkans even before that time...’.^  ^ Are we 
therefore to conclude, by induction, that war and ethnic cleansing have been ever 
present in the region? Did, then, Robert Kaplan get it right when he concluded that 
‘today’s events are nothing more than the sum total of everything that has gone 
before’?*^
As a way of considering the validity of such claims let me start by asking ‘what is 
history?’. Michael Oakeshott, for instance, points out that for a historian history should 
be ‘thinking about the past for the sake of the past; it is a way of thinking about the past
 ^Thomas W. Smith, History and International Relations, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 50. 
The author refers to Reinhold Niebuhr’s understanding o f history.
William W. Hagen, ‘The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4 ,1999, p. 52. 
The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction 
and Reflections on the Present Conflict. Introduction by George F. Kennan. Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1993, Introduction, p. 13.
Robert D. Kaplan, ‘A Reader’s Guide to the Balkans’, Nerw York Times Book Review, 18 April 1993, p. 
30.
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free from all extraneous interests’. T h i s  he called ‘the historical past’, i.e., the past for
its own sake, different from the present and independent of it.^ "^  But the past which he
took to be the most important and distinguishable from ‘the historical past’, is what he
termed ‘the practical past’;
‘Wherever the past is merely that which proceeds the present, that from which 
the present has grown, wherever the significance of the past lies in the fact that it 
has been infiuential in deciding the present and the future fortunes of man, 
wherever the present is sought in the past, and wherever the past is regarded as 
merely a refuge from the present -  the past involved is a practical past, and not a 
historical past. This practical past will be found, in general, to serve either of 
two masters -  politics or religion’.
In other words, in practical experience, the past is designed to justify, to make valid 
practical beliefs about the present and the future. It constitutes an argument the form of 
which disguises its real content and cogency; the language is that of history, while its 
thought is that of practice.*^ In this sense, ‘the past in history varies with the present, 
rests upon the present, is the present’.*^  For this reason, history as René Descartes 
suggested, could not claim truth, for events never happened exactly as described in 
history books.
Implicit in the above is the idea of historical selection bias, which is often instrumental 
in so far as it aims to promote a particular position or standpoint. As Thomas Smith
Michael Oakeshott, ‘History and Social Sciences’, in the Institute o f Sociology ed.. The Social 
Sciences: Their Relations in History and Teaching, London: Le Play House Press, 1936, p. 77.
Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, pp. 102,106.
Ibid., p. 103.
Ibid., p. 105.
Ibid., p. 107. For a similar view see also Benedetto Croce, History as the Story o f  Liberty, New York: 
Norton, 1941, p. 19.
For Descartes at issue was the idea of: historical pyrrhonism -  historical narratives are not trustworthy 
accounts o f the past; anti-utilitarian idea o f history -  untrustworthy narratives cannot really assist one to 
understand effectively the present; and the idea of history as fantasy-building -  the way in which 
historians distort tiie past is by making it appear more splendid than it really was. R. G. Collingwood, The 
Idea o f  History, Revised edition. Edited by Jan Van der Dussen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 59- 
60.
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acknowledges ‘history is ripe for partisan selection and interpretation’.*^  Indeed, history 
offers a wide range of cases upon which one may choose what to remember and what to 
forget. Take, for example, the oft quoted battle of Kosovo of June 1389 -  a historical 
event kept alive in Serbian national memory. Although the outcome of such battle is 
often portrayed as a defeat for the Serbs such depiction is disputed as historical data 
suggests that the outcome of the battle in fact was a draw.^° Indeed, the Serbian state 
lived another seventy years before it gave way to Ottoman rule.^* The great losses 
incurred in the battle and the death of Prince Lazar -  a posthumous Serbian martyr -  
may have been sufficient to stimulate Serbian national awareness about the particularity 
of such an event. However, the claim that Serbs alone fought the Ottoman invaders of 
Europe is myth, for other peoples of the region fought alongside Serbs, as like the Serbs 
they had a vested interest in confronting the Ottoman occupiers.^^
Similarly, Tore Bogh has also contended that ‘the portrayal of the Serbian people as the 
historical bulwark against Islam is a delusion’. He supports this view with another 
example from fourteenth century history: the so-called battle of Nikopol (Bulgaria) -  a 
crusade against the Turks organised by the French, German and Hungarian rulers -  
which took place in September 1396, thus, only seven years after the battle of Kosovo 
of 1389. Against expectations, the battle ended in victory for the Ottoman forces thanks 
to about 1,500 warriors that came to rescue the Turkish leader Bajasid [Bayezid]. The
Thomas Smith, History and International Relations, p. 3.
For the battle o f Kosovo see John V. A. Fine Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from  
the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest, Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University o f  Michigan 
Press, 1987, pp. 408-411. A.B. Lord, ‘The Battle o f Kosovo in Albanian and Serbocroatian Oral Epic 
Songs’ in Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti, eds.. Studies on Kosova, Boulder, Colorado: East European 
Monographs Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1984, pp. 65-83.
Fine Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans, pp. 568-577.
Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History o f  Kosovo, London: Hurst, 1998, p. 13.
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irony is that the warriors in question were Christian Serbs led by Prince Lazar’s son and 
successor, Stefan.^^
It is interesting, therefore, to notice the choice made by the Serbian nationalists to 
remember and mythicise the battle of Kosovo of 1389, which subsequently became 
allegiance forming and to disregard or even forget the battle of Nikopol of 1396. In the 
same vein, political entrepreneurs of the 1990s, while preparing the ground for new 
wars and new campaigns of ethnic cleansing, conspicuously chose to remember the 
atrocities of the Second World War and to forget the recent 45 years of more or less 
peaceful interethnic coexistence. Once again the highlighted memories became 
allegiance forming while suppressed ones passed into oblivion.
Acknowledging the link between the past and the present raises the question of how far
the present draws from the past. Does the past perhaps condition, or even dictate, the
present or is it the present that affects perceptions of the past. The answer to this
question is succinctly given by Michael Ignatieff. In his words: ‘it is not how the past)
dictates to the present, but how the present manipulates the past that is decisive’.
Applying this in the case of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, he continues that in
order to mobilise for war,
nationalists had to convince neighbours and friends that in reality they had been 
massacring each other since time immemorial ...(although)... history has no 
such lessons to teach... The Balkan peoples had to be transformed from 
neighbours into enemies, just as the whole region had to be turned from a model 
of interethnic peace into a nightmare from the pages of Thomas Hobbes. '^^
Ambassador Tore Bogh, ‘Ethnic Issues in the Yugoslav Break-Up’, Lecture at the European Centre for 
Minority Issues (ECMI), Flensburgh, 16 March 1999.
http://www.ecmi.de/activities/lecture tore boegh.htm. See also Harold W. V. Temper ley. History of 
Serbia, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1919, p. 104.
Michael Ignatieff, ‘The Balkan Tragedy’, New York Review o f Books, 13 May 1993, pp. 3-5, at p. 3.
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The selective recall of history also found expression in the propaganda war, which 
emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the numbers of the dead during the 
civil war of 1941-45 with Serbian nationalists arguing that more than 700,000 Serbs 
were murdered by UstaSa forces while Croatian nationalists putting this figure down to 
only tens of thousands/^
The validity of historical memory can be questioned, however, particularly when the 
events involved belong to a far distant past. In principle, as Fred Halliday points out, 
what has happened in living memory is what should matter: ‘it is not the most ancient 
that is valid, but the most recent’ That said, unlived (for the majority of the 
population) memories associated with the atrocities of the Second World War needed 
not supersede the living memories of more than four decades of peaceful interethnic 
coexistence. For the people of the former Yugoslavia are no more haunted in perpetuity 
by their past history than any other people. That they have been encouraged to dwell in 
the past ‘misdeeds’ of their neighbours is a testimony of the instrumental twisting of 
historical memory in order to buttress present policy preferences and present political 
interests. It also testifies to the ‘value added’ interpretation of history. In this view, 
history is endowed with ‘value esteeming’ i.e., it does not have value in itself, according 
to its nature, but instead, at times, it has been given value by elites to serve political 
ends.^  ^The story of the battle of Kosovo, for instance, became legendary because so it 
suited Serbian clerical and nationalist elites.^* Similarly, the revival in the 1990s of the
For the Serbo-Croat conflict o f 1941-1945 refer to Chapter III, pp. 98-103.
Fred Halliday, ‘The Perils o f  Community: Reason and Unreason in National Ideology’, Nations and 
Nationalism, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2000, pp. 153-71 at p. 169.
Christopher Coker, War and the 2(f^ Century, p. 98. The author refers to Nietzsche’s interpretation o f  
history. Emphasis in original.
Central to the story o f the battle o f Kosovo is the role o f the assassin, MiIo§ Obilic, one o f Tsar Lazar’s 
paladins, whose loyalty was doubted by his lord. His disappearance on the eve o f the battle seemed to 
confirm the suspicion against him, but in fact he had crossed over to the Turkish camp in order to kill the
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memories of previous atrocities was a matter of the elite choosing to evoke these
specific historical values at that particular time, in order to reinforce national
antagonisms, incite hatred and vengeance, and stimulate new atrocities?^ Indeed,
manipulation of history was a crucial device in emphasising differences and creating
ethnic polarisation. As Tom Gallagher points out:
In the absence of racial and linguistic differences ... manipulation of the past 
may have been the obvious route to take for elites intent on widening group 
differences. The past was turned into a contemporary political resource by 
reviving old conspiracies or inventing new ones, emphasising past wrongs, 
asserting historic rights, and promoting stereotypical images of neighbouring 
peoples.^®
On the other hand, that present political considerations render leaders selective in their 
treatment of past history does not mean that the study of history is futile. In principle, 
history is there for scholars to leam from and draw lessons notwithstanding that 
‘.. .lessons are sometimes wrongly learnt, or the wrong lessons learnt... The problem 
is not that history has no function, or mission, or use, but rather that history is almost 
always prone to subjectivity and the predilection of those who write or interpret it.
Steven Majstorovic, for instance, has argued that history constrains ‘the options that 
leaders exercise...’. He maintains that historical constraints are particularly applicable
Sultan. Despite this suicidal act, the Turks managed to capture Tsar Lazar and then executed him. 
However, it was not the noble Lazar’s preference for a heavenly crown instead o f earthly subjection 
which lived most vividly in the Serb folk memory, but Milo§ O bilic’s cunning murder o f the Sultan. 
Mark Almond rightly suggests that the glorification o f this act by nineteenth-century writers helped 
stimulate the cult o f  political murder at the beginning o f the twentieth. ‘The grand futility o f Obilic’s act 
became its fascination’. Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War -  The War in the Balkans, London: 
Mandarin, 1994, p. 191.
See ibid., especially pp. 3-7,135.
Tom Gallagher, ‘My Neighbour, my Enemy: The Manipulation o f  Ethnic Identity and the Origins and 
Conduct o f War in Yugoslavia’, in David Turton, ed.. War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local 
Violence, Rochester: University o f Rochester Press, 1997, p. 71.
E. H. Carr, ‘The View from the Arena’ (Review o f W. Laqueur and G. L. Mosse eds.. Historians in 
Politics), TLS 7 March 1975, p. 246. Quoted in Thomas Smith, History and International Relations, p. 
53.
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for the Serbs: ‘the Serbs, more than the Croats and Muslims, are shackled by their view 
of history and may not be able to escape what they see as an apocalyptic destiny ... to 
defend Christianity from the mounting forces of Islam’. Moreover, he argues that not 
only Milosevic but any Serbian democratic alternative would be constrained by 
h is to ry .A t  least two problems, however, can be identified with this argument. First, 
before the conflict erupted -  as indeed during its course and also in its aftermath -  there 
was no convincing evidence of ‘mounting Islamic forces’ in the region. In point of fact, 
although the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and the majority of the population in 
Kosovo were Muslims both societies were largely secular. Secondly, Majstorovic’s 
argument does not make clear why history needed to constrain Milosevic (or some 
democratic alternative) to the extent of waging war and undertaking ethnic cleansing of 
other ethnic groups. While the perception of history might affect one’s understanding of 
particular events, history determines neither choices nor actions.
One does not have to obscure the fact that in the course of history there have been 
clashes between Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Albanians. But, conflict between 
them -  war and ethnic cleansing included -  has not been a permanent factor of 
interethnic relations but rather situational i.e., occurring at a particular time and a 
particular place as opposed to all times and all places. That said, previous cases of 
violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia needed not condition ethnic cleansing in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Indeed, previous conflict could have well
Steven Majstorovic, ‘Ancient Hatreds or Elite Manipulation? Memory and Politics in the Former 
Yugoslavia’, World Affairs, Vol. 159, No. 4, 1997, pp. 171 and 178. In a later article, he has been yet 
more explicit when stating that death and destruction in the region has often been the result o f the limits 
and constraints imposed by historical memory for both masses and elites. See Steven Majstorovic, 
‘Autonomy o f  the Sacred: The Endgame in Kosovo’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 5, Nos. 3/4, 
1999, p. 172.
139
served as a deterrent to rather than as a precedent for the latest campaigns of ethnic 
cleansing and its accompanying wars.
The presumption that ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was 
determined by the history of past conflicts ignores a wide range of factors that may well 
have contributed more directly and vigorously to the emergence of the latest conflict. In 
particular, it disregards the selective use of history which the elites employed in a bid to 
legitimise their political aims and interests. In addition, it fails to explain why past 
history motivated the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia but did not do so in the 
rest of the world. As Michael Brown has pointed out, ‘other (ethnic) groups ... have 
historical grievances of various kinds’ but those ‘have not led to violent conflict in the 
1990s’.”
History is not set in a linear motion that would lead us from the past straight up to
today’s events in some recognisable pattern.^ "* People are not necessarily either haunted
or bounded by history. Past history does not have to determine the present. The main
problem vsdth the view that embraces any form of historical determinism is that by
exempting leaders from moral responsibility for their actions it leaves no room for
agency. As Reinhold Niebuhr wrote:
Even when the historic situation is [a] tragic ... one, and when a careful estimate 
of historic probabilities is bound to lead to more pessimistic than optimistic 
conclusions, we have no right to speak of ‘inevitabilities’ in history. Men are 
always agents, and not merely the stuff, in the historical process.^^
Michael E. Brown, ‘Introduction’, in Michael E. Brown, ed.. The International Dimensions o f  Internal 
Conflict, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996, p.l3.
Thomas Smith, History and International Relations, p. 154.
Niebuhr wrote this in the framework o f the Cold War but his conclusion fits just fine in our context as 
well. See, Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘A Protest Against a Dilemma’s Two Horns’, World Politics Vol. II, No. 3, 
1950, pp. 338-9. Isaiah Berlin is another outstanding personality that denunciated historical inevitability 
in general. Historical determinism, in his view, stems fi'om ‘a desire to resign our responsibility, to cease 
from judging provided we be not judged and above all be not compelled to judge ourselves, from a desire
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In other words, leaders’ options have had choices and when they make the wrong 
decisions the responsibility for this does not have to lie with history. In the case of the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, it was not past history and its memory that constrained 
the options that leaders exercised but rather their present political interests and 
considerations.
IV.3 ‘Ancient Ethnic Hatreds’
In conjunction with the view that considers conflict in the former Yugoslavia as 
historically determined there is another explanation for the conflict that takes its starting 
point from a pessimistic reading of history. Looking only upon the past regional 
conflicts, this view attributes recent wars and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans to ‘the 
bestial vice’ of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ that allegedly permeates the region. The 
assumption here is that the tradition of enmity in the region has been so powerful that ‘it 
has thrust itself in the genetic makeup of the region’s inhabitants’^^  -  hatred itself being 
part of the so-called Balkan temperament.
Such an assumption may seem discredited today, nonetheless, it held sway especially in 
the first years of the conflict, even amongst policy-makers who, perhaps, should have 
known better. Foreign Ministers from the European Community sent to Yugoslavia in 
1991 to resolve the crisis alluded to the ‘Balkan temperament, a south Slavic 
predisposition -  either cultural or genetic -  toward fratricide’.F o r m e r  British Prime 
Minister John Major when commenting upon the events in the former Yugoslavia in
to flee for refuge to some vast amoral, impersonal whole o f  nature or history’. I. Berlin, Historical 
Inevitability, London: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 77-8.
See Misha Glenny, Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, I804-I999, London: Granta 
Books, 1999, p. xxiv.
Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death o f a Nation, Revised and Updated Edition, London 
and New York: Penguin Books, 1997, p. 159.
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1992 spoke of ‘those people, wrapped in their ‘ancient hatreds’...’.^ * Similarly,
speaking at a news conference in February 1993, the former U.S. Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, stated that:
The death of President Tito and the end of communist domination of the former 
Yugoslavia raised the lid on the cauldron of ancient ethnic hatreds. This is the 
land where at least three religions and a half-dozen ethnic groups have vied 
across the centuries. It was the birthplace of World War One. It has been a 
cradle of European conflict, and it remains so today.^^
In March of the same year. President Clinton also depicted the conflict between Serbs, 
Croats and Bosnian Muslims in terms of hatred: ‘the hatred between all three groups ... 
is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old. That really is a 
problem from hell Moreover, this line of reasoning was quite common amongst 
journalistic accounts of the conflict. A frequently quoted journalist, Robert Kaplan, 
contended that in the Balkans ‘men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, 
dooming them to hate’."^  ^ While communism kept the processes of history and memory 
in the region on hold for forty-five years, upon its collapse ‘the lid was taken off and 
millennial conflicts exploded with all their extraordinary hatred."*^  Even academics 
promulgated such a view. Mearsheimer and Van Evera, for instance, write of Kosovo as 
being ‘consumed by a war that stems from hatreds bom of great cruelties that Albanians 
and Serbs have inflicted on each other in the past’."^  ^ While William Hagen observed
Cited in Misha Glenny, Balkans, p. xxiv.
Quoted in David Turton, ‘Introduction: War and Ethnicity’, in David Turton, ed.. War and Ethnicity, p, 
33.
Quoted in Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States ' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-1995, New  
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p. 105.
Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, London: Papermac, 1994, p. xxiii. 
Although Kaplan’s account suffers from lack o f perspective regarding inter-ethnic relations in the Balkan 
region as it concentrates only upon extreme and untypical episodes o f  Balkan history, it has been credited 
with influencing President Clinton’s policy in Bosnia, particularly in its early stages. See Elizabeth Drew, 
On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 157.
Robert Kaplan, ‘A Reader’s Guide to the Balkans’, p. 30.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, ‘Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing’, New York Times, 
April 19, 1999, p. A23.
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that ‘the war in Kosovo has reinforced the Balkans’ image as a cauldron of ethnic 
hatred’.'^ '*
Nor is there anything novel in the notion of the revival of ‘ancient hatreds’ in the 
Balkans. It is interesting, for instance, to read in a 1913 Carnegie Report on the regional 
conflicts associated with the Balkan Wars that the ‘fading away of the Turkish Empire 
meant that the accumulated hatred of centuries were u n lea sh e d . . .T h e  origin of the 
ethnic hatreds in the former Yugoslavia, nevertheless, remains a matter of dispute, some 
observers insisting on their age-old character; others arguing that hatred is not ancient 
but instead modem. Noel Malcolm, for instance, argues that ‘the idea that differences 
should be a basis for hatred is, historically, a recent innovation, brought in by 
intellectuals and politicians in the 19* century when they tried to impose the theory of 
the homogenous state on their very heterogeneous h om e lan d s . . .O th e r  scholars 
suggest that ethnic hatreds are of even more recent origin and are associated with the 
World War Two massacres."^  ^ Yet, others argue that hatred was manufactured, 
mobilised and manipulated by scrupulous leaders intent to serve their own political 
interests and gamer popular support while preparing the ground for conflict and also 
during its course."^ * That hatred accompanies fighting and atrocities is hardly a 
revelation, but this is not to say that collective hatred is a constant and uniform 
occurrence.
^  William Hagen, ‘The Balkan's Lethal Nationalism’, p. 52.
The Other Balkan Wars, at n. 3, p. 71. This view, however, is contradicted by other data represented in 
this report. A letter o f a Greek soldier, for instance, printed in page 148 o f the report states: ‘We are -  
such is the order -  to bum the villages, massacre the young, and spare none but the old people, children 
and minors’; implying therefore that the violence was a top-down one and not the result o f accumulated 
hatreds. In addition, one reads in this report that war could have been avoided by imperative orders from 
Athens, Belgrade and Sofia (p. 73), thus testifying to the political origin o f the Balkan Wars.
^  Noel Malcolm, ‘Seeing Ghosts’, Review o f Robert D. Kaplan’s ‘Balkan Ghosts’, The National Interest, 
No. 32, Summer 1993, p. 85. See also Ivo Banac, ‘The Fearful Asymmetry o f War: The Causes and 
Consequences o f Yugoslavia’s Demise’, Daedalus, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 143.
Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower, pp. 99-100.
See Russell Hardin, ‘Self-Interest, Group Identity’, in John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stem, eds.. 
Perspectives on Nationalism and War, Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995, pp. 35-38.
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A closer examination of the assumption that attributes ethnic cleansing to the re­
awakening of ancient hatreds suggests that it is an empirically flawed argument. To start 
with, the ancient hatred view is reductionist and a simplistic one as it remains 
unreflective of fundamental contemporary causes of the conflict. Moreover, it represents 
a static view of reality as it fails to take into account considerable periods in history 
during which ethnic groups coexisted peacefully aside each other. Adherents of this 
approach, therefore, can be criticised of being ‘guilty of selection bias’.In d e e d , they 
eschew the fact that the pattern of amity and enmity between different ethnic groups and 
nations in the region did not follow a linear trajectory but rather shifted at times with 
amity and enmity being mobile qualities. Reducing the causes of ethnic cleansing to the 
simple formula of ‘ancient hatred’ or the ‘Balkan temperament’ means reading history 
the wrong way. As Russell Hardin emphasises ‘if [ethnic hatred] systematically 
underlies history’ -  as this approach would have us believe -  ‘[such hatred] must be 
systematically evident’.B u t ,  history does not support this claim, as for the most part 
the relations between the peoples of the region have been smooth.^ ^
Similarly, Aleksandar Fatic suggests that in the late 1990/1 when the Socialist Federal Republic o f  
Yugoslavia (SFRY) began to disintegrate, there was no overwhelming hatred between its constituent 
nations and national minorities. SFRY ‘was a fairly prosperous country with some understandable mutual 
animosities, dating back to the Second World War, but there were by no means glaring, and were 
certainly not a major political and security threat. They were no more pronounced than similar 
animosities in other countries o f the region’. Aleksandar Fatic, Reconciliation via the War Crimes 
Tribunal?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, p. 17.
Beverly Crawford, ‘The Causes o f Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach’, in Beverly Crawford 
and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds.. The Myth o f  ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Politics, Economics, and ‘Cultural’ 
Violence, Berkley: University o f California at Berkley, 1998, p. 11.
Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic o f  Group Conflict, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995, p. 148.
Bogdan Denitch, for example, maintains that except for communal massacres associated with the 
Second World War, Serbs and Croats have lived together more or less tolerably for four centuries. See 
Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death o f  Yugoslavia, revised edition, Minneapolis, London: 
University o f  Minesota Press, 1996, p. 62. Noel Malcolm also points out that while prior to 1878 -  the 
year o f the Congress o f Berlin that ended the Ottoman occupation o f Bosnia -  violence was not associated 
with ethnic conflict but rather it was sparked by agrarian conflicts between serfs and landowners, from 
1878 onwards (with the exception o f the two World Wars) interethnic relations have been generally good. 
Noel Malcolm, ‘Seeing Ghosts’, p. 85. And although the Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo have
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By the same token, if ancient ethnic hatred was so pervasive, how would one account 
for the ever-increasing number of inter-ethnic marriages in the region? In Yugoslavia, in 
the 1980s, more than 3 million people out of a population of around 22 million were 
products of ethnically mixed marriages or were married to someone of a different ethnic 
group/^ In Bosnia by the late 1980s, 30% of marriages in urban areas were mixed 
marriages/^ Moreover, ethnonational relations in workplaces and neighbourhoods were 
generally good. The Yugoslav Survey of the 1990, for instance, reveals that 36 percent 
of the respondents characterised ethnonational relations in workplaces as ‘good’, 28 
percent ‘satisfactory’, and only 6 per cent said ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. According to the 
same source, relations in neighbourhoods were considered to be ‘good’ by 57 percent of 
the interviewees, ‘satisfactory’ by 28 percent of them, and only 12 percent chose to 
describe such relations ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’.^ "^
The contention that ancient hatred motivated the latest conflict and aggravated it to the 
extent of ethnic cleansing is largely grounded on untypical moments of history. With 
the exception of the 1990s, ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia tended to be 
contingent on external -  regional or global -  conflicts such as the Balkan Wars or the 
two World Wars rather than self-generated. Furthermore, concentration on conflicts 
between ethnic groups conceals the divisions within them. Indeed, the Serbs of Croatia 
may have had more in common with their Croat neighbours than with their Serb
not intermingled to a large extent, relations between them have been cordial and calm for most o f  the 
time.
Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 36.
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, Updated Edition, London: Papermac, 1996, p. 222.
The Yugoslav Survey 1990 ‘Public Opinion Survey on the Federal Executive Council’s Social and 
Economic Reform’, 31 March, pp. 3-26, at p. 25. Quoted in Anthony Oberschall, ‘The Manipulation of 
Ethnicity: from Ethnic Co-operation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 
23, No. 6, 2000, p. 988.
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brethren in Serbia. Similarly, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia may have had far 
more in common with each-other than they did with either Serbs from Serbia or Croats 
from Croatia. In conditions of war and ethnic cleansing hatred exists, but rather than 
being the cause of violence it may well be its consequence.
In sum, the ancient hatred thesis lacks explanatory power and misses the essential 
nature of the recent ethnic cleansing campaigns and the conflict in general. Its main 
function has been to obscure the understanding of the conflict particularly by blaming 
all parties equally for the situation and reducing attacker and defender to the same 
status. Indeed, ‘one bundle of hatred could be no better and no worse than another’. 
Consequently, the adherence to the ancient hatred proposition rationalised inaction or, at 
best, limited involvement on the part of the Western powers on the ground that 
intervention in such an irrational quarrel would be counterproductive trapping the 
Western armies in a permanent quagmire with no exit in sight.^  ^In addition, the ancient 
hatred assumption distracts attention from the fact that it was national elites that 
stimulated, mobilised and utilised hatreds for their own political ends. For leaders, this 
was a means to polarise society and mobilise support as a way of gaining and 
consolidating power. Indeed, depicting the conflict in terms of hatreds made it easier for 
the national leadership to legitimise policies of ethnic cleansing, i.e., the 
homogenisation of the nation from ‘the hateful other(s)’.
Noel Malcolm, ‘Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure’, The National Interest, No. 39, Spring 1995, 
pp. 5-6.
For some the blame was an orphan. As Lord Carrington, the EC negotiator, declared after few weeks o f  
the initial Serb attack on Bosnia (March 1992): ‘Everybody is to blame for what is happening in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and as soon as we get the cease-fire there will be no need to blame anybody’. While in 
an interview o f  December 1994, he declared: ‘I don’t think any [of the three parties is] particularly in the 
wrong. They are all in the wrong. And all have some right on their side’. Cited in the same source.
See Wayne Bert, pp. 101-106. David Turton, p. 10. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, ‘Ethnic Wars and 
International Intervention’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1,1998, p. 128.
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IV.4 Fear
Other scholars, when tracing the causes of wars and ethnic cleansing in the former 
Yugoslavia, adopt yet another approach, which pivots on the mutual fears and insecurity 
of the conflicting parties. In the view of David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, for 
instance, intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the future. 
When individuals and groups fear for their safety, security dilemmas with their potential 
for violence abound. It is this context of fear and insecurity that in turn becomes 
conducive to elites’ efforts to polarise and mobilise society.^^ This ‘bottom-up’ view has 
attracted attention of a number of analysts who contend that fear was a crucial element 
in bringing about violence.^* The following seeks to evaluate the extent to which ethnic 
fears, i.e., collective fears of contending ethnic groups, contributed to the incidence of 
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. First, I ask what was feared 
and by whom, then I consider the utility of fear from the leadership perspective.
IV.4.1 The range o f fears
Post World War Two Yugoslavia was not a fear-free environment. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war some still feared the return of wartime atrocities, whereas after 
1948 Tito’s break with Stalin the fear of a possible retaliatory strike by the Soviet Union 
was wide spread. Moreover, the fear of Great Serbian restoration did not disappear 
among non-Serbs while Serbs for their part feared that the non-Serb fellow Yugoslavs 
would conspire to undermine Yugoslav unity and secure their own states in two of
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management o f  Ethnic 
Conflict’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996, pp. 41-75; and Lake and Rothchild eds.. The 
International Spread o f Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998, especially chapters one and fifteen.
See for instance, Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s  Honour -  Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, 
New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997, pp. 7 and 45; and Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
How Not to End Civil War’, in Walter and Snyder, eds.. Civil Wars, pp. 78, 82, 84.
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which -  Croatia and Bosnia -  Serbs would become persecuted minorities/^ 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect that the existence of collective fear set the 
former Yugoslavia apart from other communist countries of Eastern Europe. Aleksa 
Djilas’ depiction of the communist Yugoslavia as a system based on fear (in the sense 
that to challenge it often meant the loss of job or even imprisonment)^® is real but such 
depiction could just as reliably have been applied to any other former communist 
country. Yet, this background of fear was not unimportant since it provided a ground 
conducive to the rise and manipulation of new fears.
As the Yugoslav federation began to disintegrate the institutions designed to provide 
law, order and stability were undermined creating, in turn, a situation in which 
uncertainty and insecurity were pervasive. In such a setting, groups were bound to fear 
for their own future.^^ While Serbian nationalists made exaggerated claims with regard 
to the ‘threats’ to the Serbs in Kosovo and then also to those in other republics, the non- 
Serb peoples of the federation fearing the implications of Serbian protective nationalism 
reacted with their own heightened nationalism, thereby generating a vicious spread of 
interrelated fears encompassing majorities and minorities alike.
In the context of uncertainties over the new state boundaries an evident anxiety was the 
fear o f loss o f territory. This fear was in particular associated with the Serbs, 40 percent 
of whom lived outside Serbia proper, mainly in Bosnia and Croatia. Nonetheless, the
Ivo Banac, ‘The Fearful Asymmetry o f War’, p. 168 and Aleksa Djilas, ‘A Profile o f Slobodan 
M ilosevic’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3,1993, p. 93.
Djilas, ‘A Profile o f Slobodan M ilosevic’, p. 87.
Barbara Walter has identified, in general, five fear-producing environments namely: the government 
collapse; geographical isolation or vulnerability o f ethnic minorities; shifts in the political balance o f  
power; redistribution o f resources; and, forced or voluntary disarmament in the aftermath o f a peace 
treatise. Coincidentally, in the case o f  the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, her last four fear-producing 
environments can in fact be viewed as a function o f the first one i.e., the federal government collapse. See 
Walter, ‘Introduction’, in Walter and Snyder, eds.. Civil Wars, pp. 4-8.
148
widespread territorial distribution of the Serbs in Yugoslavia proved to be an asset on 
which the Serb nationalist leaders were able to capitalise in their bid to create a ‘Greater 
Serbia’ that would include Croatian Krajina and Bosnia.^^ Fear of lost territory on the 
part of the Serbs was only aggravated by purposeful mis/use of state propaganda and 
media.^^ Historical memories and national myths associated with the contested 
territories were rekindled and the nationalist rhetoric portrayed territory as sacred, 
‘something that cannot be lost under any circumstance’.^ "^  A zero-sum conception of 
territory implied that at stake were Croatian Krajina and the whole of Bosnia.
Given that all republics of the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia) were 
multinational, fear o f secession by minorities was very pronounced among majorities, 
especially given that dissenting minorities (with the exception of Bosnian Muslims) had 
a mother country in one of the adjacent states, which were legitimately concerned with 
the welfare of their kin. Fears of secession among the Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian 
leadership respectively were heightened as elites of the Serb minority in Croatia, Serb 
and Croat community in Bosnia and Albanians in Kosovo claimed repeatedly their 
intentions to secede. Once the Serbian minority in the Krajina region of Croatia had 
declared its self-styled independence and seized control over about a third of Croatia’s
“  Badredine Arfi, ‘Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction o f Insecurity’, Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
1998, p. 178.
“  Although not completely controlling all media outlets, M ilosevic had under his supervision the state 
television station whose director and key staff he appointed and replaced as necessary. Newspapers (and 
magazines) were not influential because few people afforded buying them; still, Milosevic controlled the 
three largest o f them. Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Revised Edition, Luton: University o f Luton Press, 1999. Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbour 
- A  Story o f  War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, especially p. 227.
^  George SchOpflin, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics o f  Europe, London: Hurst, 2000, p. 287.
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\territory, and the Serbs of Bosnia had declared their Republika Srpska, fears of the loss 
of territory had been confirmed as secession had become in fact faits accomplis
On the other hand, fear o f becoming a minority was perceptually equated with 
becoming a victim in a foreign state, given that in the region minorities had been 
usually dominated by majority groups. In the Yugoslav federation, nationalities other 
than Serbs came to see themselves in a disadvantageous position, given the dominant 
role of Serbs particularly in the army, state and communist party structures. This might 
well have been one of the key reasons for the disintegration of the federation especially 
in the case of Slovenia and Croatia. But once the federation was no more, there was no 
reason for Macedonia either to remain within the contour of the rump Yugoslavia. As 
Gligorov put it (presumably addressing a Serb): ‘Why should I be a minority in your 
state when you can be a minority in mine?’.^ ^
In regions where minorities were disproportionally large minorities, fear of becoming 
demographically overrun by another ethnic community was quite pronounced. As 
George Schopflin points out, ‘where the demographic reproduction rates of the two 
communities are ... disparate ... one group concludes that the massive growth in size of 
the other means that it has lost the ethnic game [and] that its ability to ensure its cultural 
reproduction has been undermined’ This fear had been looming large in Serb minds 
since Kosovar Albanians maintained a majority in increase within the province.
Republika Srpska remains in place as to-date although within the borders o f Bosnia, while the Serbian 
move in Krajina has been reversed. The Albanians o f Kosovo declared their independence in July 1991 
but have not, so far, received international recognition,
^  This saying has been attributed both to the former president o f the Former Yugoslav Republic o f  
Macedonia Kiro Gligorov and his son Vladimir Gligorov. Steven Majstorovic, ‘Ancient Hatreds or Elite 
Manipulation?’, p. 172 attributes this to the former whereas Unfinished Peace: Report o f  the International 
Commission on the Balkans, with a foreward by Leo Tindemans, Washington, D C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1996, p. 32 attributes this to the latter.
SchOpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, p. 270.
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Similarly, the Serbs were worried about their numerically disadvantageous position in 
the contested areas of Croatia and Bosnia. While Bosnian Muslims did not have an 
absolute majority, Serbs in Bosnia were hardly a minority either.^* In such a 
demographic setting, as Susan Woodward has pointed out, the rhetorical support from 
Zagreb and Belgrade to Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs respectively were sufficient 
to make Bosnian Muslims feel like a vulnerable minority, while Sarajevo’s insistence 
on an integral and independent Bosnia made Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs feel 
vulnerable on their part.^  ^ Voting along ethnic lines meant, therefore, that Serbs and 
more so Croats would de facto be a minority in Bosnia should a system of majority rule 
-  as in Croatia and Serbia -  be adopted.
Understandably, this spectrum of fears translated into the fear o f loss o f security both in 
its economic and political aspects. Loss of territory would have meant fewer natural and 
man-made resources and consequently loss of property, jobs, etc. Whilst, politically, 
loss of territory would have meant diminution of state sovereignty. Moreover, fear of 
becoming a minority may not only have been perceived in terms of assimilation (which 
would have amounted to loss of cultural identity), or in terms of discrimination and 
persecution but, perhaps also as a threat to physical existence at the level of the 
individuals and group. This fear was aggravated especially by the activated memories of 
past atrocities and inflated figures of casualties associated with inter-ethnic fighting 
during the Second World War as both Croatian and Serbian nationalist leaders ‘engaged
According to the 1991 census, Bosnian Muslims constituted 43.7 percent (up from 39.5 percent in 
1981) o f  Bosnia’s population; Serbs 31.4 percent; while Croats constituted 17.3 percent. There figures are 
cited in Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War’, in Walter and Snyder, 
eds., Civil Wars, p. 82.
Ibid.
151
in a war of numbers sought to provide victimhood and justification for a pre-emptive
strike’7°
On the basis of the above it may be concluded that prior to the occurrence of ethnic 
cleansing in the 1990s, as well as during its course, fear was not an ephemeral emotion^^ 
but continuous and persistent. The conditions of dissolving the federal state were highly 
conducive to a variety of fears, which may have induced ethnic groups to consider 
providing for their own security as the crippling federation failed to offer reliable 
protection. These fears were not utterly without foundation and may help one to 
understand, for instance, why war and ethnic cleansing were to some extent supported 
by the community of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, although the role of fear should not 
be overlooked, its functional character should not be missed out.
IV.4.2 The functionality offear
The remaining of this section asks whether fear conditioned behaviour to the extent of 
ethnic cleansing. Were reactions of the perpetrators permeated wholly by distrust and 
fear with no room for rationality and calculation? Was fear the driving motivation for 
ethnic cleansing or was it used to legitimise policies and actions of the perpetrators 
instead?
Oberschall, ‘The Manipulation o f Ethnicity’, p. 990.
Among the first to study fear as an emotion -  a negative emotion -  was Aristotle, who saw it as ‘a kind 
of pain or disturbance resulting from the imagination o f impending danger and ‘...attended by a 
certain expectation o f undergoing some destructive experience’. Aristotle’s interest in fear, however, is 
that o f  the orator who only seeks to produce or control it. He, therefore, does not attempt to offer an 
account o f the relation between fear and human behaviour as such. See Aristotle, The Art o f  Rhetoric, 
Translated with an Introduction and Notes by H. C. Lawson-Tancred, London: Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 
153-156.
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Although the impact of fear on human behaviour is not the focus of this discussion, it is 
relevant since like other emotions, it influences perceptions of others and ‘especially 
how ambiguous actions and situations are interpreted’ Fear also can affect cognition, 
for as a familiar saying has it: ‘the way one knows is the way one feels’. In fact, more 
often than not, fear tends to impair careful cognition rather than enhance it. As Arne 
Ohman points out, fear is threat focused in that the fearful is biased towards discovering 
threat^^ and also inclined to build hostile images of those that s/he perceives as a source 
of fear and threat. At the same time, the presence of fear tends to promote memories of 
past threatening situations even when the present setting is considerably different fi*om 
the past. Nonetheless, the effect of fear on behaviour through perception, cognition, 
image, etc., tends to be unintentional and not necessarily dire in its consequences. For, 
as American vice president Lyndon Johnson once said: ‘Every damn place you go 
there’s fear’,^ '* yet, not in every place there is war and/or ethnic cleansing.
Figueiredo Jr. and Weingast have cogently argued that for politically frail leaders who 
seek to maintain power by inducing massive change in their societal environments fear 
holds the key to success. The success of such a strategy, whose costs are borne by 
masses, requires that the average citizen be engaged and approves the policy of leaders 
who, in turn, skilfully manufacture and play upon ambiguous situations. Fear proves 
indispensable for the architects of this strategy as they use the fears imbued in people in
Neta C. Crawford, ‘The Passion o f World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional 
Relationships’, International Security, Vol. 24, N o .4 ,2000, p. 134.
Arne Ohman, ‘Fear and Anxiety: Evolutionary, Cognitive, and Clinical Perspectives’, in Michael Lewis 
and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, eds.. The Handbook o f  Emotions, Second Edition, New York and 
London: The Guilford Press, 2000, pp. 577-8.
Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds.. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 587.
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order to gamer their support. Overwhelmed by fear for their lives, livelihoods, and 
families, citizens become more willing to support extremist state policies.^^
The Serbs under the rule of Slobodan Milosevic provide an instructive example. Since 
the early stages of his career he had ‘sensed an opportunity in Serbian fears’ and 
encouraged and exploited them as a means towards his political ends.^  ^ As Aleksa 
Djilas points out, Milosevic ‘succeeded because he understood the power of fear and 
knew how to use it for his own purposes’. Fear became his faithful ally in manipulating 
Serbian masses, in winning party cadres and securing support of the military and 
paramilitary forces.^^ Not only did his leadership employ mthless criminals to create a 
climate of interethnic fear and suspicion^* but, aided by state propaganda and 
newsmedia, it also promoted fear as a source of conflict.^^ In turn, fear became 
instrumental at the hands of manipulative leaders as part of their efforts to increase the 
receptivity of their arguments. Indeed, abundance of fear facilitated their persuasive 
appeals.
This was a tactic that delivered results as far as mobilisation of citizens was concerned. 
As George Schopflin puts it: ‘People can be ‘stirred up’ if they feel that there is 
something to which they might respond, like fears as to the future of the community;
Rui J. P. de Figueirendo Jr. and Barry R, Weingast, ‘The Rationality o f Fear: Political Opportunism and 
Ethnic Conflict’, in Walter and Snyder, eds.. Civil Wars, pp. 263-267.
Ivo Banac, ‘The Fearful Asymmetry o f War’, p. 151.
Aleksa Djilas, ‘A Profile o f Slobodan M ilosevic’, pp. 87, 95-96.
See for instance Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 238. The notorious campaigns o f mass rape, 
plunder and killing led by the Serb warlord Éeljko Ra2njatovic -  known as Arkan -  are a case in point. 
Although such campaigns were public knowledge, the Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic considered Arkan 
to be a Serb patriot. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic, ‘My Conscience is Completely Clear, Milosevic 
Declares’, The Independent, 13 December 2000, p. 17. Similarly, the former Bosnian Serb leader Biljana 
Plavsic kept Arkan in her company for most o f the 1990s and publicly declared him a ‘hero’. See Maggie 
O’Kane, ‘Court Comes o f Age with Her Surrender’, The Guardian, 12 January, 2001, p. 13.
Refer to Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Revised Edition, Luton: University o f Luton Press, 1999, Chapter Ten.
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mobilisation must have resonance if it is to work’.*® In terms of the nationalist mission, 
therefore, fear served to provide the necessary cohesion and resonance needed to secure 
popular support. In addition, from the leadership perspective, fear had the positive effect 
of distracting the attention of the masses from the logic of conflict and its evidence. At 
the same time, by spreading fear, elites were also facilitated in their endeavour to 
propagate the thesis of ethnic hatreds and dehumanise the targeted others. Furthermore, 
like hatred, fear was particularly useful when implanted amongst soldiers and 
paramilitary troops as this exhorted them to be fiercely ruthless and act with courage 
against demonised ethnic groups.
This is to suggest that the role of fear in the occurrence of ethnic cleansing was not 
deterministic. Instead of pushing actors into confrontation, fear could have played an 
accommodative role, serving as an incentive to resolve the situation peacefully. That 
this was not the case was a matter of choice: leaders elected to act otherwise and use 
fear as a self-serving tactic, i.e., as a means of garnering support and legitimising their 
exclusivist policies. In particular, fear of loss of territory was skilfully exploited by 
nationalist elites of the dominant group(s) to argue that all measures -  ethnic cleansing 
included -  were legitimate to prevent loss of contested areas. Although a permissive 
factor, fear alone can not be blamed as a cause of ethnic cleansing in the sense that the 
expulsion of targeted minorities was not bound exclusively with its (fear’s) existence. It 
may, however, provide clues as to why citizens, at least some of them, were somehow 
willing to support exclusive policies of ethnic cleansing planned by their leaders.
80 Schopflin, Nation, Identity, Power, p. 258.
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IV.5 The security dilemma and securitisation
Fear as a function of uncertainty, threat and insecurity has been considered, particularly 
by the realist school of International Relations, to be at the heart of the security 
dilemma. Crudely, the gist of the security dilemma is that each actor by striving to 
increase its own security inadvertently provokes fears and countermeasures that reduce 
the security of others. Realists have employed the security dilemma to analyse state 
behaviour in conditions of anarchy i.e., the absence of a world sovereign.*^ While the 
impetus of the security dilemma is fear, the preconditions of the security dilemma 
include rational, defensively motivated actors that strive for security in an anarchical 
environment characterised by first-strike advantages and the indistinguishability of 
means of defence and offence. In addition, uncertainty about the intentions of others, 
which can easily evolve into fears is another requirement for the security dilemma.*^ 
This latter requirement suggests that what is important in a situation of security 
dilemma is one’s perception of the intentions of others and one’s belief about them 
rather than the true intentions of others.
The application of the security dilemma in analysing ethnic conflict, however, is a 
recent enterprise of mainly the 1990s, Barry Posen being amongst the first scholars to 
apply this approach.*^ The essence of Posen’s argument is that when the state is in 
process of disintegration, the different nations and ethnic groups that once lived under
The intellectual roots o f the security dilemma can be retracted in the writings o f  classical realists 
particularly Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, although none o f  them uses the term explicitly. For an 
animating discussion in this regard see Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between 
Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy, Dissertation for the Degree o f Doctor o f  Philosophy in Peace and 
Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1999, pp. 26-36. John Herz was among the first scholars to 
develop the idea o f the security dilemma. See, J. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma’, World Politics Vol. 2, No. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180. While Robert Jervis offered a first original 
contribution in the study o f the security dilemma. See, R. Jervis, ‘Co-operation under the Security 
Dilemma’, World Politics Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, pp. 167-213.
Melander, Anarchy Within, pp. 21-23.
”  Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival Vol. 35, No. 1,1993, pp. 27-47.
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its umbrella are left to fend for their own security. In taking steps to defend themselves, 
members of any given group threaten inadvertently the security of other groups, which 
lead them to take measures in order to bolster their own security and diminish that of 
their adversaries. Driven by perceptions of threats and insecurities ethnic groups get 
caught on cycles of security dilemmas which, in turn, lead to violence.
Since Posen wrote his article in 1993, a number of scholars have embraced the view that 
security dilemmas are useful in understanding wars and ethnic cleansing that befell the 
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.*  ^One of the most pertinent studies of the security 
dilemma especially in relation to the Bosnian conflict is that of Erik Melander, who 
investigated the role of the security dilemma in the eruption of the war between Serb 
nationalists and Croat nationalists, and the war between Serb nationalist faction and the 
Bosnian Government.*^ Following a compelling analysis of the military balance 
Melander concludes that the logic of security dilemma provides a plausible explanation 
for the eruption of war and ethnic cleansing in the first case. In his view, it was 
strategically advantageous for the Serbs to avoid or postpone a confrontation with the 
Croat nationalist faction over Bosnia and concentrate on defeating the Bosnian 
Government first. This would have allowed the powerful Serb military to deal with its 
adversaries one at a time and prevent the Croats and Muslims from combining their
Erik Melander distinguishes between ethnic security dilemmas and other security dilemmas as, for 
instance, those between states, the main difference being that whereas states are separated by borders, 
actors in ethnic conflict(s) that get caught in security dilemmas are not insulated from each-other by 
borders but instead are more or less intermingled. In addition, the type o f military and intelligence 
resources at the disposal o f actors is substantially different in the two cases, i.e., in the case o f ethnic 
security dilemmas intelligence resources are relatively unsophisticated while armed forces are mainly 
based on infantry. Melander, Anarchy Within, p. 37.
See for instance, Susan L. Woodward, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War’, in 
Walter and Snyder, eds.. Civil Wars, p. 74 and William Zartman, ‘Mediating Conflicts o f  Need, Greed 
and Creed’, Orbis: A Journal o f  World Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, p. 257. The later author, in fact, says 
that security dilemmas are the best explanation for ethnic violence in Bosnia and Kosovo amongst other 
cases.
Melander, Anarchy Within, Chapters 6 and 7.
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strategic assets so as to obtain maximum synergy. Had they defeated the Bosnian 
Government first, the Serbs would have been in a more advantageous position to 
confront the Croats since their lines of communication would have been safer and more 
strategic positions secured to lend credence to a successful strike. The reason why this 
scenario did not materialise, Melander argues, is that the Serbs were hinged by the lack 
of trust that their Croat counterparts would refrain from co-operating with the Muslims, 
leading instead to an acute security dilemma that in turn induced the Serbs to try and 
strike a crippling preemptive blow against the Croat nationalist forces.*  ^ In contrast, 
Melander concludes that the security dilemma is redundant as an explanation for why 
the Serb nationalists initiated large scale war and ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian 
Government and its supporters. The reason for this is that the leadership of the Serb 
nationalist faction was aggressively revisionist in the sense that these leaders were 
willing to go to war in order to extract a revision of the status quo at a time when the 
Bosnian Government harboured no hostile intentions and lacked the military capability 
to strike first and initiate war against the vastly superior Serb forces.**
Melander’s analysis is compelling and provides many important insights. Nonetheless, 
the security dilemma does not necessarily provide a valid explanation for the initiation 
of war even in the case of the Serbs versus the Croats. Although better armed than the 
Bosnian Muslims, it is doubtful whether Croat forces possessed the military capability 
to strike a serious first blow against the superior Serb forces, at least in 1991-1992.
Ibid., Chapter 6. In many ways, this lack o f trust on the part o f the Serbs was something o f their own 
doing. It was the Serbs who following the declaration o f independence o f  Slovenia and Croatia waged 
war briefly against the former and then against the latter for six whole months, in the course o f which the 
Croat inhabitants o f Krajina were ethnically cleansed and a third o f  the Croatian territory occupied. 
Moreover, the Serb nationalist faction started to concentrate its military arsenal in Bosnia in preparation 
for war since late 1991. See Chapter III, pp. 112-114 and Chapter V, pp. 196-197. It follows, therefore, 
that any expectation on the Serb side for Croatian trust might have well been unrealistic.
Melander, Anarchy Within, Chapter 7.
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Moreover, the other precondition of the security dilemma, namely the 
indistinguishability of means of defence and offence, was missing in every instance of 
war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Given that the target of ethnic 
cleansing were civilians, who of course were defenceless, the offence had its upper hand 
and it was clearly distinct from defence. In addition, considering both cases as part of 
one larger war of the dissolution of Yugoslavia may provide important clues for the 
Serb nationalist policies. As Melander accepts in the last page of his study, what was at 
stake in the former Yugoslavia were ‘demands for ethnic unmixing by foremostly the 
Serb nationalist faction’ and this was ‘a major contribution to the break down of 
interethnic trust’. Had the Serb leadership demonstrated a ‘genuine commitment to 
democracy and minority rights’ the bloodshed could have been avoided. It is the 
‘undemocratic policies which contribute[d] to demands for independence or union with 
another state’ that ‘trigger[ed] fears of ending up on the wrong side’ of the borders and 
gave way to a security dilemma.*^ Unlike Serb demands for ethnic ‘unmixing’, the 
security dilemma was not the cause of war and ethnic cleansing.
Whereas the security dilemma did not cause war and ethnic cleansing, its presence, 
nonetheless, might have been important in inducing people to participate in the events 
directed by the elites. Furthermore, it might have been useful for the elites to manipulate 
security concerns among the grassroots and create security dilemmas, or exacerbate or 
take advantage of the already existing ones, as a means of intensifying group solidarity 
and mobilising popular support for a confrontational course of action which had nothing 
to do with the safety and well-being of their followers but instead served leadership
Ibid., p. 236,
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parochial interests/^ For objective or subjective reasons, the security dilemma is vdde 
spread. Indeed, as Morgan’s quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, the 
relevance of the security dilemma in explanation may be greatly reduced not least 
because it (i.e., the security dilemma) may be unavoidable.
A related explanatory argument appears to be that of securitisation which may be 
applied to understand the ways in which labelling an issue as a security problem gives 
that problem a special status and legitimates the extraordinary measures taken by state 
representatives to deal with it.^ * The most serious security problems involve threats to 
state survival, i.e., to sovereignty.^^ But, societal threats that emerge when nation and 
state do not correspond neatly, associated with claims of secession -  when a group 
claims it own sovereignty; or irredentism -  when a part of the population and the 
territory it inhabits is claimed by another state; pose no less serious threats to a state 
demanding in turn governmental action.^  ^ According to Buzan and Waever, 
securitisation -  the presentation of an issue as an existential threat and the acceptance of 
such a claim by the audience -  demands the use of extraordinary measures to deal with 
the perceived existential threat(s). '^  ^Translated to the case of former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, the logic of securitisation means that once a government or an elite has presented 
an ethnic group/minority as an existential threat to the well being of the dominant 
community, and once such a claim is somehow accepted by the latter, than the elites’ 
decision to ethnically cleanse the group that posed the threat may seem legitimate. This
^  Ibid., p. 214. See also Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, ‘Civil Wars and Security Dilemma’, in Walter 
and Snyder eds,. Civil Wars, p. 23.
See Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in Ronnie Lipschutz ed.. On Security, New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86.
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security -  A New Framework fo r  Analysis, Boulder and 
London, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 150.
Ibid., p. 153.
Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, pp. 46-86. Buzan et al.. Security -  A New 
Framework fo r  Analysis, 1998, pp. 24,29.
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is precisely why securitisation is problematic, however, unless one is speaking from the 
point of view o f the perpetrators o f the crimes. Indeed, the logic o f securitisation 
appears thoroughly deterministic. By not allowing for other alternative forms o f action, 
the concept o f securitisation provides no theoretical ground for disputing ethnic 
cleansing in the first place.
Nevertheless, securitisation may be important in understanding how some governments 
securitise issues in order to justify the use of extraordinary measures. In this respect, 
Buzan and Waever have picked up a significant moment in the securitisation 
continuum, but they have not problematised either the government who does 
securitisation, or its homogenising project(s), or the extraordinary means such a 
government may employ to deal with the alleged threat(s). In addition they have left 
unanswered some important questions: why in some cases securitisation produces more 
insecurity than security? May not the means i.e., use of the extraordinary measures 
undermine the end i.e., the provision of security, the elimination o f the threat(s)? Are 
not the alleged existential threats heavily prejudged? Why aren’t alternative responses 
considered? In short, securitisation is a one-sided explanation since it tells the story 
from the point of view of the architects and perpetrators o f ethnic cleansing and by 
making no allowance for alternative forms o f action it appears to rationalise the use of 
extraordinary measures to deal with the perceived threat(s).  ^  ^ /
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IV.6 The Role of Nationalism
Much of the intellectual curiosity about nationalism stems from its apparent association 
with conflict. Yet, few scholars have tried to connect the two phenomena together.^^ As 
James Mayall has pointed out, the reason why nationalism has been somehow neglected 
in International Relations may have to do with the fact that the focus of the discipline 
has been, and remains, intertwined with the consequences rather than the causes.^^ 
Nonetheless, given the theme of this thesis, it is appropriate to consider the extent to 
which nationalism can explain violence and ethnic cleansing -  a question that this 
section addresses. Accordingly, the following will elucidate the concept of nationalism 
and its potential for violence. Then, the proposition that views the divergence of 
ethnonational identities as a source of ethnic cleansing will be examined.
IV.6.1 Nationalism: Its meaning and potential for violence
As with concepts, such as ‘nation’, ‘ethnic community’ or ‘ethnicity’ there is no agreed 
definition of ‘nationalism’. As pointed out in Chapter 11*^  the difficulty of defining such 
terms lies vrith the intangible nature of the entities they are supposed to define and also 
vrith the problems inherent in delineation, i.e., how to draw a dividing line between
Amongst the few to explore the connection between nationalism and war, Barry Posen has argued that 
states act purposefully to produce nationalism because o f its utility in mass mobilisation warfare. Indeed, 
nationalism increases the intensity o f warfare and the ability o f the state to mobilise the creative energies 
and the spirit o f self-sacrifice o f its warriors, Barry R, Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military 
Power’, in John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stem, eds.. Perspectives on Nationalism and War, p. 136. 
Considering the connection between war and nationalism, Stephen Van Evera has predicted that 
nationalism will pose large risks in Eastern Europe where politically fi'ail elites engage in chauvinist 
mythmaking, where there is no consolidated tradition o f respect for minority rights and where borders 
lack legitimacy and correspond poorly with ethnic boundaries, Stephen Van Evera, ‘Hypothesis on 
Nationalism and War’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 ,1994, pp. 33-34.
James Mayall, ‘Nationalism in the Study o f International Relations’, in A. J. R. Groom and Margot 
Light, eds.. Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory, London and New York; Pinter, 
1999, p. 182.
^  Chapter 11, p. 38.
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overlapping phenomena. Most scholars, nevertheless, agree that nationalism is a modem 
phenomenon that emerged in the last two hundred years in the aftermath of the French 
and American revolutions and is therefore associated with the existence of the modem 
state.^* G. de Bertier de Sauvigny suggests that ‘nationalism’ appeared first in literature 
in 1789 and did not appear again until 1830. From then until the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries this word was not used extensively.^^ In the 1930s, Carlton J. 
H. Hayes considered nationalism to be a modem fiision of two very old phenomena -  
nationality and patriotism. Although Hayes’ definition has not survived widely in our 
days, it does have a useful purpose, as it is one of the pioneering qualifications that 
differentiate between nationalism and patriotism. Walker Connor has also emphasised 
this distinction. Connor maintains that ‘nationalism and patriotism refer to two quite 
distinct loyalties: the former to one’s national group; the latter to one’s state (country) 
and its institutions’. He contends that in the case of ethnically homogenous (or nearly 
so) states, nationalism and patriotism become indistinguishable. But, in the case of 
multiethnic states nationalism and patriotism are in conflict with each-other and when 
such conflict is perceived irreconcilable in the sense that people feel they must chose 
between them, nationalism customarily proves more potent. The disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, in his view, can be seen in this light, as the Albanian, Bosnian Muslim, 
Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian and Slovenian nationalism has each proven more potent 
than a Yugoslav patriotism.
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp. 4-5, John Breuilly, 
Nationalism and the State, 2"^ * Edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 1, 368.
^  G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, ‘Liberalism, Nationalism, and Socialism: The Birth o f Three Words’, The 
Review o f  Politics Vol. 32, April 1970, pp. 155-161.
For Hayes nationality was an attribute o f human culture and civilisation, nationalities being groups of 
people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, who cherish common historical 
traditions, and constitute or think they constitute a distinct cultural society. Patriotism, on the other hand, 
referred to the love o f country or native land. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1937, pp. 6 ,1 2 ,2 9 .
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism -  The Quest fo r Understanding, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994, pp. 81, 196-7.
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Because nationalism is multifaceted, the task of its definition is uncommonly difficult. 
Ernest Gellner, for example, argues that ‘nationalism is primarily a political principle, 
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’, and that 
‘...nationalism requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across the political 
ones.’ ®^^ In contrast, Anthony Giddens stresses the psychological/emotional character of 
nationalism, ‘the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasising 
commonality among the members of a political order’, a n d ,  therefore, he undermines 
the political character of nationalism. Exclusive reliance on the psychological/emotional 
character of nationalism is, however, problematic, not least because it poses an handicap 
in understanding and explanation. Indeed, it is not clear why emotion alone should 
condition behaviour. If nationalism is wholly emotional, and conflict and violence is 
attributed to it, why does violence erupt in some places, at certain times, but not others? 
This indicates that mass violence may not be inherent in the national sentiment and that 
there is more to nationalism than mere emotion.
Michael Freeden has suggested that nationalism is characterised by five core elements. 
First, the prioritisation of the nation as a key constituting and identifying framework for 
human beings, nationhood being the condition in which this occurs. Second, a positive 
valorisation of one’s own nation, whose interests and values take priority over all other 
values and interests. Third, the urge to give political and institutional expression to the 
nation, sometimes conceived as the possessor of the state. Fourth, space and time are 
considered crucial determinants of national identity. Fifth, there is a sense of belonging
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 1.
Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985, p. 116. Connor, 
also, takes this view and acknowledges only the sentimental character o f nationalism. Connor, 
Ethnonationalism.
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and membership in which sentiment and emotion play an important role.^ ®'^  While 
acknowledging the emotional dimension of nationalism, this conceptualisation concedes 
that nationalism is primarily a political phenomenon, the first four core elements 
depending on a political elite which formulates them and devises a strategy for their 
fulfilment.
Nationalism has traditionally been a salient contributor to state building and the 
formation and consolidation of the national identity. Its political components are 
sufficiently amorphous to allow for various interpretations, enabling thus the elite to 
utilise nationalism as a legitimating tool for their policies. The psychological 
component of nationalism, on the other hand, can serve as a useful tool to persuade 
people to support the elites and their political platforms and therefore contributes 
towards fostering socio-political ties.
In principle, all ideologies carry emotional attachments to their particular conceptual 
configurations because human values excite emotional and rational support and also 
because ideologies constitute mobilising ideational systems to change or defend 
political practices. The distinction of nationalism, nonetheless, is that it 
institutionalises and legitimates emotion as a motive force of political life. As Micheal 
Freeden puts it: Tn nationalism, the role of emotion becomes an overriding consciously 
desired value -  which is why it contains such useful sets of ideas when recruitment to
Michael Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, Political Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 4, 1998, pp. 
751-2.
This is not to deny the fact that the elite needs the support o f the masses, it is rather to emphasise the 
elite dependent nature o f nationalism. As Lord Acton said early in the past century: ‘The few have not 
strength to achieve great changes unaided, [but] the many have not wisdom to be moved by truth 
unmixed’. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton), ‘Nationality’, in The History o f  Freedom 
and Other Essays, edited by John Neville Figgis, London: Macmillan, 1919, p. 272.
Freeden, ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’, p. 754.
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the flag and sacrifice are predominant political ends’. I t  follows, therefore, that the 
emotional component of nationalism has political overtones, in so far as it is influenced 
by political agendas and allows for political exploitation.
The acknowledgement that nationalism was a strong component of war and ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia is almost common place. Indeed, the ‘return of the 
repressed’ idiom borrowed from Sigmund Freud and applied in the scholarly rhetoric 
with reference to ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ and historical memories, has been extended 
further to include also the ‘return of the repressed’ nationalism and ethnonational 
identities. The essence of the latter account is that nationalism and ethnonational 
identities were rooted in pre-communist history but were then suppressed by the 
communist regime. With the collapse of communism this gloom-and-doom perspective 
views the region as a seething cauldron of violence due to the forceful return of 
suppressed nationalism. Rogers Brubaker has considered the above view with reference 
to Eastern Europe and argues that nationalism flourished in the 1990s largely because of 
the policies of the communist regimes which although repressed nationalism, at the 
same time institutionalised territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental 
social categories, thereby creating a political field conducive to nationalism. 
Nevertheless, not all analysts consider nationalism to have been frozen during the reign 
of the communist regime and some disagree on its timely origin. Susan Woodward, for 
instance, is among those who argue that nationalism was not repressed in the former 
Yugoslavia; instead it was institutionalised by the federal system. For William
Ibid.
108 Rogers Brubaker, ‘Myths and Misperceptions in the Study o f Nationalism’, in John A. Hall, The State 
o f  the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory o f Nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, pp. 273,285-288.
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 45.
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Hagen, on the other hand, nationalism does not appear to have been a new development. 
He argues that ‘to a historian, today’s Balkan crisis are rooted in, above all, the 
crippling dependence of all Balkan peoples on the ideology and psychology of 
expansionist nationalism’ which in the case of Serbia, for instance, ‘has defined the 
country’s political culture since Napoleon’s days’.
Cathie Carmichael has argued that ethnic cleansing in the Balkans is tied to the ideology 
of nationalism (as defined by Gellner) that spread in the region following the collapse of 
the Ottoman and Habsburgh empires in the 19^ century and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
in the late 20^ century.^*  ^ Attributing ethnic cleansing to nationalism, she concludes 
that: ‘Nationalism has had more power over individuals’ lives in the Balkans than any 
other political force in the last two hundred years. Nationalism will continue to 
determine the fate of the individual, whether he or she believes in its truth’. T h e  
direct relation she depicts between ideology and human action is, however, not 
unproblematic. Ideology may motivate behaviour but it is not clear whether it 
determines it. Moreover, ideology appears both as a rationalisation of certain forms of 
political action and as an instrument of such action and it is precisely this double-edged 
role which ideology plays in political movements, both promoting and ‘reflecting’ those 
movements, that makes it difficult to provide any causal analysis of the relationship 
between political ideology and political action.^
William W. Hagen, ‘The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms’, pp. 52, 61.
' ' ' Cathie Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans -  Nationalism and the Destruction o f  Tradition, 
London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 3, 12.
"^Ibid., p. 110.
' For this last point see John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 383.
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Considering the role of ideology one should avoid the risk of overemphasising ideas to 
the detriment of agency. Indeed, ideas cannot do much when left to themselves. It is the 
elite who primarily determines what is done with ideas, how they are interpreted and 
implemented. Consequently, the understanding of the occurrence of ethnic cleansing is 
bound with the agenda of the elite who conceived and presented the nation as 
constituted in certain ways, rationalised national values and interests, and made the case 
for their political and institutional expression. Whether nationalism relies on a 
subjectivist and voluntarist conception of nation (civic nationalism) or adopts a 
conception of nation that is based on lineage (ethnic nationalism)^is primarily a 
function of political leadership. Whether the state is conceived as a nation-state or 
multiethnic is, again, dependent on the elite’s policies. So are the means embraced to 
achieve either of these goals. Nationalism is contingent of the quality of political 
leadership. The connection between nationalism and (violent) conflict may not only be 
mediated but also determined by the leadership and its policies.
IV.6.2 Ethnic cleansing a clash o f ethnonational identities?
Some have argued that ethnic cleansing and its accompanying wars in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s are a result of conflicting ethnonational identities. Daniel 
Byman, for instance, contends that the collapse of the Yugoslav federation is ‘the most 
poignant recent reminder of the bloodshed and turmoil that can occur when national 
identities fail to coalesce’, implying, therefore, that when ethnonational identities are 
divergent any ethnonational group that falls under the political control of another nation
One o f  the first scholars to manifest this distinction was Hans Kohn. See Hans Kohn, The Idea o f  
Nationalism, New York: Macmillan, 1944; and Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, Princeton: Van 
Nostrand, 1955/65. Other scholars have adopted these concepts and elaborated them further. See, for 
instance, Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992 and Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, London: Chatto 
and Windus, 1993.
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is exposed to danger, ethnic cleansing included/Similarly, Vivienne Jabri attributes 
conflicts that prevailed in the 1990s predominantly, if not solely, to identity 
differences/^^ By the same token, in his 1997 account of the Bosnian conflict, Steven 
Majstorovic argued that ‘the subjective and historically experienced nature of ethnic 
identity is ... precisely what drives ethnic conflict in Bosnia’. H e  maintains that 
history (at least since the time of conversion to Islam) provides fertile ground for 
primordial divergent and conflicting identities between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in 
Bosnia, as the unconsolidated Bosnian Muslim identity remained ‘a tug of war between 
Serbian, Croatian and Muslim interpretation of h i s t o r y I f ,  however, conflicting 
identities were constantly underlying conflict between these groups -  as Majstorovic 
suggests -  conflict then should have been manifest all the time because, as he argues, 
identities were divergent all the time. Following this logic, therefore, his argument 
leaves unanswered the question: ‘where were divergent ethnonational identities in times 
of peace?’ -  that is the majority of the time span since conversion to Islam which 
constitutes the starting point of his argument. Moreover, if divergent ethno/national 
identities underline conflict, how would one account for some curious alliances that 
emerged in the course of the 1990s wars. At times, the Bosnian Serb Army depended 
heavily on the supply of fuel from the Croat forces, a practice that continued even after 
the signing of the Federation agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Daniel Byman, ‘Forever Enemies? The Manipulation o f Ethnic Identities to End Ethnic Wars’, 
Security Studies Vol. 9, No. 3,2000, p. 149.
Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered, Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 210.
Majstorovic, ‘Ancient Hatreds’, p. 173.
Ibid., p. 176.
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Croats in early 1994.'*^ Furthermore, there have been even recorded cases when one 
side rented tanks from the other s i d e . * y  ^  ^
But, o f course, there are other problems with the proposition that ethnic violence in the 
former Yugoslavia stemmed from non-coalescing ethnonational identities. To start with, 
such a view tends to consider ethnonational identities as given, static, and immutable 
rather than historically contingent and dynamic.*^* Instead, ethnonational identities are 
relational qualities that exist only in a context of relativities.*^^ It is in this relational 
context that the dynamic o f identities evolve. This context does not have to be hostile 
and exclusivist, instead it can be co-operative and harmonious as members of different 
communities, while preserving their distinctiveness, borrow certain features of others 
although selectively. The situation in the former Yugoslavia is not an exception to this.
In addition, those that emphasise differences of ethnonational identities overlook the 
fact that especially in times of conflict and war, leaders traditionally have been keen to 
reinforce the ethno/national identity because of its potency as a military resource and 
because o f its potency as a source of popular mobilisation. Moreover, the perspective 
that views ethnic cleansing as stemming from conflicting identities underplays the
Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction o f Yugoslavia, 2"*^  edition, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000, pp. 247-255.
Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective’, in Mats Berdal and David M. 
Malone, eds.. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000, p. 101.
In spite of pointing that ethnonational identity is continuously reformulated and therefore flexible, 
Majstorovic for instance, maintains that this is so only within the framework that does not threaten the 
constraints imposed by myth and memory, although he refrains from considering the ways in which 
myths and memory emerge as well as their objectivity. See, Steven Majstorovic, ‘Ancient Hatreds’, p. 
171. Despite being cautious in the use of language, ethnonational identity in his view seems to be static in 
so far as the boundaries set by myth and memory are static.
Fredrick Barth was the first to problematise the relational character of ethnic identities. See his 
introduction in Fredrick Barth ed.. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation o f Culture 
Difference, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969, pp. 9-38. See also, A. Epstein, Ethos and Identity: 
Three Studies in Ethnicity, London: Tavistock, 1978.
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manipulation and instrumentalisation of ethnonational identities by political leaders for 
their own interest. In point of fact, ethnonational differences were ‘politicised, distorted, 
and exploited as additional powerful weapons of division and as explanation and 
justification for barbarities’ by the respective elites. The strenuous efforts of elites in 
Zagreb and Belgrade to construct two different national languages out of a previously 
single one are a case in point.
Viewing ethnic wars and campaigns of ethnic cleansing as rooted in conflicting 
ethnonational identities misses another important point, namely, that it was war and 
ethnic cleansing that increased the significance of ethnonational differences and 
reinforced collective identity. Similarly, it was in the aftermath of the atrocities that the 
national sentiment became stronger and the salience of differences was over­
emphasised.*^^ The comment of a Bosnian Muslim in charge of transport for the 
Bosnian army in the Travnik region during the Bosnian war exemplifies this point: ‘I 
never thought of myself as a Muslim. I don’t know how to pray. I never went to a 
mosque. I’m European like you. ... But now I have to think of myself as a Muslim, not 
in religious way, but as a member of a pe o p l e . . . W h i l e  in the decades prior to the 
1990s, individuals in the Yugoslav federation might have not identified themselves in 
the first place by ethnic criteria, with the eruption of violence they had no option but to 
identify with their own ethnic kin if protection was to be secured.
Foulie Psalidas-Perlmutter, ‘The Interplay of Myths and Realities’, ORBIS: A Journal o f World 
Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, p. 241.
Although written in different alphabets, for many linguists differences between Serbian, Croatian and 
Bosnian dialects were less pronounced than the difference between American and British English. See 
Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, pp. 28-29.
See David Turton, ‘Introduction: War and Ethnicity’, p. 3.
Quoted in Tom Gallagher, ‘My Neighbour, My Enemy: The Manipulation o f  Ethnic Identity and the 
Origins and Conduct o f  War in Yugoslavia’, in David Turton, ed.. War and Ethnicity, p. 63.
This was particularly the case given that national leaders appealed to their nations in terms o f  
arguments about survival, arguing that the fate of the individual depended on the fate o f the group and 
that the role o f  the group for the individual and the role o f the politician for the group was protection. See
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Given that ethnic cleansing is about ethnic purification of territory it is obvious that 
ethnic cleansing does acquire an identity component. Indeed, the expulsion of people 
from their homelands affects their individual and collective identity by detaching them 
from the physical base that provides a sense of identity. But, differences of 
ethnonational identities, in themselves, were insufficient to produce this inhuman 
phenomenon. The attachment to the homeland, native language, ideals, values, 
traditions and symbols -  elements that constitute the ethno/national identity -  do not 
require a people to reject or even dislike such traits in other people. By the same token, 
maintaining that these characteristics define a people as ‘different’ from others does not 
imply that such difference need necessarily be antagonistic. After all, difference does 
not always entail conflict and even if it does, the conflict need not be violent. The ‘us’ -  
‘others’ dichotomy does not have to be confrontational. As Russell Hardin points out 
individuals can identify with a particular nation or ethnic community without having an 
out-group against whom to be h o s t i l e . I n  sum, there is nothing inherent in diverging 
ethnonational identities that leads necessarily to violence. As barely any state is truly a 
nation-state, diverging ethnonational identities are to be found in any country and yet 
practices of ethnic cleansing are not experienced in most of them. Identity difference 
may be exacerbated by exploitative power relations and asymmetrical material 
conditions which may in turn lead to conflicts of various degrees,^^^ but the appearance 
of non-coalescing ethnonational identities as a cause of violent conflict is misleading.
Susan Woodward, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War’, in Walter and Snyder, eds.. 
Civil Wars, p. 83,
Russell Hardin, One for All, pp. 151-2.
For the context o f  the 1980s see Chapter V, pp. 178-187.
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IV.7 Conclusions
This chapter has examined critically some of the more widely accepted schools of 
thought purported to explain the expulsion of ethno/national minorities in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Although a direct causal relation between ethnic cleansing on 
the one hand, and past history, fear, security dilemmas and nationalism on the other, 
was not found, an indirect, facilitating relation has been at play.
It is argued here that ethnic cleansing was not determined by the history of previous 
violent conflicts between the contending parties, although this is not to say that history 
did not have an influencing role. Indeed, the reactivated memories of past conflicts, 
especially those associated with the Second World War, contributed in forming peoples’ 
fears that the past might be repeated and increased the opportunity for politicians to 
influence the setting in which ethnic cleansing took place. Nevertheless, 
overemphasising past history and elevating its role to constraining leaders’ options to 
the extent of ethnic cleansing means denying that other options were available. In 
addition, it means an abdication of moral responsibility on the part of the perpetrators 
and also a justification for non-intervention or belated intervention on the part of the 
international community.
Although ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ became a catch-all explanation for ethnic cleansing 
among many circles of Western politicians and journalists, especially in the early 1990s, 
this approach misses the complex nature of ethnic cleansing. Yet again, its main 
function has been to legitimise policies of inaction or limited involvement on the part of 
Western powers. In the context of national politics its function has been to polarise 
society and justify exclusive nationalist policies.
173
Moreover, the relevance of fear and security dilemma as causes of ethnic cleansing is 
greatly reduced due to the fact that they are omnipresent and therefore unavoidable. 
They did, however, act as an instrument of policy aiding leaders to mobilise support and 
legitimise their exclusive agendas.
The attribution of ethnic cleansing to nationalism is also problematic. As shown in the 
Introduction, the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing long preceded the nationalist 
ideology. Furthermore, the connection between violence and nationalism is not only 
mediated but also determined by policies set out by the elite. Whether nationalism takes 
a militant or a benign form is a function of political leadership. Similarly, non­
coalescing ethnonational identities are not inherently violent. They not of themselves 
fed into the flames of ethnic cleansing but instead the politicisation and manipulation of 
such identities by national elites.
The above analysis has identified the decisive role played in the occurrence of ethnic 
cleansing by the political leadership as the sole agent responsible for choosing and 
implementing the exclusive policies in dealing with ethnic minorities. The action of the 
political elite intended to bring about national homogenisation takes a central place in 
this causal inquiry not only because it represents the main cause of ethnic cleansing but 
also because when the question arises as to how far back the cause(s) of ethnic 
cleansing in the post-Cold War Yugoslavia should be traced -  the political leadership of 
the 1990s may be regarded as a limit. The following chapter proceeds to consider the 
politics of ethnic cleansing in the closing decade of the twentieth century.
See, Introduction, pp. 14-16.
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V. T he P o litic s  o f E thn ic  C iean s in g
'As President (of the Presidency) o f  Bosnia Herzegovina, I  am sorry that in this situation I  must 
talk fo r  the Muslim people. I  solemnly state that the Muslims will not attack anyone. However, 
ju st as solemnly I state that the Muslims will defend themselves with great determination and 
survive’.^
'We have to secure unity in Serbia if  we want, as the biggest and most numerous republic to 
dictate events ... These are questions offrontiers, essential questions o f  state. And frontiers, as 
you know, are dictated by the strong, not the weak ... [I jfw e  need to fight, we 7/ really fight. We 
may be no good at working or trading but a t least we know well how to fight
'We have everything. We now control 70% [o f  the territory o f  Bosnia Herzegovina]. But we 
claim only 64%. All we need now is a negotiated settlement’.^
'Feeding or evacuating the victims rather than helping them resist aggression makes us 
accomplices as much as good Samaritans ' /
V. 1 The concept of politics
Political activity, J. D. B. Miller has opined, arises out of disagreement and is concerned 
with the use of government to resolve conflict. Politics is about policy, and policy is a 
matter of either the desire for change or the desire to protect something against change.^ 
Disagreements in political situations evolve over the distribution of available resources, 
which almost always are insufficient to meet all the demands of each claimant thereto. 
The term ‘resources’ is here understood in a broad sense, including anything which is an
' Alija Izetbegovic, the former President o f the Presidency o f Bosnia, addressing the Bosnian Assembly 
on 14 October 1991, after the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadïic had threatened that the Muslims 
will ‘disappear’ should Bosnia opt for independence. Cited in Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia -  
Death o f  a Nation^ Revised and Updated Edition, London: Penguin, 1997, p. 215.
 ^ Slobodan Milosevic, the former Serb President, addressing a meeting with local council leaders in 
March 1991. Cited in Marcus Tanner, C ro a tia -A  Nation Forged in War  ^New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1997, p. 243.
 ^Radovan Karadzic, the former leader o f the Bosnian Serbs. Cited in Patrick Moore, ‘Ethnic Cleansing in 
Bosnia: Outrage but Little Action’, Radio Free E urope/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 1 
No. 34 ,28  August 1992, p. 2.
 ^ Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister. Cited in Peter Maass, Love Thy Neighbour -  A 
Story o f  War, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1996, p. 269.
 ^This is not to say that agreement never appears in politics; indeed resolution o f conflict into some kind 
o f agreement is one o f the principal aims o f political activity. The point Miller makes is that politics, to be 
distinguished as a recognisable activity, demands some initial disagreement between parties or persons 
and the presence o f government as a means o f resolving disagreement. J. D. B. Miller, The Nature o f  
Politics, London: Gerald Duckworth, 1962, pp. 14, 16,21.
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object of desire or need, such as food, raw material, monetary wealth, territory.^ 
Possession of resources, on the other hand, is the typical means of attaining power. At 
the individual level of analysis, the power one has indicates one’s ability to produce 
intended effects upon the surrounding environment and to realise one’s purposes within 
it.  ^ Power is always relational; it is the ability to influence or control the actions of 
others, to get them do what one wants them to, and what they would otherwise not have 
done.* In addition to being relational, power is also structural, that is to say, the relative 
differences of power between people are to a large extent the result of social 
arrangements. As David Beetham argues, central to the social organisation of power are 
processes of exclusion, typically embodied in rules, which prohibit general access to 
key resources, and which determine who may require the use and possession of them, 
and by what means. Resources become a means of power in so far as people can be 
systematically excluded from access thereto. If everyone had access to means of 
production and subsistence, and to instruments of physical force; if everyone controlled 
socially necessary activities and possessed the skills associated with their performances; 
if everyone occupied positions of authority; then resources would not constitute a basis 
for power relations.^ Because power relations involve negative features of exclusion, 
restriction, and compulsion, power arrangements stand in need of justification if the 
powerful are to enjoy moral authority as opposed to merely de facto power, or validity
 ^Robert Purnell, The Society o f  States: An Introduction to International Politics, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1973, p. 1.
 ^Abilities here refer not to things which happen to one but instead to things which one does. Abilities, in 
this sense, are conditional dispositional properties that depend on the actor activating them, one necessary 
condition for exercising an ability being the actor’s will, his choice, to do so. In this conception, power is 
not concerned with affecting something (altering something, or impinging on something) but is concerned 
with effecting something (i.e., bringing something about, or accomplishing something). Peter Morriss, 
Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987, esp. pp. 12, 19, 25, 
29.
* Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses, New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1979, 
Chapter One.
 ^David Beetham, The Legitimation o f  Power, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 47-50.
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under a given system of law/^ The centrality of disagreements over distribution of 
resources as a means to power has popularised the expression ‘power politics’ 
indicating the intrinsic connection between the two terms. Indeed, the meaning of the 
one cannot be separated from that of the other. Hence a wide held conception of politics 
is a Weberian one that conceives politics as ‘striving to share power or striving to 
influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within a 
state’.
This chapter deals with the politics of ethnic cleansing i.e., disagreements regarding 
official policies -  at national as well as international level -  that impacted on the 
exclusion of national minorities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The analysis starts with 
considerations about the collapse of Yugoslavia emphasising the legitimation crises and 
the emergence of identity politics which accompanied it. The claims to state power on 
the basis of ethno-national identity divided society along ethnic lines and facilitated 
efforts for organisation of political units on the basis of ethnicity. Accordingly, this 
chapter explores attempts by the Croatian and Serbian leadership to redraw borders in 
order to make their new polities congruent with their respective nations. Failing 
negotiation, war became a means to such an end, and the chapter proceeds to consider 
the contributing role, or otherwise, of war itself in state building efforts. The analyses, 
then, takes on board the nature of the international community’s response to ethnic 
cleansing.
'°Ibid, p. 57.
Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: Routledge,
1997, p. 78.
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V. 2 The Legitimation Crisis and the Politics of Identity
Ethnic cleansing did not occur in a vacuum, and conditions that allowed for the 
expulsion of minorities were not created overnight. They were instead part of a gradual 
process that can be traced in the legitimation crisis which plagued the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1980s and the emergence of the ‘identity politics’ that filled the 
void created by the erosion of a system devoid of its former ideological base and 
effectiveness. The reason for considering the legitimation crisis is that it challenged 
what had previously justified the existence of the Yugoslav federation and released an 
intolerant spirit, which enabled claims to power on the basis of ethno-national identity 
to take place. The latter, known as the ‘politics of identity’, was important for the 
inception of ethnic cleansing due to the exclusivist attitude in which such politics was 
premised and enacted.
Crisis, in general, refers to a crucial stage or a ‘turning point’ in a sequence of events. 
Jürgen Habermas has argued that in social scientific terms ‘crisis arise when the 
structure of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are 
necessary to the continued existence of the system’. I n  his opinion, crisis in social 
systems is not produced through accidental changes in the environment but through 
incompatible structural imperatives that cannot be integrated in a hierarchical way. 
Crisis occurs due to persistent problems that ‘cannot be resolved within the range of 
possibility that is circumscribed by the organisational principle of society
Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, London: Heinemann, 1976, p. 2. 
Ibid, p. 7.
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The nature of crisis that crippled socialist Yugoslavia was multi-layered with strong 
economic and political/constitutional dimensions. The Yugoslav federation was held 
together by a complex balancing act at international level and an extensive system of 
rights and overlapping sovereignties provided for in the constitution. But with 
Yugoslavia’s international status diminishing as the Non-Alignment Movement lost its 
significance and the Cold War neared its end, and with the gradual economic decline, 
the checks and balances that ensured the existence of the federation became increasingly 
non-operational.^"^ Throughout the 1970s an ‘artificial prosperity’ was achieved by a 
combination of rapid modernisation and readily available foreign credits, but this came 
to an end in 1980 when the terms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for granting 
loans to Yugoslavia became more rigorous.T he measures advocated by the IMF 
Recovery Plan including dinar devaluation, real interest rates and free movement of 
prices were unsuccessful. Toward the end of the decade, unemployment approached 
20%, foreign debt reached US$ 23 billion and the monthly inflation rate was 2,500 
percent. The gap in economic development between various regions in the Federation 
widened further. In 1987, for instance, the net personal income per worker in Croatia, 
Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia was respectively 70%, 58%, 55% and 44% that of 
S lo v en ia .In  particular, Kosovo -  always Yugoslavia’s poorest region -  became 
proportionately poorer vis-à-vis the country’s richer areas, in 1984, for example, the 
province’s wealth being only one-sixth of that of Slovenia.
Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy -  Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Washington D C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1995, Chapter 2.
James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis, London: Pinter, 1992, p. 62,
Gow, Legitimacy and the Military, p. 63. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in 
Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p. 37.
1 have drawn these percentages from figures in Harold Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989, p. 192.
Gow, Legitimacy and the Military, p. 68.
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Such economic conditions created serious tensions in the federal-republic relationship. 
Although republican governments were, in principle, economically independent, the 
constitution provided for taxation of richer republics in order to support funds not only 
for the federal budget but also for development of poorer regions, a provision 
increasingly rejected by Slovenia and Croatia.Conflict amongst republican leaders 
over economic resources, economic and political reform and debt repayment became 
constitutional conflicts and then a crisis of the state itself as politicians were unwilling 
to compromise.^® The heated debates over the political and economic re-organisation of 
the federation exemplified the tension between the option of centralisation and 
decentralisation of the federation, themes that had surfaced with vigour also in the 
interwar crisis.^* Not unlike then, political leaders of the wealthier regions, namely 
Slovenia and Croatia, favoured greater decentralisation of power coupled with 
economic and political liberalisation, and investment in their respective economies, 
whereas the southern regions, particularly Serbia and Montenegro, preferred 
centralisation of power and a command economy along with the redistribution of wealth 
and resources. Deprived of the support of the richer states, the federal government 
became increasingly paralysed, laws were not made and implemented, and societal 
cohesion was at risk. In a gradual fashion, the central government received less and less 
support from the citizenry and increasingly failed even to be the target of their demands 
because the people knew that it was incapable of providing supplies.^^ The on-going
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 40. The Slovenes and Croats had put great hopes in an early entry into 
the European Community (EC) as a way o f liberating their economies from the negative pull o f Serbia 
and the South. ‘Europe now’ was one o f the most potent slogans in the campaign leading up to the 
referendum in December 1990, and the Euro-flag fluttered over many buildings in Slovenia alongside the 
national flag. Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War -  The War in the Balkans, London: Mandarin, 
1994, p. 16.
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 15.
Refer to Chapter III, pp. 91, 98-99.
See I. William Zartman, ‘Introduction: Posing the Problem o f  State Collapse’, in I. W. Zartman ed.. 
Collapsed States -  The Disintegration and Restoration o f Legitimate Authority, Boulder and London: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995, p. 5.
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crises threatened the principles which had legitimated the socio-political organisation of 
Yugoslavia producing in turn a need for alternatives, a need for re-legitimation?^
Legitimacy is normally used to imply justification or validation of a practical activity. 
Thomas Frank has imaginatively conceived legitimacy as a property, which exerts a pull 
towards compliance on those addressed.^"  ^The urge for legitimacy is a constant in the 
political life. As Inis Claude has pointed out ‘politics is not merely a struggle for power 
but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or denial, the 
confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake’.L eg itim acy , 
therefore, is inherent in power relationships in so far as it justifies and renders them 
acceptable.Power and legitimacy are complementary and for statesmen, in particular, 
legitimacy is a highly desired property not least because it makes them more secure in 
the possession of power and more effective in its exercise.^^ Crucial moments for 
legitimacy are times of change -  transitional periods from an old to a new system, times 
of conflict and war -  when criteria of legitimacy are challenged and contested.
James Gow, one of the few analysts to consider the issue of legitimacy in the context of 
the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, has offered a normative conception of legitimacy.
John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall o f Yugoslavia, London: 
Macmillan, 1998, p. 94. Latinka Perovic, ‘Yugoslavia, Serbia and the future’, Bosnia Report, No. 21/22, 
January-May, 2001, p. 29.
Thomas M. Franck, The Power o f  Legitimacy Among Nations, New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, p. 16.
Inis Claude, ‘Collective Legitimation as a Political Function o f the United Nations’, International 
Organisation, Vol. 20, No. 2,1966, p. 368.
See Alfred G. Meyer, ‘Legitimacy o f Power in East Central Europe’, in Sylva Sinnanian, Istvan Deak, 
Peter C. Ludz, eds.. Eastern Europe in the 1970s, New York: Praeger, 1972, p. 45; and Thomas 
Luckmann, ‘Comments on Legitimation’, Current Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2 ,1987, p. 111.
Claude points out that despite overlapping use o f legitimacy, on the one hand, and law and morality, on 
the other, and although the latter are both important legitimacy principles they do not, however, exhaust 
the notion o f  legitimacy. The problem o f legitimacy has a political dimension that goes beyond its legal 
and moral aspects, the process o f acquiring legitimacy being ultimately a political phenomenon that may 
not be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles. Claude, ‘Collective Legitimation’, p. 368.
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conceiving it as a crasis i.e., a combination o f three elements: environmental support, 
effectiveness and the (ideological) base of legitimacy, each o f which being a necessary 
element that works on the others in a contingent way.^* However, Gow’s conception o f 
the term and its application in the case of the former Yugoslavia reveal adherence to a 
historical or empirical approach rather than a normative one. The problem with a 
normative conception of legitimacy lies in the fact that even if agreement were to be 
reached on a set of criteria, fulfilment of which renders an activity legitimate, any effort 
to establish such condition means evaluating discretely only a specific moment (or 
period) o f time when these criteria are satisfied. Adopting such approach defies the fact 
that legitimacy is a property of the legitimation process which requires evaluation. It is 
more useful, therefore, to speak of ‘legitimation’ as an activity or process that seeks 
‘legitimacy’ rather than speaking of the property o f ‘legitimacy’ in itself.
The work of Rodney Barker is illuminating when dealing with the conception o f 
legitimacy or, for that matter, the impossibility of vesting such term with precise 
meaning. Barker distinguishes between ‘legitimacy’ as an abstract, ascribed quality o f a 
government (or a political system in general) and ‘legitimation’ as an activity in which 
governments characteristically engage, the making of claims. If legitimacy is a fiction, 
an abstract political resource, a metaphor employed to describe circumstances where 
people accept claims made by the rulers, legitimation is an observable activity, a 
contested political process that involves creation, modification, innovation, and
Gow, Legitimacy and Military, p. 20. David Beetham also speaks o f legitimacy in a normative way. He 
identifies three criteria of legitimacy: (i) legal validity or conformity to rules, (ii) justifiability of rules in 
terms of shared beliefs, and (iii) legitimation through expressed consent. See David Beetham, The 
Legitimation o f Power, p. 20.
While ‘legitimation’ and ‘legitimacy’ are used throughout this chapter, the above distinction is bore in 
mind whenever doing so.
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transform ation.Gow’s analysis remains valid, nonetheless, so long as his term 
‘legitimacy crisis’ is substituted by ‘legitimation crisis’, implying that what is analysed 
is a process, a governmental activity, its various ways and the degree of success for 
claiming legitimacy -  which is what, in fact, he does.
Resurrecting the conception of legitimation as a crastical activity, in the instance of the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1980s the case can be made that none of its three components 
(environmental support, effectiveness and ideological base) were providing general 
satisfaction. As mentioned above,^  ^ economic crises of huge proportions and 
political/constitutional disagreements rendered the operationality of the central 
government ineffective. Simultaneously there was little faith in or support for the 
authorities’ attempts to rescue the economy. At the same time, poor performance was 
eroding the ideological capital. Confidence in the Communist Party, for instance, fell 
from 49.8 percent in 1980 to 22.9 percent just two years later.^  ^ Given the creeping 
paralysis of the federal government, legitimacy, as a government resource, devolved 
gradually to republican level, such devolution being de facto formalised in 1990 with 
holding at the republican level of multi-party elections, the first of this sort since before 
the second World War.^  ^ In the process, nationalism offered a partial, transitional basis 
for relegitimation. It supplanted the old ideological legitimation base provided by 
communist ideas and acted as a survival strategy for ambitious leaders keen to secure 
popular backing for their exclusivist policies.
Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities -  The Self-Presentations o f  Rulers and Subjects, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, Chapter I. For a conception o f legitimation as a process see also 
Roberto Cipriani, ‘The Sociology o f Legitimation: An Introduction’, Current Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2, 
1987, pp. 1 ,4 , 9.
Refer to pp. 179-180.
Gow, Legitimacy and Military, pp. 21, 64.
”  Ibid, p. 122.
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The devolution of legitimacy to the republican level brought about a new distribution of 
power and a new configuration of power relationships. The republics became sovereign 
entities but this did not imply that their respective new governments were able (or even 
intended) to satisfy all groups in their society. "^^  Indeed, as evidenced from 
developments during the 1990s, virtually in all republics the state was conceived as the 
sovereign state of the dominant nation, making other ethnic groups feel neglected, 
affronted, alienated, and excluded.^^ Moreover, given the scarcity of resources, 
economic discrimination or privilege along ethno-national lines facilitated the 
politicisation of such identities giving ethnic difference political relevance.^^ It is this 
political relevance attached to identity that in academic discourse has given way to the 
widely used term ‘identity politics’ or its equivalent ‘the politics of identity’.
Gaining currency in the 1990s, the politics of identity signalled a ‘shift in the grammar 
of political claim making’.N o t  only did ethno-national groups demand recognition but 
they also demanded resource allocation from the state in order to advance their interests 
and agendas. In other words, identity politics refers to claims to power on the basis of a 
given communal identity.^* This implies that identity politics is not necessarily about
This was particularly the case in Croatia and Serbia with regard to the Serb and Albanian minority 
respectively. See Chapter III pp. 111-112, and below p. 219.
This conception o f the nation-state was expressed explicitly in the constitutions o f the new polities. 
See, Robert M. Hayden, ‘Constitutional nationalism in the formerly Yugoslav republics’, Slavic Review, 
Vol. 51, No. 4, 1992. The atmosphere o f dissatisfaction that surrounded ethnic groups in the newly 
created states resembled to a considerable extent the situation o f the republics in the immediate years 
preceding disintegration. In both instances this sense o f  alienation and neglect led to resistance and 
cmposition.
 ^ See Beverly Crawford ‘The Causes o f Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach’ in Beverly 
Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds.. The Myth o f  ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Politics, Economics, and 
‘Cultural’ Violence, Berkley: University o f California at Berkley, 1998, pp. 11-2.
Nancy Fraser, Justice Interrupts: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition, New York: 
Routledge, 1997, p. 2.
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 6.
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identity per se, but rather about the use of identity to achieve certain goals; it is about 
the instrumentality of identity, the use of identity as a means to an end.^^
When embraced at the governmental level, ‘the politics of identity’ affects the social 
character o f the state, the boundaries that the state sets between insiders and outsiders, 
and the kind of rights that the state grants to its citizens to the detriment of outsiders. 
The politicisation of identity that proceeded the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia 
and its immediate aftermath was primarily about strategic use of identity in order to win 
or defend rights and resources to the exclusive benefit o f â' particular group. It is the 
exclusivist spirit in which politics o f identity was based and enacted that is important 
for the understanding of the inception of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. 
Politicisation o f identity in this case may be understood as a response to perceived 
power relations that were deemed unjust and discriminating and as a concerted effort to 
resist them, rather than being simply about identity or difference per se. It is this 
conception of the ‘politics of identity’ that has explanatory purchase in relation to the 
eruption o f violence and its escalation to large scale ethnic cleansing in the former 
Yugoslavia.
The politicisation of ethno-national identity in such a case was facilitated by a number 
of structural conditions such as previous constitutional arrangements that had in fact 
institutionalised ethno-national difference."^® Moreover, the economic crisis that led to 
economies of shortage and competition for resources following the disintegration of
Refer to Chapter IV, pp. 168-172.
The process was initiated with the 1974 constitution, which devolved considerable power to the 
republics. Since then the process did not reverse. See George Schdpflin, Nations, Identity, Power - The 
New Politics o f Europe, London: Hurst, 2000, pp. 338, 356-7. For institutionalisation of the national 
identity in the successor states see Robert M. Hayden,‘Constitutional nationalism’. ^  ✓
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federal structures provided a conducive environment in which political relevance of 
identity could be nurtured."^ * In addition, a weak civil society coupled with weak state 
structures guaranteed a shift towards the ‘ethnicisation of politics’ -  the exercise of 
power by ethnic criteria/^ Ultimately, the politicisation of identity was manipulated by 
the political leadership. Indeed, the application of the ‘politics of identity’ in the case 
under consideration was a highly elitist process.T his was so, because in order to 
legitimate themselves and their special power position, the elites couched their appeals 
in terms of collective identity in order to increase their claims’ credibility. Kinship itself 
was utilised as a form of social capital to establish relations of trust even where they 
previously did not exist.'^ '^
Identification with a nation or ethnic community became a mechanism for political 
differentiation."^  ^The role played by the conception of enemies -  the targeted ‘outsiders’ 
-  was functional in marking community boundaries, first in ideological and then in 
physical terms. The virtual community boundaries nurtured among masses by the 
mediation of the leadership and the means of communication which the latter controlled 
and manipulated, gave way to real physical boundaries when the ‘politics of identity’ 
translated into appeals for self-determination on the part of nations that claimed intrinsic 
and unique rights to territory by virtue of their national identity."^  ^ The putative new
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 79.
George Schôpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, pp. 43-4.
For a thorough analysis on elitist activities with special focus on Serbia see V. P. Gagnon, Jr., ‘Ethnic 
Nationalism and International Conflict -  The Case o f Serbia’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 
1994/95, esp. pp. 132,140,164.
Ibid., pp. 135-136. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘Seeking a State o f One’s Own: An Analytical Framework for 
Assessing Ethnic and Sectarian Conflicts’, in Crawford and Lipschutz, eds.. The Myth o f ‘Ethnic 
Conflict’, p. 69.
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 80. John Mueller, ‘Does War Still Exist?’, Paper prepared for the 
Conference on The Waning o f Major War, University o f Notre Dame, April 6-8, 2001.
The principle o f self-determination is ambiguous and its interpretations vary. Indeed, it is paradoxical 
that the same principle o f self-determination that served as the rationale for the foundation o f the 
Yugoslav Federation in 1945, was invoked in the 1990s as the basis for the disintegration o f  that
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States, that the claims to self-determination validated, implied new borders and it was 
these borders that were contested.
V. 3 Drawing New Borders: Making the Polity Congruent with the Nation
The dissolution of the Yugoslav federation obviously implied the creation of new 
political units but the underlying question of this process was what type of such units? 
First, would the new states be confined within the administrative borders of the former 
federal republics or would new borders be redrawn if necessary by force? Second, 
would the new states be based on egalitarian principles granting all citizens equal rights 
and protection; or would they be defined on parochial terms in which the state is 
conceived to belong to the majority nation to the detriment of ethno-national minorities? 
As the unfolding events showed, however, the predominant elite conception of the state 
was ethnic in character: a given state was sought to belong to a given nation. Initially, 
nonetheless, the Serb leaders (both political and military) appeared to resist the idea of 
disintegration of the federation, realising that the federation was the best way to protect 
their interests and dominant position while at the same time enabling all Serbs to live in 
one single state."*^  In spite of that, given the resistance of Slovenia and Croatia to the 
Yugoslav federal organisation, the Serb leadership came to eventually accept the idea of 
the disintegration of the Federation, although in its (Serb) own terms.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia was bound to be a complex affair. The old federal 
constitution had provided for the equality of each and every constituent nation (narod) 
of the federation and although Serbs (and Croats) lived in various republics where they
Federation and subsequently for legitimisation o f  ethnic cleansing and ethnic wars. See Spyros 
Economides, The Balkan Agenda: Security and Regionalism in the New Europe, London Defence Studies 
10, London: Brassey’s for the Centre for Defence Studies, University o f  London, 1992, p. 6.
Misha Glenny, The Fall o f  Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, London: Penguin, 1992, p. 134.
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did not constitute a majority, they did not consider themselves a minority either since 
they were a founding nation of the federation/^ This arrangement would no longer 
exist, however, should the federal republics gain sovereign status. Clearly, should 
administrative republican borders of the federation be legalised, the notions of 
‘majority’ and ‘minority’ would shift to render former preponderant groups -  such as 
Serbs -  to a minority status in the most of new polities."^  ^The Serb president, who came 
to power by promising protection of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia, was adamant that 
he would not tolerate the drawing of borders on the premise of uti possidetis, a principle 
of international law under which new states emerging from the fracturing of larger ones 
are recognised within their federal administrative borders.^® Challenging this 
international principle and with it territoriality as the basis of claims to statehood in the 
society of states, the Serb leadership strove to redraw borders so as to incorporate all 
Serbs in one greater Serbian state.^^
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, p. 32.
The Serbs constituted the largest nation in Yugoslavia but in late 1980s more than 2.5 million o f them 
(out o f 8.1 million) lived outside the administrative boundaries o f the Serb republic, mainly in Bosnia and 
Croatia. These figures come from Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and 
Balkan Politics in Transition, 2"** edition, Boulder: Westview, 1995, p. 126.
Uti possidetis emerged in the context o f the decolonisation o f Latin America and was later also applied 
in Africa. In the 1990s its application extended to the former Soviet Union, Czech and Slovak republics 
and the former Yugoslavia. For the latter case see, Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The 
Disintegration o f  Yugoslavia from the Death o f Tito to the War fo r  Kosovo, edition, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1999, pp. 209, 239. Rein Mullerson, ‘New Developments in the Former USSR and 
Yugoslavia’, Virginia Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1993. For a detailed legal 
interpretation o f the principle o f uti possidetis see Malcolm N. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and 
Boundaries’, European Journal o f  International Law', Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997.
Prosecutor v. Dusko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement o f 7 May 1997. Case No. IT-94-1-T. Paragraphs 
84-97. Printed in André Klip and Gôran Sluiter eds.. Annotated Leading Cases o f  International Criminal 
Tribunals, Volume I, The International Criminal Tribunal fo r the Former Yugoslavia 1993-1998, 
Antwerp: Intersentia, 1999. The cited paragraphs at pp. 309-311. See also Prosecutor v. Dusko TadiC, 
Appeals Judgement o f 15 July 1999. Case No. IT-94-1-A. Paragraphs 83-162. Printed in André Klip and 
Gôran Sluiter eds.. Annotated Leading Cases o f International Criminal Tribunals, Volume III, The 
International Criminal Tribunal fo r the Former Yugoslavia 1997-1999, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001. The 
cited paragraphs at pp. 783-806. Stan Markotich, ‘Serbian President Focuses on Creating a Greater 
Serbia’, Radio Free Europe/R adio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 30, 29 July 1994, pp. 
11-16. James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries -  A Strategy o f  War Crimes, London: Hurst, 
2003, Chapters 6 & 7.
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The core argument of the Serb president was that if Yugoslavia was to dissolve, only
nations -  not republics -  had the right of self-determination and therefore of secession
from the federation/^ In face of Slovene demands to self-determination, Milosevic
made it clear that Belgrade did not intend to oppose Slovene independence but wanted
in turn the recognition of such a right for the Serbs as well; that is, all Serbs should have
the right to live in a state of their own. In a meeting with students and academics of the
University of Belgrade in March 1991, referring to Croatian demands to leave the
federation, Milosevic stated:
It has not occurred to us to dispute the right of the Croatian nation to secede 
from Yugoslavia, if that nation decides of its own free will in a referendum ... 
but I want to make it completely clear that it should not occur to anyone that a 
part of the Serbian nation will be allowed to go with them.^^
The rationale of the Serb leadership for the redrawing of borders and their claim to 
govern assigned territories were couched in terms of the so-called ‘historical rights’ i.e., 
that such territories had been bequeathed by history in that the claimed areas had been 
part of an earlier Serb state, the Serbs had been largely indigenous in such territories and 
held legal title to a significant portion of these lands.^ "^  Indeed, the Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic claimed the right of national sovereignty of no less than 64 percent 
of Bosnian territory where he alleged Bosnian Serb households held legal title to land 
and farm.^  ^Attempting to bolster their argument, the Serb leadership vested its claims
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 112. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 209.
Cited in Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 113,131.
Arguments based on ‘historical rights’, however, are not associated exclusively with the Serbs, or with 
them only during the 1990s. The ‘historical rights’ logic has been part o f the rationale for the acquisition 
o f Kosovo by Serbia in 1912 and the control o f the province since then. ‘Historical rights’ provided the 
bases for Zagreb’s territorial pretensions on Bosnia in the early 1990s, justified this time by the existence 
o f the Independent State o f Croatia during World War II, which included present Croatia and Bosnia. 
Moreover, ‘historical rights’ provided justification for the Greek official opposition to the international 
recognition o f the former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia in the early 1990s; Greece arguing that 
Macedonian territory had been Greek long before Slavs entered the Balkans. See, Woodward, Balkan 
Tragedy, pp. 212-3.
Ibid., p. 212. Norman Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort and Termination o f the War’ in Branka Maga§ and Ivo 
Èanic eds.. The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 208-
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with ‘democratic’ nuances by organising referenda in their communities in Croatia and
Bosnia with entirely predictable results/^ Susan Woodward terms this as the
‘democratic principle’ of the national rights to territory -  which she attributes mainly to
the Serbs/^ Such terminology, however, is misleading not only because it camouflages
the fact that the logic behind the Serb claims to territory was ethnically exclusivist, but
also because it misrepresents democracy. Woodward misses the point that it is the elites
who propose platforms and set out agendas. In a democracy the citizenry do not
determine the issues they are called to decide upon; do not formulate and asks questions
that they themselves have to answer; nor do they establish when the decision(s) should
be arrived at.^ * Indeed, the type of questions (and the way in which they are) asked are
contingent on the elite and when the wrong questions are asked it is imprudent to expect
right answers given by the people. As Offe asserts:
It is democratically impossible for the people to decide or (re)define who 
belongs to the people ... either by excluding parts of the population from the 
citizenship (for example, through ethnic cleansing) or by unilaterally 
incorporating collectivities that are outside the ‘given’ political community ... 
[T]erritorial borders cannot be changed in obviously democratic ways^^
The reason for this is that it is not likely to get generally agreed answers to the 
following questions: which constituency is to decide on secession -  the majority of the 
separatist group, the whole, or concurrent majorities of both constituencies? And which 
constituency is to decide in the highly likely event of a second order conflict over these 
procedural alternatives?^® The Serb rationale for the re-drawing of borders cannot be
9. Glenny, The Fall o f Yugoslavia, p. 170. This rationale has been used earlier by Serb authorities to 
justify the colonisation policies in Kosovo during 1920s and 1930s, See Chapter III pp. 92-93.
Refer to Chapter III, pp. 112,115.
Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 212-3.
Claus Offe, “ Homogeneity’ and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity Conflicts through 
Group Rights’, The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1998, p. 118. See also, James Mayall, 
Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 52-53.
Offe, “ Homogeneity’ and Constitutional Democracy’, pp. 116-7.
“ ibid., p. 117.
190
interpreted in terms of democracy or democratic processes: it had instead to do with the 
elite vision of the political organisation of the Serb State. The justification for the Serb 
claim to territory, be it based on ‘historical rights’, or legal title to land and farm, or the 
protection of Serb communities that would become minorities in Croatia and Bosnia 
loosing thus protection provided by previous constitutional provisions, reinforced the 
definition of territory on ethnic, exclusivist terms and validated the Serb attempts to 
redraw borders even by means of force.
The politics of force, discernible in Milosevic’s statement at the beginning of this 
chapter, were implemented with considerable success initially in Croatia, almost one- 
third of whose territory was occupied by Serb troops by autumn 1991, marking thus, 
even if temporary, the forceful alteration of borders. Although in late November 1991, 
Milosevic agreed to the deployment of international peace-keeping troops in Croatia, 
such deployment was consistent with his central war aims which included partitioning 
of Croatia into Serb and Croat entities, redrawing of borders between Croatia and new 
Yugoslavia and eventual secession of Serb inhabited territories in Croatia and their 
joining rump Yugoslavia.^^ Milosevic was aware that in an internationally recognised 
Croatian state Serb troops would be considered as a foreign army invading another 
country, so it was better for the Serbs to get the United Nations troops to freeze the 
existing lines of confrontation, which would in time, Milosevic might have hoped, 
transform into de facto international boundaries.^^
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia^ p. 188. Gow, The Serbian Project, p. 152.
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 195, 198. François Jean, ed.. Life, Death and Aid: The Médecins Sans 
Frontièrs Report on World Crisis Intervention, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 90.
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But the ethnic definition of territory posed an existential threat especially to Bosnia 
given its multiethnic composition and geostrategic importance as a gateway to a greater 
Serbia and a greater Croatia. The initial goal of the Serb leadership with regard to 
Bosnia was that the republic should remain within Yugoslavia regardless of whether 
Croatia and Slovenia were to secede from the federation.^^ Given that Bosnia could not 
be prevented from seeking independence, the fall back position became the partitioning 
of the republic so that areas claimed by the Serbs could be joined with rump 
Yugoslavia.^"  ^The Croatian policy in relation to Bosnia was more ambiguous, however, 
because the Croats’ opinions about Bosnia’s future were divided. The mainstream 
membership of the ruling HDZ and that of the Croatian army, concerned with the peace 
and territorial integrity of the republic of Croatia, maintained that Croatia could not 
insist on restoring its own territorial integrity if it conspired to undermine territorial 
integrity of another internationally recognised state (Bosnia). Moreover, this faction saw 
Bosnian Muslims as a natural ally against a common Serb opponent. Bosnian Croats of 
Sarajevo, Tuzla and other Bosnian towns supported Bosnian independence as well. On 
the other hand, the Herzegovinian Croats -  known as the Herzegovinian lobby -  who 
were well represented in the Croatian government, in the leadership of the ruling HDZ, 
among Tudjman’s advisors and Croatian diaspora -  aspired to detach areas of western 
Herzegovina, and as much of Bosnia as possible, and link them up with Croatia.^^
This position was shared also by the Serb military which was convinced about the importance o f  
acquisition o f Bosnian territories. As the Federal Defence Secretary General Veljko Kadijevic maintained 
while the Yugoslav People’s Army began a process o f manoeuvre and mobilisation across Bosnia whilst 
war in Croatia was still going on: ‘[Bosnia] by its geographical position and size [is] one o f the key stones 
for the formation o f a common state for all Serb people’. See James Gow, Triumph o f the Lack o f  Will -  
International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, London: Hurst, 1997, pp. 33-4.
^  Noel Malcolm, Bosnia -  A Short History, New, Updated Edition, London: Papermac, 1996, pp. 215, 
223, 229. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction o f  Yugoslavia, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2"** edition, 2000, p. 196-8.
Patrick Moore, ‘The Serbian and Croatian Factors’, Radio Free Europe /  Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) 
Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 22, 28 May 1993, pp. 16-17. Patrick Moore, ‘Endgame in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, Radio Free Europe /  Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 32, 13 August 1993, p. 
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Although, in theory, the independence of Bosnia became imperative for the Croat 
leadership following the end of war in Croatia (in order to ensure that Bosnian Croats 
did not remain in the rump Yugoslavia), the said leadership did not desist from its 
territorial pretensions in Bosnia but conspired to divide the republic along ethnic lines.
The idea of division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia remained fundamental to 
both Serbian and Croatian policy considerations. Indeed, given their territorial 
pretensions, Milosevic and Tudjman convened a series of meetings to discuss the 
partitioning of the Bosnian republic. Reportedly inaugurated in March 1991 with a 
meeting in Karadjordjevo (a town in Vojvodina) they were to continue in secret on 
various levels during the course of war.^  ^The disregard for the Bosnian Muslims was 
justified on the part of Belgrade and Zagreb by their allegation that Bosnian Muslims 
were either Serbs or Croats.^^ Ethnic cleansing as a strategy of creating homogenous 
territories was contemplated right at the outset of these talks. Both Tudjman and 
Karadzic proposed a discussion on ‘population transfers’ or ‘resettlement of 
populations’ as a means of achieving ethnic homogenisation.^* This was no surprise. It
“  The first in the series o f such meetings following the outbreak o f the war, took place in the Austrian 
town o f Graz in the end o f February 1992. Here, the Serbs and Croats reportedly agreed in principle, on a 
division o f Bosnia which would give Croats 20 percent, the Serbs 65 percent, and Muslims 15 percent o f  
Bosnia’s territory. The Graz accord failed, however, because Radovan Karadiic and Mate Boban who led 
the Serb and Croat delegations respectively could not agree on a number o f issues including who should 
control Mostar, Patrick Moore, ‘Endgame in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, p. 19. S. P. Ramet, Balkan Babel, 
p. 205. Glenny, The Fall o f  Yugoslavia, p. 193.
Milosevic and Tudjman even argued to an European audience that an independent Bosnian state would 
bring to Europe the threat o f Islamic fundamentalism, claiming that just as Serbs and Croats had protected 
Europe from Ottoman horde, so Serbia and Croatia remained Europe’s ultimate line o f  defence against 
the Muslim danger from the East. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 217-8.
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 220, 306-7. The language o f expulsion permeated political discourse 
in the course o f the Bosnian war. A case in point is the leader o f the Party o f Serbian Unity and head of  
the paramilitary group ‘Tigers’ that perpetrated war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
Zeljko Rainjatovic, known by his nom de guerre Arkan, who formed an alliance with Milosevic in the 
December 1993 legislative elections. Describing the programme o f his party Arkan claimed that he would 
work for the ‘unification o f all Serbian lands ... Serbs will never tolerate citizens loyal to another entity 
[as part] o f their country ... [Tjhose who look to Tirana, Budapest and Iran should pack their bags’. 
‘Democracy’ he said in a campaign rally ‘was created in Serbia centuries before America was even 
discovered’. Cited in Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 354. Similarly, Vojislav SeSelj, the leader o f the
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was but a logical consequence of the ethnic definition of territory and the political 
attempts to secure ethnically homogenous territories on the basis of ‘historical rights’ to 
land.
It should be emphasised, nevertheless, that the problem with ‘historical rights’ 
arguments that purported to justify nationalist policies in Belgrade and Zagreb, and their 
respective counterparts in Bosnia, is that being based on selective interpretations of 
history, they were incompatible and exclusivist and therefore could provide no basis for 
agreement. In any case, if Serbs and Croats had ‘historical rights’ over Bosnian 
territory, so had the Bosnian Muslims. If Serbs claim ‘historical rights’ over Kosovo, 
such claim can be made vrith equal force also by Kosovar Albanians. In addition, by 
appropriating the terminology of ‘rights’ the ‘historical rights’ arguments suggest 
entitlement, i.e., possession of a given territory by a group to the detriment of any other 
group or person who reside in that territory. Moreover, being couched in terms of the 
collectivity, the ‘historical rights’ arguments take -  exclusively -  as the unit of ‘rights’ 
the ethno-national community, the implication being that any other community or 
individual outsider is considered devoid of the right to live in such territory. 
Furthermore, not only are ‘historical rights’ views based on flimsy historical evidence, 
they can also serve as rhetorical justification for claims made for other purposes, and be 
a cynical cover for the promotion of material interests -  acting as instruments of 
political mobilisation in the domestic arena, or as ‘catch-all’ explanations to convince a 
sceptical international community about the righteousness of a given national policy.^^
extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party, and the founder o f  the self-styled Cetnik army declared as early 
as August 1991 his readiness to expel Bosnian Muslims from Bosnia if  they happened to resist Serb 
suppression. Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 226-7.
For this latter point see Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers -  Territory and State Formation in the Modern 
World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 34-5.
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The evocation of ‘historical rights’, in addition to providing justification for the 
redravring of borders, served also to bolster arguments for the protection of the rights of 
Serb communities who would otherwise become a minority in Croatia and Bosnia and 
lose protection provided by previous constitutional arrangements. It bears emphasising, 
however, that it is not that concerns for minority rights were illegitimate but, the means 
employed to this end, war and ethnic cleansing, were deeply problematic. In addition, 
the degree of inconsistency vrith which the Serb leadership claimed protection of its 
own kin was appalling. The Serb leadership demanded rights for Serbs outside Serbia 
but had no intention of offering such rights to minorities within Serbia. It was ironical 
that Milosevic demanded protection of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at a time when he 
imposed a system of apartheid towards Albanians in Kosovo and repressed the 
Hungarian minority in Vojvodina and the Muslims of Sandzak.^® But double standards 
characterised also the Tudjman’s regime, which while paying lip service to Bosnia’s 
integrity conspired to reach an agreement on its territorial division. Moreover, while 
demanding the status of ‘constituent nation’ for the Croats in Bosnia,^^ Tudjman denied 
such a status to the Serb minority in Croatia. The inconsistency and exclusiveness 
involved in Serb and Croat claims to territory and protection of their own kin, in effect, 
denied negotiations that might have led to generally acceptable solutions, giving way to 
the alternative of war as continuation of politics by other means. The casus belli was the 
redrawing of borders.
For the last two cases see Edith Oltay, ‘Minorities as Stumbling Block in Relations with Neighbours’, 
Radio Free Europe /  Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 19, 8 May 1992; and Milan 
Andrejevich, ‘The Sandiak: The Next Balkan Theatre o f War’, Radio Free Europe /  Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 47,27  November 1992.
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 292.
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V. 4 Wars of Ethnic Cleansing
Form the point of view of the state, borders -  as demarcation lines -  are important for 
what they contain inside i.e., the people, as well as economic and geostrategic resources. 
Whereas economic and geostrategic resources are important factors for the strength of 
the state, it is within the state borders that national identities are moulded and it is 
through them that the state attempts to transform de jure sovereignty into de facto 
control.^^ The notion of control and its relation to the homogenous composition of the 
population is of significance here, given the common held assumption that the more 
homogenous a population, the easier is for a government to control and rule it. This 
logic appears to have been an important part of the Serb calculus for ethnic cleansing 
especially in Bosnia.
The establishment of ethnically homogenous territories was a goal that could not be 
achieved on a voluntary, peaceful basis. Given the degree of ethnic complexity in 
Bosnia, the unmixing of people was a recipe for war. The Serb president, however, 
appears to have been enthusiastic about the prospects of military confrontations and was 
‘well-prepared to accept war as a solution to the Yugoslav problem’. I n  preparation 
for war a major reorganisation of the armed forces took place. Following the cessation 
of hostilities in Croatia, most of the forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija -  JNA) that had been fighting there withdrew to 
Bosnia. In early 1992 there were some 100,000 JNA troops in Bosnia with over 700
tanks, 1,000 armoured personnel carriers, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all under the
For an insightfiil analysis in the context o f the Arab-Israeli conflict see David Newman, ‘Real Spaces, 
Symbolic Spaces: Interrelated Notions o f Territory in the Arab-Israeli Conflict’ in Paul F, Diehl, ed., A 
Road Map to War: Territorial Dimension o f International Conflict, Nashville and London: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1999.
Glenny, The Fall o f  Yugoslavia, p. 38. See also Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, p. 205.
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personnel carriers, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all under the command of the 
General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade/'^ Between March and May 1992, there were 
several attacks and take-overs by the JNA of areas that constituted main entry points 
into Bosnia or where situated on major logistics or communication lines, coupled with 
shelling, sniping and rounding up of non-Serb civilians in the attacked areas/^ In July 
1991, on instructions from head-quarters in Belgrade, the JNA seized all documentation 
relating to conscription from Bosnia’s Secretariat for Defence and Republic’s 
municipalities, ensuring that conscription process was exclusively in the hands of the 
JNA which, in turn, assured that only Serbs were recruited into the armed forces/^ In 
addition, Belgrade undertook to arm the local Serbs, a technique that had been practised 
earlier in Croatia and was to feature also in Kosovo/^ The plan ‘RAM’ (‘the Frame’ -  
implying borders of the future Serb state) that Belgrade had initiated with the complicity 
of the JNA to secretly arm local Serbs in Croatia was extended to fulfil the same 
function in Bosnia/^
Territorial Defence units (Teritorijalna Odbrana -  TOs) in predominantly Muslim areas 
of Bosnia were disbanded and disarmed by the JNA as far as possible in late 1991 and 
early 1992. TOs of the Serb populated areas, on the other hand, were substantially re­
equipped and in the course of the Bosnian war they reportedly operated in tandem with
Prosecutor v. DuSko TadiC. Judgement o f 7 May 1997 at note 51 above, paragraph 124 at p. 317. See 
also Milan Vego, ‘The Yugoslav Ground Forces’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1993, p. 248.
Prosecutor v. Dusko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement o f 7 May 1997, at note 51 above. Paragraphs 125- 
6 at p. 317. The composition o f the military industry in Bosnia provided for a particularly fierce fighting. 
After the fall out with Stalin in 1948, Tito concentrated the military industry and installations in the 
Bosnian mountainous heartland. Over 60 percent o f Yugoslavia’s military industries were based in 
Bosnia, and over 60 percent o f  these were situated in Croat and Muslim regions. Glenny, The Fall o f  
Yugoslavia, p. 151.
Prosecutor v. Dmko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement o f 7 May 1997, at note 51 above. Paragraph, 106 
at p. 313.
Judah, The Serbs, pp. 170-1. Steve L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic 
Conflict and International Intervention, Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 130.
Glenny, The Fall o f  Yugoslavia, p. 151. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 39.
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the JNA7^ It should be pointed out that whilst the JNA was a powerful army, equipped 
with all the conventional weapons and equipment that modem European armies 
possess,TOs were equipped with essentially infantry weapons, rifles, light machine- 
guns, some small calibre artillery, mortars and anti-personnel mines. The JNA’s pre­
emptive action to disarm TOs in Muslim and Croat regions, nonetheless, reinforced 
Serb military superiority by cementing a military imbalance in favour of Serb troops. 
Clearly, Muslims were in the most precarious position having been left on their own, 
whereas Bosnian Croats received support from Zagreb (who vigorously sought buying 
weapons from suitable markets in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East*^), even 
though not on the scale Bosnian Serbs were assisted from Belgrade. Although a Bosnian 
army was announced to have been founded in May 1992, it had no centralised command 
until autumn 1993, and even then as many as half of the troops were reportedly 
unarmed.
May 1992 is an important moment in the re-organisation of the JNA. With secession of 
the non-Serb republics and the admission by Serbia and Montenegro that the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer existed, the JNA’s operations in the republic 
of Bosnia could be viewed as aggression in a foreign country. Recognising that the JNA 
was not a neutral participant in the conflict, on 15 May 1992 the UN Security Council 
passed resolution 752 demanding that all interference from outside Bosnia by units of
Prosecutor v. Dusko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement of 7 May 1997, at note 51 above. Paragraphs 106- 
7 at pp. 313-314. Refer also to Chapter III, pp. 112,116.
The JNA was reputed to be the fourth most powerful army in Europe. Glenny, The Fall o f  Yugoslavia, 
p. 134.
Marcus Tanner, Croatia, pp. 234-5. Milo§ Vasic, ‘The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies’ 
in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After -  A Study in Fragmentation, Despair 
and Rebirth, London and New York: Longman, 1996, p. 123. For the Croatian fighting forces in Bosnia 
see Chapter III, pp. 116-117.
Milan Vego, ‘The Army o f Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1993, p. 65. 
James Gow, ‘One Year o f War in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Radio Free Europe /  Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 23 ,4  June 1993, p. 2.
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the JNA cease immediately and that those units either be withdrawn, be subject to the 
authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia or be disbanded and disarmed.*^ 
In order to appease the international community and at the same time retain in Serb 
hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia, a redistribution of the JNA personnel 
was organised: all Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in the JNA units elsewhere were 
transferred to Bosnia while Serb soldiers not from Bosnia were assigned to Serbia and 
Montenegro. This ensured a seeming compliance with international demands while 
effectively retaining large Serb armed forces in Bosnia. With effect from 19 May 1992, 
the latter were renamed the Bosnian Serb Army (Vojska Republike Srpske -  VRS) 
which was placed under the command of General Ratko Mladic, the former 
Commander of the 2"^  Military District of the JNA based in Sarajevo, whereas the 
remainder of the former JNA was to become the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije -  
VJ).*"'
It is worth emphasising that the purported withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia was not 
vo lun ta ry . I t  was in fact a ruse, a calculated move to give the impression of 
compliance with Security Council Resolution 752 while assuring that military 
operations it had already begun in Bosnia were successfully continued. Ultimately, the 
decision to divide the JNA was a deceptive measure to sow confusion over the nature of 
the armed conflict in Bosnia, obscure Belgrade’s responsibility for war, and allow 
observers as well as Serb political leaders to say that Belgrade and the JNA were not
See UNSC Resolution 752 at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/comexpert/752.htm.
Prosecutor v. Dusko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement o f 7 May 1997 at note 51 above. Paragraphs 113- 
4, 118 at pp. 315-316.
The withdrawal o f the JNA from Bosnia bears similarities with that from Croatia. The Armed Forces of  
the Republic o f  Serbian Krajina in Croatia (OruÈanie Snage Republika Srpska Krajina -  OS RSK) 
remained in effect proxies o f Belgrade. Not only had the Krajina Serbs inherited from the JNA a military 
capability and command and control structures, but their armed forces retained vital linkages with 
Belgrade, including membership o f a common officer corps, whereas OS RSK officers remained on the 
Belgrade military payroll. Gow, The Serbian Project^ pp. 76.
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involved in the war in Bosnia and that the armed confrontations constituted a civil 
war.*  ^ The announced JNA withdrawal was fictional. The VJ air crews and aircraft 
remained in Bosnia and worked with VRS throughout 1992 and 1993; the VRS 
inherited JNA’s weapons and equipment; the same officers and commanders; largely 
the same troops; the same logistic centres and suppliers; the same infrastructure; the 
same goals and missions, tactics and operations. All active duty members of the VRS 
continued to receive their salaries from the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) while the VRS Main Staff maintained direct 
communication on a daily basis with the VJ General Staff via a communications link 
from Belgrade.*^
Moreover, Serb fighting capability was enhanced by thousands of criminals released 
from Serbian prisons who were then integrated into paramilitary units and covertly 
instigated by the state to perform atrocities.** The organisation of paramilitary units was 
another deceptive measure that served the purpose of strategic ambiguity, whereby 
seemingly independent forces could be blamed for atrocities and the appearance of 
chaos could be maintained in the field. In operational terms paramilitary units 
performed the function of infantry ‘shock troops’ carrying out tasks that regular army 
could not perform such as close combat, street-to-street fighting or acts of ethnic
Milan Vego, ‘Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 
1992, pp. 445-9. Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 270.
Prosecutor v. Dukko TadiC. Opinion and Judgement o f 7 May 1997, at note 51 above. Paragraphs 115, 
118, 606 at pp. 315, 316, 410. See also Separate and Dissenting Opinion o f Judge Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald Regarding the Applicability o f Article 2 o f  the Statute printed in André Klip and GOran Sluiter 
eds.. Annotated Leading Cases o f International Criminal Tribunals, Volume I, The International criminal 
Tribunal fo r  the Former Yugoslavia 1993-1998, pp. 457-468. Vego, ‘Federal Army’, pp. 445-6, 448.
Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour -  Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 1997, pp. 132-3. Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal: Sagas o f Sarajevo, New York: 
Random House, 1998, pp. 192, 410-411. Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Milosevic: Portrait o f  a 
Tyrant, New York: The Free Press, 1999, p. 118.
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cleansing including rape, torture, terrorisation, mutilation and murder.*^ This Serb 
military superiority is said to have induced Milosevic to think that war in Bosnia would 
be short and easy, a miscalculation reflected not only in the rush with which Belgrade 
started the war but also in the absence of a strategy to terminate it.^ ®
The Serb war aim in Bosnia was acquisition of territory that was deemed crucial in 
strategic and/or demographic terms and rendering it ethnically homogenous in order to 
facilitate its con tro l . In  a conspicuously asymmetrical conflict in which Serb troops 
enjoyed military superiority -  not only in heavy weapons and material, but also in 
command, control, communication, intelligence and logistics -  while facing small, 
badly equipped and unorganised armies, the Serbs were well placed to exploit the 
tactical advantage of offence especially in the initial stages of the fighting.^^ By the end 
of summer of 1992, Serb forces had under their control about two-thirds of Bosnia’s 
territory whereas nearly one million civilians -  mostly Muslims -  had been displaced 
from their homes. The most intense battles were fought in the north for the vital east- 
west corridor that would provide contiguous Serb territory linking Banja Luka (and 
therefore Serb held territory in Western Bosnia and Croatia) with Serbia proper. These 
areas were also crucial for controlling JNA bases and weapon stores.^  ^ Up to the 
summer of 1995 when Muslim and Croat forces organised a counter offensive following 
the Washington agreement, little territory changed hands.
Gow, The Serbian Project, p. 79.
^  Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, pp. 216, 235. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York: Random House, 
1998, p. 245.
See, for instance, Norman Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’; and Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. 
For the advantages o f the offence see Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, in 
Michael E. Brown, ed.. Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1993, especially p. 109.
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 256. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 51. Almond, Europe's Backyard 
War, p. 269.
201
However, the acquisition of territory was easier than its control given the mixed 
demographic composition of the region and the fact that the Serbs were in a minority in 
most of the newly acquired territories. The strategy of ethnic cleansing might have been 
useful for the perpetrators in order to acquire territory, but was much more so in order to 
control it. After summer of 1992, by which time the Serbs had acquired their preferred 
boundaries, the conflict was transformed into an attritional, low-intensity one: battles 
were rare whereas the civilian population became increasingly the target of violence. 
According to a CIA report, which was leaked in early 1995, Serb forces and 
paramilitary troops had committed 90 percent of the acts of ethnic cleansing up to this 
time. As a commentator put it: ‘to those who think that parties are equally guilty this 
revelation is pretty devastating ... the scale of what the Serbs did is so different. But 
more than that, it makes clear, with concrete evidence, that there was a conscious, 
coherent, and systematic Serb policy to get rid of Muslims, through murder, torture and 
imprisonment’.^ "^
Based on observations regarding the dynamics of violence in the former Yugoslavia, 
some analysts have argued that wars of ethnic cleansing were distinct from wars which 
occurred prior to the 1990s, and that a fundamental restructuring in the nature of 
organised violence is taking place. For Mary Kaldor, for instance, wars in Bosnia 
marked a departure from traditional, Clausewitzian wars, being the ‘archtypal example, 
the paradigm of the new type of warfare’, primarily about ‘identity politics’, in which 
civilians are the main target of violence.^^ Michael Ignatieff as well has pointed out that 
wars of ethnic cleansing differ from conventional warfare not least because their
See David Campbell, National Destruction -  Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis: 
University o f Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 101.
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, pp. 6, 8, 31.
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fighting units were not only regular armies or police forces, but also paramilitary and 
mercenary groups, local warlords, and criminal gangs. He points out that the irregulars 
of the 1990s Balkans are historically distinct, in that instead of being co-opted and 
tamed by the state, they were covertly instigated by states -  Serbia and Croatia -  to 
perform atrocities. Ignatieff goes on to confirm that irregulars were created to allow the 
state to officially deny ethnic cleansing. The war was franchised to private enterprise, in 
order to dispense with any of the moral accountability associated with professional 
soldiery.^^ David Keen, for his part, has argued that war aims in our days are centred 
around profit; war itself being the continuation of economics by other means.^^ In our 
case. Keen’s argument would imply that wars of ethnic cleansing were about territory 
and its resources as well as about appropriation of humanitarian aid or other 
international material assistance.
Although providing a dynamic and an imaginative comprehension of violence, the 
above interpretations do not necessarily make a convincing case that the wars of ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia were so profoundly different that they departed 
altogether from previous warfare. Kaldor’s emphasis on the ‘highly decentralised’ 
nature of the fighting units in the Bosnian wars,^* or Ignatieff s assertion that war ‘used 
to be fought by soldiers ... is now fought by irregulars’^  ^appear to be exaggerated -  at 
least in the context of our case study. The report of the UN Commission of Experts, the 
evidence emerging from the Hague trials, and a number of serious studies provide
^  Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour, pp. 132-3.
David Keen, ‘Incentives and Disincentives for Violence’, in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds.. 
Greed and Grievance -  Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 
27. See also David Keen, ‘The Economic Functions o f Violence in Civil Wars’, Adelphi Paper 320, 
Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, pp. 8,47-50.
^  Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour, p. 6.
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ample evidence that paramilitary and other irregular Serb units operated in collaboration 
with the JNA and the full knowledge and support of Belgrade. The same applies for 
their Croat counterparts. On the other hand, the fit between war and profit, pointed 
out by Keen, is of course a real one, but this is not to say that economic incentives for 
war are either new or distinct. Indeed, they can be found to be a significant rationale for 
waging war in all times and places. The acquisition of resources may not necessarily be 
an end in itself but rather a means to an end, and it is the latter that is insufficiently 
explored by Keen’s argument. In other words, economic incentives do not exhaust the 
gamut of the motivations for waging war.
In so far as the attitude towards civilians is concerned, the wars that followed the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s were not necessarily distinct from previous 
wars experienced in the region, such as the Balkan Wars (1912-3), or those fought under 
the cover of the two World Wars.^ ®^  In all these cases irregular units have been involved 
in warfare and civilians have been persistently the target of violence. The practice and 
the official rationale for expulsion of people have not changed significantly in the 
course of the past century, nor have the consequences. Technical aspects may have 
advanced, however, in order to increase efficiency and the speed of the expulsion.
See, for instance, Final Report o f  the Commission o f Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, S/1994/674 at httD://www.his.com/~twarrick/commxvu 1 .htm. Part 
III, paragraph A. Prosecutor v. Di^ko Tadic, Appeals Judgement o f 15 July 1999, at note 51 above, 
especially paragraphs 146-162 at pp. 800-806. Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, pp. 209-210. Gow, Triumph o f  
the Lack o f  Will, pp. 31, 33-35. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds, pp. 248, 339. Milan Vego, ‘The Croatian 
Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1993, p. 101.
Refer to Chapter III, pp. 70-79, 98-103.
For opinions in favour o f this point see Christopher Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the 
Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management o f Risk’, Adelphi Paper 345, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, pp. 8, 23, 25, 26. Human 
Rights Dimensions o f  Population Transfer, Including the Implantation o f  Settlers, Preliminary report 
prepared by Mr. A. S. Al-Khasawneh and Mr. R. Hatano, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f  
Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17, 6 July 1993, paragraph 30.
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What cannot be emphasised enough is the fact that the state remained central in the 
organisation and execution of wars of ethnic cleansing. While wars in the former 
Yugoslavia might have not been fought in full adherence to Clausewitz, the presence of 
irregular units being an obvious deviation, that these units served the state interest; that 
wars of ethnic cleansing were an instrument for the attainment of state objectives; and 
that these wars make sense as extensions of official policies remains an obvious fact for 
many. It is the centrality of the state in the planning and execution of warfare that 
precludes one from deducing that wars of ethnic cleansing marked a full departure from 
Clausewitzian warfare. Indeed, in adherence with Clausewitz, the wars of ethnic 
cleansing had political objectives; they were not autonomous but an instrument of 
policy. They did not happen in a vacuum; they had goals and reasons. Moreover, wars 
of ethnic cleansing, especially in Bosnia, did not suspend the political intercourse of the 
warring parties or change it into something entirely different. And again, in accordance 
with Clausewitz, the shape and character of these wars was a function of the nature of 
war aims and of situations which gave rise to them.^°^
At the centre of the wars of ethnic cleansing was coercion i.e., the exertion of strength 
upon a targeted subject in order to induce an intended response. As noted above, 
although enjoying superiority in heavy weapons, Serb forces lacked sufficient 
manpower to press the full advantages of their arsenal. As a result, their military 
operations relied not on direct combat with opponents but on the demonstrative capacity 
of violence which was intended to compel the targeted populations to leave, a feature 
that could be observed also in the course of the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994.^ ®"^
See Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 
Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 86-88, 605,607.
104 Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, p. 39.
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Conditioned by a mountainous territory that provided little routes of manoeuvre for 
large land armies and few lines of attack for supporting air forces, in strategic terms, the 
Bosnian conflict had two main components: limited manoeuvring to seize and control 
the heights and lines of communication, and siege warfare. The heights around the 
cities were important due to the superiority they gave to those who controlled them, 
either to attack or to defend cities below. Cities, on the other hand, were important 
strategically as junctions of lines of communication and supply. Different forms of war 
have diverse purposes, but siege warfare is one form of war which aims exclusively at 
control of territory, an aim that includes having a population in place that supports the 
political agenda of the ruling side. The Serb siege tactics against Bosnian cities not only 
cut off food, water and power in an indiscriminate manner but repeatedly enlarged the 
target to include non-combatants as a primary target. Strategic bombardment -  a 
persistent element of the siege warfare in Bosnia as well as in Croatia -  had two 
intended aims. First, by reaching behind the enemy’s forces and exerting pressure on the 
enemy population, the strategic bombardment sought to turn the people away from 
supporting their armed forces and their government and thus undermine the will of the 
side under bombardment to continue the war. Second, and most importantly, strategic 
bombardment aimed at producing mass flight of the population of the cities and their 
defenders so as to make possible for the besiegers to take over the territory.
As indicated in the previous section, from the policy standpoint, wars of ethnic 
cleansing were a result of clashing state projects that had incompatible claims over 
territory and sought diverging forms of political organisation. For the warring parties.
For an informed ethical discussion on the Bosnian war see James Turner Johnson, ‘War for Cities and 
Non-combatant Immunity in the Bosnian Conflict’, in G. Scott Davis, ed.. Religion and Justice in the 
War over Bosnia, New York and London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 63-90.
See ibid.
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the use of force was a continuation of politics by other means, the ‘politics’ of any one 
side being irreconcilable with those of the rest. The use of force, however, was neither 
irrational nor senseless, at least from the perspective of the perpetrators. Instead, it was 
an integral part of the legitimation process of such state projects. As Roberto Cipriani 
has argued:
... the outbreak of war ... unleashes a series of processes of legitimation, 
starting with the first skirmishes, preparatory for the explosion of the conflict, 
and later arriving at the justification of mobilisation, as well as the acceptance of 
the strategic choices made by the leaders. Final victory is undoubtedly a triumph 
of legitimation: but even defeat can give rise to an ‘explanation’ which avoids 
the invalidation of a regime or political formula.
Wars of ethnic cleansing legitimated the ethnic definition of territory by all means 
available ranging from partition of territory at the negotiating tables to the most grisly 
forms of violence employed on the ground. In the process, these wars served also the 
purpose of legitimating those who devised and pursued such state projects, i.e., political 
leaders and army commanders, their policies, tactics and values -  even if temporarily.
V. 5 The Impact of the Western-led International Involvement 1991-1995
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, political activity arises out of disagreement 
and is concerned with the use of government to resolve conflict. At the national level of 
analysis, ethnic cleansing and wars that accompanied it were a result of incompatible 
claims over territory and diverging visions of the political organisation of the Serb, 
Croat and Bosnian states as they emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In dealing 
with such disagreements, government policies reflected the irreconcilability of 
respective nationalist projects, leading ultimately to the most fiercely war, in the post- 
1945 Europe, over the dismemberment of Bosnia. Such was the degree of organised
Cipriani, ‘The Sociology o f Legitimation’, p. 4.
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violence employed in the course of this war that ethnic cleansing was almost complete 
by 1995 and the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines had become a matter of fact. As 
Karadzic’s quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, the perpetrators of ethnic 
cleansing were simply hoping to receive international recognition and cement their war 
gains. An analysis of the politics of ethnic cleansing, therefore, would be incomplete if 
one refrains from considering the Western powers’ reaction to it not least because such 
reaction -  at times -  appeared to have worsened the situation on the ground. This 
section elevates the level of analysis to the international arena by critically examining 
the Western response to the Yugoslav crises and their escalation with a particular focus 
on the West’s reaction to ethnic cleansing up to December 1995 when fighting in 
Bosnia was halted. It argues that the measures employed by the Western led 
international community were a poor substitute for more decisive and forcefiil action to 
prevent or curb the unfolding horrors of ethnic cleansing.
Western involvement in the Yugoslav conflict has been for the most part disappointing. 
The West appears to have failed to fully comprehend the nature of the conflict,^®* i.e., 
that this was a conflict about political reorganisation of states on the basis of ethnic 
criteria, in which war became a means to redraw borders and homogenise territory. 
Lacking a political understanding of the nature of the impasse and preoccupied with the 
developments in the former Soviet Union, the West, initially, sought to stick to the 
basics: press for the territorial integrity and unity of the Yugoslav federation. Although 
in November 1990, the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had warned 
the first Bush administration that Yugoslavia will fall apart, probably accompanied by
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 175. Noel Malcolm, ‘Bosnia and the West -  A Study in Failure’, 
The National Interest, No. 39, Spring 1995, p. 4. Latinka Perovic, ‘Yugoslavia, Serbia and the Future’, p. 
30.
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acts of violence, they could not get the attention of their principals. Similarly, the 
French, British and Germans were dismissive of the CIA warnings. In early 1991, the 
State Department even sent over officials to Belgrade to express support for the unity, 
independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. One of the key reasons for the 
European Community’s intention to preserve the federation -  as Mark Almond has 
pointed out -  had to do with anxieties about the US $16 billion owed by Yugoslavia. 
‘No Federation, no repayment’ seems to have been the Community’s th in k in g .T h e  
irony is that by pressing for the preservation of the federation in 1991, the Western 
policy only reinforced the Yugoslav deadlock. Because Belgrade felt supported by the 
West when seeking to retain the federation, the federal army had little incentive for 
restrain.*Indeed, in the ensuing war in Croatia, the support offered by the federal 
army to the Krajina Serbs in the form of artillery cover, logistical back-up, intelligence 
and aerial power, as well as ethnic cleansing of the Croats was overlooked by Western 
powers.**^
In the space of a few months, nevertheless, the West reversed its policy and eventually 
recognised Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia by early 1992.**  ^ Although lacking sufficient
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, chapter 2, especially pp. 43-7. For a fascinating analysis o f  the 
analogies between flaws o f the British reaction to the Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s and the Ottoman 
crisis in the Balkans in the late nineteenth century see the same source pp. 91-101. In both cases, the 
Western powers, initially, sought to maintain the status quo i.e., preserve the Ottoman empire in the late 
nineteenth century and the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990s, whilst misunderstanding the nature o f  
the crisis and the stakes o f the parties involved.
Mark Almond, Blundering in the Balkans: The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis, Oxford 
and London: School o f European Studies, 1991, p. 24.
James Gow and Lawrence Freedman, ‘Intervention in a Fragmenting State: The Case o f  Yugoslavia’, 
in Nigel S. Rodley, ed.. To Loose the Bands o f  Wickedness: Intervention in Defence o f  Human Rights, 
London: Brassey’s, 1992, pp. 97-8. See also Adrian Hastings’ comments on ‘Discussion: The 
International Response’ in Maga§ and Éanic eds.. The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 306- 
7.
See Gow and Freedman, ‘Intervention in a Fragmenting State’, p. 108.
Croatia and Slovenia were recognised by the EC on 15 January 1992. Bosnia was recognised by the 
EC on 6 April 1992, whereas by the United States the next day. The Serb attacks in Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia, and the accompanying atrocities -  some o f which hit the headlines in the West -  may have
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guarantees regarding the protection of ethnic community rights, the recognition in itself 
was not so much the cause as the trigger of the Serb aggression in Bosnia. Serb actions 
had been planned earlier and the carve-up of the republic was already under way by the 
time of Bosnia’s recogni t ion .But  once violence erupted, the scale of Western 
misperceptions became increasingly obvious. Their most widely known were those 
based on bogus historical analogies that propounded the thesis of ‘ancient ethnic 
hatreds’ and that all sides were responsible for the violence and could, therefore, be 
blamed equally.**  ^A further problem was that the first Bush administration being more 
apprehensive about developments in the former Soviet Union and viewing no imminent 
threat to its own interest from the Balkan crisis, took a low-key position in the 
management of the conflict and let the European Community (EC) take the lead.^*  ^But 
the EC proved incapable of handling the situation effectively; whereas the bloodshed 
might have been averted by massive preventive deployment of an international force 
with a mandate to neutralise Serb military superiority, this was not an option because no 
country was prepared to commit the necessary troops and resources.
From the very start of the conflict in Yugoslavia, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas 
Hurd, and his colleagues at the Ministry of Defence, had cited the precedent of the 
British deployment of troops to Ulster after 1969 as a reason for avoiding intervention
induced the first Bush administration and its West European counterparts to shift their policy and 
recognise these republics. See Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 248-9.
Over the previous year the Bosnian Serbs had declared their autonomy in large tracts o f Bosnia, arms 
delivery had been made to Karadzic's supporters, a Bosnian Serb state was declared in October 1991, key 
logistic points were controlled by the JNA and artillery troops surrounded Sarajevo in the winter months. 
Malcolm, ‘Bosnia and the West’, p. 13. James Gow, Trumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, pp. 34-5. And, as 
pointed out above talks for the partition of Bosnia were under way since early 1991. See above p. 191.
See Chapter IV, pp. 141-147.
Spyros Economides, ‘Balkan Security: What Security? Whose Security?’, Journal o f  Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3,2003, p. 114.
Christopher Bennett, ‘Ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia’ in Montserrat Guibemau, and John Rex 
eds., The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997,
p. 126.
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in ex-Yugoslavia.^^* Whereas recalling the Vietnam analogy at the beginning of August 
1992, President Bush asserted: ‘I do not want to see the United States bogged down in 
any way into some guerrilla war. We lived through that once’.^ ^^  Moreover, neither 
Britain nor United States was willing to spend the cash in a time of recession 
compounded for President Bush by imminent elections whilst the British government 
was faced with a deficit of about fifty billion pounds. The European Community, for 
its part, not only appeared as a not very unified diplomatic actor -  on several occasions 
speaking with no unified voice -  but, also it had a vastly underdeveloped military force 
depending constantly either on the US or NATO troops.
The Western reluctance to use force was exploited accordingly by the Serbs, and is 
likely to have been a factor in the original Serb planning for war. As Milosevic stated in 
a speech in the Serbian parliament in early 1991: T believe and assess ... that the great 
powers will not intervene in Yugoslavia. The great powers will find it difficult to 
intervene in any European country, especially not in a country in which their personnel 
could die’.^ ^^  The international community’s failure to act forcefully earlier towards the 
JNA attacks against Slovenia and Croatia, or at critical moments such as the sieges of 
Vukovar and Dubrovnik (in the course of the Croatian war), might have reinforced 
Milosevic’s opinion that international reaction would not be a significant obstacle to 
Serbia’s political goals and war aims.^^  ^Hence, his assumption that war would be short 
and easy.
' Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 254. 
Ibid., p. 255.
120 Ibid., pp. 252-3.
See Philip H. Gordon, ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, 
1997-1998, especially pp. 75-6.
Cited in Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, p. 207. The JNA also cherished such thoughts. See James Gow, 
Triumph o f the Lack o f  Will, p. 33.
Cigar, ‘Serb War Effort’, p. 207.
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Similarly, the EC did not foresee a lasting armed conflict. The president of the EC 
Council of Foreign Ministers, Hans van den Broek asked Lord Carrington, who took on 
the task of bringing peace to Yugoslavia in September 1991, to work towards a 
comprehensive peace settlement ‘within two months’. E v e n  when violence erupted, 
the EC does not appear to have considered military intervention. Instead, as a 
consequence of the misperception that attributed to all sides equal responsibility. 
Western European powers opted for an impartial standing. The stated aim of the 
Western response became reduction of the quantity of weapons entering the war zone. 
Accordingly, UN Security Council Resolution 713 (26 September 1991) imposed an 
arms embargo against all of former Yugoslavia. Although Bosnia was recognised as an 
independent state in April 1992, the embargo was not lifted against her, effectively 
undermining her right to self-defence. However, unintentionally, far from maintaining 
impartiality and non-intervention, the Western powers did in fact intervene decisively to 
entrench the massive military superiority of the Serbs. Although the embargo was 
applied to Serbia as well as its proxy forces in Bosnia, the Serbs were not affected by it 
since they enjoyed the stockpiles of the fourth largest army in Europe. In the long run, 
the effect of the embargo in Bosnia was to prolong rather than reduce the fighting. 
The West’s policy in Bosnia demonstrates that impartiality can be an illusion when 
aggressors and civilians are treated equally and an arms embargo is applied in the same 
manner to the weak and the strong. Impartiality proved a particular embarrassment for 
the Western powers in the case of the July 1995 massacre in Srebrenica -  declared a 
United Nations ‘safe area’ by UN Security Council Resolution 819 (16 April 1993) -
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 190.
Malcolm, ‘Bosnia and the West’, p. 7, Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, pp. 324, 326. S. P. Ramet, 
Balkan Babel, p. 245. Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 198.
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when the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did nothing to stop the 
murder of some 7,000-8,000 Muslim men and boys/^^
Srebrenica exposed also the flaws of the safe-areas policy, and the lack of international 
commitment to defend them. About 35,000 troops were required to protect the ‘safe 
areas’, but UN member countries contributed a mere 7,000. Moreover, protection of 
safe areas was a job for combat-capable, peace-enforcement operations while the UN 
troops on the ground were given only a peace keeping mandate -  a strategic 
incompatibility, in fact, since there was no peace to keep and civilians were increasingly 
the target of violence. Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, BihaC, Zepa and Gorazde were 
declared ‘safe’, but in practical terms, there was no possibility of rendering them safe 
because the United Nations was reluctant to abandon its position of impartiality. Having 
been established without the consent of the parties and without any credible military 
deterrent, the ‘safe areas’ were not safe in any military meaningful sense except for 
UNPROFOR troops.
Moreover, international aid agencies often found themselves unwittingly contributing to 
ethnic cleansing. In July 1992, for instance, aid workers of the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) escorted 7,000 Muslims cleansed from north 
western Bosnia to the Croatian city of Karlovac assured by the local Bosnian Serb 
authorities that these Muslims were leaving voluntarily.^^* Similarly, in March 1993 
workers of Médecins Sans Frontièrs and UNHCR assisted the evacuation of several
See Srebrenica Report, Report o f the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
53/35 (1999), http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf.
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 313. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 274-5. Kaldor, New and 
Old Wars, p. 65.
Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 246.
213
thousand of Muslims from the isolated enclave of Srebrenica ‘under the sardonic gaze 
of the Serbs, who could not have hoped for more’.^ ^^  Clearly, impartiality became 
morally problematic, as failure to take sides inescapably resembled complicity. Indeed, 
the failure to protect victims appeared as a kind of tacit intervention on the side of those 
who inflicted human rights infringements.
In addition to being morally problematic, impartiality was also a source of strategic 
incoherence. As long as the West adhered to the claim of impartiality a settlement of the 
conflict proved virtually impossible to achieve. The shifting of the configuration of 
forces on the ground to the detriment of the Serbs was made possible by a Croat- 
Muslim coalition, which was facilitated mainly by the United States. Although the 
strategic calculation for forging such a coalition is difficult to be disputed, the American 
green light for the Croat offensive to recapture Serb held territory has provoked 
controversy in light of ethnic cleansing of the Croatian Serbs that accompanied or 
followed the offensive, an act which contradicted the humanitarian objectives of the UN 
troops stationed in Croatia.*^® On the other hand, the facilitation of a belated defeat of 
the Serb military does not necessarily justify either Western passivity in the previous 
years or its inability to curb ethnic cleansing.
François Jean, ed., Life, Death and Aid, pp. 93, 94.
James Mayall, ‘The Concept o f Humanitarian Intervention Revisited’, in Mary Buckley and Sally N. 
Cummings, eds., Kosovo: Perceptions o f War and its Aftermath, London and New York: Continuum, 
2001, p. 267.
See discussion in Dana H. Allin, ‘NATO’s Balkan Interventions’, Adelphi Paper 347, Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, pp. 31-2 
and Richard K. Betts, ‘The Delusion o f Impartial Intervention’ in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds.. Turbulent Peace -  The Challenges o f  Managing International Conflict, 
Washington, D C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2001, pp. 287-8.
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The Western powers’ misunderstanding of the Bosnian conflict and their initial 
commitment to impartiality reflected a confusion about the classification of the conflict 
as civil war or international aggression. Problematising the Bosnian conflict as a civil 
war was to eschew intervention, whereas problematising it as international aggression 
would have mandated intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as a threat to 
regional peace and security. The Serb/Yugoslav government argued that fighting in 
Bosnia amounted to civil war while at the same time supporting the Serb war effort 
there both materially and politically. Until the last year of the conflict, the West 
acquiesced in such a judgement, consequently severely limiting its involvement.
Furthermore, the EC, and its successor the EU, committed another crucial mistake by 
resorting to an international peace process that sought dismemberment of Bosnia along 
ethnic lines. In the comprehension of the Western mediators, the way to deal with the 
conflict was to reach a compromise between community leaders, which in effect 
implied taking on board the very perception of the conflict that nationalists wished to 
propagate. Whereas paying lip service to the preservation of a multi-ethnic Bosnian 
society, the West was unprepared to back such claim, and adhered instead to the 
presumption that ethnic separation could lead to peace. Moreover, since partition 
invoked the ethnic homogenisation of territories, pursuing such path inevitably meant 
endorsing ethnic cleansing.
A number of partition plans were negotiated with the help of Western mediators: the 
Cutilheiro Plan (Spring 1992), the Vance-Owen Plan (January 1993), the Joint Action
See, for instance, David Campbell, National Destruction, p. 157 and Kaldor, New and Old Wars, pp. 
117-8.
See pp. 196-200 above.
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 58.
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Plan (put forward by the US, Russia, France, the UK and Spain in May 1993), the 
Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (summer 1993), the European Action Plan (end of 1993), the 
Contact Group Plan (initiated by France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S. in 
summer 1994), and finally the Dayton Agreement that, under US auspices, succeeded in 
ending the fighting in December 1995.^^^  What was not agreed upon initially was the 
ratio of the proposed division of Bosnia, though the principle itself was not disputed. 
While all plans sought partition of the country in three parts corresponding to the three 
ethnic communities, the Vance-Owen Plan had the distinction of suggesting the division 
of Bosnia into ten provinces: four v^th a Muslim majority, three "with a Serb majority, 
two with a Croat majority, whereas Sarajevo, the tenth province, was to retain power- 
sharing between all three groups.
The interpretations of the Vance-Owen plan vary, with some arguing that it sought to 
deny Serbs contiguous and ethnically pure territories, resist attempts to forcefully 
change borders and provide for a decentralised and demilitarised Bosnian state.^^  ^
However, the fact that the plan rewarded Croats not only Avith what they had previously 
wanted but also with some areas traditionally with a Muslim majority is said to have
For the partition plans see David Campbell, National Destruction, Chapter V; and Unfinished Peace: 
Report o f  the International Commission on the Balkans, with a fore ward by Leo T indemans, Washington 
D C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, pp. 42-54.
The Vance-Owen Plan is the name o f the peace plan designed by the EC Special Envoy, David Owen, 
and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Cyrus Vance, which was presented in January 1993 and 
negotiated through to May o f the same year, when the plan was eventually rejected by the Bosnian Serb 
parliament. This plan -  likewise the Dayton Agreement -  was, nevertheless, openly supported by 
M ilosevic despite the disagreement o f local Serb leaders. The latter, including Karadzic and Babic, did 
not disagree with the Serb president over his ultimate goal o f unifying all Serb-populated lands into a 
Greater Serbia. Rather, frictions arose over M ilosevic’s piecemeal strategy for creating a Greater Serbia 
which involved giving up some control or influence over Serb conquered lands temporarily possibly in 
order to gain more later. See Stan Markotich, ‘Serbian President Focuses on Creating a Greater Serbia’, 
esp. p. 16.
Gow, Triumph o f  the Lack o f  Will, pp. 241, 309. Srebrenica Report, paragraph 31. David Owen has 
provided his own account -  and defence -  o f the Vance-Owen Plan in his Balkan Odyssey, San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace, 1995, chapter 111.
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given Croats an incentive to ethnically cleanse Muslims in the latter areas, which they 
did in the course of the Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994.^^* In addition, the Serbs did 
not cease their ethnic cleansing of the Muslims; 5,000 Muslims from the town of Tuzla 
and another 4,000 from the town of Trebinje are reported to have been expelled by the 
Serbs following the announcement of the Vance Owen Plan/^^ The general problem 
with the partition plans was that the proposals for the division of territory created ‘new 
ethnic minorities’, at the same time stimulating ethnic cleansing as a strategy for their 
removal. Thus, though seeking to diminish violence, proposals for partition merely 
legitimated and encouraged the expulsion of ethnic minorities.
When the final plan was agreed upon at Dayton, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was almost 
complete; the plan itself coming close to what Milosevic and Tudjman had discussed in 
Karadjordjevo in March 1991.^ "^ ® While maintaining the territorial integrity of the 
country, the Dayton Agreement provided for the internal partition of Bosnia into 
statelets organised on the basis of ethnicity. Although succeeding in ending the war, 
Dayton embraced a policy failure of a sort given that the international community 
lacked the political will to act forcefully to punish aggression and curb ethnic 
cleansing.
Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, chapter 13, especially pp. 284-5, 297-8. Malcolm, ‘Bosnia and the 
West’, p. 8. Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 256. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, pp. 276-7.
This Serb offensive aimed at gaining control o f the road linking the Bosnian town o f Zvomik with 
Serbian-held areas around Sarajevo. David M. Kresock, “ Ethnic Cleansing’ in the Balkans: The Legal 
Foundations o f Foreign Intervention’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 27,1994, p. 230.
Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p. 61. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, p. 389.
In terms o f the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia would continue to exist within its internationally 
recognised borders, but it would consist o f two distinct entities: the Muslim-Croat Federation (51 percent 
o f the territory) and Republica Srpska (49 percent). Despite provisions for the return o f minorities, to- 
date, the slow rate o f returns coupled with an uncooperating stance o f Republika Srpska have effectively 
hampered the integration o f the country in one whole.
The failure o f the Western powers in Bosnia, however, was primarily political, not humanitarian. 
Hundred o f thousands o f lives were saved and millions o f people were fed by the UN peace keeping 
operations, with UNPROFOR’s annual budget spiralling above $1 billion in 1994 alone. See Christopher 
Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse -  Causes. Course and consequences, London: Hurst, 1995, p. 4; 
and James Mayall, ‘The Concept o f Humanitarian Intervention Revisited’, p. 272.
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Whereas partition along ethnic lines was not a Western creation, it is sadly ironic that 
the Western powers embraced and enacted a strategy of conflict resolution that 
eventually aligned the West with the political reasoning of the Serb, and to a less extent 
Croat, leadership that favoured the dismemberment of the country/"*  ^While denouncing 
expulsion of ethno-national minorities as a practice the Western powers backed its 
outcomes, negotiating a peace that rewarded ethnic cleansing and ratified its results. 
Furthermore, the negotiation of the terms of peace with war criminals, who bore 
responsibility for ethnic cleansing, raised the profile of such individuals and 
undermined the pursuit of justice. In many ways, the current problems regarding the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement are a stark reminder of the old dictum that the 
way wars end determines the kind of the ensuing peace.
V. 6 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: What is the Difference ?
The previous section considered the international dimension of the politics of ethnic 
cleansing in the first half of the 1990s with particular focus on Bosnia. It suggested that 
disagreement in governmental policies over responses to the Yugoslav crisis counted for 
the Western powers initial low-key attitude. Warfare and ethnic cleansing gradually 
attracted the attention of the great powers but their humanitarian response to a political 
and military problem was by and large insufficient. The present section extends the 
international level of analysis to the case of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in late 1990s. 
The occurrence of ethnic cleansing can be seen as failure of prevention, but nowhere 
was this lesson more obvious than in Kosovo as the international community failed to 
address persistent human rights abuses in the province throughout the 1990s.
See Campbell, National Destruction^ pp. 160-1.
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Unlike the case of Bosnia or Croatia, which had not experienced ethnic cleansing since 
the Second World War, in Kosovo, the case can be made that low-scale ethnic cleansing 
was going on throughout the 1990s. In effect, as the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo has asserted ‘from the 1980s onward, Kosovo exhibited all the 
signs of a catastrophe waiting to happen’. S i n c e  the early 1990s, ‘Serbianisation’ of 
Kosovar institutions was speeded up by means of replacing Albanian with Serb workers 
in civil services, radio and TV, newspapers and magazines, schools and hospitals, 
raising the rate of unemployment among the Albanians to record levels. Education in 
the Serbian language became mandatory, cities and villages and their streets were given 
Serb names. Many Albanians were evicted from their homes and apartments and a vast 
portion of the Albanian population had to depend for food supplies on international aid 
organisations. Inevitably, the trend among Kosovar Albanians was to leave the
145province.
Faced with Serb oppression, the Albanians embraced a policy of peaceful resistance 
hoping to receive support from the international community, which in turn failed to 
respond in a satisfactory way to the evidence of their ‘good behaviour’. The relatively 
low level of violence in Kosovo during the first half of the 1990s -  at least by 
comparison vsdth Bosnia and Croatia -  induced the international community to push the 
Kosovo issue further to the back of their policy agenda. The decision to exclude Kosovo 
from Dayton negotiations, at a time when Republika Srpska -  a creation of ethnic 
cleansing -  was recognised as a separate entity within Bosnia led many Albanians to
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, 
Lessons Learned, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 62.
See Elez Biberaj, ‘Kosova: The Balkan Poweder Keg’, London: Research Institute for the Study o f  
Conflict and Terrorism, Conflict Studies 258, 1993, pp. 5-9. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo -  A Short History, 
London: Papermac, 1998, pp. 349-352. Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Human Wrongs in Kosovo: 1974-99’, The 
International Journal o f  Human Rights, Vol. 4, Nos. 3/4, 2000, pp. 105-126.
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believe that violence was the only way to attract international attention. Moreover, the 
international recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1996 without any 
substantive provision for the protection of minority rights or any precondition for the 
restoration of the autonomy of Kosovo reinforced the Kosovar Albanians’ perception of 
violence as an attractive alternative.
The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1997 marked a shift in the 
Kosovar Albanians resistance policy towards the Serbian rule, the new movement being 
determined to fight against the subjugation of the Albanians.Although ostensibly a 
reaction to the KLA, the Serbian action in Kosovo was intended to use the pretext of the 
insurgency to carry out ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians with the view to securing 
long-term control of the province.*"^ * The rising level of violence in early 1998 belatedly 
directed Western attention to the situation in the region. However, the U.S. Special 
Representative for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, Robert S. Gelbard, 
who visited Belgrade on February 23, 1998, reflected a position favourable to the Serb 
stance and branded the KLA ‘a terrorist group’. T h e  implication of such a depiction 
was that it induced Serb officials to believe that they could act ruthlessly in Kosovo 
without encountering Western interference. Indeed, Belgrade resorted to
Roland Dannreuther, ‘War in Kosovo: History, Development and Aftermath’, in Buckley and 
Cummings, eds., Kosovo, p. 18. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, pp. 1, 56.
On the emergence o f the KLA see Chris Hedges, ‘Kosovo’s Next Masters?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, 
No. 3, 1999. Tim Judah, ‘A history o f the Kosovo Liberation Army’, in William Joseph Buckley, ed., 
Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000, 
pp. 108-115. ‘The Kosovo Liberation Army: A Struggle for Power’, Strategic Comments, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
May 1999, pp. 1-2.
See Gow, The Serbian Project, Chapter 8.
See ‘Robert S. Gelbard, Special Representative o f  the President and Secretary o f State for 
Implementation o f Dayton Agreement Address at the U.S. Institute o f Peace, Washington, DC, February 
25 ,1998’, at http://www.state.gov/www/policv remarks/1998/980225 gelbard uspeace.html.
When General Wesley Clark visited Milosevic in October 1998, the Yugoslav leader tried to convince 
him that Belgrade was able to solve the crisis by itself: ‘... he said you know General Clark ... we know 
how to handle problems with these Albanian killers. 1 said, well how do you do that? He said, we have 
done this before, 1 said when, he said Drenica 1946.1 said how did you handle it? He said we kill them,
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unproportional measures to deal with the KLA sponsoring massacres that outraged the 
international community. ^  ^  ^
Some analysts question whether Milosevic intended to desist from his offensive in 
Kosovo even while the peace talks were convened in France in February and March 
1999 with the view to end the violence in the province. They argue that the Serb leader 
was instead using the negotiations to buy time in order to prepare for the next round of 
Serb military attack on Kosovar Albanians. While tens of thousands of refugees were 
displaced from their homes, Serb forces in Kosovo were augmented at high speed 
increasing from about 22,000 in November 1998 to more than 50,000 by March 20, 
1999. They were drawn primarily from the VJ armed forces as well as from the units of 
the Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministarstvo Unutra§njih Poslova -  MUP). The 
former were involved in border areas and provided artillery and gunship support to 
MUP units that operated in the interior of Kosovo carrying attacks against the KLA and 
perpetrating ethnic cleansing of the Albanians. In addition, the VJ and MUP forces were 
complemented by paramilitary units which were intended for close quarter killing 
missions. During the NATO’s air campaign all Serb forces operated as one integrated 
force with a single integrated command, under general Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander 
of the 3^  ^Army (and later to be Chief of Staff of the VJ).^^^
all o f them. He said it took several years but we kill them all’. Cited in Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee, 
Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, Aldershot; Ashgate, 2001, p. 63.
Two notorious massacres include the murder of 58 members o f Adem Jashari’s family, a well known 
KLA leader, on March 5, 1998 in Prekaz and the massacre o f 45 Kosovar Albanians in the village o f  
Raçak on January 15, 1999, the latter being broadcasted to the world by the OSCE head o f  mission, 
William Walker.
See among others, Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, Vol. 
75, No. 2, 1999, p. 236. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, p. 152. Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
Saving Strangers -  Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 283. Refer also to Chapter III, pp. 122-123.
Gow, The Serbian Project, pp. 202, 209-210, 277. Lawrence Freedman, ‘Victims and Victors: 
Reflections on the Kosovo War’, Review o f  International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3,2000, pp. 351-2.
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In disregard of these facts, some observers argue that the responsibility for ethnic 
cleansing of the Albanians in Kosovo rests vydth Such an accusation relies on
the assumption that had NATO not intervened, the Serbs would have ended their 
killings and forced expulsion of the Albanians. The problem with such reasoning, 
however, is that it ignores the record of the Milosevic’s regime. Four hundred 
thousands Kosovar Albanians had been displaced from their homes while some 500 had 
been killed in the year leading up to NATO’s action a l o n e .G i v e n  the Serb 
augmentation of heavy weaponry and military personnel in the province it is not 
unreasonable to surmise that in the absence of NATO bombing many more Albanians 
would have been killed and permanently ethnically cleansed. Indeed, many analysts 
recognise that the commencement of the bombing on 24 March 1999 was simply chosen 
by Belgrade as a trigger to accelerate the expulsion of the Albanians and that the 
responsibility for ethnic cleansing lies with Milosevic’s regime.
The Alliance’s war against Serbia was premised on the presumption that due to the 
systematic abuse of human rights of Kosovar Albanians the Serb authorities had 
forfeited the right to political and territorial control over Kosovo and the right to be the 
representative of that very population. After the Bosnian war, it was clear that to end 
Serb oppression of the Kosovar Albanians, to terminate this conflict and protect the 
victims, it was necessary for the West to take sides. Standing passively in the face of
See, for instance, Michael Mandelbaum, ‘A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia’, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, 1999, pp. 2-8. Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, ‘For the 
Record’, The National Interest, No. 57, Fall 1999, pp. 9-15. Refer also to Chapter III, pp. 124-126. 
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 269. See also Chapter III, pp. 124-126.
Freedman, ‘Victims and Victors’, p. 352. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, p. 3. 
Michael Walzer, ‘Kosovo’ in Buckley ed., p. 333. James B. Steinberg, ‘A Perfect Polemic: Blind to 
Reality on Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6, 1999, pp. 128-133. Ivo H. Daalder, ‘NATO and 
Kosovo’, The National Interest, No. 58, Winter 1999/2000, p. 114.
Marc Weller, ‘Armed Samaritans’, Counsel, August 1999, pp. 20-2. Dannreuther, ‘War in Kosovo’, in 
Buckley and Cummings, eds., Kosovo, p. 13.
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Belgrade’s scorched-earth campaign of ethnic cleansing was no longer tenable/^^ 
Hence, NATO was finally prepared to will the means -  commit whatever level of air 
power -  to halt Serb repression of the Albanians.
NATO’s action to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was motivated by a combination 
of various factors among them the desire to avert an impeding humanitarian catastrophe, 
secure regional peace and stability, punish the Serb authorities for their behaviour in 
Kosovo, and elevate Western values and n o rm s .O th e r  considerations such as the 
credibility of the Alliance searching for a new role in the post Cold War era and the 
prospect of large numbers of refugees on a permanent basis in the European countries 
influenced the Western policy agenda as well.^^° Although NATO’s action in Kosovo 
was not solely humanitarian in character, the concern for the protection of human rights 
and the reversal of ethnic cleansing figured prominently in the rationale for intervention.
NATO’s Operation Allied Force started as a low scale bombing campaign -  in terms of 
target numbers and force size -  that was intended to be of a short duration, but which 
escalated into a more aggressive air campaign that went on for 78 days. Although 
NATO’s air strikes were unable to halt Serb ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians
Dana Allin, ‘NATO’s Balkan Interventions’, p. 52.
Both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and American President Bill Clinton justified NATO action 
over Kosovo in terms o f defending the values o f liberty, the rule o f law, human rights and open society as 
well as lessons learned in Bosnia. As President Clinton put it: ‘[Ijn the Balkans, inaction in the face o f  
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behind NATO’s intervention in Kosovo see Independent International Commission on Kosovo, pp. 159- 
160, 172, 185; and Adam Roberts, ‘NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo’, Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3, 
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before it had been virtually completed, they did succeed in reversing it. Barely a month 
after the cease fire only about 50,000 displaced Albanians were awaiting repatriation, 
whereas more than a million of them had already returned home.^^* Conducting the 
most precise air war in history, NATO emerged from the conflict with zero casualties 
while at the same time as far as possible minimised the human suffering of their 
opponents.Nonetheless, the Alliance’s operation had its limitations.
Despite its accomplishments, NATO’s air war suffered from a flawed strategy. In 
particular, the way Operation Allied Force commenced violated two of the most 
enduring axioms of military practice: the importance of achieving surprise and the 
criticality of keeping the enemy unclear as to one’s intentions.Indeed, the ruling out 
of a ground threat from the very beginning and the incremental escalation of the air 
strikes provided the Serbs with the time and conditions they needed to accelerate ethnic 
cleansing. In addition, critics charge that the air campaign was initiated on the 
assumption that the bombing would not last more than a few rounds. This suggests that 
a false conclusion had been drawn from Bosnia in so far as the Alliance underestimated 
how far the bombing would lead to an intensification of the barbarities against Kosovar 
Albanians although it had received warning beforehand by the Director of the CIA -  
George Tenet.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War fo r  Kosovo -  A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Santa 
Monica: Rand, 2001, p. 226.
See Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, especially pp. 2,
4.
Lambeth, NATO’s Air War fo r  Kosovo, p. xxii.
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 268. Roberts, ‘NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo’, p. 109. 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, pp. 4, 86,289.
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NATO’s action in Kosovo was impeded by a questionable reading of the history of the 
Bosnian war including a lack of appreciation of the differences between Bosnia and 
Kosovo. NATO’s over confidence that air power alone would force Milosevic to yield 
on Kosovo reflected a wrong analogy between Operation Deliberate Force conducted in 
Bosnia prior to the Dayton negotiations and Operation Allied Force designed for 
Kosovo. It is generally acknowledged that the former was rather a limited operation that 
sought to end the siege of Sarajevo unlike the latter which had more ambitious aims 
including, bringing Milosevic back to the negotiating table, reversing ethnic cleansing 
and restoring the rights of the Albanians. In addition. Operation Deliberate Force was 
combined with a ground effort by Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia and a successful 
offensive (in military terms) by Croatian forces in Krajina, while some 10,000 NATO 
troops had been deployed in Bosnia prior to the onset of bombing. In the case of 
Kosovo, on the other hand, the KLA, despite the strength gained by the end of 
Operation Allied Force, remained a small, not well armed and organised army that was 
no match for the Serb troops. Moreover, the West seems to have underestimated the 
fact that Kosovo was crucial to Milosevic’s political survival. He had built his career 
since 1987 on a Kosovo agenda claiming to be the protector of the Serbs in their contest 
with the Albanians and it should have been anticipated, therefore, that Milosevic’s 
behaviour in Kosovo would be more recalcitrant than in Bosnia. Although not fatal, 
these miscalculations impaired the efficiency of NATO’s action and may explain the 
opportunity costs that the Alliance incurred due to the anaemic start of Operation Allied
Lambeth, NATO’s Air War fo r  Kosovo, pp. 182-4. Leurdijk and Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to 
Crisis, pp. 61-2. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate’, 
International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, pp. 29-30. Jon C. Pevehouse, Joshua S. Goldstein, ‘Serbian 
Compliance or Defiance in Kosovo? Statistical Analysis and Real-Time Predictions’, Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1999, p. 539.
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Force without an accompanying ground threat; the prolongation of the campaign; and 
the acceleration of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb troops.
In addition, NATO’s reluctance to accept the risk of casualties has raised some 
controversial moral questions. NATO’s decision to fly its aeroplanes at high altitudes of 
15,000 feet and its refusal (at least initially) to deploy ground troops may have 
conveyed a moral message that assumed an asymmetrical valuing of human life: the 
lives of NATO personnel were considered of a greater value than the lives of Kosovar 
Albanians that the Alliance was protecting or the lives of other civilians in Kosovo and 
Serbia. However, the logistical difficulties in mounting a major ground operation should 
not be overlooked. Given that the Greek government declined to make available the port 
of Thessaloniki whereas Albania and Macedonia had unsuitable terrain and poor 
infi'astructures which the speedy build-up of Serb forces in Kosovo did not allow time 
to reconstruct, the air campaign was the most attractive option. Although it was a 
tactical mistake to openly exclude the option of ground troops beforehand, exposing the 
weakness of the Alliance and thus playing in the hands of its opponents, a ground war 
would have meant more casualties on all sides of the conflict.
Similarly, the charge of selectivity -  intervening in Kosovo but not in other instances of 
massive human rights abuses -  does not necessarily undermine NATO’s intervention in 
the province. Whilst a particularistic achievement is no match for a universalistic one, it 
is undoubtedly better than no achievement at all. The inability to reverse ethnic 
cleansing everywhere does not justify inaction in situations where action can be 
mobilised to reverse mass expulsion of a victimised people. As Christopher Coker 
asserts, NATO went to war on Serbia ‘in defence of the ‘moral minimum’: the fact that
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ethnie cleansing could no longer be countenanced in the European state system’ Of 
course, our world would be a better one if ethnic cleansing is rejected everywhere, 
however, in the absence of that, this ‘moral minimum’ is by itself a significant 
achievement.
Kosovo has also exposed the gaps in international law regarding the legality of 
intervention, laying bare the stand off between incompatible principles: those 
safeguarding the territorial integrity of states and prohibiting the non-defensive use of 
force on the one hand, and those seeking to protect the human rights of vulnerable 
populations within these states, on the other. In particular, the veto system of the UN 
Security Council’s members has stirred controversy about the legality of Operation 
Allied Force since Russia’s and China’s reluctance to sanction NATO’s action made the 
UN authorisation of it impossible.*^* In such circumstances, the Alliance justified the 
use of force in terms of the existing Security Council Resolutions (1160, 1199 and 
1203) passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in which the Security Council had 
determined that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo threatened regional peace 
and security, and had demanded that Serb forces stop the unfolding humanitarian 
tragedy. The defeat (by 12 votes to 3) of a Russian draft resolution condemning
Coker, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity’, p. 77.
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, pp. 172, 290. See also Jürgen Habermas, 
‘Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Law and Morality’, in Buckley ed. Kosovo', and 
Catherine Guicherd, ‘International Law and the War in Kosovo’, Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2,1999.
The opponents o f NATO’s intervention over Kosovo take the view that NATO’s air campaign was 
illegal since it had no explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council to act against a sovereign state. 
See, for instance, Christine M. Chinkin, ‘Kosovo: A ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ War?’, American Journal o f  
International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999; and Jonathan I. Chamey, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian 
Intervention in Kosovo’, American Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999. Both articles are 
also available at httD://www.asil.org/aiil/kosovo.htm. Surely, the authorisation by the UN Security 
Council is the best way to provide a legal basis for the use o f force for humanitarian purposes, but when 
such authorisation cannot be obtained should massive human rights violations be tolerated for the sake o f  
the veto o f one or two members o f the UN Security Council, or for the sake o f respecting the sovereignty 
of a state which oppresses persistently some o f its own peoples? Refer to Chapter VII, pp. 268-271.
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NATO’s action, tabled in Security Council two days in the bombing, added validity to 
the Alliance’s intervention/^^ Some international lawyers have interpreted the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 that finalised the cessation of hostilities as a tacit 
acceptance that NATO’s action was not unlawful in the specific circumstances. 
Although the Security Council did not endorse NATO’s intervention in advance, by 
rejecting a resolution condemning it the UNSC eventually engaged in a form of 
‘retroactive validation’ of NATO’s action.
Even if NATO’s intervention may be considered illegal given that it contravened the 
UN Charter’s prohibition on the unauthorised use of force, the Alliance’s operation was 
still legit imate.The reason for this lies with the fact that diplomacy failed to mitigate 
a conflict that threatened to destabilise the Balkan region giving way to the option of 
either doing nothing or mounting a military intervention under NATO’s auspices. 
Although Operation Allied Force produced a temporary and severe worsening of the 
conditions of life for the Kosovar Albanians, the intervention made possible the reversal 
of ethnic cleansing in addition to dismantling the oppressive Serb police and 
paramilitary structures and liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long 
period of harsh repression. In this sense, NATO’s action reflected the spirit of the UN 
Charter in so far as it related to the protection of vulnerable people subjected to gross 
abuse. The legitimacy of NATO’s intervention, likewise its proportionality, should be
See Wheeler, Saving Strangers^ pp. 275-281.
See, for instance, Thomas M. Franck, ‘Legal Interpretation and Change in the Law o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention’, in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds.. Humanitarian Intervention -  Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 225. See also Louis Henkin, 
‘Kosovo and the Law o f ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, American Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 93, 
No. 4,1999.
This was the view o f Independent International Commission on Kosovo, p. 4. See also U.K. Select 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report, ‘Did NATO misjudge M ilosevic’s likely response in 
Kosovo to the bombing campaign?’, http://www.parliament.the-stationerv- 
ofFice.co.uk/pa/cmI99900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2811 .htm.
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viewed from the prism of what is likely to have happened had NATO’s operation not 
taken place. Had NATO not intervened, Kosovo would have remained under Serb 
oppression and ethnic cleansing would have been permanent with flows of refugees 
destabilising already poor and unstable neighbouring countries.Although NATO’s 
failure to prevent the Serb exodus at the end of the bombing campaign certainly detracts 
from the humanitarian outcome of the intervention, it does not invalidate its 
achievements. After all, NATO did remedy a gross injustice at the expense of a smaller 
one.
V. 7 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the politics of ethnic cleansing in the official disagreements over 
the nature of the organisation of the new states -  namely, Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia -  
that emerged from the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. The contest evolved over 
the following issues:
State borders -  would administrative boundaries of the old federation gain 
international status or would new borders be drawn by means of force?
- Distribution of strategic and economic resources -  a process, which was 
conceived by parties in zero-sum terms.
- The kind of state governance -  was the state to belong to the majority nation to 
the detriment of ethno-national minorities or otherwise?
- Minority rights and their protection -  where minorities to be inclusively 
accommodated or excluded from the new states?
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, pp. 163, 169, 186, 289. James B. Steinberg, ‘A 
Perfect Polemic’, pp. 129, 133.
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Ethnie cleansing was premised on the ethnic definition of territory. Its architects and 
perpetrators sought to secure possession of the state by the majority nation, as well as, 
distribution of resources, and granting of rights and protections, exclusively to the 
members of the said nation.
Embraced as a strategy of nation-state building, primarily by the Serbian government in 
Belgrade, and to a lesser extent by its Croatian counterpart, ethnic cleansing was 
ostensibly justified by a variety of arguments including ‘historical rights’ and protection 
of one’s own kin. It was ironical, nevertheless, that a legitimate issue such as that of the 
treatment of Serbian minorities was undermined by their very own government which 
while claiming protection of its own kin resorted to a criminal official strategy that 
degraded, humiliated and excluded other ethnic minorities.
The Western powers reaction to ethnic cleansing has been inconsistent, overlooking the 
expulsion of the Croats by the Serbs in Croatia in 1991 and then condoning ethnic 
cleansing of the Serbs by Croats in 1995, whereas their response to ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia and Kosovo vacillated from passive action to active response but damage 
limitation on the side of intervenors remained throughout the order of the day. In 
particular, the Western reaction to the Bosnian conflict was confused and painfully 
slow; their humanitarian response to a political and military conflict being by and large 
inadequate. Deploying a peacekeeping force where there was no peace to keep, 
announcing ‘safe areas’ while the necessary troops and resources for their protection 
were not provided, declaring impartiality in face of humanitarian and human rights 
abuses against civilians, imposing an arms embargo that enhanced the military
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superiority of the aggressors, and negotiating with nationalist leaders who planned and 
enacted the expulsion of minorities were inappropriate responses to ethnic cleansing.
The occurrence of ethnic cleansing can be seen as failure of prevention but nowhere was 
this lesson more obvious than in Kosovo since the international community failed to 
address human rights abuses in the province throughout the 1990s. Prevention having 
failed, however, the Western reaction to ethnic cleansing in the province was 
qualitatively different from that in Bosnia, as the Atlantic Alliance willed the means -  
high level of air power -  to halt the exclusion of the Albanians. Although suffering from 
a flawed strategy (over-reliance on air power whereas ground troops, at least initially, 
were ruled out) and hampered by legal contradictions (such as the impasse in the UN 
Security Council regarding the sanctioning of the intervention), NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo was the first instance ever when military force was used to reverse ethnic 
cleansing of a population that had been for long oppressed by its own government. 
Despite its controversy, the Western intervention was an important factor in frustrating 
the hopes of the aggressors for the implementation of an exclusivist nation-state model. 
The security and stability of the region in the long run, however, remain, in part, a 
function of the Western powers’ long-term commitment in order to facilitate 
reconstruction of societies and states in ways that will ensure against the recurrence of 
ethnic cleansing.
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VI. E thnic C lean s in g  an d  th e  P rov is ion  of In/Security
Security, o f course, saturates the language o f  modern politics. Our political vocabularies reek o f  
it and our political imagination is confined by it. The hypocrisy o f  our rulers ... consistently 
hides behind it. '
VI. 1 Introduction
Implicit in the analysis of the previous chapter, as well as of chapter III, has been the 
assumption that ethnic cleansing was rationalised by the respective governments and 
their higher military echelons on the grounds of security. The belief that the more 
homogenous a state the more secure it is, and that homogeneity must be secured at all 
costs, justified ethnic cleansing as a means of providing desired security.
Security, of course, has been traditionally one of the principal issues of politics and an 
essential interest of every state. Especially in the modem era, security has become the 
central dynamic in governmental rationality to the extent that it is said that we live in “ a 
society of security’, in which practices of national security ... structure intensive and 
extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of 
inside/outside, normal/pathological, civilised/barbaric...’.^  As the citation at the 
opening of this chapter suggests, security has come to permeate the language and 
practice of modem politics. Indeed, modem understanding of politics is generally 
reliant, foundationally, upon security.^ In other words, politics and security are 
intrinsically linked. There can be no understanding of politics disentangled from 
security, and security can not be conceived dissociated from politics.
' Michael Dillon, Politics o f  Security -  Towards a political philosophy o f  continental thought, London 
and New York: Routledge, 1996, p. 12.
 ^ David Campbell, Writing Security -  United States foreign policy and the politics o f identity, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 255.
 ^See Dillon, Politics o f Security, p. 10.
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It is this intrinsic connection between security and politics that in the context of this 
thesis necessitates a separate chapter on security with the aim of making explicit some 
implicit assumptions inherent in the previous chapters 111 and V. The inherent 
assumptions, it may be recalled, were that concerns for state security were used by the 
respective governments to justify the suspension of civil liberties, the forceful 
redrawing of borders, the expulsion of targeted minorities, and the waging of war. In 
addition, concerns for national security worked to silence domestic opposition (lest an 
opposing person be branded an enemy of the nation) and enabled power holders to 
exploit the ‘threat’ of ethno-national minorities for domestic purposes and claim a right 
to handle such a threat with less democratic control and constraint."^
This chapter problematises such a conception of security. It contends that the issue is 
not that state security is not important, but that the means employed to secure national 
security -  ethnic cleansing -  were deeply flawed. The importance of security, however, 
should not suggest that state security is either an absolute value or an end in itself. 
Rather, state security should be seen as a means to an end, the end being security of 
peoples. In terms of the thesis’ question, this chapter addresses more directly the sub­
question whether ethnic cleansing occurred because of concerns for state security. It 
argues that although the expulsion of assorted minorities was justified in terms of the 
provision of state security, its unfortunate consequence was insecurity of states and 
peoples -  including the very state and nation on whose interest ethnic cleansing was 
carried out.
Refer to securitisation, Chapter IV, pp. 160-161.
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The argument of this chapter evolves as follows: the next section considers the meaning 
of security in the context. Section VI.3 reflects on the utilisation of ethnic cleansing as 
a state building strategy on the grounds of national security. Pointing out some 
disparities between state’s security and people’s security in political and legal practice, 
section VI.4 argues that unless state security provides for the security of peoples it 
becomes counterproductive and it undermines the very entity -  the state (and, 
conventionally, the nation) -  which it seeks to protect.
VI.2 The Meaning of Security in the Context
As students of security are well aware, a general, all-encompassing, definition of 
security is not possible to provide because the concept has many dimensions and it can 
be applied simultaneously to various analytical levels. Hence, the purpose of this 
section is to identify some qualifications of the concept of security that may facilitate 
the understanding of security policy in relation to ethnic cleansing. An intuitive 
meaning of security centres around the absence of threats, fears, and anxieties, the latter 
implying a sense of insecurity. Security and insecurity are inter-linked; the need for 
security being conditioned by the presence of insecurity. Indeed, in the absence of 
insecurity one would be out of the business of security, since security in such a case 
would be guaranteed. Security, thus, is a relative value which is a function of the degree 
of threats -  the more threats faced the less security and vice-versa.^
 ^Not all scholars, however, conceive security as a relative value. Barry Buzan, for instance, argues that 
the word security ‘implies an absolute condition -  something is either secure or insecure -  and does not 
lend itself to the idea o f a graded spectrum..,’. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for  
International Security in Post-Cold War Era, 2"** edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
1991, p. 18. For a sympathetic view o f  security as a matter o f degree see Ole Waever, ‘Societal Security: 
The Concept’ in Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration 
and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London: Pinter, 1993, p. 23; and David A. Baldwin, ‘The 
Concept o f Security’, Review o f  International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-26,
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In International Relations literature an often referred to conception of security is that of 
Arnold Wolfers who conceives security as the absence of threats to acquired values.^ 
Buzan et al have also emphasised security-threat connection depicting security as 
‘survival in the face of existential threats’, where existential threats refer to those that 
threaten a collectivity’s identity, state’s sovereignty, excessive environmental 
degradation, etc., and which are accompanied, in turn, by calls for emergency responses, 
including the employment of coercive means.^
Security can be understood in an objective or subjective sense. Security, in an objective 
sense, refers to the absence of threats to acquired values; in a subjective sense, the 
absence of fear that such values will be attacked.* Both the objective and subjective 
sense of security imply that perception is an important factor in the actor’s conclusion 
about the presence or absence of a threat. Hence, sometimes actors may overestimate 
their threats whereas in other times they may underestimate them perceiving themselves 
secure when in fact they are not.
Crucial qualifications of security have to do with some aptly pointed questions by David 
Baldwin: Security for whom? Security for which values? From what threats? By what 
means? At what cost? In what time period?^ Depending on the research problem at hand 
these questions may generate varying answers. ‘Security for whom?’ can have as an 
answer ‘the world’, ‘a continent’, ‘a region’, ‘a state’, ‘a nation’, ‘an ethnic
 ^ Arnold Wolfers, “ National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
LXVII, No. 4 ,1952, p. 484.
 ^Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security -  A New Framework fo r  Analysis, Boulder and 
London, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 24, 27. Barry Buzan, ‘Change and Security Reconsidered’ in Stuart 
Croft and Terry Terriff eds.. Critical Reflections on Security and Change, London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 
2 .
* Wolfers, “ National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol’, p. 485.
® Baldwin, ‘The Concept o f Security’.
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community’, ‘an individual’, ‘humankind’. Values to be protected can be many: 
territorial integrity or independence of the state (traditionally included in the concept of 
national security), multiculturalism, welfare, etc. Threats to be averted can be multiple 
varying from aggression to recession, from ballistic missiles to a secessionist movement 
of an ethnic group. Means by which security may be attained can also be variable 
differing from peaceful to coercive. Costs can be low to high and the time range may be 
short to long term. In a word, questions that can be raised in relation to security are 
many and the possibility of answers multiple. Hence, the impossibility of providing an 
all-encompassing definition of security.
Traditionally, however, security has been defined in terms of security of the state(s), and 
this remains a principal usage of the term to date. In this conception, security is 
understood in terms of threats to state sovereignty and territory that suggest protection 
through coercive power and deterrence of external military threats. Hence, the concept 
of security is closely related to the concept of ‘emergency’ and ‘the exceptional’. The 
context in which states strive for security is usually considered to be an anarchical, self- 
help one which determines the behaviour and attitudes of the units (states) irrespective 
of changes which may occur inside them.^ ® Moreover, priorities and needs of states at 
national (domestic) level are usually perceived to be a function of the needs of states to 
survive and increase their power in the anarchical international state system. In this 
context, ethnic cleansing and its by-product -  refugees -  are conceived as an inevitable 
consequence, but not necessarily a cause, of conflict and insecurity. This line of
See Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
2000, pp. 5,10.
’ ' See, for instance, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace, 
New York: Knopf, 1948.
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reasoning in security thinking, that has been associated with the intellectual hegemony 
of neo/realism, prevailed throughout the Cold War era.
Form the 1980s onwards, nonetheless, there has emerged a non-traditional usage of the 
term ‘security’ which includes non-military aspects such as human (people), economic 
and environmental ones/^ This has been called the ‘broadening’ of the 
conceptualisation of security/^ Simultaneously, there has been a deepening of the 
conceptualisation of security, a process which Ken Booth describes as ‘investigating the 
implications and possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives 
from different understandings of what politics is and can be all about’.Consequently, 
the field of security studies has been complemented by considerations of security of 
individuals and groups rather than focusing simply on the traditional conception of 
security as military defence of state interests and territory.
The reappraisal of security has generated, therefore, a wide range of referents (i.e., what 
is to be secured); some being more traditional (e.g., ‘the state’, ‘international’, 
‘regional’) and others more new (e.g., ‘societal’ (referring to people conceived as 
individuals and groups), ‘the environment’, ‘economic’, or even ‘food’, ‘health’, and 
‘culture’) .T h e  broadening and deepening of security studies, however, is still in a
See, for instance, Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International 
Relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983. Joseph S, Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘International 
Security Studies’, International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1988. Richard Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1989. Thomas Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and 
Violent ConüïcV, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1994.
Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1991, pp. 
317-318. Ole Waever, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed.. On Security, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 47. Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical 
Theory, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp. 106-7.
Ken Booth, ‘Security and Self: Reflections o f a Fallen Realist’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. 
Williams, eds.. Critical Security Studies: Cases and Concepts, London: UCL Press, 1997, p. 111.
The latter five referents were suggested in the United Nations Development Programme report o f 1994 
(in addition to ‘personal’, ‘community’, and ‘political’ security) to supplement a vague concept o f
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State of flux, and important definitional and empirical questions remain either 
unanswered or unsatisfactory answered/^
Despite the debate about what/who should be the focus of security, crucial to any 
analysis of security are two referents: states and peoples. The analyses of security in 
connection with other referents can serve either of these two key referents or both of 
them. In normal circumstances, nevertheless, when the state provides (or strives) for 
security of its people -  the nation and minorities alike -  the dichotomy between state 
security and people’s security is not a salient one. In such cases, by and large, state 
security and its people’s security coincide. The dichotomy becomes real, however, when 
the state fails to provide for security of all its peoples. People who are made insecure by 
deliberate state policies can not conceive their security to coincide with that of their 
state. It is this nexus between security of the people on the one hand, and security of the 
state on the other, that in the framework of this chapter provides the central focal point 
of the analysis of security policy vis-à-vis ethnic cleansing.
VI.3 State Building, Ethnic Cleansing and Security as a Legitimating Mechanism
The concept of security has been intimately linked to the process of nation-state 
building. The latter is by definition a highly political enterprise having to do with re­
distribution of power in a given society in order to empower the nation and disempower
‘human security’ referring to (1) ‘safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression’ and 
(2) ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns o f  daily life -  whether in homes, jobs or 
in communities’. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994, New  
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 23.
For instance, although quite effective as a campaign slogan and also as a label for non-military aspects 
o f security, existing definitions o f human security tend to be extraordinary expansive raising reasonable 
questions whether the concept can serve as a useful practical guide for academic research and/or policy 
making. See Roland Paris, ‘Human Security -  Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’, International Security, Vol. 
26, No. 2, 2001, pp. 87-102. Astri Suhrke, ‘Human security and the protection o f refugees’, in Edward 
Newman and Joanne van Seim eds.. Refugees and Forced Displacement -  International Security, Human 
Vulnerability, and the State, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003.
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minority groups/^ As such nation-state building is inherently an exclusive enterprise. At 
the centre of the process stands the national government, whose elite’s world views and 
belief systems may serve to rationalise various strategies of homogenisation ranging 
from assimilation to the extreme case of ethnic cleansing, or even genocide.
As Chapter III demonstrated, the national elites’ perception of ethnic minorities as a 
threat to state security has been a rather persistent feature in the 20^ century Balkan 
history. The presence of minorities made it more difficult for statesmen to construct 
polities that emulated a nation-state model based on the congruence between the state 
and the nation. From the Balkan Wars, to the Greko-Turkish war, the two World Wars 
and the wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia the recurrent theme has been that of 
the homogenisation of peoples as a security creation mechanism. The underlying 
assumption was the more homogenous the people the more secure the state.
State formation in the Balkans emulated the logic of the nation-state, which had 
previously served as a concomitant rationalisation of the state building process in the 
West. As Charles Tilly has pointed out, the presence of a culturally homogenous 
population lowered the cost of state building by making uniform administrative 
arrangements feasible, promoting loyalty and solidarity of the subject population, 
putting ready-made communication systems at the disposal of the rulers, increasing the 
likelihood of unity against external threats, and increasing the prospect of success for 
centralised policies of resource extraction and control .Thus the incentive of state-
See, for instance, Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View o f  Ethnopolitical Conflicts, 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1993, pp. 131-132.
Charles Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History o f European State-Making’ in Charles Tilly, ed.. The 
Formation o f  National States in Western Europe, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 42, 
79. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, 
pp. 106-7.
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makers to homogenise their constituencies was primarily a pragmatic one, conceived in 
terms of pay offs from coercive centralised policies which aimed at the consolidation of 
their own power.
The national idea -  the idea that ‘the nation is the only proper basis for a sovereign state 
and the ultimate source of governmental authority’ -  provided the international 
legitimacy of the rulers’ efforts to homogenise populations from the French and 
American revolutions onwards.With the rise of the nation-state as a model of state 
organisation, national identity was made central to the modem political life -  shared 
national identity was assigned sole political validity and made the exclusive basis of 
political allegiance.^® Moreover, the modem state defined by the idea of sovereignty -  
the idea that the government has an exclusive right to govem over its territory and 
population -  gave a free hand to mlers to decide on the distribution of membership in 
their political community, thus, minimising the choices available to ethnic minorities. 
The justification for ethnic cleansing in terms of an exclusive conception of sovereignty 
has provided a cmcial enabling condition for the expulsion of minorities. Although in 
the 20**’ century, the national ideal and an exclusive conception of sovereignty conflicted 
with the new emerging norm of national minority rights and their protection embodied 
in the work of the League of Nations and the United Nations, their world-wide 
entrenchment ensured that when ethnic minorities came to conflict with the state, it was 
them that would have to move out.^ *
James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,
p. 2,
David Beetham, ‘The Future o f the Nation-State’ in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall, 
eds.. The Idea o f the Modern State, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984, p. 220.
See Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, p. 55.
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As noted in the introduction of this thesis, ethnic cleansing as a means of creating 
homogenous polities is not associated exclusively with the Balkans, although scarcely 
any other region in the twentieth century experienced this phenomenon with such a 
sickening frequency. Embraced primarily as a tool of policy and facilitated often by the 
occurrence of war, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans began to set a precedent for ethnic 
cleansing in the twentieth century continental Europe with the idea of compulsory 
‘exchange’ of minorities providing the basis for the expulsion of up to 14 million 
Germans from east central Europe in the immediate aftermath of the second World War 
alone.^  ^ As Alfred de Zayas asserts: ‘State interests were given priority over human 
rights and mass expulsion gained international respectability as a legitimate solution of 
demographic problems; in fact, the principle of compulsory population transfers was 
seen by many as a panacea, a final solution to the troublesome minority problem’. 
Whereas the Allies detested the genocide and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Nazis 
they accepted the logic that homogenous nation states are preferable to multi-cultural 
ones on the ground of security. Indeed, the justification for such policies was 
underpinned by the assumption that the security of the state is the greatest value. 
Coupled with preoccupation for state security, was a concern for the interests and rights 
of the majority nation conceived as the unit that holds the exclusive right to the nation­
state, a unit that legitimises the state and in turn is served by the state. Hence, according 
to this reasoning, the nation had a legitimate right, and interest, to make the state secure 
even at the expense of the expulsion of ethnic minorities. The Czech leader Eduard 
Benes made this view public when he stated that ‘before we begin to define the rights of 
minorities we must define the rights of majorities and the obligations of minorities’.^ "^
Refer to Chapter III, p. 88, footnote 77.
Alfred-Maurice De Zayas, ‘A Historical Survey o f Twentieth Century Expulsions’, in Anna C. 
Bramwell, ed.. Refugees in the Age o f  Total War, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 20.
Eduard BeneS, ‘The Organisation o f Post-War Europe’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2 ,1942, p. 237.
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Once again, the underlying assumption was the perceived necessity of the nation-state 
as the dominant form of political organisation, ethnic homogeneity being considered as 
a value in itself and sought to be achieved by means of ethnic cleansing. The expulsion 
of ethno-national minorities in the Balkans and elsewhere was justified by the sweeping 
proposition that all members of the minority group(s) were potentially subversive and 
unreliable, that they collaborated with foreign powers collectively, and that national 
security could be secured only by rendering the state free from ethnic minorities.
The rationalisation of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, especially in the late twentieth 
century, was couched predominantly in (nation) state building terms. As noted, the 
Bulgarian authorities justified the expulsion of Bulgarian Turks in the late 1980s as a 
consequence of ‘progressive’ policies of modernisation whereas the Serb President in 
the 1990s, similarly, couched his arguments on state building in terms of effective 
centralisation and unity of his nation.^  ^ While championing ‘a unified and strong 
Serbian state’ Milosevic’s interpretation of such a state was grounded on the bases of 
achieving the convergence between the political and national boundaries by expelling 
ethnic groups whose political allegiance he could not guarantee and putting in place a 
centralised authoritarian state administration. His aim was to secure the control of the 
preferred boundaries, the territory and the resources it encompassed, and the control and 
compliance of the subject population in order to ensure that no hostilities or armed 
insurgency would be faced again in the future.^^
^ See Chapter III, pp. 107, 111. 
Refer to Chapter V, pp. 187-207.
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However, whereas the expulsion of ethnic minorities may, arguably, serve to construct 
the social bond and unify the dominant nation, the same cannot be said about its 
external effects. Whilst ethnic cleansing may have been perceived as a means of easing 
tensions with neighbouring states by diminishing the threat of secessionist claims and 
future wars over territory, in fact, at the same time, it held the potential to do exactly the 
opposite by menacing the peaceful coexistence between neighbouring countries and 
even act as a prelude to war.
What failed to be appreciated by political elites who engaged in ethnic cleansing in the 
late twentieth century was the fact that their circumstances of state building were so 
different from those of early modem Europe as to make attempts of justifying such 
contemporary practices, in terms of previous ones, futile. The normative stmcture of 
international society with its relatively (in historical terms) strong emphasis on human 
rights and accountable governance has rendered the early practices of state building by 
means of ethnic cleansing obsolete. At the same time, the tremendously high 
humanitarian costs of such a process -  in terms of death, suffering and loss of rights -  
although belatedly, has come to breach the boundaries of the acceptable.
The historical experience suggests that the political meaning of ethnic cleansing has 
evolved gradually in the course of history.^^ While it was perceived as a natural 
concomitant of the process of state building in pre-modem times and viewed with 
sympathy as a tool of security up to the first half of the 20* century, by the end of the 
same century it came to be viewed increasingly with scepticism and disdain. Underlying
See Carrie Booth Walling, ‘The History and Politics o f Ethnic Cleansing’, The InternationalJournal o f  
Human Rights, Vol. 4, Nos. 3/4, 2000.
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this evolution is the questioning of the assumption that there is a single standard model 
of state building exemplified in the utilisation of ethnic cleansing as a means of securing 
cohesion of the political community, and the search for other alternative trajectories of 
political development that pay attention to the inclusion and human rights of ethnic 
minorities. Whilst state security remains an important value, its acquisition may no 
longer be justified independent of the means.
VI.4 In/Security of States and Peoples
The analysis so far leaves little doubt as to who is more or less privileged in the security 
policy and practice. The privileging of the state as a referent object of security is 
normally premised on the normative claim, which holds that states are the agents that 
provide citizens with security. As already noted, when a state’s security policy advances 
the wellbeing of its citizens, the state security and people’s security are positively 
correlated and security interests of the state and its people may well coincide. Indeed, in 
normal circumstances, the state -  as an aggregation of capabilities and resources -  is the 
most structurally capable actor to provide security for its people.^*
This privileging of the state in terms of security is enshrined in international law, in 
which context security denotes security of the state. In the national level, for instance, it 
is the state’s government which defines security problems and devises strategies to deal 
with them. Foundational international principles -  such as sovereignty and non­
intervention -  give states a free hand to deal with security threats at the domestic level, 
at times, preventing needy civilians from receiving aid or protection offered by external
This is not to suggest that the state provides full security but rather that the state creates conducive 
conditions in which relative security may be provided.
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parties. In the international level, on the other hand, the law of the United Nations 
Charter grants certain competencies to the member states of the Security Council in 
situations where international peace and security may be threatened and requires them 
to take measures to deal with such threats accordingly.
Given their privileged status, it comes as no surprise that states have drawn heavily on 
the security concept to win acceptance for a wide range of questionable policies ranging 
from arbitrary arrest, internment without trial, censorship and the withdrawal of travel 
documents to waging wars. Curiously, prioritisation of state security in terms of 
international law has, in various instances, provided justification for drastic measures 
against people. For instance, according to Chichele professor of international law, Ian 
Brownlie, the expulsion of 14 million Germans in the aftermath of the Second World 
War ‘may be justified as a part of the sanctions and measures of security imposed by the 
principal members of a coalition which had fought a lawful war of collective defence 
against Nazi Germany’ In his view, the act of expulsion was justified because the 
allied powers sought to prevent future threats to peace and security.^® Although the 
employment of extraordinary measures in service of security -  at times -  is 
questionable, the above example illustrates the dubious use of the concept of security in 
states’ interests.
Arguably, a recent example of the dubious use of security in the state’s interest can be 
found in the policies of Israel. From early 2003 till the present the Israeli government 
has been building a 437 mile barrier of trenches, fences, wire and concrete walls around
Ian Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law, 4^ ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990 p. 561.
Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f  Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 
409.
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and within the West Bank ostensibly as a necessary measure of security designed to 
defend Israelis against suicide bombers and other Palestinian attackers. Although Israel 
has legitimate security concerns, many governments and international lawyers, 
however, think that the barrier is illegal. In September 2003 the UN General Assembly 
issued a report condemning the barrier as ‘an unlawful act of annexation’ and demanded 
that Israel reverse its construction.^^ Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in its advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 ascertained that the construction of the barrier by 
Israel is contrary to international law and recommended that its construction should 
cease forthwith whereas parts already constructed should be dismantled.^^ The Israeli 
Government, nevertheless, considers the ICJ opinion as politically motivated and 
intends to contemplate only the re-routing of a 20-mile section of the planned barrier. 
The Israeli’s claim that the barrier is solely a means of combating terrorism has been 
thrown into doubt, nonetheless, by the fact that by reaching deep into occupied territory, 
sometimes even encircling entire Palestinian towns and villages, the barrier -  built on 
agricultural land or otherwise land cleared by demolishing houses -  would disrupt the 
lives and violate the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, forcing 
many of them to move out and possibly resulting in the annexation of more territory by 
Israel.^ "^
Report o f the Special Rapporteur o f the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation 
of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, submitted in accordance with 
Commission resolution 1993/2 A, Question o f the Violation o f  Human Rights in the Occupied Arab 
Territories, including Palestine, E/CN.4/2004/6, 8 September 2003.
‘Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Advisory 
Opinion o f the International Court o f Justice, 9 July 2004. http://www.ici- 
cii.org/iciwww/idocket/imwp advisory opinion/imwp advisory opinion 20040709.pdf.
See Greg Myre, ‘Israel to Reroute Path o f Barrier in West Bank’, The New York Times, 14 July 2004. 
http://www.nvtimes.com.
Advisory Opinion o f the International Court o f Justice, 9 July 2004 at note 32 above. ‘Isreali’s 
‘separation barrier’ in the occupied West Bank: Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
consequences’, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, February 2004, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/20/isrlpa7581 txt.htm. ‘The International Court o f  Justice: Law and 
Peace’, The Economist, February 21®‘-27**’ 2004, p. 38.
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Another example of the ambiguity of law provisions vis-à-vis security is the case of the 
exception clause in Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 -  known as the Fourth Geneva 
Convention -  and Article 17 of Protocol II (1977) to the same Convention which 
provide for a total or partial evacuation of the population ‘if the security of the 
population or imperative military reasons so demand’. T h e  interpretation of these 
exceptional clauses can be murky, for instance, allowing for different interpretations of 
the same situation by peoples involved on the one hand, and state authorities on the 
other. This, in turn, warrants concern over the possible use of terms such as ‘security of 
the population’ or ‘imperative military reasons’ as a basis for limitation or restriction of 
rights and freedoms of individuals and groups. For instance, when strategic borders are 
targeted -  as in the case of Bosnia and Palestine -  is the removal of population justified 
on security grounds? Or, does such removal instead serve the purpose of the acquisition 
of territory? When a population supports an insurgency organisation, is it legitimate to 
expel it on the ground of ‘imperative military reasons’? Or, do attempts to expulsion 
provide for broadening of the basis of the insurgency? In other words, dilemmas of 
security allow for multiple interpretations of the exception clauses. Indeed, the breadth 
Avith which ‘security’ and ‘imperative military reasons’ could be interpreted raises doubt
Although prohibiting ‘individual and mass forcible transfers’, Article 49 o f the Fourth Geneva 
Convention states that: ‘...the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation o f a given area 
if  the security o f the population or imperative military reasons so demand’. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention is printed in Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., Documents on the Laws o f  War, 3*^  
Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 301-369, Article 49 at pp. 317-318. Article 17 of 
Protocol II states that ‘The displacement o f the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related 
to the conflict unless the security o f the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand’. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f  12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of  
Victims o f Non-International Armed Conflict (Protocol II) is printed in Roberts & Guelff eds.. 
Documents on the Laws o f  War, pp. 483-512, Article 17 at p. 491.
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as to the de facto protection Article 49 and Article 17 provide suggesting that these 
exception clauses may be used to give forced removals of people a legal basis.^^
It is abundantly clear therefore that the concern for state security has been a concomitant 
justification of ethnic cleansing. In the Balkans -  not unlike elsewhere -  ethnic 
cleansing has been rationalised by its architects and perpetrators on the grounds of 
security arguments ranging fi*om grand ones such as securing strategic borders, unity of 
the nation and future peace, to more cynical ones like those which sought to justify 
rounding up of Bosnian Muslim men in concentration camps for purposes of screening 
for war crimes (after their identity documents had been destroyed!), or en masse 
expulsion of Kosovar Albanians ostensibly on the bases of their support for a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation (KLA).^^ In each and every case the definition of security threats and 
strategies to deal with them was provided by the state. That is to say that ‘the grammar 
of security’ was viewed as ‘inherently statist’ according the state a high, if not the 
highest, value in itself.^* Put differently, the value of state security relative to other 
values was conceptually prejudged.
The term ‘security’ has conventionally been associated with the interests of 
collectivities, primarily states but also nations who legitimise these entities. The 
asymmetrical and paternalistic manner in which security is used in the discourse of
Examples in this regard include the case o f present day Arabs o f Palestine and the European Germans 
following World War II, referred to above. Another instance is that o f the removal o f Japanese Americans 
from the West Coast o f the United States during the Second World War. Indeed, in Korematsu v. United 
States case, the United States Supreme Court held explicitly that such an act was necessary as a military 
imperative. See Final Report o f the Special Rapporteur Mr. Al-Khasawneh to the forty-ninth session o f  
the Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, Human Rights and 
Population Transfer, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23,27 June 1997, paragraphs 38-39.
Refer to chapters III and V and also Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. Judgement o f  2"*^  August 2001. 
Case No. IT-98-33-T. Especially paragraphs 156 and 160. 
http://www.un.Org/ictv/krstic/T rialC 1/judgement/krs-tiO 10802e-3 .pdf.
Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, pp. 95, 109.
248
politics and international law to privilege the state suggest that security is not a neutral 
label which can be used in the same way for states and the individual or groups of 
individuals short of nations. Nevertheless, modem international law has extended 
beyond the regulation of interstate relationships to embrace security demands of 
individuals as exemplified in a growing body of human rights law, refugee law and 
humanitarian law which seek to pacify the individual against the exercise of power by 
the state and also oblige the state to protect individuals subject to its power.^^
In reaction to the growing visibility of individual human rights, some scholars have 
suggested that the individual -  not the state -  should be made the main referent object 
of security. One of the most prominent proponents of this view is Ken Booth who 
argues that states are not suitable to be prime referents of security because (1) whereas 
some states are in the business of security others are not; (2) even those states that are in 
the business of security represent the means and not ends; and (3) states are so diverse 
in their character that they cannot serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of 
security."^ ® To privilege the state, in this view, is illogical because it implies privileging 
the security of the means as opposed to the security of the ends."^  ^ Indeed, at the turn of 
the century, it looks like individuals and groups of individuals are set to be increasingly 
central in security thinking -  legally, ethically, and politically."^  ^ Some even argue that 
individual and collective human security do no longer depend overwhelmingly on the 
state."^ ^
See Gregor Noll, ‘Securitising sovereignty? States, refugees, and the régionalisation o f international 
law’, in Newman and van Seim eds.. Refugees and Forced Displacement, especially pp. 279-280,
Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, p. 320.
Ibid.
Edward Newman, ‘Refugees, international security, and human vulnerability: Introduction and survey’, 
in Newman and van Seim eds.. Refugees and Forced Displacement.
See, for instance, Martin Shaw, Global Society and International Relations -  Sociological Concepts 
and Political Perspectives, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, p. 110; and Alex J. Bellamy and Matt
249
However, this dichotomy of the level of analysis -  security of the individual as opposed 
to security of the state -  is not necessarily unproblematic. This is so because, 
conceptually, it does not cater for the enormous differences in power and autonomy 
between the state and the individual. Not only do states possess the power to define and 
defend their own security interests, they also usurp the power to define the security 
interests of individuals (sometimes they defend them at others violate them). The 
individual, on the contrary, has minimal voice in security discourse whereas his 
autonomous power to defend his own security interests is extremely limited.'^ '* So, while 
one cannot help but agree with Booth in that security should be primarily about humans 
and that states are means and not ends, the conclusion that security of humans does not 
depend overwhelmingly on the state may well be misleading. As already pointed out, 
states are the best suited actors to provide for security in terms of powers they possess 
and privileges accorded to them in the international system. Whereas the security of the 
individual is a clearly identifiable level of analysis it remains, nevertheless, subordinate 
to other levels, primarily that of the state and international system."*^
This verity, again, is enshrined in international law. For instance, the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights states in Article 32(2), which addresses the issue of 
personal responsibilities, that: ‘The rights of each person are limited by the rights of 
others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a
McDonald, “ The Utility o f Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & 
Tow’, Security Dialogue^ Vol. 33, No. 3, 2002, p. 376.
^  See Gregor Noll, ‘Securitising sovereignty?’, p. 280.
For this last point see Barry Buzan People, States, and Fear: An Agenda fo r  International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991, p. 54. Spyros Economides, 
‘Balkan Security: What Security? Whose Security?’, Journal o f  Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3,2003, p. 122.
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democratic society'/^ Similarly, Article 27(2) of the 1981 African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights makes an analogous opposition between individual rights and 
collective security."^  ^ So, the issue is not to deny the centrality of the state as the main 
provider of security but to reorient the state structures in ways which provide for 
security of the individual and groups of individuals in recognition that state security and 
people’s security are closely inter-linked. Hence the growing awareness that the state is 
the entity with prime responsibility to protect its citizens as the fundamental and 
ultimate function of sovereignty.
Blaming some states for ethnic cleansing, as this thesis has done, does not mean, 
however, that all states (and at all times) can be regarded as inevitable culprits in 
depriving individuals and groups of their security. It is only those states that engage in 
massive violations of human rights that are likely to have their privileges suspended. 
Indeed, there is an increasing awareness in that a government which forces its citizens 
to leave or creates conditions which induce them to leave internationalises its internal 
actions and should expect others to intervene in its internal affairs."^ * Large-scale 
conflicts -  including ethnic cleansing -  that result on massive numbers of refugees and 
human suffering bring about the option of humanitarian intervention."^  ^ Although 
international responses to humanitarian crises, so far, have been overall reactive, self- 
interested and on ad-hoc basis, there is growing international awareness on the linkage
^  The American Convention on Human Rights is printed in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics Morals -  Text and Materials, 2"*^  Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1436-1448. Article 32(2) at p. 1444.
Article 27(2) states that: ‘The rights and freedoms o f each individual shall be exercised with due regard 
to the rights o f others, collective security, morality and common interest’. The African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights is printed in Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights in Context. Article 
27(2) in p. 1454.
See Myron Weiner, ‘Security, Stability and International Migration’ in Myron Weiner ed.. 
International Migration and Security, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 25-26.
See Chapter V, pp. 207-218,222-229 and Chapter VII, pp. 266-273.
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between global, regional, and state security, on the one hand, and protection of human 
rights (at the individual and collective level) on the other. Intervention in Kosovo, for 
instance, may be viewed as a manifestation of such an interconnectedness at work. 
Interpretations of this case vary, however, with some arguing that NATO’s response to 
Kosovo’s crisis was an expression of the pursuit of human security.Others, on the 
other hand, argue that the Alliance’s intervention was self-interested and the protection 
of peoples was merely a by-product of a reactive response, which sought primarily to 
protect Western interests.^* Whilst emphasising one particular rationale for intervention, 
these two interpretations underplay the fact that intervention in Kosovo was a more 
nuanced enterprise that involved a wider range of motivating factors.^^ What the case of 
intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s demonstrates, however, is that states have the 
prime responsibility for protection of people. And, even when a state does not fulfil this 
obligation, but instead engages in massive violations of human rights, the responsibility 
for safeguarding subjugated people falls with the international community of states.
A decade of war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia has confirmed that the 
urge for security is not an illegitimate one, but one that, nonetheless, does not render 
security above all else. Although politics offer some opportunities for unmoral action 
for which ‘state security’ can serve as a convenient cloak, the interpretation of what 
constitutes ‘national security’ and how much value should be attached to it is a moral 
question which rests on value judgements i.e., balancing of security with other desired
This was the view o f the former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy. See Lloyd Axworthy, 
‘NATO’s New Security Vocation’, NATO Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 8-11. For Mr. 
Axworthy, the Kosovo crisis shows how individuals are the main victims and targets o f state-sponsored 
aggression. It should be remembered, nonetheless, that ethnic cleansing is a collective crime -  the victims 
are targeted as members o f a collectivity although the underlying motives are profoundly political. While 
humanitarian imperative triggered Allied intervention, the protection o f  the individual may have been a 
corollary o f  the protection o f a collectivity targeted as such.
See, for instance, Economides, ‘Balkan Security’, especially pp. 116-8.
Refer to Chapter V p. 223.
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values such as welfare, freedom and good neighbourliness. A governmental policy 
designed to provide security has a normative character being concerned as it is with the 
questions of what should and should not be conceived as a threat and why, and what 
means should be used to avert such a threat. This implies that security, like other goals, 
may be purchased by a variety of means, but some means of which ethnic cleansing is 
one are profoundly problematic -  undermining the security of particular peoples. But 
when one people is endangered, that puts in jeopardy the security of others too. This 
suggests that the pursuit o f security cannot be self-referential. The value of security 
purchased at the price of insecuring ethno-national minorities might not be very high 
after all. A zero-sum conception of security which assumes that more security for a state 
(or nation) means less security for other states and/or peoples, can lead to a situation in 
which a state is surrounded by insecure states and peoples inviting the reasonable 
question whether insecure neighbours are good neighbours at all.
The experience of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans shows that the whole peninsula, in 
fact, has suffered as a consequence of ethnic cleansing in an adjacent state or region. 
Usually it is the direct costs of ethnic cleansing that are more often brought forward i.e., 
the number of dead, burnt houses, razing of villages, destruction of infrastructure, 
refugees and the burden of providing for them by the neighbouring countries and 
international community. But a greater part of the human costs of ethnic cleansing may 
well result ‘indirectly’ from the casualties due to destruction of entitlements,^^ that is, 
lack of access to food, housing, health facilities, education, employment, and other 
resources, in addition to negative psychological effects involving the grieve for a lost
The term ‘entitlements’ -  connoting forms o f human command over resources -  comes from A. K. Sen, 
Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981,
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home and anxieties for an uncertain future. Sadly, many of the victims of ethnic 
cleansing face unique impediments to their recovery and are unable to move forward 
without the closure that comes from knowing with certainty what has happened to their 
family members and properly grieving for them. Srebrenica, in particular, has lent its 
name to ‘Srebrenica syndrome’, a new pathology category, a post-tramautic syndrome 
displayed by the survivors of Srebrenica who ever since July 1995 have no news from 
their loved ones and live haunted by their memories.^"*
The irony is that ethnic cleansing may have not secured either the state or the people on 
whose name it was carried out. Serbia in the 1990s, for example, has suffered the most 
dreadful impoverishment in its history. At the end of 1996, for instance, the total 
production of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY -  Serbia and Montenegro) was 
only 48 percent of the production achieved in 1989, whilst the industrial output 
amounted to 37-38 per cent of the 1989 level. Real wages of those employed in the 
social sector in the FRY dropped by mid-1996 to only 25 percent of the 1990 wages. In 
1994, 35.6 per cent of Serbia’s population were below the poverty line.^  ^The scale of 
plundering Serbia has been awesome with up to $4 billion being spirited out of the 
country during the 1990s apparently to outset the effect of the UN sanctions but 
substantial amounts ending up in private bank accounts owned by Milosevic’s cronies 
in Cyprus, Switzerland, Russia, Greece and Israel to name some of the most favoured 
destinations.^^ In 1996, FRY -  Serbia and Montenegro -  was the country with the 
highest number of refugees in Europe hosting more than half a million registered Serb
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic. Judgement o f August 2"‘‘, 2001 at note 37 above. Paragraph 93.
These figures are quoted from Vladimir Goati, ‘Introduction: Political Development in the Federal 
Republic o f Yugoslavia (1990-1996)’, in Vladimir Goati ed., Elections to the Federal and Republican 
Parliaments o f Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990-1996 -  Analyses, Documents and Data, Berlin: 
Sigma, 1998, p. 23.
Ian Traynor, ‘Search for the missing millions’. The Guardian, March 29,2001, p. 4.
254
refugees from Bosnia and Croatia in addition to about 100,000 unregistered ones/^ 
Unlike any other time in her history, Serbia is faced with strained diplomatic relations 
with neighbouring countries who are rendered poorer and less secure by her policy of 
ethnic cleansing. If, initially, ethnic cleansing as a means to security was conceived on 
zero-sum terms, its end result can be described as negative-sum having impacted 
adversely on almost everyone and led to severe consequences for the foreseeable future.
VI. 5 Summary
The argument of this chapter can be summarised as follows:
- The meaning of security is open to argumentation because the concept has many 
dimensions and can be applied at once to various analytical levels. In the gamut 
of referents of security, nevertheless, two stand out: the state and the people. 
State security and people’s security are, normally, positively correlated but they 
are bound to clash when the state employs deliberate policies that become a 
source of insecurity of the people.
- The state is privileged in security policy and practice. Ambiguous legal 
provisions and insufficiently precise terms (including ‘national security’ and 
‘imperative military reasons’), at times, have enabled interpretations that give 
ethnic cleansing a legal basis on the ground of security.
- Ethnic cleansing as a means to national security, however, is deeply problematic 
because by undermining the security of particular peoples it puts in jeopardy the 
security of others too.
Zlatko Isakovic, Identity and Security in Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 150, 154, 
165.
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By seeking security to the expense of others rather than the benefit of the whole, 
ethnic cleansing cannot guarantee stability; instead it is bound to disturb peace 
and good relations among states and peoples.
Although conceived on zero-sum terms, the end result of ethnic cleansing has 
been negative-sum reducing security of both states and peoples.
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VII. C o n c lu s io n
VII. 1 The argument in brief
This thesis has shed light on ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century Balkans with 
particular reference to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The central question ‘Why 
did ethnic cleansing occur in the Balkans?’ has been addressed by means of explanatory 
inference grounded on a historical evidence of the large scale cases of ethnic cleansing 
in the region, primarily those associated with the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the Greko- 
Turkish war of 1923, the first and second World Wars as they affected the region, the 
Bulgarian crisis of 1989, and the regional wars of the 1990s.
My analysis shows that although the origins of ethnic cleansing may be conceived to be 
multifarious in so far as they may be traced inductively in past history, fear, security 
dilemmas, and nationalism -  as manifested in the region -  these correlations, 
nevertheless, are neither direct nor deterministic. Such factors may have facilitated the 
occurrence of ethnic cleansing; however, the large-scale expulsion of targeted 
minorities has been primarily a matter of deliberate policy. Furthermore, the fact that 
ethnic cleansing was time and place specific renders its occurrence a function of the 
quality of political leadership. Consequently, this thesis has argued that ethnic cleansing 
in the region occurred because it was espoused as a strategy of nation-state building, the 
nation-state model being perceived by the national leaders as a supreme value. Ethnic 
cleansing was premised on ethnic definition of territory and was purported to serve 
control of the state, its territory and resources by the majority nation and the granting of 
rights and protections exclusively to the members of the said nation. Moreover, 
concerns for state security have been concomitant justifications of ethnic cleansing. 
Curiously, ambiguous legal provisions and insufficiently precise terms (such as
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‘imperative military reasons’), at times, have enabled interpretations that give ethnic 
cleansing a legal basis on the ground of security.
Virtually all cases of ethnic cleansing analysed in this thesis reflect the incompatibilities 
of territorial expansionism and the official perception of minorities as a threat that 
undermined the cohesion of the dominant nation. The practice and the official rationale 
for the expulsion of the targeted communities have not changed significantly in the 
course of the past century although technical aspects may have advanced in order to 
increase efficiency and the speed of expulsion.
The politics of ethnic cleansing at the national level has been intrinsically linked with 
the delineation of borders, control of territory, national security and the political 
organisation of the state (i.e., the nature of state governance and its ‘ownership’, and 
granting of rights and their protection). So high was the perceived importance of these 
issues in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in the 1990s that 
war itself became a means of ethnic cleansing. Wars of ethnic cleansing were not 
autonomous but instead an instrument of policy -  the state being central in their 
organisation and execution. Furthermore, the shape and character of these wars was a 
function of the nature of war aims and of situations that gave rise to them. Since the 
central feature of wars of ethnic cleansing was coercion, military operations relied not 
on direct combat with opponents but on the demonstrative capacity of violence which 
was intended to compel the targeted peoples to leave.
If the practice and the official rationale for ethnic cleansing have not changed as such, 
the reaction of the international community towards such a policy has. Historical record
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shows that ethnie cleansing has come to be perceived as an illegitimate policy, which 
violates established and emerging human rights standards and norms. Although the 
Western powers’ reaction to the expulsion of ethno-national minorities in the course of 
the twentieth century has been inconsistent -  condoning or overlooking it some times 
while pressing for its reversal at other times -  the use of military means by the Western 
Alliance to reverse ethnic cleansing in Kosovo may suggest that ethnic cleansing can no 
longer be countenanced, at least in the European state system.
The tragedy of ethnic cleansing and the wars that accompanied it, especially in the 
1990s, has placed the Balkans at the centre of the stage in which issues -  whose 
importance transcends the region -  are rethought and reconsidered. Ethnic cleansing in 
the former Yugoslavia may provide a sad opportunity to shed light and develop a new 
crime in international humanitarian law. Moreover, not only the establishment of the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) develops further the 
international legal framework concerned with humanitarian law but the intervention in 
Kosovo may represent a normative shift in the reconceptualisation of humanitarian 
intervention and state sovereignty. Furthermore, the why and how ethnic cleansing was 
carried out in the closing decade of the twentieth century has raised important questions 
regarding conflict resolution and the political organisation of states. It is to these three 
issues that the rest of this conclusion now turns.
VII.2 Criminalising ethnic cleansing in its own right
Although the protection of civilians during armed conflict, nowadays, may be 
considered an elementary notion inscribed in various legal documents, in the beginning 
of the twentieth century it could not be predicted that ethnic cleansing would become so
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central to armed conflicts. Indeed, the Hague Convention IV concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, as originally adopted in 1899 and revised in 1907, contains 
no explicit mentioning of the practice of forced removal of civilians, probably because 
such a practice was regarded, at that time, ‘to have fallen into abeyance’.^  Even the 
occurrence of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the two World Wars in which civilian 
casualties were horrendous did not affect profoundly the political and legal imagination 
of their times. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1948 and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
did not address explicitly the offence of expulsion as such.^ A reason for this can 
presumably be found in the political circumstances of the time given the Western 
powers’ preoccupation to deal with the German ‘menace’ by means of expulsion.^
The emerging culture of human rights, however, took on board, gradually, the issue of 
expulsion although no mentioning of ethnic cleansing as such can be found in hard law. 
In our days, it is widely believed nonetheless that acts of ethnic cleansing are in breach 
of customary and conventional humanitarian law and constitute a violation of basic 
principles of conventional and customary international and human rights law."^  Indeed, 
by expelling its own nationals a Government violates all rights that are, to any extent.
’ Jean S. Pictet, Commentary to the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons 
in Time o f  War, Geneva: International Committee o f the Red Cross, Vol. IV, 1958, p. 279.
 ^The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights are printed 
in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics Morals -  
Text and Materials, 2"‘‘ Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1376-1380 and pp. 1423- 
1435 respectively.
 ^Refer to Chapter III, p. 88, footnote, 77 and Chapter VI pp. 241-242,245.
 ^ See, for instance. The Human Rights Dimensions o f  Population Transfer, Including the Implication o f  
Settlers, Preliminary report prepared by Mr. A. S. Al-Khasawneh and Mr. R. Hatano, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17,6 July 1993.
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dependent for their full and effective enjoyment on the person’s being able to live in 
his/her own country/
Ethnic cleansing, as a special case of mass expulsion, may be considered illegal on the 
ground of arbitrariness (the absence of due process) and discrimination (the expulsion 
of a group of people on the very ground of belonging to that specific group) -  whose 
prohibition appears in a great many human rights conventions and declarations/ A 
discriminatory and arbitrary mass expulsion -  including ethnic cleansing -  violates the 
letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European and 
American Human Rights Conventions, as well as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, to mention a few examples/ The work of the International 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) attests to the fact that the offence of ethnic 
cleansing has, at last, been recognised by the international community as an 
international crime for which respective political leaders and their military echelons are 
liable and should not be offered impunity/
Despite the evolutionary process of international law, however, legal opinion is divided 
as to the adequacy of the existing legal provisions regarding mass expulsion in general, 
and ethnic cleansing, in particular. Henckaerts, for instance, believes that the legal
 ^This is stated in the first principle o f the International Law Association (ILA) Declaration o f Principles 
on International Law on Mass Expulsion, adopted at the 62”** ILA Conference, Seoul, 24-30 August, 
1986. Reprinted as Appendix VI in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law 
and Practice, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 223-227. This declaration is, however, 
soft law. It remains an expression o f intent to outlaw mass expulsion but posses no obligations on states 
as such.
® See discussion in Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion, chapter I.
 ^The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is printed in Steiner and Alston, International 
Human Rights in Context, pp. 1381-1394.
* Alfi’ed de Zayas, ‘Ethnic Cleansing 1945 and Today: Observations on Its Illegality and Implications’ in 
Steven Béla Vârdy and T. Hunt Tooley eds.. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, Boulder: 
Social Science Monographs Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2003, p. 800.
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provisions dealing with mass expulsion are sufficient and no new convention is needed, 
although he acknowledges that ‘a specific treaty on mass expulsion would have the 
advantage of establishing specific enforcement procedures’.^  De Zayas, similarly, 
opines that ‘the norms and the jurisprudence on the illegality of forced population 
transfers are consistent’, although he admits that ‘there is no proper mechanism of 
implementation and no sanctions for enforcing compliance’. He advocates, however, a 
convention on mass expulsion.
The Working Group on Mass Expulsion convened by the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law in 1983 concluded, nevertheless, that there are many gaps in the law 
and suggested that an appropriate international instrument should be considered and that 
the problem of mass expulsion should be examined anew.*  ^ Similarly, assessing 
whether the existing legal principles afford adequate protection against population 
transfers, the UN Special Rapporteurs Al-Khasawneh and Hatano argued that there are 
gaps in legal protection and that ‘the development of law on this global human rights 
problem of war and peace is long overdue’.M oreover, the 90* Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference, held in Canberra from 13-18 September 1993, called for the elaboration of 
a convention against expulsion and displacement of populations complementary to the 
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
’ Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion, p. 197.
De Zayas, ‘Ethnic Cleansing 1945 and Today’, in Vârdy and Tooley, eds,, Ethnic Cleansing, especially 
pp. 790,798, 803.
' Report o f the Working Group on Mass Expulsion, International Institute o f  Humanitarian Law, San 
Remo, Italy, 16-18 April 1983.
The Human Rights Dimensions o f Population Transfer, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17, 6 July 1993, paragraphs 
368-372, 374. The quote comes from paragraph 382.
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Genocide, effectively banning such displacements and making them punishable under 
international law/^
The dissatisfaction with the existing legal provisions stem from the fact that although 
mass expulsion / population transfers / ethnic cleansing violate established principles of 
fundamental human rights, there is no legal code that universally prohibits them as such. 
Moreover, the existing hard law provisions are not specific enough to relate directly to 
the problem of expulsion. Hence the need for legal clarification. In the first instance, 
legal clarification is needed in the field of definitions in order to name and categorise 
specific crimes for what they are rather than use terms loosely and interchangeably by 
lumping a wide range of crimes in one vague category. Some had hoped that the Rome 
Treaty of July 1998 adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court would cater 
for this. However, although the International Criminal Court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction began as a longish list of crimes, it was disappointing that it ended up as a 
detailed specification of only four international law crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.*"  ^Due to this restriction, the Rome 
Treaty does not mention ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘mass expulsion’ although it stipulates 
that deportation or forcible transfer of population constitutes crimes against humanity 
under Article 7 and war crimes under Article 8 of the Statute.*^
United Nations Decade o f  International Law, Report o f  the Secretary-General, Forty Ninth session, 
U.N. Doc. A /49/323,19 August 1994, p. 23, paragraph 68.
See discussion in James Crawford, ‘The drafting o f the Rome Statute’ in Philippe Sands, ed.. From 
Nuremberg to The Hague -  The Future o f International Criminal Justice, Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp. 142, 152.
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (A/Conf. 183/9, 1998) printed in M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, ed.. The Statute o f  the International Criminal Court -  A Documentary History, New York: 
Transnational Publishers, 1998, pp. 39-103. The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.
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Gaps and ambiguities in the law demand attention. As pointed out in Chapter VI, one of 
the key legal provisions in relation to ethnic cleansing in war time is rather ambiguous 
in so far as the exception clause is concerned. Although Article 49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention was drafted with the intention to prohibit and thereby prevent 
expulsion of civilians in times of armed conflict, at the same time, it sanctions such 
transfers when ‘imperative military reasons so demand’. The exception clause leaves 
states with large margin of discretion to use ‘military necessity’ (likewise ‘national 
security’) as justification for forcefully removing people. Moreover, as the UN Special 
Rapporteurs pointed out, because the law is not sufficiently specific violations occur as 
protection against population transfer practices have to be inferred from human rights 
and other international legislation related to the practice. Non-ratifying states claim 
exemption, while some ratifying states exonerate themselves by conjuring up 
extenuating reasons why, in their case, particular legal rules should not apply. 
Moreover, gaps in legal protection exist in non-intemational armed conflict and 
conflictive situations not involving use of arms, in which cases forced removal of 
peoples can be ‘insidious, incremental and thus ‘hidden’, allowing the transferring agent 
(the State) to assert plausible deniability before charges of unlawful action’.^ * This is 
suggestive in the light of the insistence of the Serbian government in the 1990s, that 
Bosnian war was a civil war rather than an interstate one.^  ^It is also telling with regard 
to the Bulgarian government’s absurd justifications for ethnic cleansing of the Bulgarian 
Turks -  in peace time -  in the late 1980s.^ ® These inadequacies in the law suggest that
Refer to Chapter VI, pp. 247-248,
See Al-Khasawneh and Hatano, The Human Rights Dimensions o f  Population Transfer^ 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17, paragraph 371.
Ibid., paragraph 368.
See Chapter V, pp. 198-200.
Refer to Chapter III, pp. 106-108.
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there is need to review in greater detail arguments used to justify ethnic cleansing and 
inscribe the law in more specific terms.
In the opinion of this author, remedies in the law are needed for it to be stronger and at 
the same time more specific with the view to criminalise ethnic cleansing explicitly. To 
this end, either a new convention on mass expulsion -  which considers ethnic cleansing 
as a special case -  may be negotiated and adopted by the UN General Assembly, or an 
appropriate protocol may be added to one of the related treaties such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Rome Treaty. The existing soft-law 
relevant to this purpose such as the International Law Association Declaration of 
Principles of International Law on Mass Expulsion,^^ the Draft Declaration on 
Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers,^^ the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,^^ and the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, "^* may be used as a legal background to make the transcendence into hard 
law.
The consequences of not doing so will be the continuation of a weak and unspecific law 
in relation to ethnic cleansing (and mass expulsion in general) and a misleading analogy 
between ethnic cleansing and genocide -  given the tendency for an expansive 
interpretation of the definition of genocide as stipulated in the Genocide Convention -
See note 5 above.
This is annexed in the final report o f  the Special Rapporteur Mr. Al-Khasaneh to the forty-ninth session 
o f the Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, Human Rights and 
Population Transfer, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23, 27 June 1997.




to the extent that genocide will be devalued and cheapened whereas the nature of ethnic 
cleansing will be obscured rather than explained?^
Advocating the need to strengthen the law and make it more specific vis-à-vis ethnic 
cleansing should not mean to suggest that the law will be a panacea for serious human 
rights infnngements. In our world the law is bound to depend on its master: politics. 
This, nevertheless, does not imply that legal devices are irrelevant. On the contrary, 
being an expression of what is right and what is wrong, law can be instrumental in 
bringing about the desired normative change.
VII.3 The need to rethink humanitarian intervention
A great part of the strength and attraction of International Relations stems from the fact 
that it is interdisciplinary. Indeed, its thinking is not influenced only by related subjects 
such as history, law and philosophy but also by distant subjects such as physics. 
Concepts such as complementarity, complicity, and complexity that have emerged in 
the contemporary jargon of International Relations as key ethical questions have been 
instrumental to the innovative thinking of physicists throughout the twentieth century, 
in challenging the traditional Newtonian mechanics and establishing new ways of 
thinking about the physics of particles.^^ Just like the observation changed what a 
physicist can measure about a particle, so observation is changing what we think about 
human rights infringements and how should we respond to them.
Refer to Chapter II, pp. 44-56.
See Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy y Introduction by Paul Davies, London: Penguin, 2000.
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Observing on our TV screens staggering numbers of refugees, the slaughter of civilians, 
children left orphaned, destruction of towns and villages, stimulates a reaction which 
demands on the part of the observer that something should be done to stop the tragedies. 
In our time, doing nothing about civilians who are subjected to appalling cruelty by 
their ovm governments is widely viewed as being morally diminishing not least because 
it makes us feel complicit in atrocities. The normative context vis-à-vis human rights 
infringements has evolved gradually and significantly during the second half of the past 
century and onwards. The evolving nature of the response towards ethnic cleansing in 
the Balkans attests to the fact that rights -  as reasons to treat people in certain ways -  
have changed depending on the circumstances and the time frame. This suggests that the 
toleration of ethnic cleansing in the past cannot be a justification for the toleration of 
ethnic cleansing in the present. By the same token, the inability to reverse ethnic 
cleansing everywhere should not be an excuse for not reverting it where this is possible.
The tragic story of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has enormous significance for the 
way peoples think and act in relation to human rights infringements. As the case of 
Bosnia and Kosovo show, humanitarian intervention -  the use of force across state 
borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at ending widespread and grave violations 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals other than its own citizens^^ -  
becomes the last resort because opportunities are missed for preventive action. 
Unfortunately, the international community is still not ready to accept and act on the 
logic of prevention, given the implication this holds for politically sensitive issues of 
sovereignty, the needed resources and the lack of broadly supported political interest in
See J. L. Holzgrefe, ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’ in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 
eds., Humanitarian Intervention -  Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas^ Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, especially p. 18.
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conflict prevention?* Although intervention is cheaper before anything resembling 
ethnic cleansing, the international community reacts only when a crisis has broken out 
despite the counter-intuitiveness of this. Yet even a belated intervention aimed at 
stopping massive human rights infringements has not, so far, escaped controversy. The 
reason lies primarily on its impact on what is perceived as the most fundamental 
principle of the society of states -  sovereignty.^^
It bears emphasising, nevertheless, that non-intervention remains the norm in normal 
circumstances and that humanitarian intervention challenges the relevance of 
sovereignty only in exceptional situations when a government engages in large-scale 
violations of human rights of its population, or a part thereof. Sovereign states are 
expected to act as guardian of their citizens’ security but -  as Nicholas Wheeler asks -  
what happens if states behave as gangsters towards their own people, treating 
sovereignty as a license to kill?^ ® In the latter circumstances, what moral values attach 
to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention? Should sovereignty of such a state be 
respected?
Although no universally agreed answers to the above questions so far exist, there is a 
growing consensus that in such extreme cases there is a moral duty to intervene forcibly 
in order to end large-scale human suffering.^* This growing consensus is premised on 
the assumption that governments who seriously violate human rights undermine the one
Hans Van Ginkel and Edward Newman, ‘In Quest o f ‘Human Security” , Japan Review o f  International 
Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, p. 78.
For a concise overview o f the meaning o f sovereignty and its continuing relevance see Geoffrey Stem, 
The Structure o f International Society, Second Edition, London and New York: Pinter, 2000, Chapter 6.
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers -  Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 471.
Ibid., p. 475. Robert Keohane, ‘Introduction’, in Holzgrefe and Keohane, eds.. Humanitarian 
Intervention, p. 10.
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reason that justifies their political power, and therefore should not be protected by 
international law. As Fernando Teson argues: ‘...to the extent that state sovereignty is a 
value, it is an instrumental, not an intrinsic value. Sovereignty serves valuable human 
ends, and those who grossly assault them should not be allowed to shield themselves 
behind the sovereignty principle. Tyranny and anarchy cause the moral collapse of 
sovereignty’.^  ^This is to suggest that sovereignty should not be conceived as an amoral 
attribute and that the traditional precedence of sovereignty over respect for human rights 
should be questioned. It also implies that what goes on inside the borders of a sovereign 
state is not necessarily disconnected from international politics, and that the legitimacy 
of social and political arrangements at the national level is not just a domestic matter for 
a given state. Put differently, a state should not be able to claim the prerogatives of 
sovereignty unless it meets internationally agreed responsibilities which include 
protecting the human rights of and providing security to all those within its jurisdiction. 
As Francis Deng asserts sovereignty should be conceptualised as responsibility: states 
failing to exercise their sovereignty responsibly -  for instance, by abusing human rights 
of their citizens in a large scale -  should lose it temporarily (until the capacity of the 
state to protect its people is restored). In such circumstances the international 
community has not only a legitimate right but even an obligation to override state 
sovereignty through military intervention.^^
The responsibility for protecting the lives and promoting welfare of citizens lies, 
however, first and foremost, with individual sovereign states.Sovereignty as
Fernando R. Tesôn, ‘The liberal case for humanitarian intervention’, in Holzgrefe and Keohane, eds.. 
Humanitarian Intervention, p. 93.
Francis M. Deng, Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge fo r  the International Community, 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993, especially pp. 13, 14-20, 125.
Refer to Chapter VI, p. 252.
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responsibility is premised on complementarity that is, only when there is a 
responsibility deficit -  only when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own 
citizens or is the perpetrator of violence against them -  does the responsibility to protect 
targeted peoples fall with other states. The failure to react to massive human rights 
violations of peoples by their own governments, and respect for sovereignty of such 
states, imply complicity.
Complicity has important implications especially for political leaders of powerful states 
so that they consider how their decisions affect the lives of other peoples in other 
countries. This is particularly the case for the Western states given that those vyith the 
greatest capacity to act have the greatest responsibility to act. It is natural therefore, that 
in times of humanitarian crises the deliberations of the UN Security Council attract the 
attention of the whole of the world. The dilemma of humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo, however, suggests that to demand that the UN Security Council must give its 
consent to international intervention for humanitarian purposes, at times, is to risk 
policy paralysis by subjecting the agenda to any obstructionist permanent member(s) 
determined to use the veto clause. Although the United Nations Security Council 
remains the most appropriate body to sanction humanitarian intervention, in exceptional 
cases when massive human rights infnngements occur it is desirable -  for the sake of 
saving human lives -  that the permanent members of the Council consider restrictions 
on the use of the veto clause. However, as the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty pointed out, should the Security Council fail to act in face of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide, support for military action for humanitarian purposes 
should be sought from the majority in the UN General Assembly, or alternatively the
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matter should be delegated to a regional organisation acting within its defining 
boundaries/^
One fundamental lesson from humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo is that 
intervening parties should commit themselves not just to the cessation of hostilities but 
to the long-term stabilisation and pacification of societies affected by violence. 
Anything less risks undermining whatever levels of initial success in conflict 
management and even resort to arms on the part of the interveners. As James Mayall 
points out, the protection of the victims and the relief of suffering can be viewed as ends 
in themselves at the point of intervention, however, over the long run, it is necessary to 
reconstruct society in ways that will ensure against a recurrence of the initial 
hostilities.^^ Humanitarian intervention, therefore, should be coupled with a long-term 
engagement in order to address causes of the conflict through a commitment to conflict 
resolution and social reconstruction.^^
The evidence suggests that there is a tendency in moving in this direction, however, 
such a move -  so far -  has not been decisive. Although minority returns in Bosnia give 
reason for optimism^* it is unfortunate that financial resources needed to boost and 
sustain returns have been faltering steadily. With an estimated cost for the 
reconstruction of Bosnia running up to US$ 30 billion, disbursement of some US$ 5
See discussion in The Responsibility to Protect: Report o f  the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for ICISS, 2001, 
paragraphs 6,28-6,35, http://www,iciss,gc,ca,
James Mayall, ‘The Concept o f Humanitarian Intervention Revisited’, in Mary Buckley and Sally N, 
Cummings, eds,, Kosovo: Perceptions o f  War and its Aftermath, London and New York: Continuum, 
2001, p, 276,
Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p, 306.
More than a million victims o f ethnic cleansing had returned home in Bosnia by the end o f February 
2004, Out o f these 436,238 were minority returns, i.e., persons returned to their pre-conflict 
municipalities, currently dominated by another community, http://www,unhcr,ba.
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billion during the four years following the Dayton Agreement should not be seen as the 
job done. While the interest in refugee returns has grown since the year 2000, the 
funding required to rebuild homes and attend to the needs of returnees has reduced 
sharply. Time, nonetheless, has not yet come to factor out the international vigilance 
over the peace process in Bosnia. There is still an acute need for long-term programmes, 
which strengthen institutions and provide economic bases for reconciliation and peace 
building.
Moreover, the eruption of violence in Kosovo in March 2004 highlights the fragility of 
socio-political structures and relationships in the province.^^ Despite the initial success 
to reverse ethnic cleansing of the Albanians by the Serbs in 1999, the intervention does 
not seem to have gone far enough given the failure of interveners to prevent the attacks 
of the Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. This incidence of hostilities alerts to the dangers 
of indecisive commitment on the part of the interveners. The political and economic 
conditions of the province and the perceived deficiencies of the international 
administration of Kosovo provide important clues about the recurrence of the conflict. 
Five years after the secession of hostilities no agreement on the status of Kosovo has 
been reached, neither a deadline set for such an agreement."^ ® The province is drawn in 
severe poverty with official unemployment levels at 60 percent. Likewise in Bosnia, the 
international financial aid needed to boost the economy and the process of peace
See Ian Traynor and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘UN Security Council Convenes Emergency Meeting 
Amid Warnings o f Worst Crisis in Kosovo since 1999’, The Guardian, March 19, 2004, p. 15. Adam 
LeBor, ‘NATO Forces Struggle to Hold Back Rampaging Albanians’, The Times, March 19, 2004, pp. 8- 
9.
This appears to have encouraged the Serb official claims for the ethnic partition o f  the province -  a 
position that is opposed by the majority Albanian population o f Kosovo.
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building has been insufficient whilst the deployment of UN peace keeping troops -  
especially so the American contingent -  has been continuously reduced/^
The Balkans experience suggests that humanitarian intervention should not be based on 
a negative conception of peace. In the one European region in which neither peace nor 
stability is yet guaranteed, the Western powers should neither disavow their strategic 
interests nor shirk their responsibilities lest they risk undermining their previous 
commitments and prospects for democratic peace. Coping with the consequences of 
ethnic cleansing will be a continuing challenge for many years to come. The 
international presence and support -  in the next few years -  remains a crucial factor for 
peace and stability to take firm hold in the Balkan region.
VII.4 Implications for conflict resolution
Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s has brought to the fore not only 
the question of the external intervention but also the question of what sort of states 
ought to exist and how should they be constructed. Some analysts subscribe to the view 
that homogenous states are more desirable, in comparison to other forms of political 
organisation, because they provide more stability. Recently, David Goodhart, for 
instance, has argued that the nation-state remains irreplaceable as the site for democratic 
participation. He maintains that solidarity and diversity are conflicting values, on which 
basis he questions the compatibility between an ethnically diverse society and a welfare 
state."^  ^Dahrendorf and Miller, also, defend the nation-state model, and the congruence 
of the state and nation embodied in it, on the ground that it provides social solidarity
See Ivo H. Daalder, ‘The United States Shouldn’t Pull Out o f  the Balkans’, International Herald 
Tribune, October 4, 2000, p. 8.
David Goodhart, ‘Discomfort o f Strangers’, Prospect, February 2004, Published also in Guardian, 24 
February 2004.
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and collective benefits needed to maintain redistributive practices -  which, of course, 
favour nations/^
In spite of prima facie validity of the proposition that homogeneity implies stability, 
such an assumption is not, however, supported by the evidence. As the cases of 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia demonstrate 
ethnic homogeneity is no guarantee of internal harmony.' '^  ^ Moreover, arguing -  as 
Goodhart does -  that negotiating the tension between solidarity and diversity runs 
through an acute dilemma underpinned by a reluctance to sharing, appears to be a 
justification for existing power relations between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have-nots’ at the 
national level. Dahrendorf and Miller, on the other hand, overlook the fact that even in 
Western Europe, the congruence of the state and the nation is not necessarily the norm. 
Ethno-national minorities exist in every state and this will be the case also in the future. 
The proponents of the nation-state neglect the fact that cohesion of the nation-state 
purchased at the price of alienating ethno-national minorities can be counterproductive 
sowing the seeds of long-term conflict. Moreover, the feasibility of such a cohesion can 
be challenged on the grounds of ethical selectivism and the injustice provided to the 
excluded minorities.
The defence of the homogenous nation-state as a supreme form of political organisation 
has important political implications not least because of the impact it has on the nature 
of the relationship between the state and people -  who inhabit it -  other than the nation. 
Such a defence seems to suggest that it is the people who should fit the state rather than
David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Preserving 
Prosperity’, New Statesman & Society, 15/29, December 1995, pp. 3 8 ,40 ,41 .
^  See Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, ‘Ethnic Wars and International Intervention’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies, Vol. 27, N o .l, 1998, p. 130.
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the state fit the people. Furthermore, this assumption of the superiority of the 
homogenous nation-state has prompted some analysts to consider sympathetically the 
exchange of populations and the division of contested territories as a way of solving 
intractable conflicts, despite the tragic human consequences of such practices in 
history."^  ^ Citing a few scattered episodes from the past and based on a superficial 
reading of their evidence the advocates of this position come up with some disturbing 
policy prescriptions which effectively amount to recommendations for the international 
community’s supervision of ethnic cleansing and proscription of its reversal.
Referring to the stability of Poland and Czechoslovakia following ethnic cleansing of
/
their German minorities after World War II, Benjamin Schwartz concludes that ‘the 
most stable and lasting solutions to ethnic and nationalist conflicts has been ethnic 
cleansing and partition’. H e  does not contemplate, however, why and how stability of 
these two states can be explained by a single factor such as ethnic cleansing. Can it be 
instead that their stability is an attribute of other factors including alliance politics and 
protection offered by a superpower (USSR) rather than the expulsion of deprived 
minorities? More disturbing, nevertheless, the implication of Schwartz’s logic for 
external intervention is that the United States has only two options: Washington can
Chaim D. Kaufmann, ‘When All Else Fails -  Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the 
Twentieth Century’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1998, pp. 120-156. Chaim Kaufmann, 
‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996, 
pp. 136-175. John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, ‘The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia’, The 
New Republic, 14 June 1993, pp. 22-28. Daniel L. Byman, ‘Divided They Stand: Lessons About Partition 
from Iraq and Lebanon’, Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-29. Dobrica Cosic -  an influential 
Serbian nationalist writer and President o f the former Yugoslavia between 1992-1993 -  is known to have 
been an advocate o f the partition o f Kosovo. In July 1996, the President o f the Serbian Academy o f Arts 
and Sciences publicised the idea o f the partitioning of the province. The current Serb President Vojislav 
KoStunica is also an advocate o f this view. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Kosovo: 
From Crisis to a Permanent Solution’, 1 November 1997. http://www.ceip.org/programs/law/kosovo.htm. 
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Benjamin Schwartz, ‘The Diversity Myth: America’s Leading Export’, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 275, No. 
5, 1995, p. 66.
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either ‘await the time when mutual exhaustion or the triumph of one group over another 
will create an opening for intervention in a purely peacekeeping capacity’ or, 
alternatively, ‘the United States can effectively intervene, not by building civil societies 
or pacifying such conflicts but by helping one side impose its will on the other
Robert Hayden’s prescription for intervention differs slightly but the outcome would be 
the same. Considering the partition of Bosnia as inevitable, Hayden blames ethnic 
cleansing on the international community who refused to accept the agreed partition of 
the country by the Serbs and Croats and refused to impose such a division on the 
Bosnian Muslims, who, in his view, may have then acceded to an exchange of 
populations."^* Clearly, Hayden is neither troubled by the immorality of his case, nor by 
taking sides with the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, it does not seem to 
have occurred to him that allowing Serbs and Croats to keep territories gained by means 
of aggression would have permitted morally outrages conduct appear triumphant.
The central problem with the above prescription is that not only partition of territory 
and forceful population transfers violate human rights and fundamental freedoms but 
the underlying premise of their workability is not necessarily valid. Indeed, to argue that 
population exchanges and division of territory bring about peace and stability is to 
misconstrue the course of events. Surveying a variety of cases, Radha Kumar concluded 
that the history of partition is a troubled one. Kumar argued that the partition of Cyprus, 
India, Palestine, and Ireland rather than separating irreconcilable ethnic groups.
Ibid., p. 67.
Robert M. Hayden, ‘The Partition o f Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990-1993’, Radio Free E urope/ Radio 
Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 22, 28 May 1993. See, also, Robert M. Hayden, 
Blueprints fo r  a House Divided -  The Constitutional Logic o f  the Yugoslav Conflicts, Ann Arbor: The 
University o f Michigan Press, 1999, pp. 158-9,163.
276
fomented further violence and forced mass migration,"^  ^Another major study on causes
-q—
and consequences of partition in the twentieth century found that partition is a failed 
policy. Far from being conducive to peace and security, the forced division of nations 
has repeatedly led to ‘the displacement of indigenous populations, the 
disenfranchisement of ethnic and secular minorities, the fhistration of empowered 
majorities, internecine social conflict, and interstate war’.^ ® This conclusion is supported 
by Nicholas Sambanis’ statistical analysis of 125 civil wars between 1944 and 2000 
which found that ethnic partition neither helps reduce the risk of war recurrence nor 
resolves the problem of ethnic antagonism.^ ^
The focus of conflict resolution in our era should not rest on the misplaced assumption
of the superiority of the homogenous nation-state but rather recognise the need for
human diversity and cultural pluralism. The findings of Lord Acton in the early
twentieth century provide a fundamental prerequisite for conditions of long-lasting
peace and stability and it is worth quoting here:
If we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be 
the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the 
most perfect which ... include various distinct nationalities without oppressing 
them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those 
in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A State which is incompetent 
to satisfy different races condemns itself; a State which labours to neutralise, to 
absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a State which does not 
include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government’.^ ^
The inadequacy of the nation-state idea in a world characterised by ethnic heterogeneity 
has been obvious to many other thinkers including C. A. Macartney, E. H. Carr, R. M.
Radha Kumar, ‘The Troubled History o f Partition’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, 1997.
Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics o f  Partition, New York: Hill and Wang, 1990, p. 253. 
Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique o f the Theoretical 
Literature’, World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4,2000, pp. 464-482.
John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton (Lord Acton), The History o f  Freedom and Other Essays, edited 
by John Neville Figgis, London: Macmillan, 1919, p. 297.
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Maclver, Inis Claude and Andrew Linklater.^  ^ Surely, they are right to think that in the
/
context of highly diverse, multi-ethnic societies, the nation-state model is not a feasible 
idea on the ground that by alienating minorities it cannot provide for sustainable peace, 
and equal rights and freedoms. Population transfers as a technique of conflict resolution 
represent a negative approach to the reality of a world characterised by ethno-national 
diversity and can amount to ethnic cleansing given the reluctance of people to abandon 
their homes. Conflict resolution must not endorse exclusion but rather problematise it.
The starting point for resolving conflicts should be the acceptance of ethno-national 
diversity as a fact of life, as a value on its own right, as an enrichment of each and every 
society. The challenge is to amend the traditional conception of the nation as the state- 
forming core of a polity and reconceptualise it on pluralist terms so that it can 
encompass ethnic diversity without obliterating it. World peace and stability, to a large 
extent, may depend on this. -
r  r '
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